










The handle http://hdl.handle.net/1887/54852 holds various files of this Leiden University 
dissertation. 
 
Author: Tonutti, A. 
Title: The role of modern international commissions of inquiry: a first step to ensure 
accountability for international law violations? 










The Role of Modern International
Commissions of Inquiry




de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,
op gezag van Rector Magnificus prof. mr. C.J.J.M. Stolker,
volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties








Promotoren: prof. dr. W.A. Schabas
dr. E.G. Sommario (Sant’Anna, Pisa, Italy)
Promotiecommissie: prof. dr. C. Stahn
prof. dr. J.Gilbert (University of East London, UK)
prof. dr. R. Murphy (National University of Ireland,
Galway)
prof. dr. M.L.P. Loenen
dr. S. Vasiliev
Lay-out: Anne-Marie Krens – Tekstbeeld – Oegstgeest
© 2017 A. Tonutti
The author certifies that the thesis he has presented for examination for the Ph.D. degree in ‘Politics,
Human Rights and Sustainability’ of the Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna is solely his own work other than
where he has clearly indicated that it is the work of others.
Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be
reproduced without my prior written consent.
The author warrants that this authorisation does not, to the best of his belief, infringe the rights of any
third party.
Behoudens de in of krachtens de Auteurswet van 1912 gestelde uitzonderingen mag niets uit deze uitgave
worden verveelvoudigd, opgeslagen in een geautomatiseerd gegevensbestand, of openbaar gemaakt, in
enige vorm of op enige wijze, hetzij elektronisch, mechanisch, door fotokopieën, opnamen of enige andere
manier, zonder voorafgaande schriftelijke toestemming van de uitgever.
Voorzover het maken van reprografische verveelvoudigingen uit deze uitgave is toegestaan op grond
van artikel 16h Auteurswet 1912 dient men de daarvoor wettelijk verschuldigde vergoedingen te voldoen
aan de Stichting Reprorecht (Postbus 3051, 2130 KB Hoofddorp, www.reprorecht.nl). Voor het overnemen
van (een) gedeelte(n) uit deze uitgave in bloemlezingen, readers en andere compilatiewerken (art. 16
Auteurswet 1912) kan men zich wenden tot de Stichting PRO (Stichting Publicatie- en Reproductierechten
Organisatie, Postbus 3060, 2130 KB Hoofddorp, www.cedar.nl/pro).
No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm or any other means
without written permission from the publisher.
511894-L-sub01-bw-Tonutti
Processed on: 21-7-2017
‘If the minds of men can be turned even for a short time away
from passion, race antagonism and from national aggrandizement
to a contemplation of individual and national losses due to war
and to the shocking horrors that modern warfare entails, a step
and by no means a short one, will have been taken toward the
substitution of justice for force in the settlement of international
differences’.
Nicholas Murray Butler,
Acting Director of the International Commission to Inquire







Writing a PhD Thesis is a lengthy, passionate and at the same time difficult
task. It represents a sort of a journey which goes through different stages, a
unique combination of emotional moments in which you feel pervaded by
enthusiasm and passion and situations where frustration and despair seem
to prevail. It is an exercise that requires dedication, passion and sacrifice. I
have engaged in this journey five years ago and decided to write my disserta-
tion while at the same time working in the field as a human rights defender.
Hence, I cannot capture in few lines all those faces, situations, emotions that
have accompanied me in such a path. However, to a few of them I should
devote specific attention.
First of all I would like to thank my family: my mother, my father and
my brother as well as the enlarged Barazzetto and Tonutti clans. They are those
that have empowered me with all the material and intellectual tools to embark
in such a journey. In particular, my parents have not only supported and
sponsored me in all the different steps of my education, but, more importantly,
they have instilled in me the belief that through education come emancipation,
critical thinking and awareness. These tools are essential not only to shed light
on the truth in the blurred fog that pervades everyday life but also to use such
truth to make the right choices. If I am now in the condition to test myself
everyday in embarking in such an exercise I have only to thank my parents
and in particular my dad, who is now engaged in fighting its most difficult
battle.
There is another person who I met right at the moment when I started this
PhD journey. Her name is Letizia. While our relationship has lasted the
duration of such journey, I hope that the unique mixture of feelings, empathy,
mutual respect and admiration that bounds us will continue after the end of
this experience.
I then cannot but thank the two institutions, which has sponsored and
‘housed’ this PhD. Scuola Superiore Sant’ Anna in Pisa and Leiden University.
They have not only provided me with outstanding academic and professional
inputs and tools but also, and most importantly, have represented the fertile
ground for me to meet and exchange personal life experiences with a unique
group of people. In addition, I would like to sincerely pay tribute to my two
supervisors for their dedication in accompanying me in the course of this
journey. Prof. William A. Schabas for its insightful and always revealing
comments and suggestions. Dr. Emanuele Sommario for his steadfast support
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in supervising my work and assisting me with enthusiasm and dedication
in pursuing various projects and extracurricular activities. His support,
perseverance and kindness in constantly backing and motivating me have
represented unique and precious gifts.
Finally, but not least importantly, I would like to pay tribute to the place
where most of my research has taken place: Palestine. It is impossible to
capture together all those people, emotions, moments that have characterized
my four years there. I can just say that in Palestine I found the despair that
made me realising how my work was needed. At the same time, I found there
a unique pulse of humanity and faith that made me realising how my work
was worth it. For this reason I would like to thank and dedicate my thesis
to all those Palestinians, Israelis and internationals that everyday, despite all
the enormous obstacles, pursue in their ordinary choices of life the course of
justice, human rights, humanity and mutual respect to confront a context
pervaded by oppression, violence, racism, segregation and occupation. They
have been one of the greatest lessons for this journey as well as a source of
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1 CONTEXT AND AIM OF THE RESEARCH
1.1 Research Context
In modern times we have witnessed an exponential proliferation of inter-
national commissions of inquiry tasked with investigating and reporting about
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. However, such
trend has mainly developed through the practice of ad-hoc and (often) dis-
connected responses to emergencies and crises situations. In other terms this
phenomenon has taken place without leaning on a solid and pre-determined
institutional framework and in the absence of guidelines that could lead to
a uniform and harmonised practice. As it has been emphasized by certain
authors
‘[t]his recent proliferation, coupled with a certain fragmentation in the procedures
concerning both the establishment and implementation of [commissions], has
outpaced endeavours of [commissions] policymakers to reflect on past practice.
As a consequence, [commissions] policymakers and actors have struggled – and
continue to struggle – with a paucity of sufficient resources and guidance’.1
A growing number of academics and practitioners have thus highlighted the
compelling need to shed more clarity on the role and the direction taken by
commissions of inquiry and identify common grounds on which commissions
can be established and work coherently.
International inquires have been used and deployed in conflict and other
emergency settings since the beginning of the 20th Century. In the last one
hundred years they have undergone a significant process of evolution and
refinement of their role and functions. While in recent years experts and
practitioners have shown an increasing interest in assessing such process, a
comprehensive overview of this phenomenon would help shedding more light
over a number of relevant issues. In particular, it may help not only in under-
standing the role recently acquired by commissions of inquiry but also con-
tribute to a number of debates on which the opinions of experts still diverge.
1 Robert Grace and Claude Bruderlein, ‘On Monitoring, Reporting and Fact-finding Mechan-




In particular, what are the underlying causes of this recent surge in the dis-
patching of commissions of inquiry by the international community? Should
commissions of inquiry be viewed as merely fact-finders or as law-applicable
(and even adjudication) bodies? Should their tasks be confined to finding the
facts or may they perform more dynamic and political roles such as raising
alert and provoking reactions? What should be their role and position vis-à-vis
those states involved in a dispute and within the broader international com-
munity’s response? What is the value of the findings of commissions of
inquiry? What has been (and arguably should be) the relationship between
commissions of inquiry and judicial bodies, particularly international criminal
tribunals? Finally, what has been the impact of the work of these commissions
so far and should certain trends be rectified?
The present research represents an attempt to respond to the above-
mentioned questions as well as an opportunity to address the phenomenon
of commissions of inquiry comprehensively, linking lessons learnt from the
past to the possibility of inspiring future models of response.
1.2 Research Aim
The aim of the research is firstly to provide an assessment of the evolution
undertaken by commissions of inquiry throughout history in order to appre-
ciate and understand their current proliferation and their present function.
Also, by developing a thematic comparative study among the most significant
experiences of modern commissions of inquiry, this research aims to identify
the main aspects and challenges facing their work and their role in the current
international community’s response to atrocities. In this regard, emphasis will
be given to the debates around the value to attach to the legal findings of the
commissions and their contribution to the development, consolidation and
enforcement of international law as well as their role in the process aimed
at ensuring accountability. Based on this analysis, further objectives of this
study are to measure commissions of inquiry’s impact, draw lessons learnt
from the practice and identify key issues, challenges and gaps that can help
rectifying trends in future responses.
In conclusion this dissertation will first provide a comprehensive study of the
international commissions of inquiry’s phenomenon. Secondly, it will contribute
to the need (emphasized by both practitioners and doctrine) for increased
guidance and understanding of how inquiry mechanisms function and how




2 RESEARCH QUESTION, RESEARCH OVERVIEW AND RESEARCH METHOD-
OLOGY
2.1 Research Question
Based on an assessment of the evolution undertaken by commissions of inquiry
since the beginning of the 20th Century and on a comparative and thematic
study of the most relevant inquiries’ experiences, the present research aims
to respond to the following question: which is the role currently acquired by
modern commissions of inquiry, particularly looking at the international
community’s response to gross human rights violations?
2.2 Research Sub-Questions
Once having understood and highlighted the main features of modern human
rights inquiries, the present research further aims to identify and discuss the
following sub-questions:
· Born as mere fact-finding tool, how commissions of inquiry have progress-
ively engaged with the law-applying function? In particular, what has been
the use by international commissions of inquiry of international law? What
is the value of their legal findings and their contribution in the process
of development, consolidation and enforcement of international law,
including through ensuring criminal accountability?
· Looking at their impact so far, what are the main challenges (particularly
in terms of lack of harmonization and standardization, misinterpretation
of their powers and risk of political interferences) facing the consolidation
of the role of modern commissions of inquiry in international law? Is it
possible to identify common gaps and lessons learnt that may help improv-
ing future performances?
2.3 Research Overview
The present dissertation is divided into three main chapters.
The first Chapter will provide an overview of the history of commissions of
inquiry starting from their inclusion in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (the ‘Hague Conventions’).
Such an overview will look at two angles to assess the evolution undertaken
by international inquiries in the course of the 20th Century, namely the develop-




From the first standpoint, this research will briefly touch upon the ex-
periences of the so-called ‘Hague commissions’ and those inquiries set up
within the ‘League of Nations’ framework. It will then assess the first landmark
experiences of inquiries tasked to investigate the atrocities perpetrated during
armed conflicts in the first part of the 20th Century, namely the 1913 Balkan
Wars Commission, the 1919 Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors
of the War and the 1943 United Nations War Crimes Commission. Attention
will then shift to those commissions created after the establishment of the
United Nations (UN) in the period between 1945 and 1990. This historic over-
view will conclude with an analysis of the phenomenon of proliferation of
human rights inquiries in the period between 1990 and 2016, by highlighting
the circumstances, causes and main actors involved.
In relation to the second angle, the dissertation will engage in a brief
assessment of the major instruments of codification of inquiry as a tool under
international law. Starting from the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, such
assessment will include references to fact-finding in the UN Charter and Re-
sponsibility to Protect (R2P) frameworks, the 1991 UN General Assembly De-
claration on Fact-Finding in the Field of Maintenance of International Peace
and Security as well as those soft-law attempts to regulate, codify and harmon-
ize the practice of human rights investigations through the development of
rules of procedure and guidelines. Finally the mechanism of the Humanitarian
Fact-Finding Commission enshrined in Article 90 of Additional Protocol I to
the Four Geneva Conventions will be briefly analysed.
In light of the overview given, the first Chapter will conclude by necessarily
narrowing down the scope and subject matter of the research. In particular,
this dissertation will mainly focus on those commissions of inquiry that
respond to the following criteria:
· They are mandated to investigate international humanitarian law (IHL) and/
or international human rights law (IHRL) violations, with the possibility
of highlighting the perpetration of international crimes;
· They are composed by external experts that exercise their functions inde-
pendently from the mandating organs and are assigned an ad hoc task;
· They are international in nature. Namely, they have been established by
international organizations, mainly by bodies acting within the UN or
regional organisations framework;
· They have mainly been established in the period ranging between 1990
and 2016.
The second Chapter represents the core of the dissertation. It will engage in
an in-depth comparative thematic study of those commissions of inquiry that
respond to the parameters identified in Chapter 1. The thematic areas that





· Standard of proof implemented;
· Impact of cooperation/non cooperation by the parties;
· Use and combination of sources and evidence;
· Use and contribution to the development of international law;
· The contribution in ensuring accountability and the use of international
criminal law.
Finally, Chapter 3 will devote attention to sum up a number of key points
touched in the course of the previous chapters. It will firstly provide an assess-
ment of the impact of commissions of inquiry analysed in Chapter 2 within
the broader context of the international community’s response to human rights
emergencies. It will then attempt to identify the main features of the role
played by modern commissions of inquiry. In its third and final section, this
Chapter will assess a number of key challenges and gaps faced by the current
practice and attempt to provide suggestions for rectifying certain trends. Thus,
through an assessment of the more recent practice of commissions of inquiry
and their impact, this study may help developing some significant lessons
learnt that can prove useful in inspiring future models of commissions of
inquiry, in this way providing increased guidance and understanding of how
inquiry mechanisms function and how they can be effectively used and
deployed.
2.4 Research Methodology
The present research has being based primarily on the review of the documents
that constitute the work, practice and follow-up to commissions of inquiry
and similar human rights investigations. It has also benefited from the consulta-
tion of articles, books, conferences and policy papers written by experts and
practitioners on the matter.
The author has also conducted a round of informal exchanges of views
and consultations with former commissioners, practitioners and experts in
the field. While the views emerging from these rounds of talks may have
indirectly affected the arguments and points presented in this work, the present
research has not used formal interviews, the collection of data for statistic
purposes or empirical evidence as tools.
Furthermore, the research has benefited from the fieldwork carried out
by the author in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), which
represents one of the most relevant contexts to appreciate the work and func-
tioning of modern international commissions of inquiry. This author has spent
the last four years researching and working as legal advisor for local and
international OPT-based non-governmental organisations. He has closely




UN Fact-Finding Mission on Israeli settlements and the 2014 UN Commission
of Inquiry on the Gaza Conflict. The extensive amount of field-work and
expertise developed on the topic have been converged into two publications,
which served as interim steps in the development of the research model
applied in the present work:
1 ‘From Fact-Finding to Ending Impunity: The Report of the UN Commission
of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza Conflict and the Experience of Commissions
of Inquiry/Fact-Finding Missions in the OPT’, Legal Brief – Diakonia IHLRC
(November 2015);
2 ‘International Commissions of Inquiry and Palestine: Overview and Impact’,
Study Analysis – Al-Haq Center For Applied International Law (2016).
Although the focus of the present research is not limited to the context of
Israel/OPT, the fact that this area has represented the object of a significant
number of international investigations may well explain why the extensive
research carried out in this context has provided an invaluable contribution
in influencing and shaping the content of several sections of this thesis.
Finally, with regard to the analysis contained in Chapter 2, it should be
stressed that this research has followed a comparative approach.
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It is not easy to define and explain what international commissions of inquiry
and fact-finding missions are in the framework of international law.
International inquiries were firstly conceptualised as a mean to respond
to the need for independent fact checking over a dispute or incident whose
consequences could endanger peaceful relationships among states. At supra-
national level, it has always been an extremely challenging task to impartially
ascertain facts and attribute specific conducts to identifiable actors, particularly
in situations of armed conflict where circumstances appear extremely volatile
and opposed and polarised narratives often intervene. However, states have
also considered that an independent examination of facts and conducts could
empower them with the necessary tools to respond adequately to incidents,
disputes or any other crises situation arising among them.
But how can we define more precisely what an inquiry is? Authoritative
scholars have considered ‘inquiry’ as
‘a method to ascertain facts, whereby an impartial investigative body elucidates
the facts relating to a dispute between states in order to produce a finding on the
disputed facts for the purpose of a successful peaceful settlement of the dispute’.2
Furthermore, looking at first codification attempts, Article 9 of the 1899 and
1907 Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes
determined that inquiries have the purpose ‘to facilitate a solution of these
disputes by elucidating the facts by means of an impartial and conscientious
investigation’. With specific regard to the recent proliferation of inquiries
mandated to investigate situations of armed conflict and grave human rights
violations, an interesting definition has been provided in 2015 by the Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which define them
as




‘temporary bodies of a non-judicial nature, […] tasked with investigating allegations
of violations of international human rights, international humanitarian law or
international criminal law and making recommendations for corrective action based
on their factual and legal findings’.3
It should be noted that this research will use the terms ‘commission of inquiry’
and ‘fact-finding missions’ interchangeably. In fact, despite the difference in
terminology, ‘fact-finding mission’ and ‘commission of inquiry’ can be inter-
preted in a similar manner.
Similarly to inquiry certain authors have in fact defined ‘fact-finding’ as
a ‘method of ascertaining facts’ through the evaluation and compilation of
various information sources.4
Furthermore, similarly to Article 9 of the Hague Conventions, the UN
General Assembly 1991 Declaration on Fact-finding in the Field of the Mainten-
ance of International Peace and Security defines ‘fact-finding’ as ‘any activity
designed to obtain detailed knowledge of the relevant facts of any dispute or situation’
(emphasis added).5 Hence, it emerges that there are no substantial differences
between ‘inquiry’ and ‘fact-finding’ as international legal means, both in terms
of the content (ascertaining facts) and scope (contributing to dispute settlement
and suggesting further courses of action by the international community) of
such activities. This may help explaining why many legal experts and aca-
demics have started referring to the terms ‘fact-finding missions’ and ‘commis-
sions of inquiry’ as synonyms.6
There are a number of angles from which to analyse how the role of
independent inquiry has evolved in history.
Firstly, one should look at the practice. In this regard, a first remarkable
experience is represented by the 1913 International Commission to inquire
into the Causes and Conducts of the Balkan Wars (Balkan Wars Commission).
The Commission was established in 1913 by the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace7 in order to impartially investigate the truth over a number
of facts and allegations related to the two Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 and
their impact on the civilian populations. With the years the number of inter-
3 OHCHR, ‘Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions on International Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law: Guidance and Practice’ (New York & Geneva, United
Nations 2015) 7.
4 Karl J Partsch, ‘Fact-Finding and Inquiry’ in Rudolf Bernhardt (ed), Encyclopaedia of Public
International Law (North-Holland, Amsterdam-London 1992) 343; Teo Boutruche, ‘Credible
Fact-Finding and Allegations of International Humanitarian Law Violations: Challenges
in Theory and Practice’ (2011) 16 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 2.
5 ‘Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations in the Field of the Maintenance of
International Peace and Security’, A/RES/46/59 (1991) para. 2.
6 Boutruche (n 4) 2.
7 The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a foreign policy independent think
thank that commit itself, through a number of activities including conferences, researches
and round-tables, to advance and strengthen international cooperation among nations.
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national inquiries has proliferated and so did the number of international and
regional bodies that were involved in their establishment.
Secondly, beside the developments related to the practice, it is important
to keep in mind how since the beginning of the 20th Century ‘fact-finding’ and
‘inquiries’ started to be identified and codified as mechanisms in the context
of international treaties and conventions. In this regard, one of the first codi-
fications of ‘fact-finding’ was included in the mentioned 1899 and 1907 Hague
Conventions which provided for the establishment of a specific international
independent inquiry mechanism and disciplined its functioning.
With the creation of the United Nations in 1945, independent international
fact-finding preserved and even increased its relevance not only as tool in
interstate relations but most and foremost as part of an international response
to investigate and de-escalate situations of tension. In this context, Article 33
of the UN Charter expressly lists inquiry among different peaceful means of
dispute settlements, while Article 34 grants explicit investigative powers to
the UN Security Council.8 With specific regard to situations of armed conflicts,
Article 90 of Additional Protocol I to the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949
has provided for the establishment of a permanent International Humanitarian
Fact-Finding Commission (IHFFC).9 As we will see in the following subchapters,
the UN and regional organizations have often resorted to commissions of
inquiry and fact-finding missions in the implementation of their tasks. They
have done so through the establishment of ad hoc and temporary missions
rather than by setting up permanent mechanisms.
However, despite the absence of a permanent institutional framework, a
number of attempts were made in order to codify and clarify the modus
operandi of inquiry and fact-finding mechanisms. For example, in 1970, the
Secretary-General adopted the ‘Model Rules of procedure for UN bodies dealing
with violations of human rights’.10 Following this line, in 1991 the UN General
Assembly adopted its Declaration on Fact-finding in the Field of the Mainten-
ance of International Peace and Security.11
International fact-finding has entered a new dimension with the end of
the Cold War and the turning of the 21st Century. This period has been marked
by a substantial re-shuffling of the international world order, a phenomenon
that has inevitably affected the way in which the international community
has reached to atrocities and grave human rights emergencies. In this context,
an important stage in the evolution of the instrument of commissions of inquiry
in international law has been the reference, included in the 2005 R2P frame-
8 Charter of the United Nations (1945) 1 UNTS XVI, Articles 33(1) and 34.
9 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (1977) 1125 UNTS 3,
Article 90.
10 ‘Model Rules of procedure for UN bodies dealing with violations of human rights – Noted
by the Secretary-General’, E/CN.4/1021/Rev. 1 (1970).




work, to international independent fact-finding as one of the tools at disposal
of the international community to react to situations where a State has engaged
in serious IHRL and IHL violations.12 In this regard, the years 2000s have been
characterized by an exponential proliferation of commissions of inquiry and
fact-finding missions mandated to investigate over human rights and inter-
national humanitarian law violations, a phenomenon that prompted the
compilation of a document published in 2015 by the OHCHR entitled ‘Commis-
sions of inquiry and fact-finding missions on international human rights and
humanitarian law: guidance and practice’.13
To conclude, there are mainly two perspectives from which to analyse the
evolution undertaken through the years by international inquiry mechanisms.
The first one is to assess at how these instruments evolved in the practice, the
second is to analyse the codification of such mechanisms in international
binding documents and soft-law instruments progressively developed to
regulate them. The following sub-chapters (1.2 and 1.3) will carefully assess
these two separate developments. Based on these assessments, the last sub-
chapter (1.4) will identify the criteria that would help defining and limiting
the scope of the comparative thematic analysis undertaken in Chapter 2.
1.2 COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE PRACTICE
1.2.1 An insight on traditional fact-finding: the Hague and the League of
Nations inquiries (1899-1946)
What can be considered as the most traditional forms of international fact-
finding were those investigations that followed the codification of the inquiry
tool in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the creation of the League
of Nations in 1920. These inquiries were conceived and framed as a diplomatic
tool of dispute settlement within the context of inter-state relations. Therefore,
the focus of these investigations was mainly to provide a fair and impartial
account of the facts and causes that led to state disputes. Although certain
authors have underlined how in the practice these commissions only partially
stick to the arbitral nature designed for them in the Hague Conventions and
showed an inclination towards law application,14 it is fair to conclude that
their legal analysis has been less stressed than their emphasis on qualifying
the correct facts. However, even within these traditional experiences of fact-
finding three different phases can be identified: these are the ‘vessel inquiries’
12 ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, Report of the Secretary General’, A/63/677
(2009) para. 52.
13 OHCHR, Guidance and Practice (n 3).
14 Larissa J van den Herik, ‘An Inquiry into Commissions of Inquiry: Navigating between
Fact-Finding and Law-Application’ (2014) 13 Chinese Journal of International Law 518.
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inquires or the so-called ‘Hague commissions’; the inquiries envisaged in the
Knox and Brian treaties; and the inquiries created within the framework of
the League of Nations.
1.2.1.1 The Hague commissions and the Knox and Brian arbitration treaties
The first group of commissions of inquiry were those established under the
terms of the Hague Conventions. These inquiries mainly dealt with issues
related to the sea and flotilla attacks. This is why they are often referred as
the ‘vessel inquiries’.15 In particular, the commissions established via the
Hague Conventions proved their relevance in a number of cases, the most
famous being the Dogger Bank incident of 1904 concerning the damage and
sinking of British fishing boats by Russian Warships in the North Sea during
the Russian-Japanese War.16 In this case, the commission was not only tasked
with establishing the facts but also with making findings concerning the
responsibility of the parties involved, thus promoting a successful settlement
of the dispute.17
As it has been pointed out by some authors, the vessel inquiries
‘breathed life into the Hague provisions and reaffirmed the distinctive potential
of inquiry as a modality of dispute settlement. However, they also revealed the
limits of inquiry as an independent mechanism and […] departed from the ideal
model and the techniques and principles of inquiry as accepted in The Hague’.18
On the basis of these experiences, the possibility to set up independent
inquiries was included in a number of bilateral arrangements among states.
These are the so-called ‘Knox’ and ‘Bryan’ arbitration treaties, which were used
for the conciliation of disputes in the period between 1913-1940 and made all
reference to the creation of an independent international inquiry.19 Certain
scholars have noted how, compared to the ‘Hague commissions’, these inquiries
were functioning as ‘an arbitration in disguise’ with their findings being more
legal than factual in nature.20
15 Van den Herik (n 14) 513.
16 Boczek (n 2) 365.
17 Ibid.
18 Van den Herik (n 14) 514.
19 Boczek (n 2) 365. For a more comprehensive appraisal of the so-called ‘Bryan Treaties’
commissions and in particular the Letelier commission of inquiry see, van den Herik (n 14)
515-516.




1.2.1.2 The League of Nations commissions of inquiry
In the first decades of the 20th Century international organizations also started
paying greater attention to inquiry as tool for dispute settlement purposes.
In particular, the League of Nations (1920-1946) referred to international
inquiries’ services at least six times in its history.21 The inquiries were mainly
established by the Council acting pursuant to Articles 11, 12, 15 and 17 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations and involved matters of different character
far wider than maritime disputes.22 The most prominent example was the
so-called ‘Lytton Commission’ charged to investigate Japan’s role in the 1931
Manchurian crisis.23
As it has been emphasized by scholars, these inquiries have departed from
the Hague model in a number of respects.24 Not only were they dealing less
with isolated incidents and more with broader situations of international
concern but they have also been paving the way for the trend of progressively
detaching international inquiries from states’ control. In this regard it should
be noted how the League of Nations inquiries were composed of commis-
sioners not appointed by the concerned states and they were instructed to
present their recommendations directly to the League of Nations organs.25
As it has been noted by van den Herik,
‘[t]hese commissions functioned in the pre-defined institutional setting of the League
of Nations, and […] endeavoured to facilitate the political settlement of a dispute
by offering an authoritative account of the facts that could serve as a basis for
further institutionalized diplomatic engagement by the League’.26
1.2.2 Commissions of inquiry investigating violations of international law
in context of armed conflicts: the pioneering experiences (1913-1943)
We have already mentioned how a number of commissions of inquiry were
set up, following the first codification of this mechanism in the 1907 Hague
Convention and in the League of Nations framework, mainly to settle disputes
arising between States. These commissions were primarily tasked with elucidat-
21 Boczek (n 2) 365.
22 For a more comprehensive analysis of commissions of inquiry established by the League
of Nations particularly in relation to the role of the Special Mandates Commission see, Susan
Pedersen, The Guardians: The league of Nations and the Crises of Empire (Oxford University
Press 2015). See also, van den Herik (n 14) 517-518.
23 On the work and legacy of the Lytton Commission see, Tyler Dennett, ‘The Lytton Report’
(1932) 26 The American Political Science Review 1148; Arthur K Kuhn, ‘The Lytton Report
on the Manchurian Crisis’ (1933) 27 American Journal of International Law 96.
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ing facts and responsibilities over issues where the respect of human rights
and the laws of war were not directly at stake. This should not come as a
surprise given that at the time the whole human rights law architecture, which
was gradually developed following the establishment of the United Nations
in 1945, was not yet in place and the discipline applicable to armed conflicts
was limited to the so called ‘law of the Hague’.27 However, when looking
at the first half of the 20th Century, it is possible to identify an isolated number
of ‘pioneering’ commissions charged to investigate the treatment of civilians
and violations of international law in situations of armed conflict. Although
some of them cannot be considered as fact-finding bodies stricto sensu, the work
of these commissions should be carefully examined given their outstanding
contribution to the development of international law and in laying the founda-
tions for further IHL/IHRL fact-finding and accountability efforts. These
examples include the 1913 International Commission to Inquire into the Causes
and Conducts of the Balkan Wars, the 1919 Commission on the Responsibility
of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties (Commission of
Responsibilities) and the 1943 United Nations War Crimes Commission
(UNWCC).
1.2.2.1 The Balkan Wars Commission
The Balkan Wars Commission was established in July 1913 by the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.28 It was composed by eight prominent
individuals (among politicians, parliamentarians, journalists and university
professors) from Austria, Germany, France, the United States, Great Britain
and Russia.29 The members of the Commission were divided between those
sedentary and those dispatched as field presence to the Balkans. The field team
spent five weeks in the affected areas visiting sites including Belgrade, Thessa-
loniki, Athens, Sofia and Istanbul. The Commission immediately faced a
number of challenges and obstacles due to states’ lack of cooperation. In
particular, the Government of Serbia decided not to cooperate and refused
to meet with the commissioners, while the Government of Greece posed certain
obstacles in terms of collaboration and access to the territory.30
The report, published in the summer of 1914, was divided in seven chap-
ters: ‘The origin of the two Balkan wars’; ‘The war and non-combatant popula-
27 For a better understanding of the distinction between ‘law of the Hague’ and ‘law of
Geneva’ in international humanitarian law see, François Bugnion, ‘Droit de Genève et droit
de La Haye’ (2001) 844 International Review of the Red Cross 901.
28 For an appraisal of the Balkan Wars Commission see, Frances Trix, ‘Peace-mongering in
1913: the Carnegie commission of inquiry and its report on the Balkan wars’ (2014) 5(2)
First World War Studies 147.
29 Trix (n 28) 150-151.
30 For more details on the challenges faced by the commissioners in terms of cooperation




tion’; ‘Bulgarians, Turks and Servians’; ‘The war and nationalities’; ‘The war
and international law’; ‘Economic consequences of the war’; and ‘Moral conse-
quences of the war’.31
In general, the Commission’s work displayed in detail a reality where all
parties to the conflicts (although Bulgarians were considered responsible to
a lesser extent)32 were responsible for atrocities and grave violations of the
provisions of the laws of war, as enshrined in the two Hague Conferences
of 1899 and 1907. With regard to the assessment of the causes that led to the
eruption of the wars, the report supported the view that the Bulgarians were
responsible for igniting the hostilities. However, certain experts have noted
how that specific section of the report appears somehow confusing and failed
to take into account a number of significant perspectives within the historical,
geo-political and socio-economic factors fuelling the conflict.33
The Commission’s experience as converged in its final report contained
a number of relevant aspects that set the basis for inspiring future fact-finding
models.
A first remarkable feature is the use and combination that the Commission
makes of different sources. Although this methodology has not been scru-
pulously applied in all sections of the report,34 the Commission made sure,
in a number of incidents, to identify the truthfulness of each source and
corroborate the accounts provided by one source with at least two additional
sources. As an example, to support the credibility of the statements released
by a number of Macedonian refugees in relation to the Greek army’s abuses
in certain villages, the commission emphasized how ‘in two of the more
striking stories, we obtained ample corroboration in circumstances which
admitted of no collusion’.35 In particular, an account provided in Thessaloniki
by a refugee from Akangeli concerning incidents of massacres and outrages
in his village was confirmed ‘in almost every detail’ by the story reported by
another fugitive from the same village who had fled to Sofia as well as by
the accounts provided by a group of refugees that also had fled from
Akangeli.36 The Commission adopted a similar approach in testing the credib-
ility of the witness Mito Kolev, whose mother was killed by Greek troops
during the assault of the Bulgarian village of Gavaliantsi. His accounts were
accidentally corroborated by two refugees coming from the same village and
31 Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conducts of the Balkan Wars
(Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1914).
32 It should be emphasized how the apparent ‘pro-Bulgarian’ character of certain sections
of the Report has been noted by certain scholars and linked with the work and personal
thoughts of one of the commissioners. Trix (n 28) 153.
33 Trix (n 28) 153-154.
34 For example Trix noted how Chapter 3 (‘Bulgarians, Turks and Servians’) was largely based
on single source accounts and data. Trix (n 28) 155.
35 Report of the Balkan Wars Commission (n 31) 100.
36 Ibid. See also, Appendix C, n 39, 41, 42.
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encountered by the Commission at Samakov.37 This led the Commission to
determine that there could be ‘no doubt about the truth of a story which
reached us in this way from wholly independent eyewitnesses’.38
Another relevant example of the use made by the Commission of specific
information relates to the assessment on the type of weapons employed by
the Greek army in its assaults against Bulgarian villages. According to the
report, the fact that guns and especially sabres were widely used in a number
of different incidents related to the storming of civilian villages validated the
argument that the widespread killings of civilians were the result of deliberate
attacks rather than a collateral damage. In this regard, the Commission noted
how ‘a trooper that wounds a boy with his sword can not plead error. He
must have been engaged in indiscriminate butchery’.39
Another important aspect of the report is the manner in which the Commis-
sion referred to particular incidents in order to unveil the existence of specific
patterns of violations.40 As an example – in displaying a number of single
accounts of violations of women’s honours, rapes and killings of unarmed
men perpetrated by the Greek army in several Bulgarian villages – the Com-
mission highlighted how ‘this great mass of evidence goes to show that there
was nothing singular in the cases which the Commission itself investigated’.41
Case studies, such as those concerning massacres in the towns of Doxato, Serres
and Demir-Hissar were also included in the report to help providing a general
overview of the conduct of Bulgarian troops during the second war.42 With
regard to the treatment of prisoners of war, the Commission also referred to
a number of specific incidents, such as the one involving the Bulgarian prisoner
Lazarov held by the Greek army, in order to describe the magnitude and large-
scale character of the violations perpetrated by all parties.43
Concerning the legal findings of the Commission, Darcy has emphasized
how the Commission
‘drew heavily on international law in its consideration of the lawfulness of the resort
to armed force in the Balkans, the treatment of prisoners of war and other practices
as occurred during the conflict’.44







44 Shane Darcy, ‘Laying the foundations: Commissions of inquiry and the development of
international law’, in Christian Henderson (ed), Commissions of Inquiry, Problems and Prospects




In particular, the report determined that all parties to the conflict violated the
provisions of the law of war on land and treatment of wounded, as enshrined
in the Hague Conventions.45 However the commissioners, in dealing with
the questions whether peace treaties were breached or overcome by the chang-
ing of circumstances, admitted how their own findings needed to be supported
by a more comprehensive and technical legal analysis. In the words of the
Commission
‘this report is not a legal study and we may leave to specialists the task of deciding
whether the clause rebus sic stantibus can be applied to the question of revision and
to the breach of the treaty’.46
In relation to the situation of armed conflict and hostilities, the Commission
referred to a number of provisions embedded in the 1899 and 1907 Hague
Conventions. Firstly, it dwelled on the issue concerning the opening of hostil-
ities and the obligation to provide preliminary notice whose violation by the
parties to the conflict appeared a matter of controversy in the report.47 Second-
ly, in relation to the law and customs of land warfare, the Commission noted
how the belligerents had failed in their obligation under Article 3 of the 1907
Hague Conventions to instruct their armies to comply with the provisions of
the Conventions. In particular, the report echoed Mr Marten’s remarks on
states’ level of compliance with the Conventions by concluding that ‘the 1907
Convention (and likewise that of 1899) remained unknown to the Balkan
armies generally [with to a certain extent the exception of Bulgaria]’.48
With regard to the rules concerning the actual conduct of hostilities, the
report highlighted how ‘faults and crimes [were] found in profusion every-
where’.49 Provisions related to the protection of civilians, the use of certain
methods of warfare and the treatment of wounded and prisoners of war were
blatantly and indiscriminately disregarded by both soldiers acting under orders
and criminal gangs of civilians.50 In this area, the Commission acknowledged
a number of limitations, in particular deriving from its private nature, its lack
of legal expertise and the absence of any concrete follow-up measure set up
by states. In this light it should be interpreted the call for the establishment
of a permanent international commission within an institutionalised framework,
with the support of states and international organizations, to go and oversee





50 Ibid 215, 216, 221, 225, 227, 229, 231, 233. See also, Chapter VII (‘The moral and social
consequences of the war’).
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the respect of provisions of the laws of war by belligerents and act in both
the preventive and reactive spheres.51
One should not disregard a number of limitations inherent to the work
of the Commission in terms of legal analysis. The first one was related to the
lack of legal expertise of some of the commissioners, as it was emphasized
also in the report. The second one concerned the paucity of international
binding instruments available at the time, particularly in the areas of inter-
national human rights law and international criminal law. When the commis-
sioners took up their work paradigms such as ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against
humanity’ had yet to take shape, so were the set of obligations deriving from
international human rights conventions. This significantly limited the legal
analysis to issues concerning conduct of hostilities and the respect for the laws
of war in situations of military occupation. However, a number of passages
in the report suggest that the commissioners factored trends that were not
regulated by the existing legal framework. In particular, the reference to
‘practices of extermination, conversion and assimilation’ contained in Chapter
IV of the report dedicated to ‘the war and nationalities’ is instructive.52 In
this regard, according to the Commission, ‘the object of these armed conflicts
[…] was the complete extermination of the alien population’.53 To corroborate
this claim, the report referred to the content of the letters sent to their beloved
by soldiers serving in many of the armies involved to show that in certain
instances orders to kill were given with the aim to extinguish and annihilate
the alien race.54 Such a language would have reasonably led the inquiry to
make findings about the perpetration of genocide or the crime against human-
ity of extermination, had those concepts existed at that time.55
Furthermore, Chapter IV displayed a certain number of patterns, including
situations where men were separated from women and killed without ex-
ception or villages burned to ashes in order to eradicate the presence of certain
ethnic groups. In the view of the Commission, extermination was both a
pattern and aim of these wars.56 However, extermination was not the only
policy in place in order to obliterate targeted ethnic groups. In examining the
policies enforced against the Pomaks and the ‘Slavic’ inhabitants of Macedonia,
the Commission noted how
51 Ibid 234. See also, Darcy (n 44) 5.
52 Report of the Balkan Wars Commission (n 31) 148.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid 149.
55 In this regard it is interesting to note how in Chapter VII of the Report (‘The moral and
social consequences of the war’) the Commission, by referring to the ‘fearful legacy’ of
crimes against justice and humanity, seems to pave the way for the conceptualization of
a new criminal offence. Trix (n 28) 157.




‘we have to deal here with a mitigated form of the same principle of the conflict
of nationalities. The means employed […] is no longer extermination or emigration;
it is an indirect method which must however lead to the same end, that of con-
version and assimilation’
an analysis that found echo, one hundred years later, in the Syria Commission’s
report on the Yazidi genocide.57 In certain cases, the report emphasized how
the policies of assimilation through terror and those of extermination were
put into action hand-in-hand, as it was the case for the Greek administration
of Macedonia.58 Such remarks would have probably stimulated a debate on
the respect for the universal right of peoples to self-determination and the
protection of minorities, had those paradigms existed at the time.
The Balkan Wars Commission thus represents a first landmark experience
in the practice of international commissions of inquiry mandated to investigate
atrocities. Although it has been criticized for its pro-Bulgarian narrative in
certain sections, it represented an unprecedented exercise of ‘truth seeking’
in times of armed conflict.59 In addition, the Commission’s report contained
a number of aspects that were about to significantly influence future fact-
finding exercises. In particular, it should be prized for its level of detail with
regard to the examination of specific incidents as indicative of broader patterns,
its comprehensive approach in tackling the complexities of a region that rapidly
deteriorated into two different rounds of hostilities and its innovative method-
ology in terms of use of information and combination of sources.
Furthermore, the Commission’s report contains a comprehensive analysis
of the trends witnessed during the wars based on the existing international
legal framework. Hence, from the point of view of the use and application
of international law, the Balkans Commission ‘marked a departure from
previous approaches’, which inevitably influenced future experiences such
as the 1919 and 1943 world wars’ commissions.60 Finally, the Commission
also provided an undoubted contribution to the progressive development of
international law. It did it by identifying and framing ‘brand new’ paradigms
capable of qualifying particular policies (such as the practices of extermination
and assimilation) or by emphasizing specific trends (such as violations against
the honour of women) that escaped the applicability of existing legal frame-
works and where later conceptualised in positive law instruments.
However, looking at the immediate aftermath, the legacy of the Balkans
Commission in terms of reactions and follow-up by relevant actors of the
international community was poor. In this regard, it has been argued that its
57 Ibid 155. See also, ‘They Came to Destroy’: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis’, A/HRC/32/
CRP.2 (15 June 2016) para.96.
58 Report of the Balkan Wars Commission (n 31) 186.
59 The Economist (London, 18 July 1914).
60 Darcy (n 44) 4.
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report came out too late and, as a consequence, there were no responses from
major states while even academic and press reviews of the report were hard
to find.61 Therefore, the recommendation to set up a permanent international
commission of inquiry remained on paper and states did not have the time
to properly ‘digest’ the report’s findings, as the whole process was rapidly
overshadowed by the outbreak of the First World War in July 1914.62
1.2.2.2 The 1919 Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and
on Enforcement of Penalties
Another remarkable example of international commission mandated to invest-
igate violations of international law in situations of armed conflicts during
the first half of the 20th Century is represented by the ‘Commission on the
Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties’.
The Commission was established at the Paris Preliminary Peace Conference
in January 1919 with the purpose of enquiring into the causes and responsibil-
ities of the First World War. In particular, the Commission was mandated to
investigate five different issues: the responsibility of the authors of the war;
the facts concerning breaches of laws and customs of war committed by the
German Empire and its allies; the degree of responsibility at individual level
for such offences; the constitution and procedure of a tribunal to try such
offences; any ancillary issue.63
There are a number of significant factors that challenge the inclusion of
the Commission of Responsibilities within the paradigm of international
independent commissions of inquiry.
Firstly, the Commission was not composed by independent experts but
by states’ officials. Representatives appointed by each of the ‘Great Powers’
and by countries ‘with special interests’ served in fact as members of the
Commission.64 In this regard, it should be noted that at the Paris Conference
the German Government had advanced the proposal for the establishment
of a neutral committee of independent experts to investigate into the causes
61 Trix (n 28) 158.
62 As Trix noted, ‘by the time the Report came out in May and June 1914, the public’s interest
had moved on’. Trix (n 28) 158.
63 Report of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement
of Penalties (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Oxford Clarendon Press 1919) 1.
64 ‘Great Powers’ defines those ‘most influential’ states that in 1907 formed the ‘Triple Entente’
(France, the United Kingdom and Russia) to counteract the Triple Alliance involving
Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Kingdom of Italy. At the start of World War I in 1914,
all three participants in the Triple Entente entered it as ‘Allies’ (Russia was later replaced
by the United States). ‘Countries with special interests’ were those less influential states





and responsibilities of the war. However, states part of the ‘Allied Powers’
and ‘Associated Powers’ refused, arguing that:
‘they [the “Allies” and “Associated Powers”] do not consider that the German
proposal requires any reply as the responsibility of Germany for the war has been
long ago incontestably proved’.65
Hence, the choice of commissioners marked a first remarkable distinction from
the experience of the Balkan Wars Commission where independent personal-
ities (and not representatives of states) were appointed by different countries.
Moreover, while in the case of the Balkan Wars Commission the members had
been appointed by countries that did not directly participate in the wars, in
Paris it was agreed that the same powers previously involved in the conflict
were the ones conducting the inquiry. This of course raised immediate concerns
in terms of the neutrality, impartiality and independence of the Commission.
In particular, commissioners were not only appointed by those countries but
also were selected among governmental and parliamentary officials. This meant
that political considerations of states overrode the need for technical expertise.
The second factor pertains to the framework within the Commission was
established. Contrary to the Balkan Wars Commission, the Commission of
Responsibilities was not set up by the decision of an independent entity. It
was created in the context of an international peace conference following the
instructions of the winning powers. In particular, among the purposes behind
the task to ascertain causes and identify responsibilities was the need to justify
and estimate the amount of the costs for reparations. From this perspective,
the Commission of Responsibilities could be considered as a sort of inter-
governmental commission rather than a technical body of independent experts.
Nonetheless, there are a number of reasons why such experience needs
to be considered within the framework of international commissions of inquiry.
The first one pertains to its mandate that – by requesting it to investigate the
circumstances leading to the war, the violations of the relevant legal frame-
works and the responsibilities arising – does not depart from the standards
set for other commissions.
The second, and most important reason is the legal analysis contained in
the Commission’s report and the role played by the Commission in the devel-
opment of international law.
After two months of intensive work, the Commission of Responsibilities
submitted its report on 29 March 1919 in connection with the peace agreements
concluded by the Allied Powers with Germany and Austria. It then passed
65 Acting US Secretary of State (Frank Lyon Polk) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace,
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to analyse the situation in the Balkans, particularly with regard to the conduct
of Bulgaria, which led to the adoption of a second report in July.66
The Commission’s March report was divided in sections reflecting the
instructions listed in the mandate. With regard to the responsibility of the
authors of the war, it concluded that there was abundant evidence that the
war had been premeditated by the Central Powers with the complicity of their
allies Bulgaria and Turkey. The report claimed that ‘Germany deliberately
committed to defeat any conciliatory efforts by the Entente’ and, through its
deliberate acts, it ‘made unavoidable the recourse to war’.67 In addition, the
Central Powers had deliberately violated the neutrality of Belgium and Luxem-
bourg in manifest breach of their international obligations under Articles 1
and 2 of the 1907 Hague Conventions.68
In relation to violations of the laws and customs of war, the Commission
argued that there was ‘abundant evidence of outrages committed by Germans
and its allies’.69 On this point, it is worth mentioning how the Commission
referred to a number of reports and memos submitted by different countries
aligned with the Allied Forces. In this regard, certain doubts can be raised
on the failure to rely upon more independent sources, which may have offered
a more nuanced and balanced overview of the incidents analysed.
The Commission then provided an innovative list of thirty-two offenses
perpetrated during the course of the conflict that it denoted as falling within
the meaning of war crimes, including murder, massacres, systematic terrorism,
starvation of civilians, deportation, collective penalties, deliberate bombardment
of undefended places, use of asphyxiating gas and destruction of protected
objects.70 As Darcy notes,
‘[t]he Commission’s view that these acts were punishable is in itself significant,
given that the existing treaties of international humanitarian law had not expressly
provided for criminal liability’.71
Furthermore, some of the acts mentioned, such as ‘taking of hostage’, were
not expressly prohibited by international treaties existing at the time.
On this basis, the Commission concluded that
66 Mark Lewis, The Birth of the New Justice: The Internationalization of Crime and Punishment,
1919-1950 (Oxford University Press 2016).








‘the war was carried on by the Central Empires together with their allies […] by
barbarous or illegitimate methods in violation of the established laws and customs
of war and elementary laws of humanity’.72
It should be emphasized how the reference to ‘elementary laws of humanity’
is unprecedented. This seemed to imply that, in the Commission’s view, the
paradigm of war crimes and violation of laws and customs of war could not
be sufficient to cover some of the horrific accounts of the war. In particular,
the report highlighted how some of the atrocities perpetrated were committed
by Turkish forces against Turkish citizens (in particular the Armenians) and
by Austrian forces against citizens of the Austro-Hungary Empire. In the
opinion of certain scholars, these acts – which could not be classified as viola-
tions of the laws and customs of war strictu sensu because they were directed
against nationals of the power responsible – ‘were probably the ones that, in
the commission’s view, had violated the “laws of humanity”’.73 This repres-
ented a first important step towards the conceptualization of the notion of
‘crimes against humanity’ as subsequently enshrined in the London Charter
and further developed by the Nuremberg Tribunal’s jurisprudence.
With regard to potential implications in terms of individual criminal
responsibility, the Commission expressed the view that
‘for the purpose of dealing with this point, it is not necessary to wait for proof
of responsibility of single individuals, the information received are enough to trigger
court’s jurisdiction over such offences’.74
In particular, the report argued that – given the type of offences committed –
no rank should have in any circumstances protected the holder of it from
responsibility, even in the case of heads of state.75 In this regard, the Commis-
sion carefully analysed and dismissed the argument for the immunity due
to the principle of inviolability of a sovereign of State. According to the report,
while this argument could apply on a domestic level, the situation appeared
different when looking at international law. In the view of the Commission,
the application of the principle of immunity in such cases
‘would involve laying down the principle that the greatest outrages against the
laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity […] could in no circumstances
be punished. Such a conclusion would shock the conscience of civilized mankind’.76
72 Report of the Commission of Responsibilities (n 63) 19.
73 Theodor Meron, ‘Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals’
(2006) 100 American Journal of International Law 555.
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The report thus contained the landmark and unprecedented determination
that all persons that (regardless of the rank) had been responsible for com-
mitting grave breaches of law and customs of war and laws of humanity were
eligible to criminal prosecution.77 Such position has, in the following decades,
become the centre of an intense debate, which has involved determinations
by several international tribunals.78
In dealing with the establishment of an appropriate tribunal, the Commis-
sion openly discussed the question regarding the illegality of aggressive war.
It distinguished in fact between two kinds of acts that could trigger criminal
prosecution: the act of provoking and initiating war and the grave breaches
of laws and customs of war and laws of humanity. With regard to the ‘pre-
meditated war of aggression’, the report acknowledged that such act was not
defined as an offence under current positive law. This conclusion was reached
notwithstanding that those attacks infringing the neutrality of Belgium and
Luxemburg were carried out in contravention of international treaties. On this
issue, the report resorted to a cryptic formula by noting how
‘the violation of international law was thus an aggravation of the attack against
the independence of states which is the fundamental principle of international
right’.79
The Commission also pointed out that, given the complexities behind the issue
of the authorship of a war, a tribunal competent for war crimes would not
have been the most suitable body to prosecute such an offence.80 Accordingly,
the Commission did not recommend the investigation and prosecution of the
77 Ibid. See also, Darcy (n 44) 6.
78 In particular, it should be firstly recalled the 2002 landmark decision by the International
Court of Justice in the contentious case between the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Belgium. More recently, the findings contained in the Commission of Responsibilities’
report have been referred by the jurisprudence of the ICC, both by the Pre-Trial Chamber
in its decision following the refusal by Malawi to arrest Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir
and in the separate opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji to the Pre-Trial Chamber March 2016
decision in the Ruto case. However, the ICC judges may have misinterpreted the Commis-
sion’s findings, particularly when it comes to assess the alleged customary nature of the
immunity waver. In particular, the Commission’s report expressed the need to include a
specific clause in the peace agreements in relation to the prosecution of the Kaiser, in order
for Germany to accept it. Hence, the need to seek Germany’s consent may imply that the
immunity for Head of States existed at the time as part and parcel of customary law. See,
Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo
v. Belgium) ICJ Rep. 2002; ICC, Prosecutor v. Bashir, Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of
the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation
Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al-Bashir (Pre-Trial Chamber I) Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09 (12 December 2011)
para. 23; ICC, Prosecutor v. Ruto and Sang, Decision on Defence Applications for Judgments
of Acquittal (Trial Chamber V(A)) Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11 (5 April 2016) paras. 246-250.





acts that ignited the First World War before a criminal tribunal. However, it
requested the Peace Conference to formally condemn these practices and the
creation of another ad-hoc inquiry ‘to deal as they deserve with the authors
of such acts’.81
In relation to the prosecution of grave breaches of the laws and customs
of war and laws of humanity, the report determined that the Allied and
Associated Powers could set up themselves ad hoc tribunals to prosecute
domestically such offences. The Commission separated the material authors
of those breaches from those individuals responsible for planning, organising
and commanding the crimes.82 For the latter, the report recommended to the
Peace Conference the establishment of a High Tribunal composed of national
judges from the different Allied and Associated countries. Interestingly enough,
the applicable law for the hypothetic tribunal was defined as ‘the principles
of the law of nations as they result from the usages established among civilised
people, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience’,
a wording that narrowly mirrored the ‘Martens Clause’ enshrined in the 1899
Hague Conventions.83
The Commission of Responsibilities’ records in terms of research and
gathering facts have been remarkable. In particular, it reviewed incidents
involving more than 20,000 persons, contemplating the prosecution of around
12,000 people for possible war crimes.84 However, a number of legal innova-
tions included in the report were strongly objected by the American and
Japanese delegations.85 In particular, the United States (US) criticized the
reference to ‘laws of humanity’ as they were not reflecting positive law existing
at the time. Hence, according to the US delegates, the prosecution of such
violations would have contravened the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.
Mindful of a potential ‘boomerang effect’, the US representatives did make
reservations also in relation to the proposal of prosecuting heads of state and
81 Ibid 22-23.
82 Ibid 23-24.
83 Ibid. The so-called ‘Martens Clause’ was based upon the declaration made by the Russian
delegate at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference Friedrich Martens. The clause, included in
the preamble of the 1899 Hague Conventions, recites as follow: ‘the High Contracting Parties
think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them,
populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of
international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from
the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience’. Convention (II) with
Respect to the Laws of War on Land, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247, 91 British Foreign and
State Treaties 988 (29 July 1899).
84 Cherif Bassiouni, ‘The United Nations Commission of Experts Established pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)’ (1994) 88 The American Journal of International Law
785.
85 The issue has been emphasized by Darcy who has noted how ‘there was considerable
divergence amongst the Commission’s members on some of the key legal questions with
which it was confronted’. Darcy (n 44) 5-7.
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officers for command responsibility. Finally, certain objections were raised
against criminalising the action of moving war and the establishment of an
international tribunal. In this regard, some authors have noted how the US
reversed many of these positions less than thirty years later by supporting
the establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals.86
The following Treaty of Versailles only partially endorsed the recommenda-
tions included in the Commission’s report. Article 227 of the Treaty provided
for the prosecution of the former German Emperor but only for ‘supreme
offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties’, thus ex-
cluding any reference to laws and customs of war and laws of humanity.87
The ‘Kaiser’ was in fact never prosecuted given that the Netherlands, where
he had fled after the end of the war, refused to extradite him.88 The recom-
mendation to create an international tribunal to investigate and prosecute
‘those most responsible’ for the offences was not endorsed, while Germany
agreed to hand over its nationals to be prosecuted by the Allied and Associated
Powers for violations of the laws and customs of war (any reference to laws
of humanity was removed) in their own military courts and tribunals.89
However, no prosecutions were conducted in any of the ‘Allied and Asso-
ciated Powers’ countries. Germany succeeded in convincing the Allies that
prosecuting German individuals abroad would have harmed the fragile stabil-
ity of the country.90 As an alternative, it was agreed to try suspects in
Germany. In this regard, a list of 896 people was provided to the German
authorities to start investigations.91 Due to Germany’s reluctance to prosecute
a large number of its own military officials, the Allies agreed to reduce the
number to 45 to be tried by the Criminal Senate of the Imperial Court of Justice
based in Leipzig. Of these suspects, only twelve individuals were actually tried
and six of them acquitted. Looking at the magnitude and large-scale dimension
of the offences reported by the Commission, this record appears as extremely
poor. Nevertheless, according to some experts, the Leipzig experience served
‘as an important historical precedent for war crimes trials’.92
On a separate track, efforts aimed at investigating and prosecuting Turkish
perpetrators suffered the same faith. Although Turkey had offered guarantees
86 Meron (n 73) 556.
87 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (Treaty of Ver-
sailles), (1919) Ts. 4, Art. 227. According to Darcy, the Treaty of Versailles included a
watered-down version of the Commission’s proposed tribunal also in light of the objections
field by the US and Japan representatives. Darcy (n 44) 7.
88 Meron (n 73) 557.
89 Treaty of Versailles (n 87) Art. 228.
90 Meron (n 73) 557.
91 Bassiouni (n 84) 786.
92 Ibid. Furthermore, according to Mullins, such experience contributed ‘to put on record before
history that might is not right, and that men whose sole conception of the duty they owe
to their country is to inflict torture upon others, may be put on their trial’. Claud Mullins,




that it would ensure prosecution for those nationals involved in the commis-
sion of offences, the so-called ‘Istanbul trials’ ended up showing a poor record
of convictions. In particular, the vast majority of alleged perpetrators escaped
criminal accountability and Turkey did not recognize that crimes against
humanity were committed against Arminian citizens of the former Ottoman
Empire.93 Furthermore, the Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923 by the Allies
and Turkey, provided for an amnesty in relation to offences committed during
the war.94
To conclude, while from a fact-finding and truth seeking angle the Commis-
sion of Responsibilities may have lacked the neutral and independent approach
inherent to the work of the Balkans Commission, its contribution in terms of
development of international law has been undisputed. As Darcy noted,
‘the 1919 Commission was required not only to consider existing international law
[…] but also to propose how the law might evolve in the context of a potential
judicial mechanism to try offences’.95
In this regard, the experience of the 1919 Commission concurred in framing
a number of international criminal law paradigms. It also had the undisputed
merit to set the basis for a number of debates – including whether or not to
differentiate between war crimes and violations of laws of humanity, whether
to prosecute aggression and to overcome immunity arguments in case inter-
national crimes were committed – that significantly influenced future inter-
national criminal justice efforts.96
However, the whole follow-up process to its recommendations, particularly
in terms of enforcement mechanisms, was weakened by political considerations
and did not lead to tangible results. This particularly considered the failure
of the world’s powers to adequately tackle the issue of accountability in the
peace treaties and looking at the outcome of the Leipzig and Istanbul trials.
In other terms,
93 Meron (n 73) 558.
94 Treaty of Lausanne Between Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey (1923)
28 LNTS 11, Declaration of Amnesty.
95 Darcy (n 44) 5.
96 In particular, according to certain authors the ‘Versailles list’ of war crimes served as
‘inspiration for improving international efforts’ concerning international criminal account-
ability. Dan Plesch and Shanti Sattler, ‘A New Paradigm of Customary International
Criminal Law: The UN War Crimes Commission of 1943-1948 and its associated Courts
and Tribunals’ (2014) 25 Criminal Law Forum 20; Darcy (n 44) 9.
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‘while the contours of war crimes law had been increasingly well established […],
persons violating that law faced only a hypothetical possibility of criminal
sanction’.97
1.2.2.3 The United Nations War Crimes Commission (1943 – 1948)
1.2.2.3.1 Introduction
On 20th October 1943 – in a time when the Second World War was still raging
but the course of events had turned in favour of the Allied forces – represent-
atives from the Allied Nations convened in London and decided to establish
a United Nations War Crimes Commission. The Commission was given the
initial mandate to investigate and record evidence of war crimes, while also
identifying where possible the individuals responsible. In addition, it was
requested to report to the Governments concerned cases ‘where adequate
evidence was expected to be forthcoming’.98 The UNWCC was composed of
delegates from the ‘participating powers’ with diverse backgrounds in fields
such as military analysis, politics, international law, administration, and
academia.
It would be incorrect to classify the UNWCC as a fact-finding body. As it
will be described below, its functions were limited to the examination of
information and legal assessments while its investigative powers and the
collection of facts, however initially granted, ended up not being performed.
In this regard the UNWCC can be defined more as an examining body rather
than a fact-finder. This detaches the UNWCC from the role generally exercised
by commissions of inquiry. At the same time, the UNWCC was not given any
adjudication role. It was rather envisaged as a body to provide information
and advice to states on how to act regarding investigation and prosecution
of alleged war criminals.
However, there are a number of reasons why the UNWCC should form part
of this historic overview. In particular, as we will see in the course of this
analysis, its use of the existing legal frameworks, its contribution to the devel-
opment of international law and the way its relationship with criminal justice
mechanisms was constructed were all prominent aspects of its operations.
These same elements still represent key issues in the debate on the role current-
ly exercised by international fact-finding mechanisms.
97 Meron (n 73) 558. Similarly, Bassiouni has emphasized how, ‘apart from helping to lay
the legal foundations for international criminal justice in the future, the Allies’ experiment
in retributive justice following the First World War was a dismal failure’. Cherif Bassiouni,
‘World War I: ‘The War to End All Wars’ and the Birth of an Handicapped International
Criminal Justice System’ (2002) 244 (253) Denv. J. Int.L. L.&Pol.’Y 290.
98 The United Nations War Crimes Commission (ed.), History of the United Nations War Crimes





The UNWCC’s work covered a temporal period that has no equivalent in
terms of its duration. It commenced its activities at the end of 1943 with the
war still on-going and ended only in March 1948. In this regard, historians
have pointed out how the UNWCC underwent different phases.99 In particular,
the importance of the preliminary stages of its involvement has been em-
phasized, particularly in relation the period prior to the collapse of the Nazi
regime. According to historical records,
‘through the work of the Commission and other agencies, the United Nations had
ready to their hands when the time came, a more or less practical scheme for the
prosecution and punishment of war criminals, which was capable of being com-
pleted and put into effect when the Nazi resistance collapsed’.100
The UNWCC essentially operated under a model of dispersion of efforts and
responsibility rather than on a centric approach of investigations and prosecu-
tions. While the issue of the establishment of a single war crimes prosecution
agency was contemplated by the UNWCC, it was set aside given its incompatibil-
ity with the principle of sovereignty of national institutions.101
During its five-year mandate, the UNWCC engaged in the preparation and
development of a coordinated accountability system requiring the cooperation
of different countries. It provided support to national prosecutions of Nazi
criminals as well as to the framing of a system for prosecuting ‘the most
responsible’, which culminated in the establishment of the Nuremberg and
Tokyo tribunals. Thanks to its internal discussions and stimulating debates,
it helped clarifying a number of substantial and procedural issues related to
international criminal law and criminal responsibility. Finally, through its
proactive attempts to interact with brand-new international organisations, it
also laid the basis for a number of proposals, which where further developed
with the adoption of the UN Charter and the idea of establishing a permanent
international criminal court.102 The heritage of the UNWCC’s work was
included in 22 volumes of reports detailing its activities. Overall, it examined
8178 charges involving 36,000 persons and issued 80 lists of war criminals.103
The comprehensive mandate received and the manner in which it was
discharged renders the UNWCC a rather unique experience in the history of
international fact-finding. As it was pointed out by historians,
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‘the influence of the Commission came, therefore, to be exercised indirectly, as a
counsellor of the governments, as an impulse for their action and as a forum for
international discussion’.104
Nevertheless, it is still worth to compare the UNWCC with past and future
models of inquiry.
1.2.2.3.2 Linkage with the 1919 Commission
In this light, the success of the UNWCC in inspiring retributive actions under-
taken at national and international level can be seen as a lesson learnt from
the failure of the 1919 Commission of Responsibilities. At the time the UNWCC
was established, states had in fact probably realised how the decision to
dismiss most of the recommendations formulated in the 1919 Commission’s
report had resulted in the side-lining of a number of unresolved issues. In
this regard, it was clear how delivering independent justice in 1919 would
have probably helped clarifying the facts and settling a precedent that could
have deterred future violations. It was also acknowledged how the failure to
address the root causes of the First World War combined with the unwilling-
ness of ensuring accountability for the perpetrators were among the main
factors fuelling that nationalistic resentment which rapidly led to a new spiral
of conflict.
This does not only explain the decision to establish the UNWCC in 1943 but
also the robust support and follow-up provided to its work in terms of the
activation of domestic and international judicial remedies. As it was underlined
by certain scholars,
‘[t]here was a clear sense since the early days of the Commission that ‘the real
significance of the punishment of war criminals, is only clear when it is viewed
with the construction of a new International Order’.105
Also, there have been structural and substantial differences between the
Commission of Responsibilities and the UNWCC.106 In particular, it has been
pointed out that the UNWCC’s mandate
104 Ibid.
105 UNWCC, Sub-Committee II, Report on the Constitution of and the Jurisdiction to be
Conferred on an International Criminal Court’, (submitted to the London International
Assembly by Dr J.M. de Moer), SC II/3, 25 February 1944, 4, as referred in Carsten Stahn,
‘Complementarity and Cooperative Justice Ahead of Their Time? The United Nations War
Crimes Commission, Fact-Finding and Evidence’ (2014) 25 Criminal Law Forum 3.
106 For a more comprehensive parallelism between the two experiences see, Harry Rhea, ‘The
Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of
Penalties and its contribution to International Criminal Justice after World War II’ (2014)




‘was focused strictly on the determination of the responsibility of individuals, rather
than inquiry into to the origins of war. This gave it a more neutral and targeted
mandate. Moreover, its framework encompassed new institutional ways to target
accountability’,
including coordination with domestic systems of investigations and pro-
secutions.107 Indeed, the way the UNWCC interpreted its mandate deepened
even more the gap existing with the 1919 Commission.
1.2.2.3.3 Nature of the UNWCC and contribution to future accountability models
While the UNWCC most probably benefited from the lessons learnt of the 1919
Commission of Responsibilities, it also significantly contributed to inspire
future accountability efforts. However, in order to appreciate such contribution
it is important to assess firstly the Commission’s main functions. Based on
the mandate received, the UNWCC created three different committees to deal
respectively with investigation, enforcement and issues involving substantive
law (Committees I, II and III).108 However, while ‘investigating’ was initially
included among its primary functions, the UNWCC never really performed it.
With the creation, by different Allied countries, of ‘National Offices’ entrusted
with collecting evidence concerning war crimes, the investigative powers of
the Commission became in fact extremely curtailed. As it has been pointed
out by legal experts, the UNWCC rapidly turned out to be more an ‘examining
body’ rather than a fact-finder.109 Its work was mainly focused on assessing
the information and evidence submitted by different governments and in-
cluding individuals linked with specific charges into different lists. In this
regard, Stahn has emphasized how
‘the role of the Commission might be best characterized as a sort of international
pre-trial examination, which involve[d] elements of preliminary examination and
confirmation of charges’.110
Such pre-trial role may also explain the uniqueness and diversity of the UNWCC
if compared with the experiences of modern commissions of inquiry. In par-
ticular, its role was essentially of an advisory nature is assessing whether the
evidence submitted by states was sufficient to build prima facie cases in
courts.111
The UNWCC was also responsible for preparing different lists of perpetrators
according to the charges formulated and to the level of authority and leader-
ship played. This distribution also helped the setting up of a comprehensive
107 Stahn, ‘Complementarity and Cooperative Justice’ (n 105) 2.
108 History of the UNWCC (n 98) 139.
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accountability strategy in which domestic courts were responsible for the
prosecutions of low-level and mid-level perpetrators while major war criminals
were tried by the Nuremberg and Tokyo international military tribunals. As
we will see in the course of the next Chapter, the listing of alleged perpetrators
has been recently included more systematically among the instructions pro-
vided to international human rights inquiries.112 In relation to the selection
of cases, the Commission focused its attention on those incidents that a) could
reasonably lead to a war crime accusation in domestic courts; and b) were
of a ‘reasonable importance’ thus satisfying the ‘gravity’ requirement.113 In
this light, the Commission elaborated a set of guidelines to National Offices
with regard to the information and material to be provided for the purpose
of listing suspected war criminals.114
The fact that certain literature has compared the UNWCC’s procedure for
activating domestic criminal jurisdiction with modern International Criminal
Court (ICC) triggering mechanisms perfectly explains the hybrid character of
the Commission, fluctuating in a blurred space between adjudicative and fact-
finding mechanisms. Looking in particular at its powers in re-evaluating
evidence submitted by National Offices and in identifying cases deserving
criminal prosecution, the UNWCC can in fact be considered a sort of external
pre-trial filter.
Indeed, what was probably the UNWCC’s most distinctive contribution to
future criminal justice mechanisms was its role in supporting the enforcement
of international criminal law in domestic courts. In this regard, Stahn, in
emphasising how ‘the innovative feature of its operation [was] its targeted
focus on the centrality of domestic jurisdiction in the adjudication of cases’,
has wondered whether the UNWCC had envisaged the principle of
complementarity ante-litteram.115 The UNWCC’s emphasis on domestic remedies
is corroborated by the fact that, while its dialogue with national offices was
constant and based on structured paradigms, its interaction with the Nurem-
berg and Tokyo tribunals remained limited to exchanges of information,
informal meetings and occasional trial monitoring.
While such a model has been side-lined with the progressive development
of the UN accountability framework involving the establishment of a number
of international tribunals during the 1990s, in recent years completion strategies
within the ad hoc tribunals and the enshrinement of the complementarity
principle in the ICC Statute have put domestic remedies back at the centre of
the attention, thus reinforcing the legacy of the UNWCC.
112 In particular, see the examples of the commissions of inquiry on Darfur, Guinea, Gaza,
Libya, Syria, North Korea and Eritrea.






Much has been written on the UNWCC, its role and contribution in ad-
vancing accountability and international law.116 Accordingly, this dissertation
will analyse the experience of the Commission through the lens of those
thematic areas inspiring the comparative study that will be developed in the
next Chapter. In particular, the following analysis will assess the work of the
UNWCC from the point of view of its contribution to the development of
international law; its interaction with criminal tribunals; its impact over the
response by the international community; the use of sources and evidence and
the standard of proof implemented.
1.2.2.3.4 Contribution to the development of international law
A first important area to measure the impact of the UNWCC is related to its
contribution to questions of substantive law, and in particular to the develop-
ment of concepts such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes
against peace through the work of the so called ‘Legal Committee’ (Committee
III).
Since its initial meetings it was clear that the Commission could not confine
its mandate to the traditional notion of war crimes. In this regard, the work
of the UNWCC can be seen in continuity with the attempt by the 1919 Commis-
sion of Responsibilities to conceive criminal accountability in a broader sense
than the responsibility for violations of laws and customs of war. As it was
expressed by one of the commissioners during a preliminary meeting, it was
important for the UNWCC to detach itself
‘from legalist notions, whereby crimes could only be punished if they fell within
the definition of war crimes. That would defeat the whole object of the peoples.
The reason for this departure was that the offenders had gone right outside the
realm of law’.117
Hence, with regard to war crimes, the initial discussion was focused on how
to define this category strictu sensu. It was noted that a number of acts per-
petrated during the war were not falling within the traditional notion of war
crimes. Many states believed that violations such as ‘taking of hostages’ or
‘infringement of fundamental rights on discriminatory grounds’ could simply
not go unpunished given the absence of positive law.118 Starting from this
basis, the proposals on the table were either to provide a broader list of
offences or to articulate a comprehensive definition of war crimes that could
116 See, as an example, William A Schabas – Carsten Stahn – Joe Powderly – Dan Plesch –
Shanti Sattler, ‘Symposium: The United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Origins
of International Criminal Justice’ (2014) 25 Criminal Law Forum.
117 UNWCC, Unofficial preliminary Meeting (26 October 1943) London, Statement Lord Atkin,
2; Stahn, ‘Complementarity and Cooperative Justice’ (n 105) 13.
118 History of the UNWCC (n 98) 171-172.
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envisage such ‘new trends’.119 An ad hoc subcommittee was established,
which agreed to use as reference the list drawn by the 1919 Commission of
Responsibilities while leaving open the possibility of including additional
offences. On this basis, in May 1944, the Legal Committee formulated a number
of recommendations suggesting further violations to be included in the war-
crimes list. The UNWCC endorsed these recommendations; in particular it agreed
not to be bound by a closed list of war crimes and to examine future cases
based on general sources of international law and principles of penal law.120
Speaking about crimes against humanity, the UNWCC realized almost
immediately the need to close any impunity gap in relation to those crimes
perpetrated before the outbreak of the war or against so called ‘enemy
nationals’, thus not falling within the category of war crimes strictu sensu.
While the progressive approach taken on this point by the Commission of
Responsibilities was objected by a number of states’ delegates in 1919, it was
felt in 1944 that the criminalisation of those conducts running ‘against founding
values of civilisations’ could not be disregarded once again by arguments of
positive law, given the unprecedented scale of atrocities perpetrated by the
Nazi regime against some of its own citizens.121
Such position was synthesized in a proposal of resolution formulated in
1944 by the Legal Committee, which isolated a specific type of criminal offence
within the broader definition of war crimes.122 In particular, the new type
was defined as encompassing
‘crimes committed against any person without regard for nationality, stateless
persons included, because of race, nationality, religious and political belief, irrespect-
ive of where they have been committed’.
Interestingly, such formulation was later embedded in Article 6 of the Nurem-
berg Charter, which expressly labelled it as ‘crimes against humanity’.123
The inclusion of crimes against humanity as a separate type of offence in
the Nuremberg Charter on 8th August 1945 represented a fundamental break-
through in consolidating the jurisdiction of the Commission over such a crime.
In this regard, it can be argued that the activity of the UNWCC and the London
Charter (and, subsequently, the Judgment delivered by the International
Military Tribunal) had been mutually supportive in advancing the process
119 Ibid 170.
120 Ibid 172.
121 Ibid 75. In particular, according to the US representative such crimes demanded the applica-
tion of the ‘laws of humanity and, being committed against stateless persons or against
any persons because of their race or religion, they were justiciable by the United Nations
or their agencies as war crimes’. UNWCC, III/1, 18.3.44, Resolution moved by Mr. Pell
on 18th March, 1944.





of crystallization of ‘crimes against humanity’ as part of customary inter-
national law.
As a consequence, in January 1946, the Commission finally endorsed the
Legal Committee’s recommendation to include crimes against humanity within
its jurisdiction as a separate type of war crime along with violations of laws
and customs of war. Furthermore, a number of cases submitted by Czecho-
slovakia on crimes perpetrated against Czech civilians before 1939 permitted
the UNWCC to consolidate the codification process of such an offence.124 As
a response to such petitions and taking into account the recent developments
deriving from the Tokyo and Nuremberg Charters and the Law n. 10 of Con-
trol Council for Germany, the Legal Committee agreed to a number of con-
clusions that reflected a more in-depth analysis of the constitutive elements
of the crime.125 Firstly it recognized the existence of two types of crimes
against humanity: a murder type and a persecution type, declaring that both
such categories included offences against civilians rather than against military
personnel. Interestingly enough, the Committee claimed that isolated acts could
not fall within the category and required as necessary the circumstance that
those crimes be perpetrated as part of a systematic pattern. The Committee
further recognized that such crimes could be perpetrated both in peace and
war times and acknowledged the irrelevance of the nationality of the victims
for the qualification of the offence. It finally agreed that both leaders and low-
level perpetrators could be held responsible for such crimes by emphasising
the irrelevance of the circumstance concerning their ‘legality’ under lex loci.126
All such conclusions were endorsed by the UNWCC in June 1946.
The UNWCC adopted the same modus operandi with regard to crimes
against peace. While in fact ‘crimes committed with the purpose of preparing
or launching the war’ were considered by the Legal Committee as falling in
principle within the scope of the UNWCC’s mandate, there was no consensus
among delegates over their exact qualification.127 As the matter was devolved
to an ad hoc subcommittee, two reports reflecting different views among the
delegates were submitted. In particular, a ‘majority report’ put forward the
argument that crimes against peace could not be considered as an international
crime because of the impossibility of imposing criminal liability on states.
Contrary to this position, a ‘minority report’ was presented, arguing for the
criminalization of the offence in light of its breaching a number of existing
international treaties.128 The matter was not ultimately decided by the UNWCC,
which called for the Allies’ governments to come out with a common position.
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from their governments to support the criminalisation of crimes against peace
as a separate category of international crimes. These positions were grounded
on the idea that the acts that triggered World War II were perpetrated in
breach of a number of existing treaties, including the Kellogg Briand Pact of
1928. It was also deemed unacceptable to degrade aggressive war ‘just [to]
a mere violation of international law’.129
Also in this case, the inclusion of crimes against peace as a separate crime
within the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1945 played an important
role in advancing the codification of this category of crimes in the Commis-
sion’s work. While the UNWCC’s attempts to mainstream accountability in
relation to breaches of the peace in the San Francisco Conference will be dealt
more in depth below, it should be noted that in January 1946 the Commission
formally recognized crimes against peace as a separate crime within its scope
of jurisdiction.130
The UNWCC also discussed the crime of genocide. This term had made its
first appearance in 1944, thanks to Raphael Lemkin’s famous publication ‘Axis
Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation – Analysis of Government –
Proposals for Redress’.131 Surprisingly, the question of genocide was set-aside
during the negotiations leading to the adoption of the London Charter, thus
preventing the Nuremberg trial to develop the matter further.132 Contrarily,
the UNWCC discussed genocide as a crime in 1945, in relation to a number of
British cases. In particular, Professor Stahn has analysed the declaration by
Legal Secretary Egon Schwelb, according to which practices of discrimination
in the allocation of food by Nazi authorities in Jersey could be qualified as
‘one of the characteristics of [a] policy of genocide’ based on ‘the general
principles of criminal law’.133
1.2.2.3.5 Contribution in identifying modes of criminal responsibility
Moving to the area of individual criminal responsibility, the UNWCC’s ex-
perience actively promoted and contributed to a number of interesting debates.
While paradigms such as leadership crimes and command responsibility
(already discussed in 1919 by the Commission of Responsibilities) were ex-
amined in detail and applied to a number of different cases,134 probably the
most significant discussion among delegates was the one originating in 1945
129 Ibid 184.
130 Ibid 187.
131 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government,
Proposals for Redress (2nd edition, Foundations of the Laws of War 1944).
132 History of the UNWCC (n 98) 197-199.
133 UNWCC, Committee I, Notes on the United Kingdom Case No, 1645 (Discriminatory
Measures in Jersey), I-412, 20 October 1945, as referred in Stahn, ‘Complementarity and
Cooperative Justice’ (n 105) 14.
134 UNWCC, Preparation and Presentation of Cases of War Crimes, Memorandum adopted




concerning membership in the so-called ‘criminal organizations’ (such as the
Gestapo and the S.S.) and collective responsibility.135 Two options were pro-
posed: either reversing the burden of proof in case of crimes committed by
criminal organizations by applying a presumption of guilt or criminalising
the membership in criminal associations. Despite some opposing views, the
argument prevailed of considering membership in criminal organizations as
prima facie evidence for criminal responsibility at least for the purpose of listing
individuals that should face trial.136 Interestingly enough, such position was
later endorsed by the Nuremberg Tribunal, which recognized the paradigm
of ‘criminal organizations’ and applied it to certain conducts of the Gestapo,
the SA and SS.137
While the concept of presumption of guilt in relation to the membership
in criminal organizations may indeed be seen as problematic looking at modern
fair trial standards,138 it is undeniable that the debate over the attribution
of responsibility linked to criminal groups has characterized also the work
of more recent international criminal justice mechanisms. In particular, the
development of the ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise’ doctrine by the ICTY juris-
prudence and its partial rejection by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia (ECCC) are evidence of the compelling nature of such a debate.139
1.2.2.3.6 Interaction with existing institutional frameworks
Writers have emphasized that one of the main weaknesses of the UNWCC was
the absence of a built-up network of international agencies, which prevented
any sort of fruitful interaction.140 Thus, the desire to connect with brand-new
institutional frameworks may explain the attempts of the Commission to
influence the preparatory works of the San Francisco Conference in 1945. In
particular, the UNWCC developed two proposals to be considered for inclusion
in the UN Charter. The first proposal provided a legal basis for the criminaliza-
tion of violations of the prohibition on the use of force. The second pursued
the inclusion of a reference in the UN Charter to the illegal character of the
aggressive conduct by the Axis powers, which led to the outbreak of World
135 History of the UNWCC (n 98) 289ff. See also, Kip Hale and Donna Cline, ‘Holding Collect-
ives Accountable’ (2014) 25 Criminal Law Forum 261.
136 UNWCC, Preparation and Presentation of Cases (n 134) 4; Stahn, ‘Complementarity and
Cooperative Justice’ (n 105) 22.
137 France et al. v. Goering et al., (1946) 22 IMT 203, (1946) 12 ILR 203; (1946) 41 American Journal
of International Law 172. See also Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (New
York: Alfred A. Knofp 1992).
138 Stahn, ‘Complementarity and Cooperative Justice’ (n 105) 22.
139 ECCC, (Supreme Court Chamber, Judgment) Case 002/01 (23 November 2016). For the
importance of the UNWCC’s experience in influencing the modern debate around ‘joint
criminal enterprise’ at the UN tribunals see also, Hale and Cline (n 135).
140 Stahn, ‘Complementarity and Cooperative Justice’ (n 105) 9, 26.
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War II.141 These recommendations represented a clear attempt to mainstream
the language of criminal accountability in the UN Charter. Unfortunately, they
were not adequately taken into account in the negotiations and the final version
of the UN Charter made reference only to a general prohibition of the threat
or the use of force in international relations. As it was pointed out by scholars,
‘the two recommendations would have significantly strengthened the prohibition
of the use of force and altered the UN Charter approach towards accountability
and the development of international criminal justice in the second half of the 20th
century’.142
Another relevant example of the UNWCC’s involvement in the process of setting
up a new international institutional architecture was its contribution to the
discussions around the establishment of an international criminal court.143
To this purpose, in February 1944 the Commission presented a number of
proposals to the London Assembly, focused in particular on the need to ensure
a primary role for domestic jurisdictions in a hypothetical future interaction
with international accountability efforts. This approach envisaged a model
of coordination between national and international justice mechanisms that
found entire realisation only fifty years later with the enshrinement of the
complementarity principle in the ICC Statute.
1.2.2.3.7 Use of sources and evidence
In relation to the choice of sources and evidence, the experience of the UNWCC
was clearly affected by both its ‘state-oriented’ attitude and the paucity of
international stakeholders existing at the time. In this regard, its approach
differs quite significantly from the one subsequently developed in modern
fact-finding.
Governmental sources were privileged over others with the result that the
great majority of information was received from states, while submissions by
private actors were accepted only in limited occasions. With regard to the
position of individuals concerned and victims, their participation in the process
was extremely curtailed as they had limited possibility of interacting with the
UNWCC.144
In relation to witnesses’ accounts, literature reviews have highlighted how
the approach by the Commission towards the use of primary and secondary
sources gradually shifted. While more emphasis was placed on direct wit-
nesses’ accounts at the initial stages of the work, with the consolidation of
141 History of the UNWCC (n 98) 185; Stahn, ‘Complementarity and Cooperative Justice’ (n 105)
15.
142 Stahn, ‘Complementarity and Cooperative Justice’ (n 105) 15.
143 For more information see, William A Schabas, ‘The United Nations War Crimes Commis-
sion’s Proposal For an International Criminal Court’ (2014) 25 Criminal Law Forum 171.




criminal records the UNWCC deemed sufficient to rely upon extracts from
witnesses’ statements provided by states.145 This shift was accompanied by
the dissemination of guidelines for governments and National Offices dealing
with the collection of specific evidence and the recording of witnesses’ testi-
monies. On this basis, multiple lists of alleged perpetrators were created
according to the level of evidence available in each case. This also helped
National Offices to further refine their strategic approach to investigations,
by progressively improving the level of evidence brought to the attention of
the Commission.146 All such debates around the use of primary and second-
ary sources and the need for a homogeneous approach for the collection of
evidence in criminal cases reveal once again the contiguity between the work
of the Commission and many of the current debates concerning procedural
standards set by modern human rights inquiries.
1.2.2.3.8 Standard of proof implemented
The contiguity can be appreciated also with regard to the standard of proof
to be implemented. In this sense, it is interesting to note that the Commission
adopted a standard, which can be compared with that implemented by inter-
national tribunals in pre-trial stages.147 According to Stahn, ‘this assessment
combined analysis of the ‘preponderance of evidence’ with inquiry into ‘bal-
ance of probabilities’ relating to prospects of conviction’.148 The parallelism
between the standard of proof applied in pre-trial stages and that implemented
by modern commissions of inquiry will be articulated throughout the course
of this dissertation. For now it is sufficient to note some analogy between the
standard applied by the UNWCC and the ‘reasonable grounds to believe’




147 Ibid. In particular, the UNWCC’s assessment focused on three questions: (i) Do the ‘charges
made disclose the existence of a war crime or crimes’? (ii) Does the information contain
‘sufficient material to identify the alleged offender’??(iii) Is there ‘good reason to assume
that if put on trial, the alleged offender would be convicted’? Also the Commission’s
examination entailed several determinations, namely: (i) a ‘determination whether it is
probable that a war crime of reasonable importance has been committed’; (ii) a ‘determination
whether there is or will be at the time of trial sufficient evidence to justify a prosecution’;
(iii) a ‘determination of which individuals or units, if any, should be included on the
Commission’s Lists of Accused War Criminals, Suspects, or Witnesses’. UNWCC, Prepara-
tion and Presentation of Cases (n 134) 5; History of the UNWCC (n 98) 482.
148 Stahn, ‘Complementarity and Cooperative Justice’ (n 105) 16.
149 See, in particular, those commissions of inquiry established in relation to Guinea, Darfur,
Libya, Syria, North Korea, Gaza and Eritrea. See also, Steven Wilkinson, ‘Standards of Proof
in International Humanitarian and Human Rights Fact-Finding and Inquiry Missions’ (2011)
Geneva academy of international humanitarian law and human rights.
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1.2.2.3.9 Conclusions
In conclusion, two outstanding aspects should be highlighted looking at the
UNWCC’s overall experience: the creation of a coordination and support mech-
anism for domestic accountability remedies and the contribution to the devel-
opment of international law. With regard to the first area, remarkable results
have been achieved both in terms of the creation of a structured framework
of coordination with domestic authorities and looking at the criminal record
registered at international and at domestic level. As it has been duly pointed
out, one of the most precious lessons learnt from the UNWCC is the idea that
‘lasting justice strategies require capable domestic jurisdictions and specialized
war crimes offices’.150
In relation to the development of international law, one cannot dispute
the outstanding role played by the Commission in defining, consolidating and
innovating paradigms such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes
against peace and different modes of individual criminal responsibility, many
of which later became part of customary international law.
However, the foundations laid down during its five-year mandate were
not adequately followed up. This has been mainly due to a lack of strategic
vision by international decision-makers. In fact, many of the subsequent
experiences in the area of criminal accountability have focused on the need
to clarify basic elements of core crimes rather than on ways to enforce their
prosecution. Furthermore, the idea of ensuring adequate coordination between
supranational agencies and states in enforcing accountability and empower
domestic courts to prosecute international crimes has not been devoted much
attention.151
In conclusion, the UNWCC stands as a unique experience in the history of
international commissions of inquiry. Looking at the mandate received and
at the manner in which it was interpreted, the Commission has no comparison
with other inquiry exercises. Perhaps, for the very same reason, the UNWCC
has more than other inquiry experiences perfectly incarnated the dilemma
currently faced by modern commissions of inquiry in striking the right balance
between mere fact-finding and adjudication powers.
150 Stahn, ‘Complementarity and Cooperative Justice’ (n 105) 24.
151 In particular, according to Stahn, ‘the idea that an international institution would provide
independent expert advice on core cases to domestic justice institutions remains under-
developed in existing judicial structures and treaty regimes’. Stahn, ‘Complementarity and




1.2.3 The role of international inquiries in the period 1945-1990
1.2.3.1 Introduction: Fact-finding in the context of the United Nations and within
the set up of the international human rights law architecture
Following the end of the Second World War and the San Francisco Conference
establishing the United Nations Organization, the power of creating inter-
national inquiries and independent fact-finding bodies has mainly rested in
the UN domain. In fact the UN has been vested with the primary task of main-
taining peace and security, in which settling disputes among states and invest-
igating over their respect for international norms play inevitably a prominent
role.
The creation of the United Nations also prompted the adoption of the first
instruments and conventions protecting and promoting human and peoples’
rights, which also meant the creation of additional obligations for states under
international law. However, this has not immediately implicated an active
role by the UN in mandating investigations over alleged human rights viola-
tions. With the exception of a fact-finding mission jointly established by the
UN Secretary General (UNSG) and the International Labour Organization (ILO)
Secretariat charged with investigating practices of forced labour,152 a more
consistent involvement by the UN in the field of human rights fact-finding was
registered only starting from the 1960s.
This initial hesitancy may be linked to specific limitations over the power
for the UN to intervene in situations of states’ internal human rights violations.
In particular, according to a narrow interpretation of Article 2(7) of the UN
Charter, the UN was not authorized ‘to intervene in matters that were essential-
ly within the domestic jurisdiction’ of states. In this way, at its initial stage,
the UN role was mainly limited to defying and codifying international human
rights standards in conventions and declarations, while leaving the investiga-
tion and enforcement phases to national authorities.
This position shifted towards a more progressive approach vis-à-vis human
rights concurrent to the de-colonization process and the consequent substantial
expansion of the UN membership, reflected in bodies such as the General
Assembly (UNGA) and the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) where the ‘one-
state one-vote’ principle and geographical representations were playing a
decisive role.
152 ECOSOC Res. 350(XII) (1951). The ILO fact-finding tools and practice deserve a separate
mention and will not be analyzed in the present dissertation. For an assessment of the work
and impact of those inquiries established within the ILO framework in terms of procedural
fairness and due process see Thomas M Franck and H Scott Fairley, ‘Procedural Due Process
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Indeed, a more committed involvement by UN organs in the field of invest-
igating human rights violations was accompanied by an increased interest
for independent international fact-finding. In this regard, according to certain
authors, ‘it was not until 1967 that fact-finding became firmly established as
a technique assisting in the international protection of human rights’.153
1.2.3.2 International inquiries in the practice of UN organs
A possible way of describing the UN involvement in fact-finding in the period
1945-1990 is to refer to the activities of its different organs. While, the UN
Security Council has been the only body expressly mandated to set up inquiries
pursuant to Article 34 of the Charter, different UN actors have been involved
in the practice of appointing fact-finding mechanisms by resorting to their
implied powers, a trend that has encountered no significant opposition and
has been formally acknowledged by the 1991 UNGA Declaration on Fact-find-
ing.154 In this regard, while the UN Security Council and Secretary General’s
contributions in the field have remained limited, the General Assembly and
especially the Commission on Human Rights have played a more prominent
role in activating independent inquiries.
Established in 1946 as subsidiary body of the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC), the CHR always claimed that the power to appoint fact-finding bodies
derived from its mandate to protect and promote fundamental human rights
and freedoms. With specific regard to gross violations of human rights, a
landmark development is the adoption in 1970 by the ECOSOC of resolution
1503-XLVIII.155 The resolution authorized the Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (a subsidiary organ of the CHR)
to constitute specific working groups with the purpose of identifying and
inquiring into the existence of gross violations of human rights.156 On this
basis, in its first years of work, the Commission was responsible for the estab-
lishment of a number of working groups charged with investigating thematic
and geographic situations of human rights concern.157
In particular, in 1967, the CHR set up a Working Group on South Africa
to investigate specific human rights violations. Its mandate, initially designed
to inquire into episodes of torture and ill-treatment in detention facilities, was
subsequently broadened to cover issues related to capital punishment, viola-
tions of trade unions’ freedom of expression, treatment of political prisoners
153 Robert Miller, ‘United Nations Fact-Finding Missions in the Field of Human Rights’ (1970-
1973) 40 Australian Yearbook of International Law 40, 42; Franck and Fairley (n 152) 308-345.
154 Larissa J van den Herik and Catherine Harwood, ‘Sharing the Law: The Appeal of Inter-
national Criminal Law for International Commissions of Inquiry’ (2014) Grotius Centre
Working Paper 2014/016-ICL, 3-7.
155 ECOSOC Res. 1503(XLVIII) (1970).
156 Benedetto Conforti, Le Nazioni Unite (7th edn, CEDAM 2005) 261.




and people in ‘transit camps’, practices of apartheid, colonialism and racial
discrimination. The expansion also encompassed its geographic scope, which
was extended to similar practices in Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and Portu-
guese-administered African territories.158
In the same year, the Commission established a Mission to investigate
alleged human rights violations perpetrated in the context of Israel’s occupation
of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip following the ‘Six-Day War’. Interestingly
enough, the inquiries appointed for South Africa and OPT shared a similar
composition, methods of operations and procedure and received similar
criticism by scholars in terms of procedural fairness standards.159
In the following years the Commission set up a working group to inquire into
the situation of human rights in Chile, a working group on disappearances
and deployed an ad hoc Mission to assess the situation of human rights in
Cuba.160
It is interesting to note how a number of these ad hoc working groups
progressively evolved into the permanent Special Procedures system currently
in place under the framework of the Human Rights Council (HRC), the Com-
mission’s successor.161 This may reinforce the argument that there is no clear-
cut distinction between the different methods of human rights investigations
currently developed under the UN human rights umbrella, which include –
inter alia – independent commissions of inquiry, investigations conducted by
the OHCHR and Special Rapporteurs’ reports.162
Moving to analyse the role of the UNGA, during the period 1945-1990 the
Assembly established a considerable number of committees and special com-
missions to investigate an array of different situations. Its inquiries were
created, inter alia, to investigate specific incidents (like in the case of the
assassinations of Mr. Lumumba, Mr. Hammarskjold and the Prime Minister
of Burundi), analyse long-standing policies (such as the special committees
on South Africa or Palestine) or support dispute settlement.163
158 ECOSOC Res. 2(XXIV) (1967). For more information see, Miller (n 153) 45.
159 Miller (n 153) 43. For a critical assessment of the South Africa and Palestine fact-finding
experiences see, Franck and Fairley (n 152).
160 CHR Res. 8(XXXI) (1975); CHR Resolution 20(XXXVI) (1980); CHR, E/1998/106 (1988).
161 On this point see, van den Herik and Harwood (n 154) 6.
162 See ch 1.4.
163 UN Special Committee on Palestine, UNGA Res. 106(S-1) (1947); UN Commission of Inquiry
on the Circumstances of the death of Mr. Lumumba, UNGA Res. 1601(XV) (1961); UN
Commission of Investigation into the Conditions and Circumstances Resulting in the Tragic
Death of Mr. Dag Hammarskjold and Members of the Party Accompanying Him, UNGA
Res. 628(XVI) (1961); UN Special Committee on South Africa, UNGA Res. 1702(XVI) (1961);
UN Commission on Ruanda-Urundi, UNGA Res. 1627(XVI) (1961); UN Special Committee
on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (renamed
UN Special Committee Against Apartheid), UNGA Res. 1761(XVII) (1962). For a more
comprehensive account see van den Herik and Harwood (n 154) 4.
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The Assembly also deeply engaged in the field of human rights fact-finding.
In 1963, it established a UN Mission to South Vietnam to investigate allegations
that the South Vietnamese Government was persecuting Buddhists and depriv-
ing them of their religious rights.164 The UNGA also established – concurrently
with the Working Group deployed by the CHR – a Special Committee to
Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of
the Occupied Territories.165 Furthermore, in relation to alleged massacres
committed by the Portuguese army in Wiriamu and other areas of Mozam-
bique, it dispatched a commission of inquiry investigating into such abuses
within the broader context of Portugal’s colonial and assimilation policies.166
As already mentioned, the UN Security Council (UNSC) represents the only
body that was entrusted by the UN Charter with explicit powers in terms of
fact-finding. Article 34 of the Charter specifically authorises the Council to
investigate disputes whose continuation may endanger international peace
and security. According to commentators, this power can be exercised directly
or through the establishment of a subsidiary body.167 However, as it has been
noted by certain experts, the Council generally referred to its implied powers
in setting up international inquiries and has made specific reference to Article
34 only on two occasions.168 As consequence, Article 34 has now been con-
sidered as fallen in disuse.169
Generally, UNSC’s inquiries have tackled mainly situations affecting inter-
national peace and security, thus encompassing armed conflicts, acts of aggres-
sion and violations of international humanitarian law and human rights.
Among the most remarkable examples, it should be noted the three-member
commission established to investigate the impact of Israeli settlements con-
struction in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which can be considered a
sort of ‘predecessor’ for the 2012 Human Rights Council fact-finding mission
on Israeli settlements.170 In relation to acts of aggression, the Council set up
in 1981 a commission of inquiry to investigate the origin, background and
financing of the mercenary aggression of 25 November 1981 against the Repub-
164 UN Mission to South-Vietnam, Statement by the President of the General Assembly, 1239th
meeting (1963). According to Miller, the Mission undertook its work upon ‘the invitation
of the President of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, but without the express authority of
the General Assembly. During the mission’s visit, the Diem regime was overthrown and
this, in part, led to the failure of any United Nations body, including the General Assembly,
to take any action on the report of the mission’. Miller (n 153) 42.
165 UNGA Res. 2243(XXIII) (1968).
166 UNGA Res. 3114(XXVIII) (1973); Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Reported
Massacres in Mozambique, UNGA (XXIX) Supplement No. 21 (A/9621).
167 For a more extensive analysis of the power of the UNSC to set up inquiries pursuant to
Article 34 see, Conforti (n 156) 161-166.
168 UN Commission of Investigation concerning Greek Frontier Incidents, UNSC Res. 15 (1946);
UN Commission for India and Pakistan, UNSC Res. 39 (1948).
169 Van den Herik (n 14) 524.




lic of Seychelles.171 With specific regard to the protection of human rights
from colonial practices, in 1985 the UNSC appointed an ad hoc inquiry to shed
light over South Africa colonial and aggressive practices in Angola and
Botswana.172
As it will be analysed more in depth below, in modern times the UNSC
has progressively delegated the power to set up fact-finding missions to the
UN Secretary General. As consequence, the UNSG has acquired a more active
role in appointing inquiries only starting from the 1990s. This was also due
to the explicit recognition made by the 1991 UNGA Declaration on Fact-Finding
of the role of the UNSG in using fact-finding ‘to contribute to the prevention
of disputes and situations’.173 Before the 1990s, examples of inquiries set up
by the UNSG directly have been rare, including an inquiry in the situation in
Hungary following the Soviet invasion of 1956 and a mission to investigate
alleged use of chemical weapons in the Iraqi-Iranian conflict in 1986.174
In conclusion, the period between 1945 and 1990 has been characterised
by the gradual involvement of a variety of UN actors in the establishment of
international inquiries. However, such a process has mainly developed in the
absence of a clear institutional framework by resorting to the use of implied
powers. Therefore, the UN fact-finding machinery has not followed a clear
division of labour nor has led to the definition of guidelines to identify and
specify competences in the establishment of fact-finding mechanisms. This
has indeed negatively impacted the records of these investigations, whose
follow-up has been weakened also by the scarce enforcement and accountability
remedies available at the time.
1.2.4 International commissions of inquiry established in the period 1990-2016
1.2.4.1 Introduction
The 1990s have represented an important break-through in re-shifting the
parameters of the international world order. The collapse of the Soviet Union
and the consequent termination of the policy of the ‘two blocks’ have inevitably
affected the United Nations’ approach in tackling crises situations.
171 UNSC Res. 496 (1981).
172 UNSC Res. 571 (1985).
173 UNGA Declaration on Fact-finding (n 5) para. 12.
174 Inquiry of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Hungary (established at the request
of the General Assembly) UNGA Resolution 1004 (ES-II) (1956) (replaced by UN Special
Committee on the Question of Hungary) UNGA Res. 1132 (XI) (1957); Mission Dispatched
by the Secretary-General to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in
the Conflict Between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, established in March 1984
following the request from Iran, UN Doc. S/17911 (1986).
511894-L-sub01-bw-Tonutti
Processed on: 21-7-2017
The Origin and Evolution of International Inquiries: A Historical Overview 45
Concurrently, the latest decade of the 20th Century has marked important
achievements in the process of recognition of human rights violations as a
matter of international concern, threating international peace and stability.175
This has inevitably influenced the practice of appointing international
commissions of inquiry. In particular, the latest twenty-five years have
witnessed an exponential proliferation of international inquiries in the field
of human rights.176 As many of these investigations were referring to situ-
ations where widespread human rights violations were perpetrated in the
context of armed conflicts, their mandates have often combined the use of IHRL
with that of IHL. Also, a renewed attention towards accountability and inter-
national crimes can be noticed, revitalising the legacy of the 1919 Commission
and the 1943 UNWCC after almost a fifty-year gap.
In this regard, the 1992 Commission of Experts to investigate IHL breaches
during the conflict in former Yugoslavia can be considered a first important
breakthrough.177 Its decisive role in the UN Security Council’s subsequent
decision to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia (ICTY) and its contribution in terms of gathering prosecution oriented
criminal evidence were revealing of the potential of commissions of inquiry
as a tool capable of inspiring and concretely supporting the international
community’s response to atrocities.
Inspired by such precedent, many other international fact-finding missions
have been established by different bodies at the international and regional
level with mixed success. While it is undisputed that international inquires
have rapidly proliferated in a context where the United Nations were much
more involved than before in addressing human rights violations as an issue
of international concern, a number of trends can be highlighted.
First, there has not been a serious attempt at the institutional level to
provide comprehensive guidelines and codification of the practice of fact-
finding.178 This has negatively impacted on the possibility of better harmon-
izing their practices and consolidating a coherent lesson-learnt approach.
Secondly, it should be noted a shift in the modus operandi of international
inquiries from a pure fact-finding model into a paradigm that increasingly
matches the combination of factual and legal analysis with the identification
of responsibilities and possible responses.179 Finally, a more systematic
reference to international criminal law (ICL) language has emerged in mandates
and findings of commissions of inquiry, a trend supported by the revival of
175 See, as an example, Conforti (n 156) 148, 149.
176 Hun J Kim, ‘The Role of UN Commissions of Inquiry in Developing Global Human Rights:
Prospects and Challenges’ (2016) 14 The Korean Journal of International Studies 244.
177 Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, UNSC
Res. 780 (1992).
178 Micaela Frulli, ‘Fact-Finding or Paving the Road to Criminal Justice?’ (2012) 10 JICJ 1326,
1332, 1337.




international criminal justice mechanisms within the UN framework and by
the creation of the International Criminal Court.180 This latest element can
be interpreted as an attempt by human rights inquiries to flag the issue of
accountability for the international community’s response, particularly in those
contexts where international criminal justice mechanisms have not (yet) been
empowered with jurisdiction.
1.2.4.2 International bodies involved in the establishment of commissions of inquiry
The UNSC, as the primary body mandated to maintain international peace and
security, has continued to exercise its power to set up inquiries also in recent
times. However, the number of inquiries established by the Council in the
fields of human rights and IHL in the last twenty-five years has been limited.
This can be linked with the choice of the Council to delegate such prerogative
to the UNSG based on the powers conferred by article 98 of the UN Charter
and with the activism demonstrated in this specific field by the Human Rights
Council. In particular, in the last twenty-five years the UNSC has set up
inquiries to investigate human rights violations in contexts such as Somalia
and Abkhazia.181 It also prompted landmark investigations such as the
Commission of Experts on Former Yugoslavia, the Commission of Experts
on Rwanda, the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi and the Commission of
Inquiry on Darfur.182 More recently the UNSC has also dispatched a commis-
sion of inquiry on events in the Central African Republic.183 The Secretary
General has also acted proprio motu or in conjunction with the OHCHR and has
set up special inquiries, mapping exercises and investigative teams in different
contexts marked by serious human rights violations including Liberia, the DRC,
Togo, East Timor, Cote d’Ivoire, Palestine, Guinea and Sri Lanka.
Looking at the General Assembly, its recourse to the power of appointing
fact-finding missions has decreased compared to the past. This may be
explained by the more proactive role assumed by the Human Rights Council
and the OHCHR. In fact, the establishment and consolidation of new UN institu-
tional frameworks where human rights issues are debated may have led the
UNGA to take a few steps backward in the field of human rights investigations.
However, a number of initiatives can be flagged including the Group of
Experts on Cambodia appointed in 1998 and the mandate provided to OHCHR
180 On the issue see Jens Meierhenrich (ed), International Commissions: The Role of Commissions
of Inquiry in the investigation of International Crimes (2013); Philip G Alston, The Criminalisation
of International Human Rights Fact-Finding’, Conference on Fact- finding on Gross Violations
of Human Rights During and After Conflicts (Norwegian Centre for Human Rights 2011).
181 UNSC Res. 876 (1993); UNSC Res. 885 (1993).
182 UNSC Res. 780 (1992); UNSC Res. 935 (1994); UNSC Res. 1012 (1995); UNSC Res. 1564
(2004).
183 UNSC Res. 2127 (2013).
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to set up an investigative team to shed light on human rights violations in
Afghanistan in 1999.184
While the OHCHR has been also extremely proactive in setting up investiga-
tions proprio motu,185 the real game changer in the panorama of actors
involved in appointing human rights inquiries has been the establishment of
the UN Human Rights Council. Set up in 2006 to replace the Commission on
Human Rights, the Council has rapidly taken the lead in dispatching investiga-
tions over human rights abuses, by resorting mainly to two different
channels.186 The first is the establishment of ad-hoc independent international
commissions of inquiry or fact-finding missions. The second method consists
in mandating the OHCHR to conduct an investigation over a specific country
or situation. In particular, the HRC has decided to establish ad hoc independent
international commissions of inquiry to cover different situations involving
widespread human rights violations and/or violations of IHL in armed conflicts,
which include:
· High Level Mission to Beit Hanoun (2006)
· Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon (2006)
· Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza conflict (2009)
· Fact-Finding Mission on the attacks on the Gaza flotilla (2010)
· Commission of Inquiry on Cote D’Ivoire (2011)
· Commission of Inquiry on Libya (2011)
· Commission of Inquiry on Syria (2011)
· Fact-Finding Mission on Israeli settlements (2012)
· Commission of Inquiry on North Korea (2013)
· Commission of Inquiry on Eritrea (2014)
· Commission of Inquiry on the Gaza conflict (2014)
184 Group of experts for Cambodia to evaluate the existing evidence and propose further
measures, as a means of bringing about national reconciliation, strengthening democracy
and addressing the issue of individual accountability, A/RES/52/135 (1998); OHCHR
Investigative team for Afghanistan to investigate fully the reports of massacres of innocent
civilians and of mass executions of prisoners of war as well as on reports of killings in
Mazar-e Sharif and Bamian; and reports of mass killings of prisoners of war and civilians,
rape and cruel treatment in Afghanistan, A/RES/54/185 (1999).
185 See, for example, the investigations mandated prior to the establishment of the Human
Rights Council in Colombia (2002), Cote d’Ivoire (2002), Darfur (2004), Togo (2005), Uz-
bekistan and Kyrgyzstan (2005), Afghanistan (1999, 2006). See also, the OHCHR Mission
to Western Sahara and refugee camps in Tindouf (2006), the OHCHR Fact-finding mission
to Kenya to look into the violence and allegations of grave human rights violations following
the presidential elections in December 2007 (2008), the Nepal conflict mapping (2009), the
OHCHR Assessment Mission to Tunisia (2011) and the OHCHR Mission to Egypt (2011).
For a comprehensive list of OHCHR mandated missions and investigative teams see, UNOG
Library & Archives, ‘International Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions’
(Geneva, United Nations Library).
186 According to van den Herik and Harwood, ‘[t]he HRC has firmly taken the lead in establish-
ing commissions, being the mandating body for over 60 per cent of all UN commissions




The HRC has also mandated the OHCHR to dispatch independent investigations
in situations involving serious human rights violations. More specifically, this
practice has developed and consolidated in most recent years and examples
include:
· OHCHR Mission on Honduras (2009)
· OHCHR Mission in Syria (2011)
· OHCHR Mission in Mali (2013)
· OHCHR Mission in the Central African Republic (2013)
· OHCHR Investigation on Sri Lanka (2014)
· OHCHR Investigation to Iraq (2014)
· OHCHR Investigation to Libya (2015)
· OHCHR Investigation on atrocities committed by Boko Haram (2015)
· OHCHR Investigation to South Sudan (2015)
· United Nations Independent Investigation on Burundi (2015)
1.2.4.3 The role of the Human Rights Council
While there seems to be no controversies around the competence of the HRC
in establishing inquiries due to the powers derived from the General Assem-
bly,187 it has been questioned whether the Council represents the most ap-
propriate organ to undertake such a task. This is due to a number of reasons.
1.2.4.3.1 Criticism over the lack of powers of the Human Rights Council in imposing
inquiries on States and ensuring adequate follow-up
The first reason is related to the alleged lack of powers of the HRC in imposing
international investigations on the affected countries.
Looking from this perspective, one of the advantages of resorting to the
authority of the UNSC is that a Security Council resolution adopted under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter is binding upon all UN member states. The UNSC,
as primary body for the maintenance of international peace and security, would
appear as the only actor empowered to ‘impose’ international investigations
to concerned states and in so better facilitating the work of commissions of
inquiry and ensuring an adequate follow-up. On this point, it has been argued
how the practice reveals a poor record of states’ compliance with inquiries
mandated by the HRC. On the contrary, UNSC mandated commissions such
as those established in relation to former Yugoslavia and Darfur are often
referred as best practices and experiences that have actually led to a concrete
response by the international community.
187 Christine Chinkin, ‘U.N. Human Rights Council Fact-Finding Missions: Lessons from Gaza’,
in M Arsanjani et al (eds), Looking to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honor of W.
Michael Reisman (2011) 481. See also, van den Herik and Harwood (n 154) 7.
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However – while the examples of Darfur and the former Yugoslavia should
be commended as positive models for future investigations – one should not
overestimate the power of the Security Council in such a domain.
Firstly, certain authors have disputed whether the competence granted
under Article 34 of the UN Charter to the UNSC to set up inquiries can be
‘imposed’ on states. Conforti, for example, argues that the Security Council
cannot exercise coercive powers in order to force states to cooperate with and
accept international inquiries into their territories.188 This applies to inquiries
set up according to a Chapter VI resolution, but what about a fact-finding
mission dispatched under Chapter VII? In this regard, the Council may use
its implied powers to establish a commission of inquiry to investigate over
a situation that already represents a threat to or breach of the peace, in this
way imposing it as a mandatory measure for states. Although the Council
has done this in the past (as in the referred examples of former Yugoslavia
and Darfur), the process aimed at placing a context marked by human rights
violations under the radar of the Council within its Chapter VII powers may
face significant obstacles. These challenges are related to the veto power
exercised by the UNSC permanent members and the modality through which
the UNSC operates when confronted with a situation of threat to the peace,
breach of the peace or aggression. In this regard, it seems unlikely that the
UNSC could have reached the necessary consensus to establish commissions
of inquiry with a similar mandate to those set up by the HRC in relation to
the OPT, North Korea or Syria.
Secondly, a Security Council mandate does not represent an absolute
guarantee for State cooperation. In this regard, a telling example is represented
by the UN Fact-Finding Team on the events in Jenin mandated by the UNSC
and subsequently dismantled by the Secretary General in light of Israel’s denial
of access and cooperation.
However, one should acknowledge how the practice of commissions of
inquiry set up by the UNSC registers a more decent record of compliance and
follow-up particularly if compared with that of the HRC. A telling example
is represented by the situation in Syria. In this context, the UN Commission
of Inquiry, established by the HRC in 2011, has been repeatedly denied any
access to the territory and contact by the relevant parties concerned. Such
challenges have inevitably frustrated the follow-up process to its findings and
recommendations. At the same time, an ad hoc Joint Investigative Mechanism
of the United Nations and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW) has been set up by the Security Council acting through
resolution 2235 (2015).189 The Mechanism, which has been given a much
narrower focus than the HRC Commission of Inquiry, was mandated to identify
to the greatest extent feasible individuals, entities, groups or governments who
188 Conforti (n 156) 165.




were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of
chemicals weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Mechanism was granted
access to the territory of Syria and maintained constant interaction with the
Syrian regime based on an agreement signed between the UN and the Govern-
ment of Syria concerning the status of the Mechanism in order to ensure the
timely, safe and secure conduct of the mandate of the Mechanism in the
country.190 Since the beginning of its activities the Joint Mechanism submitted
four reports. In particular, with regard to a number of incidents it has identi-
fied specific actors responsible for the use of chemical weapons (including
the Syrian Government and the so-called ‘ISIS’ group) while in other instances
has acknowledged the lack of sufficient evidence for reaching similar con-
clusions.191 Its mandate was renewed for another year by the Council acting
through resolution 2319 (2016).192 It is important to emphasized how in the
debate preceding the adoption of resolution 2319, certain permanent members
stressed the wish that the Mechanism’s findings could help reaching the
necessary consensus in the Council for the adoption of a resolution targeting
all actors responsible for chemical attacks with specific sanctions.193
To conclude, while the practice suggests that the UN Security Council may
have played a more authoritative role than the Human Rights Council in
imposing inquiries on states and ensuring a more concrete follow up, the
Security Council should not be viewed as an absolute guarantee for inter-
national inquiries’ success. In this regard, the political deadlock that has for
long time paralysed the Security Council over a number of issues – particularly
in relation to the protection granted to some of the permanent members’ closest
allies when it comes to shield them from accusations of gross human rights
violations – has certainly affected its efficiency in promptly responding to
human rights emergencies. In this regard, as the example of North Korea may
suggest,194 an active role by the Human Rights Council in appointing human
rights inquiries may even be seen as instrumental in exercising the necessary
pressure for placing a particular situation under the radar of the Security
Council.
190 Third Report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations
Joint Mechanism, S/2016/738 (24 August 2016) para. 11.
191 Ibid; First Report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United
Nations Joint Mechanism, S/2016/142 (12 February 2016); Second Report of the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Mechanism, S/2016/530
(10 June 2016); Fourth Report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-
United Nations Joint Mechanism, S/2016/888 (21 October 2016).
192 UNSC Res. 2319 (2016) para. 1.
193 ‘UN Security Council Extends Inquiry Into Chemical Weapons Attack in Syria’ (2016) The
Wire http://thewire.in/81108/un-security-council-extends-inquiry-into-chemical-weapons-
attack-in-syria/ accessed on 8 December 2016.
194 As it will be analysed in Chapter 3.1, the work and findings of the HRC Commission of
Inquiry on North Korea have played an important role in stimulating, for the first time
in history, a UN Security Council debate on the situation of human rights in North Korea.
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1.2.4.3.2 Criticism over the competence of the Human Rights Council in applying
IHL
Another criticism of the HRC’s involvement in fact-finding concerns its mixed
applicability of IHL and IHRL standards when it comes to define the mandate
of inquiry bodies.195 Critics have highlighted how such an approach, in
allowing investigations into situations of armed conflicts and breaches of the
peace, is exceeding the limits of the HRC’s mandate, which deals uniquely with
the promotion and protection of human rights. Secondly, the need for a specific
expertise to cover investigations entrusted with the analysis and application
of IHL norms has been pointed out, a task which is necessarily different from
that required in case IHRL is at stake.
While the lack of competence of the Human Rights Council in dealing with
IHL may represent a formal obstacle, one should also consider the negative
implications deriving from a strict and clear-cut separation between the two
bodies of law. Even those authors that have raised concerns over such a
practice have underlined the growing interaction between IHL and IHRL in
addressing modern situations of armed conflicts. In many contexts around
the world, widespread and systematic human rights abuses go hand-in-hand
with situations of armed conflicts where IHL norms apply. If we take many
of the situations investigated by HRC appointed inquiries, they involve the
applicability of both IHRL and IHL paradigms. Requiring the HRC not to be
actively involved in comprehensively investigating contexts such as Libya,
Syria or the Palestinian Territory just because IHL norms apply along side with
IHRL would probably render it tooth less. In this regard, a curtailed or partial
investigation would in fact run contrary to the very same purpose behind the
establishment of independent international inquiries, which is to provide an
impartial and comprehensive account of the facts and trends of violations in
order to direct relevant stakeholders within the international community to
take appropriate response.
Hence, although the Council’s involvement in the field of IHL has attracted
several criticisms, its competence can be grounded on the complementary
applicability of IHL and IHRL in situations of modern armed conflicts as
recognised by authoritative international bodies.196 This conclusion has been
shared by Marauhn who, in ruling out any accusation against the Council
acting ultra vires, has also noted that
195 Boutruche (n 4); Frulli (n 178) 1332. See also the criticism raised by NATO representatives
on the broadening of the scope of the HRC Commission of Inquiry on Libya to encompass
alleged violations of IHL committed during the NATO-led coalition airstrikes. On this issue,
see Robert Grace, ‘The Design and Planning of Monitoring, Reporting and Fact-Finding
Missions’ (2013) Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research Harvard University
15.
196 See, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory




‘[commissions] can draw legitimacy for addressing international humanitarian law
from the interface between the two bodies of law, in particular in situations of non-
international armed conflict’.197
A number of relevant examples support this view. The first one is represented
by the International Commission of Inquiry on Syria. The commission was
established by the HRC on 18 August 2011.198 It was initially mandated ‘to
investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law since March
2011 in the Syrian Arab Republic’ and applied exclusively IHRL paradigms
in its first report.199 However, the deterioration of the situation led the Com-
mission to amend its mandate. In its third report covering the period between
February and August 2012, the Commission
‘determined that the intensity and duration of the conflict, combined with the
increased organizational capabilities of anti-Government armed groups, had met
the legal threshold for a non-international armed conflict. The commission therefore
applied both international humanitarian law and international human rights law
in its assessment of the actions of the parties to the hostilities’.200
This decision found adequate support in the opinion of certain scholars.
Marauhn, for example, noted that
‘it would have been difficult to [justify in front of] the international community
had the HRC stopped its fact-finding activities upon the uprising being qualified
as a non-international armed conflict. […] [Furthermore] the law of war does not
have a supervisory body at hand with the exception of the International (Human-
itarian) Fact-Finding Commission’.201
A similar pattern can be noticed in relation to the Commission of Inquiry into
events in Libya. The Commission was set up by HRC resolution S-15/1 of 25
February 2011 in order to investigate ‘all alleged violations of international
human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’.202 The Commission investi-
gated primarily the context of human rights violations committed before,
197 Thilo Marauhn, ‘Sailing Close to the Wind: Human Rights Council Fact-Finding in Situations
of Armed Conflict – The Case of Syria’ (2012) 43 California Western International Law Journal
439.
198 Human Rights Council, A/HRC/18/53 (2011).
199 Report of the independent commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/
S-17/2/Add. 1 (23 November 2011) para 4.
200 3rd Report of the independent commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/
21/50 (16 August 2012) Summary.
201 Marauhn (n 197) 454.
202 Human Rights Council, A/HRC/S-15/1 (2011); Report of the International Commission
of Inquiry to investigate alleged violations of international human rights law in the Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, A/HRC/17/44 (1 June 2011) Summary.
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during and after the anti-government demonstrations spreading in a number
of different Libyan cities in February 2011. However, in light of the armed
conflict that developed in late February 2011 and continued during the Com-
mission’s operations, it looked into both violations of international human
rights law and relevant provisions of international humanitarian law.203
These two examples reflect how in modern times it has become extremely
challenging to separate the operative sides of those bodies mandated to address
IHRL violations (such as the HRC) from those instructed to look at the applicabil-
ity of IHL in the context of armed conflicts (such as the ICRC and the Inter-
national Humanitarian Fact Finding Commission). While, it is beyond question
that the primary focus of their mandates should not be altered, operative
implications such as investigations and inquiries should necessarily take into
account the possibility of interaction between the two legal frameworks.
As already emphasized, the activism of the HRC in mandating investigations
in contexts where both IHRL and IHL apply has been put into question also
in terms of the specific expertise required for the interpretation and application
of IHL norms.204 It has been argued that
‘the focus on human rights violations and the involvement of human rights law
experts in fact-finding missions investigating violations committed in the context
of an armed conflict may lead to distortion with respect to the evaluation of the
lawfulness of the conduct of military operations’.205
The issue concerning the implications of the applicability of IHL norms from
a ‘human rights perspective’ should not be underestimated. However, while
certain experiences such as the 2011 Libya Commission have not tackled the
issue accordingly,206 many other HRC mandated commissions have more
adequately reflected an expertise in military operations and criminal investiga-
tions both in terms of their composition and methodology used. For example,
the 2009 UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict had one former military
official and one former ICTY Prosecutor among its members. Furthermore, UN
inquiries in the OPT have frequently resorted to the expertise of (former)
military officials, military analysts and ballistic and forensic investigations.
Also, the composition of the commission of inquiry on Syria was amended
in order to include the former ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte. These examples
reflect the intention to empower these investigations with an expertise that
203 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry into Libya (n 202) Summary.
204 Frulli (n 178) 1332; Boutruche (n 4).
205 Frulli (n 178) 1332.
206 On the absence of military experts among the commissioners in the Libya Commission
see Kevin J Heller, ‘The International Commission of Inquiry on Libya: A Critical Analysis’
in Jens Meierhenrich (ed), International Commissions: the Role of Commissions of Inquiry in




go far beyond human rights law, in line with the mandates and operational
challenges faced.
1.2.4.3.3 Criticism over the ‘politicization’ of inquires mandated by the Human Rights
Council
Some critics have pointed out that the ‘politicization’ within the HRC as an
interstate body has negatively affected its impartiality in establishing inquiries,
resulting in commissions provided with unilateral mandates that have under-
mined their legitimacy and negatively affected their findings. Indeed, it is
difficult to deny the fact that the Human Rights Council is influenced by
political considerations of some of its members in defining its agenda and
interventions. As an example, the 2015 Dutch proposal for initiating an inter-
national inquiry over events in Yemen was withdrew due to the opposition
of Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies, which mounted a lobbying campaign in
the HRC by tabling an alternative resolution encompassing a national (rather
than international) inquiry.207 Indeed, the Human Rights Council’s selectivity
in focusing on specific contexts and the unilateral language used in certain
resolutions (such as those concerning the 2011 Libya uprising or condemning
Israeli practices in the OPT) are real risks that need to be urgently tackled given
the far-reaching implications on the work and legitimacy of commissions of
inquiry themselves. At the same time, it is difficult to argue that other bodies
(such as the UNSC) would be more immune from political considerations.
Although with different mandates, both the UNSC and the HRC are political
organs composed by states.
Hence, the attempt to contaminate the applicability of human rights and
international humanitarian law with political considerations, through selective
and ‘ad-hoc’ interventions based on double standards is indeed alarming and
needs to be tackled.208 However, selectivity in the application of human
rights/IHL standards is a real threat that both the UNSC and the HRC are facing.
Both of them may misuse international law to serve their different political
goals.
1.2.4.4 A renewed interest in criminal accountability
The period between 1990 and today has witnessed – more than ever in the
past – commissions of inquiry request to provide a response to the quest for
accountability.
The accountability function entails for inquiry commissions a further effort
in paving the way for stakeholders’ responses. Accountability may refer to
both states and individuals and implies not only the characterization of certain
conducts as violations of the law but also the identification of the actors
207 Kim (n 176) 242.
208 Franck and Fairley (n 152) 311-312.
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responsible. Thus, by being empowered with ‘accountability’ tasks in their
mandates, fact-finding missions started pointing the attention of key actors
involved in situations of armed conflict and human rights crisis that their
actions may be subjected to judicial (or, more broadly, law enforcement)
sanction due to their law infringements.
Notwithstanding certain examples dating back to the first half of the 20th
Century,209 commissions charged with a specific accountability mandate
represent a relatively recent trend. In this regard, the 1990s have witnessed
a renewed interest by the international community in the area of individual
criminal responsibility. This has helped the creation of a number of ad hoc
mechanisms entrusted with the repression of international crimes. The estab-
lishment, in the period 1992-2005, of ad hoc tribunals, mixed courts, special
tribunals and, finally, the creation of a permanent international criminal court
in 1998 are vivid examples of a growing attention for this particular area of
international law. This context has indeed affected the mandate and work of
international inquiries.
It can be argued that the relationship between commissions of inquiry and
international criminal accountability mechanisms has been one of mutual
inspiration. It is undeniable that the findings of commissions of inquiry have
often paved the way for international criminal investigations. For example,
the work and recommendations of the Commission of Experts on former
Yugoslavia played a decisive influence in the UNSC’s decision to establish an
ad hoc international criminal tribunal. As we will see in the course of this
study, the Commission of Experts’ findings also facilitated and supported the
investigations and prosecutions conducted in the framework of the ICTY from
a number of different angles. Similarly, the report of the International Commis-
sion of Inquiry on Darfur played a pivotal role in inspiring the UNSC’s referral
of the situation to the ICC.
At the same time, the recent proliferation of international criminal tribunals
has undoubtedly influenced the framing of mandates of international inquiries,
which started more consistently to refer to individual criminal responsibility
as one of their key elements. Again, the HRC has played a pivotal role in this
process. According to certain scholars,
‘of twelve HRC commissions, the mandates of six expressly instruct commissions
to investigate violations in order to ensure that those responsible are held account-
able’.210
209 See, in particular, the 1919 Commission of Responsibilities and the 1943 United Nations
War Crimes Commission.




1.2.4.5 Towards a new role for commissions of inquiry
In conclusion, although only few developments have been registered at the
institutional level to clarify and provide guidelines on their work, the practice
of the last twenty-five years indicates a significant evolution in the role and
function of commissions of inquiry as instruments under international law.
It is now clear that the mandates of commissions of inquiry established in the
last twenty-five years provide a broader interpretation of their role than it was
indicated in their original codifications and shed light on the wide spectrum
of their functions.
In particular, modern commissions of inquiry progressively established
under UN auspices to investigate conflicts in countries such as former Yugo-
slavia, Sudan, Guinea, Palestine, Libya and Syria have, in accordance with
the mandates received, gone far beyond the task of merely ascertaining facts
and uncovering the truth for dispute settlement purposes. Their findings have
included legal qualifications, identification of perpetrators of violations of
international law, determination of both States and individual’s responsibility
under international law, and recommendations and follow-up measures for
key actors and stakeholders involved in a certain situation, including measures
to ensure accountability.211 As we will see in the course of this dissertation,
these developments may help cementing a new role for commissions as a
warning and denouncing tool integrally part of the broader response by the
international community to situations of armed conflict and grave human
rights emergencies.
1.3 COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY: INSTITUTIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND CODIFICA-
TIONS
1.3.1 Introduction
The second perspective from which to assess the evolution in the role of
international inquiries is to look at how they have been codified in inter-
national conventions, resolutions and soft-law instruments.
As it has been described above, commissions of inquiry and fact-finding
missions, as instruments under international law, have mainly evolved through
211 See, inter alia, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United
Nations Secretary General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 (2004) (25 January
2005); Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, A/HRC/12/
48 (25 September 2009); Report of the International Commission of Inquiry mandated to
establish the facts and circumstances of the events of?28 September 2009 in Guinea, S/2009/
693 (18 December 2009); Report of the independent international commission of inquiry
on Syria (n 199).
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practice. Commissions have in fact been perceived more as ad hoc tools to
react to specific emergency situations rather than permanent and inherent parts
of a standardised response to be activated in case of necessity. This may well
explain why attempts to regulate these tools at institutional level have been
rare. Furthermore, although few references to such mechanisms can be found
in international treaties, the vast majority of regulatory frameworks have been
created through instruments of soft law, which do not purport to commit any
relevant international law actor to their respect.
1.3.2 The Hague Conventions and the traditional fact-finding model
Indeed, the traditional idea of fact-finding as tool of preventive diplomacy
in the hands of states to help them solving their international disputes is
inherent to its inclusion in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes. The Conventions provided for the estab-
lishment of a specific inquiry mechanism with the consent of all the parties
affected. Article 9 of the 1907 Convention clearly determined that
‘in disputes of an international nature […] the Contracting Powers deem it ex-
pedient and desirable that the parties who have not been able to come to an
agreement by means of diplomacy, should, as far as circumstances allow, institute
an international commission of inquiry, to facilitate a solution of these disputes
by elucidating the facts by means of an impartial and conscientious investiga-
tion’.212
The Conventions also included a specific discipline on how these commissions
shall be established and function. One necessary requirement for their creation
was the consent of both parties to the dispute.213
The so-called Hague Conventions represent an important precedent for
those calling for a more comprehensive institutionalisation of the instrument
of commissions of inquiry. At the same time, given the period and the scope
of the Conventions, it is difficult to argue that such model was created having
the idea of current human rights fact-finding in mind.
1.3.3 Codification of fact-finding in the UN Charter
A slightly different value should be attached to the inclusion of fact-finding
in Articles 33 and 34 of the UN Charter. Although the UN Security Council has
212 The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlements of International Disputes (1907), UKTS
6 (1971) Cmnd 4575, Article 9.




expressively referred to Article 34 only on two occasions, the previous
subparagraphs have widely described how UN bodies have extensively been
involved in appointing fact-finding mechanisms.
Although it is difficult to appreciate a qualitative shift in the inclusion of
fact-finding in the UN Charter if compared with the previous discipline in the
Hague Conventions, an important development should be registered. Placed
at disposal of an organ mandated to maintain international peace and security,
inquiries are no longer tools in the hands of states. They do no longer serve
uniquely states’ interests and are appointed by organs whose aims may
transcend states’ national agendas. While the purpose behind the inquiries’
appointment remains the same (clarification of facts for the maintenance of
peace and security through restoring friendly relationship among states), the
perspective from which they originate shift significantly. This shift brings
important consequences in terms of how fact-finding missions are designed,
the way they collect information and formulate findings and the recommenda-
tions and policy actions they require relevant actors to take.
As we will se in the following sub-paragraphs, after its inclusion in the
UN Charter, some attempts were made to regulate and standardise the practice
of fact-finding bodies. In 1967 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution
upholding the practice of independent international fact-finding.214 Although
certain instructions were given to the Secretary General to set up a roster of
experts, this did not lead to the creation of a permanent and predisposed
inquiry mechanism.215
1.3.4 The 1991 UN General Assembly Declaration on Fact-Finding
A more substantial improvement was represented by the adoption by the
General Assembly of the 1991 Declaration on Fact-finding in the Field of the
Maintenance of International Peace and Security. The Declaration recognizes
the need for all competent organs of the United Nations involved in the
maintenance of peace and security to have full knowledge of all relevant facts
and to undertake fact-finding activities to this end.216 The Declaration con-
tains an important definition of ‘fact-finding’ considered as
214 UNGA Res. 2329 (XXII) (1967).
215 In particular, Antonio Cassese specifically refers to the Dutch proposal presented in 1967
to the UNGA to establish a permanent commission of inquiry, which was rejected and led
to the adoption of Resolution 2329. Antonio Cassese, ‘Fostering Increased Conformity with
International Standards: Monitoring and Institutional Fact-Finding’ in Antonio Cassese
(ed), Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 295,
297.
216 UNGA Declaration on Fact-finding (n 5) para. 1.
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‘any activity designed to obtain detailed knowledge of the relevant facts of any
dispute or situation which the competent United Nations organs need in order
to exercise effectively their functions in relation to the maintenance of international
peace and security’.217
It then sets a number of guiding principles, as proper fact-finding should be
‘comprehensive, objective, impartial and timely’.218
Looking at the wording of the Declaration, the General Assembly decided
to take into account states’ concerns in relation to some of the potential side
effects in establishing international fact-finding missions. These concerns seem
linked to a traditional approach to fact-finding, which considers inquiry
commissions uniquely as a tool to solve matters arising between states. Accord-
ingly, fact-finding missions shall refrain from prejudicing states’ interests and
destabilising states’ position in the international arena. In this regard, the text
of the Declaration underlines how
‘the competent United Nations organs should bear in mind that the sending of
a fact-finding mission can signal the concern of the Organization and should
contribute to building confidence and defusing the dispute or situation while avoiding
any aggravation of it’ (emphasis added).219
Also, states’ consent is perceived as conditio sine qua non for allowing fact-
finding missions to actually operate in the field. According to the declaration,
‘the sending of a United Nations fact-finding mission to the territory of any State
requires the prior consent of that State, subject to the relevant provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations’.220
At the same time the Declaration urges states ‘to endeavour to follow a policy
of admitting United Nations fact-finding missions to their territory’.221 In
this light it should be interpreted its request to states that deny access to fact-
finding missions to explain the reasons behind such decision.222
In terms of mandating organs, the Declaration refers particularly to the
powers of the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly and the UN
Secretary General. In particular the UNSG is given precedence in selecting the
most appropriate body to undertake fact-finding tasks and mandated to
217 Ibid para. 2.
218 Ibid para. 3.
219 Ibid para. 5.
220 Ibid para. 6.
221 Ibid para. 21.




‘prepare and update lists of experts in various fields who would be available
for fact-finding missions’.223
1.3.5 Fact-finding in the R2P framework
Perhaps, the most significant breakthrough in the evolution of the role of
international inquiries is linked to their inclusion within the ‘Responsibility
to Protect’ framework. The 2009 UNSG report implementing the responsibility
to protect in fact expressively referred to fact-finding investigations as mechan-
isms at disposal of the international community to react to situations of human
rights concern. The document – while referring to Article 34 of the UN Charter
and to the competence of the UNSC, the UNGA and the HRC to establish human
rights inquiries – designs a new framework around the use of fact-finding
missions and commissions of inquiry. The reference to fact-finding is in fact
included under Pillar III of the R2P framework, which relates to the timely and
effective response that the international community should put in place in
cases where states have failed in their responsibility to protect their own
people.224 In this regard, the report argues how, as a first step to react to
a human rights emergency, ‘intergovernmental bodies can play pivotal roles
in conducting on-site investigations and fact-finding missions’.225 Drawing
inspiration from the Darfur experience, it also determines that ‘[the General]
Assembly or the [Security] Council […] may appoint a fact-finding mission
to investigate and report on alleged violations of international law’.226
More important is the emphasis on the role entrusted to fact-finding
missions within the international community’s response. According to the
report:
‘investigation, of course, is not a substitute for “timely and decisive” protective
action […] but rather should be seen as an initial step towards it. If undertaken
early in a crisis, at the first sign that a State is failing to meet its obligations relating
to the responsibility to protect, such on-site missions can also provide opportunities
for delivering messages directly to key decision makers on behalf of the larger
international community, for example, by trying to dissuade them from destructive
courses of action that could make them subject to prosecution by the International
Criminal Court or ad hoc tribunals’.227
223 Ibid paras. 14, 15.
224 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (n 12) paras. 49, 52.
225 Ibid para. 52.
226 Ibid.
227 Ibid para. 53.
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This passage is of crucial importance in order to appreciate the evolution of
human rights inquiries as instrument under international law. This is mainly
for two reasons.
The first stands behind the idea that fact-finding missions are no longer
tools that are uniquely in the hands of states. In this regard, the report imple-
menting the R2P framework certified what had already become a common
practice. It goes without saying that states’ consent and cooperation with these
investigations are no longer a conditio sine qua non for their existence. Thus,
fact-finding becomes part of an international community’s response that goes
far beyond single states’ agendas. This response directly tackles a new and
emerging interest in the modern international arena: the need for individuals
to have their basic human rights recognized and respected regardless of their
nationality, as a matter of concern of the international community as a whole.
In this regard, the transformation of the role of commissions of inquiry should
be conceived as inherent part of a wider renovation of the basic foundations
of the international world order. As the UNSG report acknowledges,
‘it is now well established in international law and practice that sovereignty does
not bestow impunity on those who organize, incite or commit crimes relating to
the responsibility to protect’.228
The second reason relates to the role that fact-finding missions are requested
to exercise. According to the R2P framework, human rights investigations
should act as initial step in the international community’s response aimed at
preventing gross human rights violations to happen or rapidly responding
to such abuses. In this context, human rights investigations act as early warning
mechanisms,229 not only by reporting emerging trends of human rights
violations through their fact-finding and legal analysis but also through de-
terring further violations to happen by suggesting the international community
further courses of action.
In this field, we can see once again how theory and practice have mutually
inspired each other. It is undisputed that the R2P framework, as further
developed in the UNSG’s report, has echoed certain important developments
from the practice related to the establishment of human rights investigations
and their impact on specific responses undertaken by the international com-
munity. The precedents set by fact-finding experiences such as those in former
Yugoslavia and Darfur were surely in the minds of the drafters of the 2009
R2P implementing report. At the same time, one can also argue that the
enshrinement of the fact-finding tool in the R2P framework has definitely acted
as engine for the consolidation of such a new model of commissions of inquiry,
228 Ibid para. 54.




in particular if one looks at the activism demonstrated in the field by the UN
HRC in more recent years.
1.3.6 Guidelines on human rights fact-finding and the 2015 OHCHR codifica-
tion
Another aspect of the so-called ‘institutionalisation’ of human rights fact-
finding relates to the adoption and publication of guidelines and manuals by
UN bodies. These instruments represent important attempts to shed more clarity
and develop a more coherent methodology in relation to different aspects of
a practice that has been too often left to non-harmonized interventions.
A first important example is represented by the UN Secretary General
‘Model rules of procedure for United Nations bodies dealing with violations
of human rights’. This instrument was adopted in 1970 and displays 25 rules
divided into eleven sections according to the life cycle of human rights fact-
finding investigations. It represents a first attempt to codify standard rules
for a more coherent exercise of fact-finding powers. In this regard, it is
specified that the ‘ad hoc organ’ deputed to undertake fact-finding should
be intended as subsidiary organ of the UN body responsible for its establish-
ment and for the drafting of its terms of reference.230 Those individuals
appointed as commissioners should act according to principles of impartiality
and integrity while decisions are taken by majority.231 In relation to states’
consent and cooperation, the language of the rules appears ambiguous. In
particular, it is determined that the mandating organ may request the affected
state(s) to cooperate with the ad hoc body in different areas (including informa-
tion request and access to territory).232 However, there is no specific reference
to the binding nature of such request or to whether state(s)’ consent should
be considered a necessary requirement to activate the ad hoc body. In this
regard, certain authors have emphasized that,
‘while the model rules are […] a modest start toward establishing normative
procedures, they are not an answer to the problem of ensuring manifest fairness
and diligence in investigations’.233
A more substantive development is represented by the ‘Training Manual for
Human Rights Monitoring’ adopted in 2001 by the Office of the High Com-
missioner for Human Rights. It should be noted how the manual is not directed
specifically to commissions of inquiry/fact-finding missions but it targets more
230 Model Rules (n 10) Rule 3.
231 Ibid Rules 6, 15.
232 Ibid Rule 17.
233 Franck and Fairley (n 152) 321.
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generally any UN body mandated to monitor and report over human rights
violations.
The Manual defines its primary objective as ‘to improve the efficiency,
professionalism and impact of human rights field operations in implementing
their monitoring mandates’.234 This can be accomplished by providing com-
prehensive information on human rights standards that are relevant to the
UN field operations. It also needs the development of specific skills and tech-
niques for human rights monitoring by UN human rights staff.
The Manual clarifies the distinction between ‘monitoring’ and ‘fact-finding’.
‘Monitoring’ is defined as a broad term describing ‘the active collection,
verification and immediate use of information to address human rights prob-
lems’.235 On the contrary ‘fact-finding’ is described as ‘a process of drawing
conclusions of fact from monitoring activities’.236 According to the Manual,
‘fact-finding entails a great deal of information gathering in order to establish
and verify the facts surrounding an alleged human rights violation. Moreover,
fact-finding means pursuing reliability through the use of generally accepted
procedures and by establishing a reputation for fairness and impartiality’.237
On these grounds, ‘fact-finding’ is considered necessarily a narrower term than
‘monitoring’.
Finally, to respond to the recent proliferation of commissions of inquiry
and fact-finding missions appointed under the UN human rights umbrella,
the OHCHR published in 2015 a document entitled ‘Guidance and Practice of
commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions on international human rights
and humanitarian law’ (‘the Guidance’). Unlike previous instruments, this
document specifically focuses on international commissions of inquiry/fact-
finding missions appointed to investigate international human rights and
humanitarian law violations. It means that it does not deal with parallel
mechanisms of investigations, including OHCHR/UN field missions and special
rapporteurs’ reports.
The publication, which provides policy, methodological, legal and opera-
tional guidance, can be seen as the result of ‘two decades of experience by
OHCHR in advising, supporting, deploying and reviewing international commis-
sions of inquiry and fact-finding missions’.238
According to the OHCHR, the Guidance serves the purpose of supporting
234 OHCHR, ‘Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring’ (New York & Geneva, United
Nations 2001) para. 19.
235 Ibid para. 28.
236 Ibid para. 29.
237 Ibid.
238 OHCHR, Guidance and Practice (n 3) 3. In particular, the OHCHR has recorded that it




‘the work of such international investigative bodies, and those establishing and
mandating them, in applying a consistent methodology based on best practice and
maximizing their potential to successfully fulfil their mandates’.239
Although the document seems to respond to an increasing demand for harmon-
ization and standardisation of these instruments, the OHCHR appears mindful
of the fact that
‘while existing standards and best practices provide a solid framework to guide
the work of commissions and missions, flexibility, good judgement and adaptability
will be required, as every commission/mission will in some way be unique and
require specific responses and support’.240
The Guidance contains an important definition of commissions of inquiry and
fact-finding missions in the sphere of international human rights and human-
itarian law. These are defined as
‘temporary bodies of a non-judicial nature, established either by an intergovern-
mental body or by the Secretary-General or the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, and tasked with investigating allegations of violations of international
human rights, international humanitarian law or international criminal law and
making recommendations for corrective action based on their factual and legal
findings’.241
The Guidance further incorporates some of the most salient developments
related to that evolution in the role of commissions of inquiry that has been
emphasized above. In particular, it expresses how
‘international commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions are now a key tool
in the United Nations response to situations of violations of international human
rights law and international humanitarian law, including international crimes’.242
It acknowledges their increasing importance ‘in countering impunity by
promoting accountability for such violations’, while also emphasizing how
the commissions’ work combines the collection of information and storage
of historical records with the identification of preliminary findings towards
further investigations.243 The Guidance further underlines their contribution
in recommending measures to redress violations, providing justice and re-
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Particularly striking is the reference to the role played by commissions
of inquiry in promoting accountability and inspiring political action by the
international community. In particular, the Guidance notes an increasing
reference in the mandates of commissions of inquiry to language such as
‘accountability’ and ‘perpetrators to hold accountable’. According to the OHCHR,
‘international human rights investigations have furnished crucial elements to judicial
procedures. They have done so in the inquiries of ad hoc international tribunals
and of the international Criminal Court’.244
The Guidance contains specific sections related to each substantive aspect of
the commissions’ life-cycle, including their mandate, composition, method-
ology, use of sources and evidence, cooperation by the parties, reporting and
follow-up measures. This is why many of its substance will be analysed more
in detail in the course of the following Chapter dealing with a thematic and
comparative study between different experiences of commissions of inquiry.
For the moment it should be highlighted how the Guidance refers to the
fact that
‘the United Nations has […] created a body of principles and standards for fact-
finding and inquiries under its authority and, over the years, established practice
and doctrine. United Nations-mandated commissions/missions should ensure that
they adhere to these principles and standards, reflect them in their terms of refer-
ence, methods of work and rules of procedure, and describe them in the final
report’.245
In particular, it reaffirms the need for commissions to respect, in the perform-
ance of their functions, principles such as do no harm, independence, impartial-
ity, transparency, objectivity, confidentiality, credibility, visibility, integrity,
professionalism and consistency.246 To this purpose, the Guidance includes
in the annexes two specific instruments such as the ‘International legal and
methodological standards and instruments’ and the
‘Model standard rules of procedure for commissions of inquiry/fact-finding
missions on violations of international human rights law and international human-
itarian law’.
These documents are expected to contribute to the creation of a more harmon-
ized and coherent framework in order to allow future experiences of human







1.3.7 The International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission
In this overview of institutional instruments regulating the use of international
inquiries, the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission deserves
a separate analysis.247 Established by Article 90 of Additional Protocol I to
the Geneva Conventions, the IHFFC represents a rather unique example of
permanent international commission of inquiry. However, its permanent
character is not the only sign of such uniqueness. The Commission possesses
distinctive features also in a number of other relevant areas including its
triggering mechanism, competence and procedure.
One can argue that the IHFFC combines characteristics of the most traditional
models of inquiries with those of more recent investigations. On the one hand,
in fact the Commission is expected to restore an attitude of respect for the
Conventions and formulate recommendations that can help states in peacefully
settling their disputes, in this way absolving a preventive diplomacy function.
On the other hand, the Commission is also mandated to investigate into alleged
serious breaches of the laws of war, particularly those that may trigger indi-
vidual responsibility, thus arguably fulfilling an accountability role that renders
it similar to modern human rights inquiries.
According to the ICRC, the Commission, in helping to clarify the facts and
settle disputes involving violations of the laws of war, may represent one of
the most powerful tools placed at disposal of the that High Contracting Parties
in order to comply with their commitment ‘to respect’ and ‘ensure respect’
for the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.248 In particular,
247 It is important to clarify that the following analysis will only address to a small extent the
role and function of the IHFFC, in light of its contribution to the thematic areas that will
be covered in the comparative study in Chapter 2. This instrument has been in fact the
object of extensive and advanced academic debate. For a more comprehensive overview
of the IHFFC and its potential ramifications, this author suggests to refer to the significant
body of literature already existing. In particular, see Luigi Condorelli, ‘La Commission
international humanitaire d’établissement des faits: un outil obsolète ou un moyen utile de mise
en oeuvre du droit international humanitaire?’ (2001) 824 IRRC 393; Frank Hampson, ‘Fact-
finding and the International Fact-Finding Commission’ in Fox Hazel and Meter Michael
(eds), Armed Conflict and the New Law, Vol. II, Effecting Compliance (London, the British
Institute of International and Comparative Law 1993) 53; Silvain Vité, Les procédures inter-
nationales d’établissement des faits dans la mise en ouvre du droit international humanitaire
(Brussels, Bruylant 1999); Fritz Kalshoven, ‘The International Humanitarian Fact-finding
Commission: its Birth and Early Years’ in Erik Denters and Nico Schrijvers (eds), Reflections
on International Law from the Low Countries (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 1998)
201.
248 ICRC, ‘The International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission’ (Geneva, Advisory Service
on International Humanitarian Law 2001).
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‘[b]y recognizing the Commission’s competence […] a State contributes significantly
to the implementation of international humanitarian law and to ensuring compliance
with it during armed conflict’.249
Although envisaged in 1977, the Commission was officially constituted only
in 1991 after twenty declarations by states accepting its jurisdiction were
deposited.
The Commission is composed by fifteen individuals elected by those states
that have recognized its competence.250 The members act in their personal
capacity and do not represent the interests of the State of which they are
nationals.
In relation to the triggering mechanism, the IHFFC cannot act proprio motu
in order to investigate a specific claim. It needs a request filed by a State that
has specifically recognised its competence. Only States have the authority to
activate the Commission, while no such competence is attributed to individuals,
non-state armed groups or international and non-governmental organisations.
Another important element concerns the fact that the Commission can invest-
igate a claim only with the consent of all the parties involved. In this regard
the functioning of the IHFFC is anchored to the traditional idea that considers
fact-finding as dependent from states’ consent.
With regard to the acceptance of the IHFFC’s competence, the mechanism
appears similar to the one designed to trigger the jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ). In particular, a State does not automatically
become bound to accept the Commission’s competence by the mere ratification
of Additional Protocol I. It needs to submit either a comprehensive declaration
(thereby permanently recognising the competence of the Commission) or an
ad hoc declaration, by which it consents to the IHFFC’s investigation only with
regard to a particular dispute.
There is a clear difference between an organ such as the IHFFC and an
adjudicative mechanism such a court or a tribunal. In this regard, the ICRC
has underlined how the Commission was neither set up with the intent of
handing over judgments nor its proceeding contain the fundamental guarantees
ensured by a judicial trial.251
While the distinction between the IHFFC and international courts or tribunals
appear clear in principle, a certain degree of contamination between the two
models emerges in relation to procedures employed.
In particular, the IHFFC discipline provides that investigations will not be
conducted by the Commission as a whole but by a seven-member Chamber
249 Ibid.
250 For a comprehensive and updated list of the countries that have recognized the Commis-
sion’s competence visit the IHFFC website at http://www.ihffc.org/index.asp?Language





consisting of five members of the Commission in addition to two ad-hoc
appointees nominated by the parties involved in the dispute.252 This element
seems clearly to draw inspiration from the consolidated practice of the ICJ to
grant the parties of a contentious case the possibility to appoint ad hoc judges.
Furthermore, in the course of the investigations the parties concerned will
be invited to assist the Chamber’s own investigations by providing information
and presenting and challenging evidence. All evidence is disclosed to the
parties involved and each of them will have the possibility to file observations.
This adversarial model appears as rather unique in the ambit of international
inquiries and places the IHFFC in a blurred zone between fact-finding and
judicial proceedings.
With regard to its mandate, the IHFFC was established to investigate alleged
grave breaches or other serious violations of the Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol I; and to ‘facilitate, through its good offices, the restoration
of an attitude of respect for the Conventions and this Protocol’.253 This word-
ing from one side limits the IHFFC investigations only to those most serious
violations of IHL.254 From the other, it allows the Commission to go beyond
the mere fact-finding in order to engage in a dialogue with the concerned
parties and formulate recommendations that would support states in peacefully
settling their disputes and in restoring the respect for basic IHL rules.
The specific reference to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I
in its mandate seemed immediately to pose significant limitations to the work
of the Commission in particular with regard to modern asymmetric armed
conflicts, given its inability to investigate violations occurring in non-inter-
national armed conflicts or to refer to IHL instruments other than Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol I. For this reason, since its official consti-
tution in 1991 the IHFFC has declared its availability to investigate claims arising
also from non-international armed conflicts and to take into account the whole
framework of IHL norms.255
Looking at the practice, to date the Commission is still awaiting its first
case. After more than two decades from its formal constitution, around seventy
states have recognized its competence. Unfortunately, such numbers had little
impact on the reality on the ground, namely that as for today the Commission
252 Ibid.
253 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (n 9) Article 90(2)(c)(ii).
254 ICRC, The International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission (n 248).
255 Frits Kalshoven, ‘The International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission: A Sleeping
Beauty?’ (2002) Humanitäres Völkerrecht 214.
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has ‘failed to attract actual work’.256 This has led certain authors to label it
as a ‘sleeping beauty’.257
There are many reasons behind the inactivity of the IHFFC. Two appear
to be particularly striking. The first one is related to its independence. The
fact that the Commission was established as a treaty body meant that it could
enjoy full autonomy from other relevant frameworks such as the ICRC or the
United Nations.258 Such autonomy, while it may strengthen the Commission’s
impartiality and independence, can also explain why the international com-
munity has not enthusiastically supported its activation in the last decades.
A clear example is represented by the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Despite
the ICRC time and time again had called on the parties to refer their claims
to the IHFFC, the UNSC decided to set up a brand-new commission of experts
rather than pressuring warring states to refer to the existing Fact-Finding
Commission’s services.259
Conversely, the second reason for the Commission’s inactivation is related
to its dependence from states’ consent. The fact that Article 90 did not
empower the Commission with a right of proprio motu initiative or with com-
pulsory and automatic competence severely impacted its ability to function.
It is in fact well known the reluctance of parties to an armed conflict to allow
their conduct to be scrutinised by international bodies.
One can criticise the recent shift in human rights/IHL mandated commis-
sions of inquiry practice to operate regardless of the consent of the parties
affected. While there is no doubt that states’ cooperation will significantly
increase the chances of success of fact-finding experiences, state practice has
also demonstrated that human rights and IHL investigations are still perceived
as a threat rather than a tool to advance the cause of peace and stability. In
this regard, the experience of the IHFFC may stand as the most vivid example
of the limited space international fact-finding mechanisms are accorded when
left entirely in the hands of states.
256 Ibid.
257 See, Elzbieta Mikos-Skuza,‘The International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission: An
Awakening Beauty’ in Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Hans-Peter Gasser, Thilo Marauhn, and
Natalino Ronzitti (eds), Frieden in Freheit: Festschrift fur Michael Bothe zum 70 Geburstag
(Nomos 2008) 481. However, as Professor Kalshoven clearly explains, it was doubtful that
even at its origin the Commission could be defined as a ‘beauty’. In this regard, Professor
Kalshoven points out how, during the debates for the formulation of Article 90, opposing
views were expressed between proponents of a strong commission with automatic and
compulsory jurisdiction and opponents of the very idea of an independent fact-finding
body. The compromise achieved through the adoption of Article 90 gives raise to a mechan-
ism that is far away from the perfect archetype of an effective fact-finding and dispute
settlement mechanism. Kalshoven (n 255) 213-214.
258 Kalshoven (n 255) 215.
259 On this issue, August Reinisch, ‘The International Fact-Finding Commission to Article 90
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and its Potential Enquiry Competence




Despite no cases have been filed to its office so far, the IHFFC has been
engaged in a number of promotional and confidence-building activities.
Through its members, the Commission visited capitals and met with political
and military representatives of states. It also interacted with relevant organs
such as the ICRC and the UN Security Council. With regard to the latter, the
possibility of utilising the services of the Commission for specific enquiries
into alleged serious violations of IHL has been discussed.260
Furthermore, Professor Kalshoven has duly noted how the Commission
has been repeatedly involved in situations that might have led to real work.
For example, The ‘Tamil Tigers’ group manifested their interest in submitting
to the Commission claims in relation to alleged violations of IHL perpetrated
during the Sri-Lanka civil war. Similarly, the Chechnya authorities invited
the Commission to investigate violations allegedly committed by Russian
forces. This submission was based on the assumption, considered inadmissible
by the Commission, that Chechnya was actually an independent State emerged
from the succession from the Soviet Union. In relation to the 2001 war in
Afghanistan, Amnesty International unsuccessfully urged the countries mem-
bers of the Northern Alliance Coalition (the United States and the United
Kingdom) to request the Commission to investigate over the high tool of
casualties recorded in the prisons of Maza-I-Sharif.261 However, the context
where the Commission went closest to an actual referral was Colombia, due
to an agreement – later vanished by a change in the Government’s policy –
reached between the Colombian Government and the rebel armed group of
the ELN.262
Finally, in the aftermath of the horrific attack to a Médicins Sans Frontières
(MSF) hospital in Kunduz (Afghanistan) on 3rd October 2015 allegedly resulting
from a NATO airstrike, MSF publicly urged
‘signatory States to activate the [International Humanitarian Fact-Finding] Commis-
sion to establish the truth and to reassert the protected status of hospitals in con-
flict’.263
While such request has revitalised public interest in the Commission, certain
scholars have duly emphasized how an IHFFC’s involvement in the dispute
260 Kalshoven (n 255) 214.
261 Ibid 215.
262 In particular, according to Kalshoven, ‘the case of Colombia is illuminating in that it brings
to light the importance of trust gradually growing between parties, to the point where they
can seriously consider entering into an agreement involving the submission of their mutual
accusations of wrongful conduct of hostilities to an independent, neutral body of outsiders’.
Kalshoven (n 255) 215.
263 MSF, ‘Afghanistan: Enough. Even war has rules – MSF calls for State activation of the
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will be highly unlikely.264 Interestingly enough, also in this case the main
obstacle for the Commission’s involvement is represented by its dependency
on affected states’ consent.
1.4 DEFINING ‘COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY/FACT-FINDING MISSIONS’ FOR THE
SCOPE OF THE COMPARATIVE THEMATIC ANALYSIS
After having provided a historical overview of the role of commissions of
inquiry as evolved in practice and as codified in international instruments,
this dissertation will engage in a comparative thematic analysis (that will be
conducted in the following Chapter) of a number of relevant experiences of
commissions of inquiry.
To this purpose, it is necessary to identify which particular inquiries will
form the subject matter of this study. Indeed, given the accounts provided
above, the potential scope of investigation would be enormous. It is thus
important to restrict and limit the scope of this study by applying a number
of criteria that will help in properly identifying and framing the object of the
comparative thematic analysis.
The first criterion concerns the subject matter of international investigations.
As it has been highlighted in the historical overview, international commissions
of inquiry and fact-finding missions have been established with a wide variety
of different mandates, ranging from settling maritime disputes or incidents
to investigating the causes of an armed conflict. The comparative thematic
analysis will restrict its scope to those missions established to investigate so-
called ‘atrocities’, namely allegations of widespread international human rights
and humanitarian law violations and possible implications related to the
commission of international crimes.
The second criterion regards their national/international character and
their mandating institution(s). Inquiries can be set up at national and inter-
national level. Those created at international level can be established in many
different manners. They can be activated by means of bilateral conventions
based on agreements between states; they can be included in multilateral
treaties (such as the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission);
or they can be set up by UN organs or by bodies active in the context of
regional organizations. Also non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can set
264 Catherine Harwood, ‘Will the ‘Sleeping Beauty’ Awaken? The Kunduz Hospital Attack
and the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission’, EJIL Talk! (15 October 2015);
Ove Bring, ‘The Kunduz Hospital Attack: The Existence of a Fact-Finding Commission’,




up their own investigations on specific incidents or patterns involving viola-
tions of human rights.265
The comparative thematic analysis will concentrate only on international
inquiries and mainly on those commissions established within the United
Nations framework. There are a number of reasons why it should be the case.
Firstly, looking at the current institutional frameworks, the UN should still
be considered as the most authoritative representation of the international
community of states in the fields of the maintenance of peace and security
and the protection of human rights. Consequently, any mechanism established
with its framework as the potential to address and affect the response of any
State of the international community, regardless of its regional affiliation.
Furthermore, the UN has developed a sophisticated and rather unique system
for the promotion and protection of human rights, which now includes increas-
ing monitoring and reporting also of those situations of armed conflicts where
the applicability of human rights law intersects with IHL. This has led the UN
to take the lead in establishing the large majority of international commissions
of inquiry/fact-finding missions investigating human rights and IHL violations.
In this regard, it can be argued that states and regional organisations still
perceive the UN as the primary actor capable to entrust a human rights invest-
igation with the necessary legitimacy, as expression of the will of the whole
international community of states. As a consequence, UN sponsored commis-
sions of inquiry still receive the highest level of attention not only in terms
of technical follow-up mechanisms (through the UN human rights machinery
and the UN Security Council) but also in relation to public opinion and media
coverage. These are factors that may affect discussions within diplomatic circles
and thus shape states’ policies. Such a focus on the UN may also be linked
to the need of assessing potential trends in terms of harmonisation and
standardisation of the practice. In this regard, the 2015 OHCHR ‘Guidance and
Practice’ can represent the perfect example of how preserving the competence
under one framework may help developing useful lessons learnt and common
guidelines.
However, certain examples of human rights inquiries established by
regional organizations or upon collaboration between states and regional/
international mechanisms will also be taken into account, particularly in cases
where their mandates and findings may allow a comparison with UN own
inquiries. Pertinent examples are the 2008 EU Independent International Fact-
Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia and the 2009 Arab League Fact-
265 See, as an example, the International Commission of Investigation on Human Rights
Violations in Rwanda since October 1, 1990, which was established jointly by FIDH, Africa
Watch, ICHRDD and UIDH in 1993. The Commission was one of the first expert bodies
to raise attention and warning against the threat of an imminent genocide in Rwanda. Final
Report of the International Commission of Investigation on Human Rights Violations in
Rwanda since October 1, 1990 (March 1993).
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Finding Committee on the Gaza Conflict as well as those inquiries established
within the framework of the European Commission and Court of Human
Rights.266
The third criterion relates to the nature of the body mandated to conduct
the investigation. Inquiries can in fact be conducted in many different ways.
Human rights violations can be investigated directly by a UN or regional
organization organ;267 through the work of Special Rapporteurs;268 through
field reports by UN missions in loco;269 through the establishment of ad hoc
commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions; or through OHCHR led
investigations.270
The comparative thematic analysis will mainly focus on those inquiries
– namely, commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions, OHCHR investigations,
panels of Inquiry, high-level missions, commissions of experts, mapping
exercises – which are established on an ad hoc basis through the appointment
of external experts acting independently and the setting up of a temporary
secretariat acting as technical and administrative support. In particular, it is
the ad hoc nature – including the appointment of external independent com-
missioners, their particular expertise and type of coordination with the secret-
ariat put at disposal – that differentiates these bodies from the other types
of investigations mentioned above.
The fourth criterion relates to the historic period. The comparative analysis
will mainly deal with those commissions established in recent times, with an
emphasis on the period ranging between 1990 and the present. As already
explained in the previous sub-chapters, this period represents an important
watershed in understanding the evolution of the role of commissions of
inquiry, particularly in dealing with human rights and international human-
266 Council of the European Union, Decision 2008/901/CFSP (2008); Report of the Independent
Fact-Finding Committee on Gaza Presented to the League of Arab States (30 April 2009).
For an assessment of the practice of fact-finding missions created in the framework of the
European Court and Commission of Human Rights see, Philip Leach – Costas Paraskeva –
Gordana Uzelac, ‘International Human Rights and Fact-Finding: An analysis of the fact-
finding missions conducted by the European Commission and Court of Human Rights’
(London Metropolitan University 2009).
267 See, as an example, UNSG, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Mali’, S/
2014/943 (23 December 2014); UNSG, ‘Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem and the occupied Syrian Golan’, A/HRC/25/38 (12
February 2014).
268 See, as an example, the UN special rapporteurs and independent experts set up on the
situation of human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Belarus, Central African
Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Eritrea, Mali, Myanmar, Somalia, Sudan,
Syria and Islamic Republic of Iran.
269 See, as an example, the Human Rights Monitoring Mission deployed by OHCHR to Ukraine
on March 2014 to evaluate and report on the human rights situation and to provide support
to the Government of Ukraine in the promotion and protection of human rights.
270 See, as an example, the OHCHR investigations mandated by the Human Rights Council




itarian law violations. The aim of this study is in fact not only to assess the
commissions’ role in ascertaining facts for dispute settlements’ purposes but
also and foremost to measure their ability to resort to the application of IHRL
and IHL in order to highlight patterns of human rights abuses, determine
responsibilities and in so inspire possible actions by the international commun-
ity, including avenues to ensure accountability.
In this regard, the end of the Cold War and the passage from the 20th to
the 21st Century has been characterized by a number of events that suggest
using it as starting point for the purpose of this study. These events are related
firstly to the creation of a new world order emerging from the termination
of the policy of the ‘two blocs’. This has indeed affected the international
community’s involvement in situations of armed conflicts and internal human
rights violations. In particular, an increasing level of interventionism by
international organs was progressively developed in matters before considered
as falling within the exclusive domain of states (which were often shielded
by the imposition of the veto power exercised within the policy of ‘two
blocks’). Secondly, the establishment of international criminal tribunals and
the renewed importance of international criminal law also stood as a new
paradigm and game-changer in the debate concerning human rights violations.
In addition, the definition and progressive development of the R2P concept
and the establishment of the UN Human Rights Council are also elements
whose importance for human rights inquiries (especially in terms of their
scope) should not be underestimated. These elements, combined together,
clearly explain why the latest twenty-five years marked an extremely interest-




2 Commissions of Inquiry into Practice
A Comparative Thematic Analysis of the Most
Relevant Experiences of Commissions of Inquiry
2.1 INTRODUCTION
As mentioned above, this Chapter will be devoted to a more in-depth analysis
of the practice of international commissions of inquiry and fact-finding
missions. The analysis will pursue a comparative and a thematic approach.
In lieu of providing an account of each commission separately, this work will
identify a number of relevant themes (or thematic areas) and for each of them
analyse and compare the contribution provided by different commissions. The
author believes that through such an approach this study will serve the
purpose of evaluating the role of these bodies and their impact much more
than just limiting itself to summarize the main findings of each commission.
To this purpose, two categories need to be identified. These are the type
of fact-finding experiences that will serve as examples (the subject matter) and
the relevant themes (or thematic areas) that will form the basis of the comparat-
ive analysis.
2.2 THE SUBJECT MATTER: COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY, FACT-FINDING MISSIONS
AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS
The selection of commissions of inquiry that will be compared in the thematic
analysis has been made on the basis of five different criteria that have been
outlined and motivated in detail in Chapter 1.4. To recap, these criteria are:
· The subject matter of the investigation;
· The international character and the mandating institution;
· The type of body mandated to carry out the investigation;
· The historical period.
Based on the argumentation provided in Chapter 1.4, the examples that will
be compared mainly respond to the following characteristics:
· The commissions are mandated mainly to investigate serious IHL and/or
IHRL violations, with an emphasis on the perpetration of international
crimes;
· They have been established by international organizations, mainly by




· They are bodies composed by external experts that exercise their functions
independently from the mandating organs and are assigned an ad hoc task;
· They have been established in the period ranging from 1990 and 2016;
Accordingly, the thematic comparative analysis will mainly be based on the
experience of international commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions,
panels of inquiry, OHCHR investigations, investigative teams and mapping and
conflicts exercises that have been established between 1990 and 2016, that have
been composed of external and independent experts and mandated by an
international or regional organizations to investigate serious IHL and/or IHRL
violations in a specific context performing their tasks with an accountability
focus.
2.3 THEMATIC AREAS SELECTED
Based on the most-debate aspects of the work undertaken by commissions
of inquiry, the thematic areas selected for the comparative analysis are the
following:
· Specific mandate received;
· Standard of proof implemented;
· Impact of cooperation/non cooperation by the parties;
· Selection, collection and use of sources and evidence;
· Legal analysis and contribution to the development of international law;
· Contribution in the areas of international criminal law and accountability.




The term mandate indicates the type of instructions received by a commission
of inquiry in its founding resolution. The instructions refer to the tasks pro-
vided to the commission and the boundaries set in terms of time frame (ratione
temporis), subject matter (ratione materiae), legal framework applicable, territorial
range (ratione loci) and actors whose conduct should be investigated (ratione
personae).271
271 OHCHR, Guidance and Practice (n 3) 67.
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The mandate represents an extremely important factor in shaping the
commissions of inquiry’s work and in directing their findings towards specific
conclusions. At a first sight, it is also an element that escapes the commissions’
control as their mandates are normally framed by political organs such as the
UN Security Council and the Human Rights Council.
In principle there is nothing wrong with political organs such as the
Security Council or the Human Rights Council setting up commissions of
inquiry and laying down their mandates. In effect, appointing fact-finding
bodies falls within their powers and competences. Problems may arise when
political organs decide to resort to human rights inquiries in order to serve
their political agenda. This appears in contrast with the very nature of commis-
sions of inquiry as independent technical bodies entrusted to impartially
establish facts. It can also negatively affect their work and prejudice the cred-
ibility of their findings. This is even more the case in conflicts where the
polarized rhetoric of the different actors involved can seriously jeopardize the
process of impartially stating the facts and correctly applying the law.
2.4.1.2 Different types of mandates
If we take a close look at the history of commissions of inquiry in the fields
of human rights and IHL, their experiences reflect a variety of different
mandates. Indeed, such diversification is linked with the manifold (and often
unique) character of the situations under investigation. It also appears in line
with the idea that commissions of inquiry represent an ad hoc response to
ad hoc, specific crises situation.
Therefore, certain commissions have been requested to investigate isolated
incidents such as targeted assassinations, coup d’état or violations perpetrated
in relation to specific and circumscribed events. This is the case, for example,
of the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi, the Commission of Inquiry on the
events connected with the march planned for 25 March 2005 in Abidjan (Cote
d’Ivoire), the Commission of Inquiry on Guinea and the HRC Fact-Finding
Mission on the Israeli attacks on the Gaza Flotilla.272 Indeed, this entails that
272 For example, the 1995 Commission of Inquiry on Burundi was given the mandate to ‘(a)
establish the facts relating to the assassination of the President of Burundi on 21 October
1993, the massacres and other related serious acts of violence which followed’. The 2004
investigation in Cote D’Ivoire .was requested to investigate alleged human rights violations
committed in connection with the march planned for Abidjan on 25 March 2004. The
Commission of Inquiry on Guinea was mandated to ‘establish the facts and circumstances
of the events of 28 September 2009 in Guinea and the related events in their immediate
aftermath’. Finally, the 2010 Commission of Inquiry on the Gaza Flotilla events was set
up to investigate violations of international law resulting from the Israeli attacks on the
Flotilla. See UNSC Res. 1012 (1995) para. 1; Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the
events connected with the march planned for 25 March 2005 in Abdijan, S/2004/384 (13
May 2004); Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Guinea (n 211) para. 1;




their temporal scopes have been circumscribed to a limited number of days,
if not hours. It also bears important consequences in terms of their findings,
as their accounts are often more detailed than those of commissions charged
with much broader temporal mandates.
Other examples of commissions of inquiry have been mandated to more
generally investigate violations of IHL and IHRL committed during broader
contexts such as armed conflicts. This is the case of the Commission of Experts
on the Former Yugoslavia, the Commission of Experts on Rwanda, the 2009
UN Fact Finding Mission and the 2014 Commission of Inquiry on the Gaza
conflicts and those commissions of inquiry recently established in relation to
Libya, Central African Republic (CAR) and Syria.
Furthermore, certain international inquiries have also been requested to
analyse and investigate long time trends marked by institutionalised and
systematic patterns of human rights violations. In these cases, the fact-finding
component necessarily becomes less detailed in relation to specific events and
the selection of incidents is based upon criteria that reflect the need to highlight
the existence of identified patterns and institutionalised policies. For example,
the UN Fact-Finding Mission on settlements was mandated by the HRC to
investigate the impact of the Israeli settlement enterprise, a policy which
originated in 1967 and still remains in force today, on the human rights of
the Palestinian people living in the OPT.273 The commissions of inquiry on
North Korea and Eritrea were based on similar grounds, namely to investigate
the state-sponsored and institutionalised patterns of systematic and widespread
violations of human rights associated with regimes that have remained in
power for decades.
Finally, some commissions have been requested, within their broader
mandate, to make findings in relation to a specific question or allegation. For
example, the Commission of Experts on Rwanda was requested to provide
conclusions on the evidence of grave violations of international humanitarian
law committed in the territory of Rwanda, including the evidence of possible
acts of genocide. Indeed, the perpetration or not of the crime of genocide in
the context of Rwanda seemed not only a further specification within the
broader mandate, but directed also the Commission’s investigation towards
reaching specific findings. Similarly, the 2004 Commission of Inquiry on Darfur
was mandated to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian
law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties and also to determine
whether or not acts of genocide have occurred. Mandates referring to specific
law, including international humanitarian and human rights law, resulting from the Israeli
attacks on the flotilla of ships carrying humanitarian assistance’, A/HRC/15/21 (27 Septem-
ber 2010).
273 Human Rights Council, A/HRC/RES/19/17 (2012) para. 9; Report of the commission of
inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, A/HRC/25/63
(7 February 2014) para. 1; Report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in Eritrea,
A/HRC/29/42 (4 June 2015) para. 4.
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questions or allegations have also instructed the 2006 Independent Special
Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, the 2006 Commission of Inquiry on
Lebanon and the 2012 Commission of Inquiry on North Korea.274
With regard to the geographical and temporal scope and the time available
to accomplish the mandate, each experience of commissions of inquiry differs.
As it was emphasized by the 2015 OHCHR Guidance, ‘the terms of the mandate
necessarily have an impact on the time frame and resources required to fulfil
it’, which means that technical resources (including intellectual, material and
logistic support) and budget provided should be commensurate to the mandate
received.275
2.4.1.3 The influence of mandating organs: unilateral and pre-determined mandates
Coming back to the initial question concerning the capability of political organs
to frame the commissions’ mandate and, in this way, indirectly affecting their
work and findings, two important trends should be highlighted.
The first one concerns the establishment of commissions provided with
a one-sided mandate, namely a mandate that requires commissions to invest-
igate only the alleged violations perpetrated by one side of the conflict. The
issue has emerged particularly in relation to the approach undertaken by the
UN Human Rights Council (and previously by the Commission on Human
Rights) towards events in Israel and the OPT.
In particular, the commission of inquiry charged to investigate events
immediately following the outbreak of the so-called ‘Second Intifada’ in 2000
was mandated by the Commission on Human Rights
‘to gather and compile information on violations of human rights and acts which
constitute grave breaches of international humanitarian law by the Israeli occupying
Power in the occupied Palestinian territories’ (emphasis added)
274 In particular, the Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste was requested to ‘establish
the facts and circumstances relevant to incidents that took place on 28 and 29 April and
23, 24 and 25 May and related events or issues that contributed to the crisis, clarify respons-
ibility for those events and recommend measures of accountability for crimes and serious
violations of human rights allegedly committed during the mandated period’; see, Report
of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste (2
October 2006) para. 1. In relation to the Commission of Inquiry on the situation of human
rights on North Korea, the inquiry was mandate to pursue three interlinked objectives
(namely (a) further investigating and documenting human rights violations; (b) collecting
and documenting victim and perpetrator accounts; (c) ensuring accountability) and pointed
towards nine non-exhaustive substantive areas of investigations including violations of
the right to food, violations associated with prison camps, torture, arbitrary arrest and
detention, discrimination, violations of the freedom of expression, violations of the right
to life, violations of the freedom of movement and enforced disappearances; see, Report
of the Commission of Inquiry on the situation of human rights in North Korea (n 273)
para. 3.




without referring to any alleged violations committed by the Palestinian
side.276
The UN Human Rights Council, which replaced the Commission on Human
Rights in 2006, immediately set up two commissions of inquiry into events
related to the 2006 ‘Lebanon War’ and the shelling of the Gaza Strip’s town
of Beit Hanoun following Israeli military operations. The two resolutions
dispatching the investigations both enshrined one-sided mandates. In parti-
cular, the international Commission of Inquiry into Lebanon was mandated
to
‘(a) to investigate the systematic targeting and killings of civilians by Israel in
Lebanon; (b) to examine the types of weapons used by Israel and their conformity
with international law; and (c) to assess the extent and deadly impact of Israeli
attacks on human life, property, critical infrastructure and the environment’.277
Similarly, the High-Level Mission to Beit Hanoun was required to
‘assess the situation of victims; address the needs of survivors; and make recom-
mendations on ways and means to protect Palestinian civilians against any further
Israeli assaults’.278
The establishment by the HRC of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza
Conflict in 2009 followed the same line. The Fact-Finding Mission’s founding
resolution in fact requested it to
‘investigate all violations of international human rights law and international
humanitarian law by the occupying Power, Israel, against the Palestinian people through-
out the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in the occupied Gaza Strip,
due to the current aggression’, (emphasis added)
without any reference to the conduct of Palestinian armed groups.279
It should be noted how commissions reacted in different ways to such
instructions. In the case of the Beit Hanoun and Lebanon missions, the commis-
sioners acted in accordance with the tasks received and refrained to investigate
the conducts of other actors involved. However, the Commission of Inquiry
on Lebanon duly noted the limitations inherent to such a mandate. In parti-
cular, it made clear how the mandate received had
276 CHR, Report of the Fifth Special Session ‘Grave and massive violations of the human rights
of the Palestinian people by Israel’, E/CN.4/S-5/5 E/2000/112 (19 October 2000).
277 Human Rights Council, S-2/1 (2006) para. 7.
278 Human Rights Council, Special session resolution S-3/1 (2006), para. 7.
279 Human Rights Council, A/HRC/RES/S-9/1 (2009) para. 14.
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‘limits ratione personae (actions by the Israeli military) and ratione loci (on Lebanese
territory) and [did] not allow for a full examination of all of the aspects of the
conflict, nor does it permit consideration of the conduct of all parties’.280
In relation to the need to investigate conducts by Hezbollah, the Commission
argued how
‘any independent, impartial and objective investigation into a particular conduct
during the course of hostilities must of necessity be with reference to all the belliger-
ents involved.’281
That said, the Commission noted how
‘it was not entitled […] to construe [its mandate] as equally authorizing the investi-
gation of the actions by Hezbollah in Israel. To do so would exceed the Commis-
sion’s interpretative functions and would be to usurp the Council’s powers’.282
A different approach was taken by other commissions. For example, the 2000
Inquiry Commission referred to its mandate as being ‘to investigate violations
of human rights and humanitarian law in the occupied Palestinian territories
after 28 September 2000’ without paying attention to the one-sided character
of its founding resolution.283 Although the report does not contain any remark
with regard to the unilateral mandate received, the investigative team led by
Professor Dugard decided that its investigation should look into violations
committed by both sides of the conflict. In particular, it concluded that
‘human rights violations [had] been committed by Palestinians, either under the
authority of the PA or by individual Palestinians acting seemingly without author-
ity’.284
With regard to the 2009 UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, its
initial terms of reference were informally revised and agreed upon with the
President of the HRC following Chair Commissioner Richard Goldstone’s
objections concerning the one-sided character of the mandate. Hence, the new
mandate, as referred in the Mission’s final report, referred more neutrally to
‘investigate all violations of international human rights law and international
humanitarian law that might have been committed at any time in the context of
280 Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon pursuant to Human Rights Council
resolution S-2/1, A/HRC/3/2 (23 November 2006) para. 5.
281 Ibid para. 6.
282 Ibid para. 7.
283 Report of the human rights inquiry commission established pursuant to Commission
resolution S-5/1 of 19 October 2000, E/CN.4/2001/121 (16 March 2001) para. 4.




the military operations that were conducted in Gaza during the period from 27
December 2008 and 18 January 2009, whether before, during or after’.285
In general it can be noted that, while the inclusion of one-sided language in
commissions of inquiry mandates has been a distinctive feature of the HRC’s
involvement particularly in relation to certain contexts such as Israel and the
OPT, commissions themselves have in certain cases minimized the harmful
implications of such trend. Thus, the negative impact of the HRC pursuing a
political agenda while making use of its power to set up international invest-
igations should not be overestimated. What may remain problematic is the
shadow casted by such ‘original sin’ in terms of ‘perception of credibility’ of
the commissions in the eye of the international community, something that
may negatively affect their whole follow-up process. This aspect should indeed
stimulate further reflection.
At the same time, despite the remarks made by the Lebanon Commission
on the matter, one should not attach too much value to the asserted usurpation
of the Council’s powers inherent to the commissions’ decisions to unilaterally
amend their mandates. In a number of cases, commissioners have in fact
themselves amended the mandates received or they have interpreted their
terms of reference in a way that did not harm the independence and credibility
of their investigations. This approach has been silently acknowledged by the
HRC, which has filed no opposition to this practice. Such behaviour can be
interpreted as a sign of the discretion that is generally granted to commissions
of inquiry in discharging their mandates.
The second contentious trend related to the capability of political organs
to influence the course of independent international investigations is the
inclusion in their mandates of formulas directing the commissioners towards
specific findings.286 Such a practice has been noted with concern by the UN
Fact-Finding Mission on the Flotilla events which emphasized how ‘by re-
ferring to terms such as ‘Israeli attacks on the flotilla’ or ‘violations of inter-
national law’ [in its mandate], its founding resolution seemed to determine
that such conducts had in fact occurred prior to any investigation’.287
Indeed many international investigations are created within a background
of pre-existing violations. The vast majority of resolutions establishing inter-
national inquiries already contain language referring to violations of inter-
national law. This practice might not be the ideal in light of the fairness and
impartiality of the fact-finding process but it is difficult to imagine how it can
be avoided. In this regard, one author has noted how
285 Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Gaza (n 211) para. 131.
286 On this issue see Franck and Fairley (n 152) 312, 316.
287 Report of the international fact-finding mission to investigate violations of international
law resulting from the Israeli attacks on the flotilla (n 272) para. 5.
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‘the UN has no reason to create an ad hoc international commission of inquiry unless
it believes that the commission will, in fact, discover that the investigated state
is responsible for human rights abuses’.288
However, in such context one should distinguish between those requests to
investigate alleged violations or even specific allegations (as for example the
question of genocide or the use of certain weapons)289 from those formulas
containing pre-assessed conclusions and directing the commissioners towards
reaching ‘pre-packed’ findings. While in the first case commissioners are simply
called to examine a particular allegation, in the second case the facts and the
law are somehow already ‘suggested’ to the commissioners. Indeed, only the
second case appears problematic for the commissions’ independent assessment
of the facts.
For example, the amended mandate of the international Commission of
Inquiry on Syria is to
‘investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law since March
2011 in the Syrian Arab Republic, to establish the facts and circumstances that may
amount to such violations and of the crimes perpetrated and, where possible, to
identify those responsible with a view to ensuring that perpetrators of violations,
including those that may constitute crimes against humanity, are held accountable’
(emphasis added).290
It is not clear why among the crimes perpetrated, the HRC has expressively
mentioned crimes against humanity, particularly given that in the context of
Syria war crimes and, possibly, the crime of genocide may also have been
committed.
Equally, the mandates of commissions of inquiry established in relation
to the situation of human rights in North Korea and Eritrea have also made
specific reference to crimes against humanity, although in these cases the
reference appears more justified given the non applicability of international
humanitarian law (and of the war-crimes regime) to the situations at hand.
Probably, the most open example of a mandate predetermining specific allega-
tions has been the one contained in the HRC resolution establishing the 2009
Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict. The Mission was in fact mandated
to investigate
‘all violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian
law by the occupying Power, Israel, against the Palestinian people throughout the
288 Heller (n 206) 10.
289 See for example, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (n 211); Report of the
Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon (n 280).




Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in the occupied Gaza Strip, due to the
current aggression’ (emphasis added),
in this way predetermining that the Israeli military campaign could qualify
as an act of aggression.291
Would these ‘specific-findings-oriented’ mandates have an impact on the
actual findings of the Commission? The practice shows in general how commis-
sioners tend not to be too much constrained by such formulas. While it has
been mentioned above that the 2009 Gaza Mission have agreed upon an
amendment of its mandate, with regard to the Commission of Inquiry on Syria
its findings on criminal accountability have not been limited only to crimes
against humanity but have extended also to war crimes and the crime of
genocide. Again, what may be problematic is the shadow casted by a ‘specific-
findings-oriented’ mandate in terms of ‘perception of credibility’ of these
inquiries in the eye of the international community.
2.4.1.4 Towards a harmonization of the practice
While commissions of inquiry (and their mandates) have necessarily to adapt
to the manifold (and often unique) character of the situations under investiga-
tion, in most recent years a trend has emerged that moves towards harmoniz-
ing and standardizing different inquiries’ experiences. This can be linked to
the significant increase in the number of commissions established but also to
the growing importance of ensuring accountability for human rights and
international humanitarian law violations. This trend has impacted on their
mandates in terms of an increasing reference to accountability in their word-
ings. Furthermore, the fact that the UN Human Rights Council and, in general,
the UN human rights machinery have been considerably involved in the
commissions of inquiry’s sphere has represented a second important factor
in such harmonization process.
As a result, mandates of commissions of inquiry have increasingly resorted
to well-established formulas in relation to at least four fields of operations,
such as:
1 The establishment of the facts in relation to IHL and/or IHRL alleged viola-
tions;
2 The emphasis on those violations that could amount to international crimes
and the qualification of such crimes;
3 The identification of responsibilities;
4 The need to formulate recommendations at domestic, regional and inter-
national level on how to advance responses, including by ensuring
accountability at domestic and international level, fostering reconciliation,
291 Human Rights Council, A/HRC/RES/S-9/1 (2009) para. 14.
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fighting impunity and deterring further violations to happen and re-estab-
lishing the respect for the rule of law.
Such trend has also been noted by the OHCHR, which in its 2015 study has
emphasized how
‘[d]espite the variations in the formulation of mandates, commissions/missions
have approached the task consistently as involving: the establishment of facts in
relation to incidents and allegations of violations of international human rights
and humanitarian law; the assessment of such facts in the light of the applicable
body(-ies) of law; the reaching of conclusions with regard to the existence of
violations and […] alleged perpetrators; and the issuing of recommendations to
different entities’.292
The OHCHR study also noted how, along with the applicability of IHL and IHRL,
there has been an increasing tendency for mandates of commissions of inquiry
to focus on international criminal law and accountability.293
2.4.2 Standard of proof
2.4.2.1 Introduction
In the First Chapter a number of definitions of what commissions of inquiry/
fact-finding missions are under international law have been given. It is now
time to start clarifying also what these bodies are not. Certainly, commissions
of inquiry cannot be equated to judicial or adjudication mechanisms. In other
words, they cannot be charged with the power of making binding judicial
determinations. In particular, as we will see in the course of the dissertation,
such non-judicial character is inherent to their nature, their procedures and
methodology. It also derives from the standard of proof they rely upon in
order to justify the credibility of their findings.
Commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions have themselves repeated
countless number of times their inability to make definitive findings.294 In
292 OHCHR, Guidance and Practice (n 3) 11.
293 Ibid 12.
294 For example, the 2009 UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict expressively under-
lined how its findings ‘do not attempt to identify the individuals responsible for the
commission of offences nor do they pretend to reach the standard of proof applicable in
criminal trials’. Similarly the Commission of Inquiry on CAR emphasized how the standard
applied ‘does not rise to the level of proof beyond reasonable doubt that would be required
to establish individual criminal responsibility in a court of law. This is because the Commis-
sion is neither a prosecutor nor a court’. Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Gaza
(n 211) para. 172; The International Commission of Inquiry on the Central African Republic




this regard, judicial bodies in criminal trials rule upon the responsibility of
an individual based on the standard of proof of ‘responsibility beyond reason-
able doubt’. This standard is grounded on the need to respect a number of
fundamental guarantees, which are embedded in the adversarial nature of
the proceedings and the right of the defendant to a fair trial. It is precisely
the existence of these guarantees that makes the reliance on ‘open source’
material and ‘unchallenged evidence’ (which are inherent to the work con-
ducted by commissions of inquiry) more difficult.295 On the contrary, if one
looks at international inquiries and the nature of their procedures, it finds out
that they have necessarily relied upon a lower standard of proof.
At the same time, experts and practitioners have warned against an excess-
ively low standard of proof in the practice of commissions of inquiry. In
particular, it has been argued that
‘a commission cannot act with the same kind of ease that advocacy groups and
international human rights organisations act. A mission has to be accountable in
terms of having sound evidence on which the analysis is based’.296
2.4.2.2 Standard of proof in the practice of commissions of inquiry
In the application of standards of proof, the practice of commissions of inquiry
have for long time been marked by a certain lack of transparency. Only recent-
ly commissions have more consistently started spelling out in clear terms the
standard of proof they were implementing. Also, recent examples display a
trend towards standardisation, with commissions increasingly resorting to
similar formulas to indicate the standard of proof applicable.
If we look at commissions of inquiry established in the past, there is little
reference in their reports on the methodology used in order to ensure the
reliability of their findings. As an example, the 1973 UNGA mandated Commis-
sion of Inquiry on the reported massacres in Mozambique, although devoting
much attention to the way sources and information had been collected, did
not clearly spell out the standard of proof it had implemented.297
In the same vein, the first attempts to codify standard rules for a more
coherent exercise of fact-finding powers did not directly tackle the issue of
standard of proof. For example, the UN Secretary General 1970 ‘Model rules
295 On the issue concerning the applicability of certain due process guarantees to human rights
fact-finding exercises see Franck and Fairley (n 152).
296 Steven Wilkinson, ‘Finding the facts: standards of proof and information handling in
monitoring, reporting and fact-finding missions’ (2014) Program on Humanitarian Policy
and Conflict Research Harvard University, 14, Interview with Yakin Ertuk, Commissioner,
Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission; Commissioner, Commission of Inquiry on Syria (7 August
2013).
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of procedure for United Nations bodies dealing with violations of human
rights’ do not contain any specific guidelines in relation to standard of proof.
A progressive shift has occurred due to the proliferation of human rights
fact-finding bodies during the years 1990s and 2000s. During this period,
commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions have increasingly clarified
the rules of procedure and standards of proof under which they have been
operating. Looking at the practice, commissions have mainly resorted to three
different standards, namely: ‘reasonable suspicion’, ‘balance of probabilities’
and ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ standards.298 Despite the qualitative
difference among them, these standards have in common the fact that they
all require a significantly lower burden of proof than the ‘beyond reasonable
doubt’ formula used in judicial proceedings.299
For example, the OHCHR Mapping Exercise on the DRC applied the ‘reason-
able suspicion’ standard by noting how
‘[t]he question [for it] was therefore not one if being satisfied beyond reasonable
doubt that a violation was committed, but rather of reasonably suspecting that
the incident did occur. Reasonable suspicion is defined as ‘necessitating a reliable
body of material consistent with other verified circumstances tending to show that
an incident or event did happen’.300
The same standard has been applied by the 2006 Commission of Inquiry on
Timor-Leste.301 Other fact-finding experiences, such as those in relation to
the Flotilla incident (2010) and in Libya (2011), have resorted to the ‘balance
of probability’ formula. In particular, according to the report of the HRC Fact-
Finding Mission on the Flotilla incident,
‘[m]atters were decided on the basis of the preponderance and quality of the
evidence so as to satisfy all the members of the Mission in order that they felt sure
of their conclusions’.302
A rather cumbersome formula was employed by the 2009 UN Fact-Finding
Mission on the Gaza Conflict, where it highlighted the importance to dispose
of ‘sufficient information of a credible and reliable nature for the Mission to
298 OHCHR, Guidance and Practice (n 3) 62.
299 For a detailed overview of the different standards engaged in fact finding see Wilkinson,
Standards of Proof in International Humanitarian and Human Rights Fact-Finding (n 149).
300 OHCHR, ‘Democratic of the Congo 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting
the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed
within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June
2003’ (August 2010) para. 7.
301 Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste
(n 274) para. 12.
302 Report of the international fact-finding mission to investigate violations of international




make a finding in fact’ in order to draw its conclusions on the events
occurred.303
2.4.2.3 Towards a harmonised practice: the ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ standard
More recently, commissions have more consistently referred to the formula
of ‘reasonable grounds to believe that a certain event took place’. According
to the 2015 OHCHR Mission in Libya this standard is satisfied in case it has
obtained
‘a reliable body of information, consistent with other material, based upon which
a reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would have reason to believe that such
an incident or pattern of conduct has occurred’.304
This standard of proof has been consistently employed by the vast majority
of recently established inquiries including the commissions of inquiry on Syria
(2011-2016), North Korea (2012), Central African Republic (2013), Gaza (2014),
Eritrea (2014), as well as the OHCHR investigations into Sri Lanka (2014) and
Libya (2015). Such coherency is revealing of an increasing tendency towards
the harmonization and standardisation of the practices of commissions of
inquiry. In particular, the Commission of Inquiry on Syria in its eleventh report
highlighted how ‘the methodology employed […] was based on standard
practices of commissions of inquiry and human rights investigations’ including
in relation to the standard of proof implemented.305
At the same time, the 2015 OHCHR ‘Guidance and Practice’ contains a
specific paragraph dedicated to standard of proof. More importantly, the
Guidance includes a recommendation for commissions/missions to clearly
indicate in their methods of works and ToRs the standard of proof they
adopted and to insert an explicit reference and explanation in their reports.306
In this regard, experts and practitioners have also emphasized how trans-
parency regarding standards of proof may play a critical role in contributing
to an inquiry’s credibility.307
The need for more clarity in relation to the methodology and standard
of proof has been emphasized also by legal scholars.308 According to
Boutruche,
303 Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Gaza (n 211) para. 171.
304 Investigation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
on Libya: detailed findings, A/HRC/31/CRP.3 (15 February 2016) para. 11.
305 11th Report of the independent commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/
31/68 (11 February 2016) para. 3.
306 OHCHR, Guidance and Practice (n 3) 62.
307 Wilkinson, Finding the facts (n 296) 13.
308 Wilkinson, Standards of Proof in International Humanitarian and Human Rights Fact-
Finding (n 149) 14.
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‘the underlying question paramount to the issue of concluding “undisputedly”
that certain facts and alleged violations are correct is the standard of proof required.
However, this standard of proof greatly varies according to the mandate and
procedure in which the fact-finding process takes place’.309
Boutruche also noted how many fact-finding bodies ‘do not elaborate on the
criteria of proof used to ascertain facts when applying the most common
standard “balance of probabilities”’.310 Similarly, Bertrand Ramcharam has
expressed the view that
‘as a general rule the standard of proof applied by fact-finding bodies should be
a balance of probabilities. Probability in this sense may be defined as an evaluation
of the likelihood of a past event having happened, given the facts and assumptions,
expected or adopted for the purposes of the evaluation’.311
Therefore, the practice of commissions of inquiry as well as the opinions of
experts and practitioners concur in identifying the correct standard of proof
for fact-finding exercises in the ‘reasonable grounds’/ ‘balance of probabilities’
models. However, it is difficult to draw clear-cut conclusions on the choice
of a standard of proof rather than another. On the contrary, given in particular
the variety of tasks assigned to commissions of inquiry, certain experts have
highlighted the need to ‘discuss the utility of employing multiple standards
of proof within the same mission’.312 In particular, the standard can vary
and the threshold may increase particularly in cases where an investigation
into alleged violations of IHL and military attacks is required or if the mandate
prescribes the identification of individuals that are responsible for the perpetra-
tion of international crimes.
In conclusion, there seems to be enough consensus that the standard of
proof that commissions of inquiry/fact-finding missions employ (whether
through the formula of ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ or ‘balance of probabil-
ities’) should be higher than a mere suspicion. In other terms there should
be more evidence supporting the findings that contradicting it. At the same
time the standard employed should be lower than the one applicable in judicial
proceedings. This goes back to the initial characterization of fact-finding bodies
as clearly distinguished in their nature and procedure from law-adjudicating
mechanisms such as courts and tribunals. As it has been emphasized by an
OHCHR human rights officer ‘the final outcome [of commissions of inquiry]
is not to convict people in front of a court of law. The purpose is to raise a
309 Boutruche (n 4) 113.
310 Ibid 114.
311 Bertrand Ramcharan, ‘Evidence’ in: Bertrand Ramcharan (ed), International Law and Fact-
Finding in the Field of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague 1982) 78.




red flag’.313 While it is important to stress the clear differences existing
between the two, it is equally relevant to stress how the work of commissions
of inquiry may have an impact on subsequent criminal investigations.
2.4.2.4 The implications for international criminal proceedings
Although it represents a lower standard than the one used in criminal trials,
‘reasonable grounds to believe’ is not an unknown formula to international
criminal proceedings. For example, the ICC Statute determines that different
standards of proof apply to the different stages of the proceeding, ranging
from the ‘reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation’ to ‘the responsibil-
ity beyond any reasonable doubt’ of an individual in trial. Within this
spectrum, the Statute disposes at Article 58 that, for the Pre-Trial Chamber
to issue a warrant of arrest, the Prosecutor should demonstrate that there are
‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that an individual has perpetrated the crimes
in question.314 This, in a way, renders the work of international commissions
of inquiry not completely avulsed from the context of international criminal
investigations. Such similarity between the standard of proof used by commis-
sions and the one employed by the ICC at the ‘arrest warrant’ stage has been
duly noted by the Commission of Inquiry on Eritrea in its second report.315
It may suggest that the commissions’ findings may play a relevant role parti-
cularly in the preliminary phases of the proceedings within the ICC frame-
work.316 However, the role of commissions of inquiry in the application of
international criminal law and in criminal proceedings deserves further examin-
ation and analysis. More attention to this topic will be devoted in the section
dedicated to international criminal law and accountability.
313 Ibid 5, Interview with Martin Seutcheu, Human Rights Officer with OHCHR.
314 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998) (Rome
Statute) Article 58(1)(a).
315 Detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in Eritrea, A/HRC/32/
CRP.1 (8 June 2016) para. 32.
316 In particular, as it will be explained more in depth in the section dedicated to international
criminal law, the findings commissions of inquiry can play a relevant role in the pre-
investigative and investigative phases of international criminal proceedings. On this issue,
Carsten Stahn and Dov Jacobs, ‘Human Rights Fact-Finding and International Criminal
Proceedings: Towards a Polycentric Model of Interaction’ (2014) Grotius Centre Working
Paper 2014/017- ICL, 13.
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2.4.3 Impact of cooperation/non-cooperation by the parties
2.4.3.1 Introduction: the critical role of parties’ cooperation for the work of commis-
sions of inquiry
An issue that should be dealt preliminary concerns whether states are under
a duty to cooperate with international inquiries. It should be underlined that
there is no general obligation under international law for parties involved into
a situation to cooperate with an international commission of inquiry. The only
organ that has the power to impose an inquiry on states would be the UNSC
acting under Article 34 of the UN Charter. Despite the contrary opinion of
certain scholars,317 ‘[t]he mainstream view is that investigations pursuant
to article 34 are mandatory and create obligations for States to co-operate under
article 25 of the UN Charter’.318 However, it has been noted how Article 34
has fallen in disuse and the Security Council has normally appointed inquiries
based on its implied powers. Hence, unless an inquiry is set up according to
a UNSC resolution containing a specific reference in this direction, states cannot
be forced to cooperate.319
That being said, cooperation by the parties involved in a conflict or a
dispute is extremely important for the work of commissions of inquiry. This
is mainly for two reasons.
The first relates to the need to grant to the commissioners access to the
territory and facilitate their movement in situations that are often extremely
volatile from the point of view of security. Past experiences indicate that where
commissions of inquiry have been given access to the territory, the accuracy
of their findings may increase both in terms of methods used and quality of
information collected. In particular, commissions of inquiry that were provided
access to the territory such as those in Darfur and the 2009 Gaza conflict have
shown a level of accuracy in assessing specific incidents that is higher than
other commissions, such as in the case of Syria, that were not allowed in. In
this regard, site-visits to locations where incidents or attacks have taken place
and direct contact with affected communities often play a critical role in
advancing the process of collecting evidence, especially in case where commis-
sions are tasked with investigating violations of IHL and IHRL or allegations
of international crimes.
The second reason concerns the parties’ support in providing the commis-
sions with evidence and information. Information in possess of those parties
involved in situations of armed conflict are often decisive in assessing whether
violations of IHL or IHRL have taken place or in determining responsibilities.
A clear example is represented by the assessment of whether an attack has
317 Conforti (n 156) 165.





breached the obligation to respect distinction and proportionality under IHL.
Such an evaluation cannot be properly conducted without knowing all the
information available at the time to the party of the conflict responsible for
launching the attack.
2.4.3.2 State’s consent: a necessary requirement in traditional fact-finding
The above discussion may help understanding why cooperation of the parties
involved may represent a critical factor for a successful accomplishment of
the international fact-finding exercise. However, it was not only for this reason
that international inquiries and fact-finding missions – as traditionally con-
ceived – were allowed to carry out their tasks only in case the parties involved
could agree on their establishment. In this regard, fact-finding – in its tradi-
tional sense – was conceived as a tool entirely falling under states’ control
in order to help them solving their own disputes. It goes without saying that
in the absence of state consent the whole fact-finding exercise was viewed as
meaningless. This idea – firstly enshrined in the 1899 Hague Convention –
was, to a certain extent, echoed in the 1991 UN General Assembly Declaration
on Fact-finding. According to paragraph six of the Declaration, ‘the sending
of a United Nations fact-finding mission to the territory of any State requires
the prior consent of that State’.320
If we look at the history of commissions of inquiry, international investiga-
tions have initially paid due respect to the principle of state consent as
necessary requirement for their activation.
An interesting example is represented by the already mentioned 2002
Investigative Team set up by the UN Secretary General to investigate the effects
of the Israeli assault on Jenin Camp within the framework of ‘Operation
Defensive Shield’ during the Second Intifada.321 After allegations circulated
among Israeli governmental officials that due to its composition the Mission
would extend its mandate covering the whole Israeli campaign in the West
Bank and accuse Israel of war crimes, the Israeli cabinet decided not to allow
the Team into the country.322 While the Security Council convened to discuss
Israel’s stance, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan decided to disband the Team.323
320 UNGA Declaration on Fact-finding (n 5) para 6.
321 The decision to establish the investigative team was later endorsed by the UN Security
Council through resolution 1405 of 19 April 2002. UNSC Res. 1405 (2002) para. 2.
322 ‘Israel defies UN over Jenin mission’ The Telegraph (25 April 2002) http://www.telegraph.co.
uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/1392196/Israel-defies-UN-over-Jenin-mission.html
accessed on 8 December 2016; ‘Israel ban on UN probe may backfire’ The Age (2 May 2002)
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/05/01/1019441391191.html accessed on 8 Decem-
ber 2016.
323 In particular, the UNSG regretted of ‘being unable to provide the information requested
by the Council in resolution 1405 (2002), and especially that the long shadow cast by recent
events in the Jenin refugee camp will remain in the absence of such a fact-finding exercise’.
UNSG, ‘Report of the Secretary General prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution
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The same approach was later adopted by former UN Special Rapporteur
on the situation of human rights in the OPT John Dugard in 2006, when Israel
provided no response to his request for cooperation in the fact-finding activity
he was entrusted to by the Human Rights Council in relation to events con-
nected to ‘Operation Summer Rains’ in Gaza.324 In this regard, the former
Special Rapporteur, who made immediately clear that the consent of the Israeli
Government would have been a necessary prerequisite for the Mission to be
deployed, clearly expressed the view that
‘it is pointless to persist with the fact-finding mission requested […] as the Govern-
ment of Israel has, by its failure to respond to [the] request, indicated very clearly
that it will not grant permission to the visit of such a fact-finding mission’.325
2.4.3.3 Commissions of inquiry as independent from state consent: the most recent
developments
Things have changed since then. In particular, in 2006 the UN Commission
on Human Rights has been replaced by the Human Rights Council. As already
mentioned, since its establishment the Council has been extremely active in
setting up human rights investigations. These inquiries have often been denied
access and cooperation by concerned states. However, such obstacles have
not prevented those commissions to carry out their inquiries. In particular,
the following chart describes a list of the most relevant international human
rights inquiries established since 1990.














UNSC (via UNSG) 1995 GRANTED
ES-10/10’, A/ES-10/186 (30 July 2002) para. 4. On the issue see, also, Michael Kearney,
‘Empowering the General Assembly to Advance International Criminal Investigations’
(2014) 4.
324 Human Rights Council, A/HRC/S-1/3 (2006) para. 6.
325 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories
occupied since 1967 pursuant to resolution S-1/1 of the Human Rights Council, A/HRC/4/
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Out of a sample of 21 commissions of inquiry, 12 commissions were denied
both access and cooperation by at least one concerned state. In one case, the
2000 human rights inquiry commission in the OPT, the investigative team was
granted access to the territory by the Government of Israel, which however
denied any sort of cooperation. In a number of other instances – including
the 1992 Commission of Experts and those missions mandated to investigate
events in the OPT– commissions were granted access and cooperation by one




2.4.3.4 Different nuances of parties’ consent and cooperation
When discussing parties’ cooperation and access, it is often difficult to reach
definitive findings. In other terms, to distinguish between ‘cooperation’ and
‘lack of cooperation’ without appreciating the different nuances emerging from
such a broad spectrum of experiences may lead to fallacious conclusions. As
it was clearly expressed by the OHCHR,
‘[l]ack of cooperation may vary from refusing to speak with and provide informa-
tion and relevant documents to these bodies, to barring them from entering the
country or the area where the incidents under investigation took place, and intimid-
ating victims, possible witnesses and sources of information to prevent them from
cooperating with the investigator’.326
It is extremely rare to document cases of absolute lack of cooperation and
access from the concerned parties. This may happen with those investigations
dealing with internationally isolated regimes such as North Korea.
Certain commissions have been formally denied any sort of cooperation
and access by a State, while at the same time informal contacts, interactions
and exchange of information may be set up. Although it is particularly
challenging to collect information on this particular issue, this may have been
the case for the 2014 Commission of Inquiry on the Gaza conflict, the 2010
UNSG Panel and the 2014 OHCHR investigation on Sri Lanka.327 On the con-
trary, certain commissions that were officially welcomed by affected states
received in practice only little assistance. A recent example is represented by
the 2015 OHCHR investigation on Libya, which, although it was formally
granted cooperation and access by the Libyan authorities, was able to under-
take only a one-day visit to Tripoli and was not provided with any response
in relation to a detailed list of questions it dispatched to the Government of
Libya.328
In other cases, commissions have been allowed into the territory but have
received little or no cooperation by the affected authorities. For example, the
2000 Human rights inquiry commission on the OPT was granted access to the
whole area but denied official cooperation by the Government of Israel.329
Another example concerns the 1999 UN Commission of Inquiry on East Timor,
326 OHCHR, Guidance and Practice (n 3) 64.
327 See, for example, Report of the OHCHR Investigation on Sri Lanka (OISL), A/HRC/30/
CRP.2 (16 September 2015) para. 9. In particular, according to the OHCHR Mission, ‘the
Government which took office after Presidential elections in January 2015 did not change
its stance on cooperation with the investigation, nor admit the investigation team to the
country, but it engaged more constructively with the High Commissioner and OHCHR’.
See also, Report of the Secretary General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka
(31 March 2011) paras. 20-22.
328 OHCHR Investigation on Libya (n 304) para. 7.
329 Report of the human rights inquiry commission (n 283) para. 7.
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which was granted only partial access to the affected areas as it was allowed
into Jakarta and East Timor but not to West Timor where many of the dis-
placed persons had taken shelter. With regard to the interaction with the
Indonesian authorities, Indonesia allowed the Commission to visit Jakarta only
in order to exchange views with the national commission of inquiry and not
to conduct any investigation or fact-finding activity.330
As mentioned above, certain commissions have then received cooperation
and access only by one of the parties to the conflict. A good example is the
2006 Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon, which was granted cooperation and
access by the Government of Lebanon but not by the Israeli Government.331
This is also generally the case for those commissions of inquiry and fact-finding
missions mandated to investigate events in Israel and the OPT.332
The situation may be further complicated in those cases of inquires
mandated to investigate non-international armed conflicts, where the process
of requiring cooperation from the non-state armed groups involved poses
significant institutional and operational challenges. Although certain commis-
sions – such as in the cases of Gaza and in the CAR – have been able to interact
with non-state actors,333 the pivotal importance of ensuring more consolidated
network of cooperation with armed groups has so far been largely under-
330 Report of the international Commission of Inquiry on East Timor, A/54/726 – S/2000/59
(31 January 2000) para. 108.
331 Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon (n 280) paras. 19, 21.
332 While receiving partial where not full cooperation by the Palestinian authorities, these
investigations have been refused any contact with the Israeli authorities. Obviously, this
has impacted the ability to travel to the affected areas, particularly in relation to the
occupied West Bank, whose borders are fully controlled by the State of Israel. It followed
that all commissions and missions entrusted to investigate events related to the West Bank
– such as the 2009 UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, the 2012 UN Fact-Finding
Mission on Settlements and the 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry on the Gaza Conflict –
were denied access to the territory and held meetings with Palestinian officials and inter-
locutors in Jordan. Different is the situation concerning the Gaza Strip, where one of the
border access areas (the so-called Rafah crossing) has been under Egypt’s control since
Israel’s disengagement in 2005. In this regard, despite Israel’s ban the Egyptian authorities
authorized the 2006 High-Level Mission to Beit Hanoun and the 2009 UN Fact-Finding
Mission on Gaza the access into Gaza through Rafah border crossing. For alleged security
concerns, they did not allow the most recent 2014 Commission of Inquiry, which held
separate meetings in Geneva and Amman. Report of the high-level fact-finding mission
to Beit Hanoun established under Council resolution S-3/1, A/HRC/9/26 (1 September
2008) paras. 3-4; Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Gaza (n 211) para 8.
333 Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Gaza (n 211) para. 145; International Commission
of Inquiry to investigate events in Central African Republic (n 294) para. 11. In particular,
the Gaza Mission emphasized how it ‘held meetings with senior members of the Gaza
authorities and they extended their full cooperation and support’. However, in relation
to certain incidents and patterns, the Mission noted how the cooperation by the Gaza
authorities has been lacking while instances of Gaza witnesses’ refusal to testify due to




estimated and overridden by security and institutional concerns in volatile
and swiftly changing contexts.
Finally, even in those cases where commissions have been genuinely
granted access to the territory and cooperation by the concerned authorities,
this has not automatically translated in practical access to affected areas and
primary sources of evidence.334 The fact that these inquiries often operate
in situations of armed conflict or in their immediate aftermath means conduct-
ing investigations in extremely challenging environments from the point of
view of the security of staff and the operations. It also often implicates the
impossibility to reach specific areas within the affected territory due to security
or logistical reasons. Furthermore, such instable and volatile contexts in many
cases affect the ability and willingness of witnesses and victims to freely
interact with the investigators for fear of reprisals, in spite of any formal
cooperation granted to the commissions by the concerned authorities.
On this point, the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur has outlined a list of
criteria in order to assess the degree of cooperation by concerned stakeholders.
These criteria include:
‘(i) freedom of movement throughout the territory of the Sudan; (ii) unhindered
access to all places and establishments, and freedom to meet and interview repres-
entatives of governmental and local authorities, military authorities, community
leaders, non-governmental organizations and other institutions, and any such person
whose testimony is considered necessary for the fulfilment of its mandate; (iii) free
access to all sources of information, including documentary material and physical
evidence; (iv) appropriate security arrangements for the personnel and documents
of the Commission; (v) protection of victims and witnesses and all those who appear
before the Commission in connection with the inquiry and, in particular, guarantee
that no such person would, as a result of such appearance, suffer harassment,
threats, acts of intimidation, ill-treatment and reprisals; and (vi) privileges, im-
munities and facilities necessary for the independent conduct of the inquiry’.335
Based on these criteria, the Commission, despite acknowledging that ‘the
attitude of the Government authorities towards the Commission has been
cooperative’, noted a number of instances where requests to review specific
records were not adequately followed up and pressures by local authorities
on prospective witnesses was made.336 Similarly, the 2013 Commission of
Inquiry on CAR faced significant challenges in carrying out its mandate due
to the volatile security situation that did not allow it to visit certain areas of
the country and in relation to the harassment and threats suffered by members
334 For example Wilkinson has emphasized how the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, despite
being accorded cooperation by the Government of Sudan, faced a number of restrictions
and resistance by regional and local authorities. Wilkinson, Finding the facts (n 296) 18.
335 Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (n 211) para. 28.
336 Ibid paras. 30-36.
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of its investigative team.337 Similar obstacles have been faced by many other
commissions and missions demonstrating how state’s consent and official
cooperation do not always automatically translate into concrete access to
sources and evidence.
2.4.3.5 Preliminary findings
The nuances that emerge from the practice thus suggest high caution in draw-
ing definitive conclusions concerning the impact of cooperation/lack of co-
operation by the parties on the records of commissions of inquiry, given the
type and number of variables to take into account. However, with these caveats
in mind, a number of tentative remarks can still be made.
Firstly, it emerges that in recent times commissions that have been denied
cooperation and access to the territory by concerned parties have decided to
carry out their tasks anyway. This represents a significant shift from the
original conception of inquiries as tools that should be activated only on the
basis of state consent. It thus seems that – particularly in light of their
conceptualization in frameworks such as R2P or as mechanisms at disposal
of UN human rights institutions – human rights inquiries should be now
viewed as instruments that are imposed on (rather than agreed upon with)
states.
In terms of cooperation, the chart displays an important distinction between
those inquiries set up by the UN Security Council and those established by
the Human Rights Council.
All four commissions established by the UNSC (former Yugoslavia, Burundi,
Darfur and CAR) have received formal cooperation and access by concerned
states. On the contrary, of 13 commissions set up by the HRC since 2006, five
were not provided with cooperation and access (Eritrea, North Korea, Syria,
OHCHR investigation on Sri Lanka, and Fact-Finding Mission on Israeli settle-
ments). Six were provided with partial cooperation and access (Beit Hanoun,
Lebanon, Gaza 2009, Gaza/Flotilla, Gaza 2014, Libya 2015). Only in two cases,
the 2011 Commission of Inquiry on Libya and the 2011 Commission of Inquiry
on Cote d’Ivoire, the HRC mandated commissions received formal cooperation
and access to the territory by concerned governments.
At a first glance, these findings may support those views already debated
in Chapter 1 that qualify the UN Security Council as the most authoritative
organ for the establishment of inquiries in the context of armed conflicts and
widespread human rights violations.338
Three objections may be raised in this regard. First, the HRC has been
recently much more active than the UNSC in establishing these kind of investi-
337 International Commission of Inquiry to investigate events in Central African Republic (n
294) paras. 20-21.




gations. Indeed, the more commissions are set up, the higher is the likelihood
to face a situation where the concerned governments are not willing to cooper-
ate. Second, as already emphasized in Chapter 1, it is difficult to imagine the
UNSC finding the necessary political consensus and leverage to impose human
rights investigations in particularly sensitive contexts such as Israel and the
OPT, Syria and North Korea. Third, the practice may reveal that a UNSC-
mandated investigation is not an absolute guarantee for state’s consent. The
example of the UNSC-mandated investigation on the events in Jenin stands
as vivid reminder in this sense.
2.4.3.6 Denial of cooperation as tool for delegitimizing commissions
It is now time to go back to the initial issue concerning the impact of parties’
lack of cooperation on the work of commissions of inquiry. Looking at the
practice, it has not been unusual for certain countries to use the limitations
posed to the commissioners’ activities as a mean to delegitimize the work of
international inquiries.
For example, Israel has denied cooperation to the vast majority of inter-
national commissions of inquiry established in relation to events in the OPT,
except for those panels of inquiry set up by the UN Secretary General to
investigate into causes of the flotilla incidents and into attacks and strikes to
UN facilities in the 2009 and 2014 Gaza conflicts.339 Israel has justified its
behaviour by referring to the political biases and the predisposed approach
of the Human Rights Council, while ignoring the fact that the mandates of
the 2009 and 2014 inquiries on the Gaza conflict enabled these missions to
investigate the conduct of all parties. As consequence, the lack of intelligence
information from the Israeli side has often been used as an argument to
undermine the quality and reliability of the inquiries’ final findings. A typical
example is the follow up to the report of the 2009 UN Fact-Finding Mission
on the Gaza conflict. Israel’s refused any sort of cooperation with the Mission,
which was denied access to the territory of Israel and the West Bank and
entered the Gaza Strip via Egypt. The Mission’s findings contained numerous
assessments on the compliance by Israel and Palestinian armed groups with
IHL norms. Based on the evidence that, for obvious reasons, did not con-
template intelligence information coming from the Israeli side, the Mission
concluded that the ‘disproportionate destruction and violence against civilians
[in Gaza] were part of a deliberate policy’.340 It also expressed the view that
339 Letter dated 4 May 2009 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the
Security Council, UN Doc. A/63/855 (15 May 2009); Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel
of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident (September 2011); Letter dated 27 April
2015 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2015/
286 (27 April 2015).
340 Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Gaza (n 211) paras. 1211, 1690.
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‘what occurred in just over three weeks at the end of 2008 and the beginning of
2009 was a deliberately disproportionate attack designed to punish, humiliate and
terrorize a civilian population, radically diminish its local economic capacity both
to work and to provide for itself, and to force upon it an ever increasing sense of
dependency and vulnerability’.341
As it will be explained more in details in Chapter 3, some of the findings were
unilaterally retracted by Justice Goldstone in an editorial of 2011 on the basis
of alleged information subsequently disclosed to him by the Israeli authorities.
In fact, Goldstone’s retraction has been used by many Israeli political figures
and international actors to undermine the legal validity of the whole report.
Indeed, one cannot deny the importance, in contexts of urban warfare and
armed conflict such as the Gaza Strip, of the information that Israel military
intelligence possessed at the time of launching attacks in order to provide a
comprehensive evaluation on the respect of basic IHL rules during Israeli
military campaigns. It is also a fact that Israel’s lack of cooperation has
rendered the work of the commissions more arduous and, in relation to specific
incidents, may have diminished the accuracy of their findings, which, parti-
cularly in certain sections, have been based mainly on testimonies of victims
and witnesses from the Palestinian side.342 Commissions themselves have
acknowledged such limitations countless number of times.
However, two considerations should be made. Firstly – irrespective of
whether certain far-reaching conclusions contained in the report of the 2009
UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict could have been avoided given
the kind of evidence available – this does not necessarily mean that the whole
fact-finding exercise has been vitiated. Secondly, deliberate obstructions posed
by states to the work of commissions of inquiry should not be used as an
argument to delegitimize the work of these investigations as ‘unbalanced’,
particularly looking at those mandates allowing for a comprehensive investiga-
tion of the conducts of all sides. Quite to the contrary, as it has been emphas-
ized by the UN High-Level Mission to Beit Hanoun,
‘the effective ban on its visiting Israel and meeting with Israeli actors (including
victims of Kassam rocket attacks in southern Israel) has itself been an obstacle to
the balance that Israel seeks’.343
341 Ibid para. 1690.
342 See in particular those sections of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict related
to attacks against hospitals in Gaza and deliberate attacks against civilians. Report of the
UN Fact-Finding Mission on Gaza (n 211) paras. 620, 707. Another example concerns the
account of the events immediately following the seizure of the Mavi Marmara vessel by
the Israeli soldiers and the exchange of fire on board. See, Report of the international fact-
finding mission to investigate violations of international law resulting from the Israeli attacks
on the flotilla (n 272) para. 115.




Thus, the decision not to cooperate with the commissions and to negatively
affect their findings should fall under states’ responsibility rather than solely
translate into criticism on the commissions’ findings. This message finds, to
a certain extent, echo in the findings of the 2014 Commission of Inquiry on
the Gaza conflict. In its report the Commission recognized
‘the dilemma that Israel faces in releasing information that would disclose in detail
the targets of military strikes, given that such information may be classified and
jeopardize intelligence sources. Be that as it may, security considerations do not
relieve the authorities of their obligations under international law. The onus remains
on Israel to provide sufficient details on its targeting decisions to allow an inde-
pendent assessment of the legality of the attacks conducted by the Israel Defense
Forces and to assist victims in their quest for the truth’.344
2.4.3.7 Is state consent a necessary requirement for undertaking international
inquiries?
This leads us directly to the core question in this debate: is it wise for inter-
national inquiries to operate without states’ consent and cooperation?
From a substantive point of view, it can be argued that, even in cases where
a State denies any sort of cooperation and access to the territory, commissions
of inquiry can still collect information from an array of relevant and impartial
sources such UN agencies, other international organisations and international
and local NGOs. Furthermore, as the cases of Gaza, Syria, North Korea and
Eritrea have clearly demonstrated, commissioners can gather first-hand in-
formation from primary sources by conducting interviews with victims and
witnesses abroad or via phone/Skype. Obtaining information from former
officials of the regimes investigated or military analysts familiar with such
contexts can also critically contribute to fill the gap left by states’ non-coopera-
tion. In this regard, the ability of the 2009 and 2014 Gaza missions of including
views from former Israeli military officials and experts as well as using the
interviews with Israeli soldiers conducted by the NGO Breaking the Silence stands
as important reminder of how commissions can undertake a thorough and
comprehensive investigation of the facts and circumstances related to specific
incidents even in the absence of cooperation from the states involved.345
344 Report of the independent commission of inquiry established pursuant to Human Rights
Council Resolution S-21/1, A/HRC/29/CRP.4 (22 June 2015) para. 75; Report of the detailed
findings of independent commission of inquiry established pursuant to Human Rights
Council Resolution S-21/1, A/HRC/29/CRP.4 (22 June 2015).
345 In this regard the Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict contains,
for each specific section, a sub-paragraph exposing the Israeli view over a particular incident
or attack. See Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Gaza, (n 211) paras. 372, 464, 498,
570. The same approach had been previously undertaken by the UN High Level Mission
to Beit Hanoun. See, Report of the high-level fact-finding mission to Beit Hanoun, (n 332)
paras. 36-40. With regard to the use by commissions of inquiry of certain sources, particular-
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Indeed, some problems remain. Site visits constitute an important com-
ponent in the fact-finding process. They enable direct inspections of locations
and allow commissioners and investigators to adequately match information
coming from witnesses’ testimonies and secondary sources with the reality
on the ground. Furthermore, intelligence information and medical reports
– which cannot be obtained unless through institutional channels of coopera-
tion with the relevant authorities – can also prove extremely valuable in
clarifying whether certain incidents have entailed violations of IHL principles
and the use of certain weapons or the excessive use of lethal force in law
enforcement operations. For example, the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the
Flotilla incidents could provide accounts of a number of killings that took place
during the seizure of the ship thanks to the information coming from Turkish
medical reports.346
However, while these sources have proven to be extremely important in
corroborating and consolidating the reliability of investigations, they cannot
be considered a conditio sine qua non for inquiries to reach specific findings
over certain incidents. Such conclusion is corroborated by the fact that commis-
sions of inquiry by nature are not bodies mandated to reach definitive findings.
As specified above, commissions of inquiry operate under a standard of proof
(‘reasonable grounds to believe’ or ‘balance of probabilities’) that is not extra-
ordinary high. This means that their findings can (and should) be subsequently
corroborated or overturned by further investigations.
In conclusion, while recognizing the critical importance of states’ coopera-
tion in ensuring increased accuracy of the findings, the practice has shown
that in general international commissions of inquiry have been able to dis-
charge their mandates and provide a fair and reliable account of the events
in line with the mandate and standard of proof implemented also in those
situations where parties’ cooperation was missing. Hence, from an operational
and substantial point of view, states’ consent and cooperation should not be
considered as a conditio sine qua non for commissions of inquiry to carry out
their mandates.
This of course does not mean that the specificity of each particular case
should not be taken into consideration. There are specific contexts, incidents
or findings for which the information coming from the parties directly involved
may prove vital in order to provide a fair account of the events. In particular,
looking at the practice, commissions of inquiry have often decided not to take
a final stance on the use of certain means or tactics of warfare in the absence
ly in relation to interviews conducted with Israeli soldiers by the NGO Breaking the Silence,
see Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Gaza (n 211) paras. 339-344, 459, 522, 727,
802, 1183, 1192-1199; Report of the independent commission of inquiry on Gaza (n 344)
paras. 284, 292, 391, 400, 401.
346 Report of the international fact-finding mission to investigate violations of international




of a comprehensive set of information, including those provided by the actors
directly involved in those incidents. For example, the 2009 UN Fact-Finding
Mission on the Gaza Conflict, despite acknowledging the breach of the obliga-
tion to take feasible precautions, could not prove the intent by Palestinian
armed groups to use civilians in Gaza as human shields given the insufficient
cooperation from the Palestinian side on this matter.347 Equally, the Commis-
sion of Inquiry on Lebanon could not make a final determination on the use
by the Israeli armed forces of depleted uranium, incendiary weapons, dense
inert metal explosive (DIME) and fuel air explosive.348 Along the same line,
the 2011 Commission of Inquiry on Libya, given the insufficient information
coming from the NATO headquarters, determined in its interim report that it
was not in a position to assess the veracity of the information received in
relation to allegations concerning NATO airstrikes intentionally and indis-
criminately targeting civilians.349 Finally, in relation to the use of chemical
weapons in the Syrian conflict, the Syria Commission of Inquiry initially
determined that although
‘chemical weapons, specifically sarin, were found to have been used in multiple
incidents during the conflict, in no incident was the commission’s evidentiary
threshold met with respect to the perpetrator’.350
However, the impossibility of reaching certain findings in relation to specific
incidents does not mean that the overall result should not be given enough
credibility or that commissions of inquiry should desist from undertaking their
investigative tasks at all. As an example, while one can criticise the 2009 UN
Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict for reaching certain conclusions
on the overall scopes and objectives of the Israeli military campaign in Gaza
in the absence of certain information coming from the Israeli side, this does
not mean that the whole report should necessarily be considered as flawed
347 Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Gaza (n 211) paras. 491-496.
348 Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon (n 280) paras. 257, 262, 263, 264.
349 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry into Libya (n 202) para. 235. However,
such issue was partially reassessed in the Commission’s final report in which the inquiry
noted that although NATO forces conducted ‘a highly precise campaign with a demonstrable
determination to avoid civilian casualties,’ certain targeted sites ‘showed no evidence of
military utility’ and resulted in ‘confirmed civilian casualties’. Full Report of the Inter-
national Commission of Inquiry to Investigate All Alleged Violations of International Law
in Libya, A/HRC/19/68 (8 March 2012) para. 812. See also Heller (n 206) 4.
350 6th Report of the independent commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/
25/65 (12 February 2014) Summary. However, such initial approach was overturned by
subsequent investigations, which allowed the Commission to determine that ‘reasonable
grounds exist to believe that chemical agents, likely chlorine, were used on Kafr Zeita, Al-
Tamana’a and Tal Minnis in eight incidents within a 10-day period in April. There are also
reasonable grounds to believe that those agents were dropped in barrel bombs from
government helicopters flying overhead’. 7th Report of the independent commission of
inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/27/60 (13 August 2014) para. 118.
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or that, in the absence of Israel’s cooperation, the Mission should not have
carried on its mandate.
Moving on to analyse whether there are any institutional obstacle that may
prevent commissions of inquiry to carry out their mandates in the absence
of states’ consent, it should be noted how many of these inquiries – including
those in Gaza, Syria, North Korea, and Eritrea – had their reports welcomed
and endorsed by their mandating organs. This may be read as an implicit sign
of acquiescence in the commissions’ practice to operate without states’
approval. The OHCHR has also acknowledged such trend by noting how
‘[l]ack of cooperation from the authorities has not prevented investigations and
fact-finding from taking place nor commissions / missions from reaching conclu-
sions’.351
Moreover, the inclusion of international fact-finding in the R2P framework
among the primary steps that the international community should adopt to
react to situations where states are failing to protect their people’s basic rights
seems to go into the same direction.
This analysis leads to the conclusion that, both from an operational/sub-
stantial and institutional point of view, there should be no impediment for
commissions of inquiry to operate in situations where parties’ consent is
missing, although states’ cooperation should be sought and strongly en-
couraged as critical factor in increasing the accuracy of the findings and
contributing to the improvement of commissions’ records.
2.4.4 Selection, collection and use of sources and evidence
2.4.4.1 Introduction
In the work of commissions of inquiry the selection of sources and evidence
and the process of combining them together are of pivotal importance to ensure
the credibility of their findings. Hence, it is relevant to assess not only the
choice of sources but also the manner in which different sources have been
combined by inquiries.
As a general remark, commissions of inquiry have, as common practice,
resorted to a combination of primary and secondary sources. Looking at
different fact-finding experiences, it emerges a manifold picture in which
commissions have referred on occasion to testimonies and interviews con-
ducted with witnesses and victims sometimes even in the form of public




hearings,352 states official records and information, reports produced by inter-
national and local NGOs, reports by UN agencies and other international organ-
izations such as the ICRC, site visits, video tapes, satellite images, assessments
of forensic experts, medical reports, ballistic examinations, experts testimonies
and written submissions by several stakeholders.
2.4.4.2 Criteria used for combining sources
Indeed, the most salient aspect to be analysed does not much pertain to the
type of source used but to the way different sources have been combined in
order to support the credibility of the findings. The methodology implemented
in order to ascertain and corroborate facts is in fact a crucial component in
assessing the credibility of the whole fact-finding exercise. In this regard, the
practice of commissions of inquiry shows a consolidated tendency towards
a combination of primary and secondary sources, with a clear inclination
towards the former.
For example, the UNSG Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka
made clear that the weight and reliability of each of the sources had been
carefully evaluated. In this regard, its final report stated how
‘allegations [were] only included as credible when based on primary sources that
the Panel deemed relevant and trustworthy. These primary sources were corro-
borated by other kinds of information, both direct and indirect’.353
Similarly, the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict determined that
‘in establishing its findings [it] sought to rely primarily and whenever possible
on information it gathered first-hand. Information produced by others, including
reports, affidavits and media reports, was used primarily as corroboration’.354
This approach finds adequate echo in scholars’ reviews. Wilkinson has empha-
sized how ‘direct observations and direct interactions with victims and
witnesses […] appears to be a mainstay of [fact-finding] missions’ and ‘the
importance of direct observations of facts, while not always attainable, sets
352 Particularly striking are the examples of the 2009 UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza
Conflict and the 2012 Commission of Inquiry on North Korea, which resorted to the formula
of public hearings in order to gather information and testimonies from eye-witnesses and
victims.
353 Report of the Secretary General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka (n 327)
para. 52.
354 Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (n 211) para. 23.
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itself at the heart of the work of [fact-finding] missions’.355 Furthermore,
according to Boutruche,
‘information gathered by others must be carefully assessed in terms of credibility
and objectivity. Such information should not be given the same weight among the
sources used to ascertain facts’.356
At the same time, Grace emphasizes how practitioners involved in fact-finding
exercises ‘in general tend to place great importance on eyewitness
accounts’.357
2.4.4.3 Criteria used to verify credibility of sources and veracity of information
Thus, it seems that the crosschecking between primary and secondary sources
appears as the most common basis used for ensuring credible fact-finding.
In terms of criteria employed to verify the veracity of the information, it is
worth noting that the Guidelines for Field Staff, NGOs and UN Agencies
involved in the monitoring and reporting mechanism on children in armed
conflicts established by UNSC Resolution 1612 have determined the minimum
standard of proof necessary to prove a fact or allegation, namely when in-
formation provided by a primary source are corroborated by at least two other
supporting sources of information.358 In this regard, Boutruche has noted
that
‘to ensure credible fact-finding and an accurate “balance of probabilities”, the
sources used to gather information must be as diverse and reliable as possible,
including information which comes directly from victims and witnesses, inter-
national organizations, non-governmental organizations and government
sources’.359
Consistently, the Commission of Inquiry on Guinea decided that
‘the information received must be checked against independent sources, preferably
eyewitness accounts, and independently verified evidence […]. This is the approach
commonly used by international commissions of inquiry, which endeavour to put
together reliable evidence corroborated by verified testimony. Thus, the report does
355 Wilkinson, Finding the facts (n 296) 30-31. See also Diane F Orentlicher, ‘Bearing Witness:
The Art and Science of Human Rights Fact-Finding’ (1990) 3 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 83.
356 Boutruche (n 4) 14.
357 Grace (195) 31.
358 ‘Guidelines for Field Staff, NGOs and UN Agencies, Children and Armed Conflict –
Monitoring and Reporting of Grave Violations of Child Rights in Israel and oPt’ (May 2009)
8; Boutruche (n 4) 10.




not include any testimony that has not been corroborated by at least one other
source’.360
Similarly, the Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza Conflict has explained
the choice of the ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ standard of proof in the
following terms:
‘[t]he assessment in each case considered two elements: 1) the reliability and
credibility of the source, taking into account its nature and objectivity, the quality
of previously submitted information and the methodology utilized by the source,
and 2) the validity and veracity of the information itself on the basis of cross-
checking witness testimony against photographic evidence and other materials
relating to the same incidents provided by other sources’.361
In terms of how to assess the credibility of sources, the DRC Mapping Exercise
report has also offered some relevant guidance in emphasizing how
‘[a]ssessing the reliability of the information obtained was a two-stage process
involving evaluation of the reliability and credibility of the source, and then the
pertinence and truth of the information itself. This method is known as the admiral-
ty scale. Reliability of the source is determined using several factors, including the
nature, objectivity and professionalism of the organisation providing the informa-
tion, the methodology used and the quality of prior information obtained from
the same source. The validity and authenticity of the information is assessed by
comparing it to other available data relating to the same incidents to ensure that
it tallies with already verified elements and circumstances’.362
2.4.4.4 Impact of the accountability focus
Certain scholars have duly highlighted the similarity in the approach between
commissions of inquiry and tribunals in relation to their preference for first-
hand information and reluctance to reach findings on the basis of hearsay
evidence.363
In particular, despite the fact that commissions of inquiry operate with
a methodology and standard of proof typical of a fact-finding rather than
judicial body, it is undeniable their increasing focus on issues related to the
ascertainment of individual criminal responsibility. This has inevitably affected
360 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Guinea (n 211) para. 22.
361 Report of the independent commission of inquiry on Gaza, (n 344) para. 19.
362 Report of the Mapping Exercise on the DRC (n 300) para. 102.
363 Dov Jacobs and Catherine Harwood, ‘International Criminal Law Outside the Courtroom:
The Impact of Focusing on International Crimes for the Quality of Fact-Finding by Inter-
national Commissions of Inquiry’ in Morten Bergsmo (ed), Quality Control in Fact-Finding
(Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher 2013) 11.
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their methodology in assessing sources and evidence. In this regard, the
Commission of Inquiry on Burundi noted how it
‘decided to conform its fact-finding activities, insofar as possible, to judicial
standards, not only to give its eventual conclusions a solid base but also in order
to amass evidence that could be of use for any later judicial action’.364
More recently, the Special inquiry into Al-Houla, undertaken by the HRC
Commission of Inquiry on Syria instructed it to ‘preserve the evidence of
crimes for possible future criminal prosecutions or a future justice process’.365
Other commissions have been requested to collect facts in order to identify
alleged perpetrators and store evidence that could serve the purpose of future
criminal investigations.366 This has inevitably affected the process of collecting
evidence and reaching certain findings. In the context of Darfur,
‘in classifying the facts according to international criminal law, [the Commission]
adopted an approach proper to a judicial body. It therefore collected all material
necessary for such a legal analysis’.367
2.4.4.5 The need to overcome lack of cooperation by the parties
Now it is time to assess a number of trends developed by commissions of
inquiry and fact-finding missions in relation to the choice and the use of
sources and evidence.
In the previous section it has been emphasized how the lack of cooperation
from the parties involved into a particular situation may seriously hinder the
collection of first-hand information by independent fact-finding bodies. How-
ever, the practice of commissions of inquiry has shown how such obstacle can
be overcome.
Firstly, inquiries mandated to investigate countries that have dismissed
their mandates such as in the case of Israel, Syria, North Korea and Eritrea
have been able to obtain first-hand information and testimonies from victims
and witnesses via Skype or by meeting them in third countries, including
through the possibility of arranging public hearings.368 Secondly, although
364 Report of the international Commission of Inquiry concerning the assassination of the
President of Burundi on 21 October 1993 and the massacres that followed, S/1996/682 (22
August 1996) para. 6.
365 A/HRC 22/13 (2013) para. 5. See also Jacobs and Harwood (n 363) 8.
366 This has been the case for commissions established to investigate the contexts of former
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Darfur, Syria and North Korea.
367 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (n 211) para. 14; Jacobs and
Harwood (n 363) 9.
368 Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Gaza (n 211) paras. 137-145; Report of the
Commission of Inquiry on the situation of human rights in North Korea (n 273) para. 12;




states official records have been difficult to obtain in cases of denial of coopera-
tion, certain commissions have been able to indirectly obtain testimonies from
witnesses familiar with States’ policies. In particular, the UN Fact-Finding
Mission on the Gaza Conflict, while it was not allowed to engage in any official
dialogue with Israeli authorities, nevertheless collected a wide variety of
information coming from the Israeli side. In particular, the team led by Justice
Goldstone was able to review a number of documents, including official
statements of Israeli authorities. It also benefited from the expertise of military
experts familiar with Israel planning military operations as well as from the
testimonies provided by Israeli soldiers to the organisation Breaking the
Silence.369 A similar approach was undertaken by the 2014 Commission of
Inquiry on the Gaza Conflict and by the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Flotilla
incident particularly in relation to testimonies provided by Israeli Defence
Force (IDF) personnel to the Israeli internal Commission (so-called ‘Turkel
Commission’).370
With particular regard to the 2009 UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza
Conflict, one of the distinctive features of the report is the extensive use by
the Mission of ‘indirect’ Israeli sources – such as public statements or inter-
views of political and military figures – in order to prove the ‘deliberate’
character of certain military attacks. In particular, the Mission determined that
it did not have to consider whether Israeli military officials involved in the
military operations were directly influenced by public statements from high-
level political and military echelons. It was enough for it ‘to conclude from
a review of the facts on the ground […] that what [was] prescribed as the best
strategy [appeared] to have been precisely what was put into practice’.371
This approach has raised some criticism and certainly cannot be used in the
context of criminal proceedings to support findings concerning individual
criminal intent beyond reasonable doubt. However, it may help providing
important indications in unveiling the link existing between violations of IHL
perpetrated on the ground and the policies and strategies designed by high-
level military and political elites. In this regard, one should remind that the
UN Mission on Gaza was not mandated to secure individuals to justice but
rather to ascertain facts over alleged violations of IHL. For this reason, such
extensive reliance on ‘indirect’ Israeli sources may still be justified given the
average standard of proof implemented and the objectives behind the fact-
finding exercise. In this regard, as certain scholars have emphasized,
‘the efforts made by the Mission(s) to find the truth and engage the parties, provide
strong evidence for the overall credibility and validity of the exercise. As a result,
369 Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Gaza (n 211) paras. 1176, 1180, 1183.
370 Report of the independent commission of inquiry on Gaza (n 344) paras 284, 292, 391, 400,
401.
371 Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Gaza (n 211) para. 1195.
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the Mission and its report have particular implications for IHL and UN fact-
finding’.372
2.4.4.6 The role of NGOs reports
The practice of international fact-finding bodies has also witnessed a prominent
role played by non-governmental organizations acting on the ground and their
reporting, particularly in situations where commissions of inquiry had no direct
access to the territory or contact with relevant authorities. As an example, the
2000 Human rights inquiry commission in the OPT emphasized the importance
of NGOs reporting in the determination of its findings. Its final report under-
lined how
‘the impressions and interpolations of the Commission and the testimony received
by the Commission [confirmed] the views expressed by the most respected and
reliable NGOs in the region. The Commission [had], therefore, relied to varying
degrees on the findings of respected NGOs where they were supported by reliable
eyewitness accounts and where they coincided with other evidence received by
the Commission’.373
It should be noted how such an attitude of resorting to the findings and
conclusions provided by local NGOs has a double-side effect. From one hand,
local NGOs possess relevant experience of the specific context, particularly when
it comes to collecting information on the ground, selecting relevant testimonies
and matching facts with existing policies. This may prove extremely helpful
for a body composed of external experts that may not always possess an
extensive experience of the dynamics characterizing a specific region. On the
other hand, the high degree of familiarity of those NGOs with the context may
sometimes affect the level of objectivity in assessing certain trends. In these
situations, the ideal solution would be for international commissions to com-
bine information provided by NGOs with the use of first-hand sources.374
Indeed, this has not always been possible particularly in contexts where
commissions have not received cooperation by the parties and full access to
the territory. When this has been the case, the information provided by NGOs
active on the ground has assumed a paramount importance and has often
inspired large sections of the commissions’ reports. This, of course, may raise
doubts on the independent contribution provided by international commissions
in ascertaining facts, as the line between fact-finding exercises and NGOs
reporting becomes more blurred.
372 Zoran Yihdego, ‘The Gaza Mission: Implications for International Humanitarian Law and
UN Fact-Finding’ (2012) 13 Melbourne Journal of International Law 48.
373 Report of the human rights inquiry commission (n 283) para. 10.




On this point, two different examples should be highlighted. On one hand,
the Commission of Experts on Rwanda extensively resorted to NGOs reporting
to corroborate its findings. Its final report stated how ‘the material contained
in most of these reports seems to be precise, detailed and corroborated by the
information gathered in particular by the Special Rapporteur’.375 This
prompted the Commission to resort extensively to NGOs contributions in
sensitive areas such as for the determination of the number of casualties in
specific incidents and by geographic areas.376
On the other hand, the UNSG Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri
Lanka was very critical in assessing the contribution of secondary sources.
For example, with regard to the value of written submissions it determined
that
‘[s]ubmissions could not be individually verified by the Panel and, therefore, were
not used as a direct source to meet the Panel’s threshold of credibility for the
allegations […]. In some cases, however, submissions helped to corroborate other
sources of information’.377
More specifically, in relation to the role of NGOs reports the Panel argued that
‘a number of NGO reports exist on events in the Vanni. While the Panel reviewed
some of these reports, it did not rely on them to compile these allegations, but
rather carried out its own assessment of the nature and scope of allegations.’378
2.4.4.7 Different standards for different findings?
Indeed, while commissions and fact-finding missions have attempted to resort
to uniform standards in the selection and evaluation of their sources and
evidence, this has not always been possible due to the different nature of their
tasks.
For example, different standards may be needed in order to investigate
a single incident or the existence of a pattern or a policy. While the great
majority of commissions have been identifying patterns and policies of viola-
tions in their reports, only few of them have expressly detailed the method-
ology used to reach such findings, particularly in relation to the choice of
incidents indicative of a specific pattern. In particular, the OHCHR Mapping
Exercise on the violations perpetrated in the territory of the DRC during the
period 1993-2003 determined that:
375 Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution
935 (1994), S/1994/1405 (9 December 1994) para. 50.
376 Ibid paras. 73-74.
377 Report of the Secretary General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka (n 327)
para. 19.
378 Ibid, para. 50.
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‘[a] gravity threshold with a set of criteria enabling the Team to identify incidents
of sufficient severity to be included in the final report was used for incident
selection. These criteria fell into four categories: 1) nature of the crimes and viola-
tions linked to a given incident, 2) scale (number) of crimes and violations linked
to an incident, and number of victims, 3) how the crimes and violations were
committed and 4) impact of crimes and violations on communities, regions or the
course of events’.379
Concurrently, the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur decided to select
‘incidents and areas that were most representative of acts, trends and patterns
relevant to the determination of violations of international human rights and
humanitarian law and with greater possibilities of effective fact-finding. In making
this selection, access to the sites of incidents, protection of witnesses and the
potential for gathering the necessary evidence were, amongst others, of major
consideration’.380
Furthermore, many experts have supported the argument that a different
approach is needed when fact-finding relates to IHL or IHRL investigations.
For example, Marauhn, by noting that the Commission of Inquiry on Syria
has applied a similar methodology for assessing both IHL and IHRL violations,
has warned against such uniformity insofar as it may raise serious concerns
vis-à-vis the reliability of certain findings.381 Similarly, Boutruche has em-
phasized that, while
‘fact-finding may at times comprise elements common in both IHL and human rights
law fields, differences exist, particularly with regard to the techniques that vary
depending on the nature of the violations’.382
In this regard, the practice of commissions of inquiry has confirmed how
armed conflicts further complicate fact-finding tasks. For example, looking
at the reports of the Commission of Inquiry and OHCHR investigation on Libya,
it emerges that the types of sources used to substantiate findings on incidents
involving arbitrary arrests, torture and enforced disappearance (which mainly
attract findings related to IHRL) have been different from those required to
investigate situations of conduct of hostilities, which call into question the
applicability of IHL norms. While for the former these missions had access to
detention facilities and received direct testimonies from victims and witnesses
of the events, for the latter little or no cooperation from the parties involved
379 Report of the Mapping Exercise on the DRC (n 300) para. 6. See also Grace (n 195) 18-19.
380 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (n 211) para. 223.
381 Marauhn (n 197) 444-447.




in the hostilities (particularly non-state armed groups) was granted.383 This
meant neither access to intelligence information about military targets nor
access to affected locations. In particular, the OHCHR investigation drew the
attention on the fact that without the ‘ability to conduct site visits and under-
take detailed investigations, [it] has not been able to determine which parties
were responsible for many specific attacks’.384 In sum, the impossibility to
resort to primary and direct sources and the need to rely necessarily upon
written reports and hearsay evidence clearly reflects a different level of
accuracy in the findings, particularly if compared to those based on direct
contacts with victims and eyewitnesses of the events.385
The challenges related to fact-finding in determining compliance with IHL
in areas were active hostilities are still on going have been already highlighted
in the section devoted to the impact of parties’ (non) cooperation. Here it is
important to stress how physical evidence may play a critical role in corrobora-
ting the findings based on primary sources (including witnesses’ tes-
timonies).386 Indeed, the opportunity to conduct site visits and the possibility
of receiving from concerned parties satellite images, medical and forensic
reports and the intelligence information available at the time of attacks are
of paramount importance, particularly when it comes to assessing respect for
the principles of distinction, proportionality, precautions or to ascertain
whether certain weapons have been employed and who is responsible for their
use. Examples highlighted above from the investigations in Gaza, Lebanon,
Libya and Syria show how often commissions have abstained from making
definitive findings in the absence of concrete evidence.387 In other occasions,
where commissions have actually reached certain conclusions, their findings
have been harshly criticised for the lack of solid evidence.388
Such challenges have been duly noted by certain authors. Boutruche, for
example, has argued that fact-finding applicable to situations of conduct of
hostilities
383 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry into Libya (n 202) paras. 82-129, 155-180;
Report of the Investigation by the OHCHR on Libya (detailed findings) (n 304) paras. 101-
107, 125-171.
384 Report of the Investigation by the OHCHR on Libya (detailed findings) (n 304) paras. 101,
107.
385 In particular, the 2011 Commission of Inquiry on Libya was criticized for its analysis of
certain attacks vis-à-vis the principle of proportionality. See Heller (n 206) 39.
386 Heller (n 206) 16.
387 (n 347-350).
388 See in particular, the section of the report of the 2009 UN Fact-Finding Mission on Gaza
concerning ‘deliberate attacks against civilians’. Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission
on Gaza (n 211) para. 706.
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‘not only requires legal expertise in order to properly cover all aspects of the related
IHL norms but broad multi-disciplinary expertise ranging in focus from forensics
to the military’.389
Furthermore, certain authors maintain that commissions need to increase their
proof standards when it comes to findings related to individual criminal
responsibility. According to Grace,
‘a general consensus exists among […] practitioners that missions should exercise
extreme caution when deciding to identify individuals suspected of criminal
responsibility’.390
Similarly, Marauhn noted how the Commission of Inquiry on Syria was tasked
with the investigation of alleged human rights violations, including those that
could amount to crime against humanity. According to his opinion,
‘the Commission, in interpreting its mandate, distinguished between establishing
the facts of human rights violations, only requiring “reasonable suspicion”. In
contrast, the second component of its mandate needs a higher burden of proof by
requiring the identification of “those responsible”’.391
2.4.4.8 Conclusions
In conclusion, commissions of inquiry generally tend to confer a prominent
role to primary and first-hand sources as well as privilege the combination
of different sources in order to corroborate the reliability of their findings. At
the same time specific factors such as lack of parties’ cooperation and denial
of access to the territory may hinder the process of source gathering. Similarly,
certain issues require an additional level of scrutiny. In particular, compliance
with international humanitarian law principles in situations of armed conflict
and the identification of individuals criminally responsible may prove particu-
larly challenging. In this regard, the practice of commissions of inquiry/fact-
finding missions shows either some hesitancy in reaching definitive findings
or harsh criticism in cases certain conclusions are drawn without solid evidence
at disposal.
In order not to be too much exposed to attacks and entrench greater
transparency one possible way would be for commissions to clearly and
389 Boutruche also emphasized the need to match the evaluation ex post made by the investiga-
tion with the one ex ante made by the attacker and points out how in order to reach findings
on solid basis ‘information must be gathered from various sources, including interviewing
eye witnesses and gathering material evidence to assess the nature of the injury or the
features of the damage’ while also underlining the importance to resort to the opinion of
military experts and to conduct site visits. Boutruche (n 4) 20, 22, 33, 34.
390 Grace (n 195) 33.




thoroughly spell out the methodology used to collect and test evidence and
the obstacles encountered in the collection of information. There is a growing
consensus that the more such a process is subjected to public scrutiny, the
more difficult it becomes to undermine the work of commissions of inquiry
at a later stage.
Unfortunately, looking at most recent examples, a reversed trend in the
space devoted to explain the methodology employed to gather sources and
evidence can be noted. While in fact certain past experiences have largely
displayed the methodology used to identify, select and corroborate sources,
such a matter has been given less attention in more recent inquiries.
The 1999 CHR-mandated Commission of Inquiry on East Timor, for example,
shaped its whole report on the basis of the sources collected and testimonies
available in relation to specific incidents. A similar approach had been pre-
viously undertaken by the 1994 Commission of Inquiry on Burundi, whose
mandate included the investigation of the assassination of the former President
Ndadaye and the massacres that followed immediately after. With regard to
the second part, the Commission’s final report contains a detailed section on
the methodology used to collect and test the evidence available. Furthermore,
the report contains an analysis of the main challenges and factors hindering
both the accessibility and reliability of such evidence.392 With regard to the
first part of the report, the criteria developed to assess and test the reliability
of evidence permitted the commission to challenge the genuineness of a
number of testimonies, particularly those coming from within official military
ranks.393
Such rigorous approach has not always been followed by more recent fact-
finding missions. With certain notable exceptions such as the 2011 Commission
on Libya, commissions have generally been more reluctant to develop and
display methodologies to assess the credibility of evidence.394 As an example,
the 2009 UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict relied extensively and
almost uniquely on the testimonies of victims or people directly present at
the scene in relation to the vast majority of incidents examined. In almost all
cases, the Mission found these testimonies to be reliable and credible. Such
complete trust has been criticised by certain scholars and may indeed cast
substantiated doubts on the procedures implemented by the Mission to test
the reliability of witnesses,395 particularly given the fact that the Mission,
392 Report of the international Commission of Inquiry on Burundi (n 364) paras 223-244.
393 Ibid para. 205.
394 Heller (n 206) 14.
395 Abraham Bell, ‘A Critique of the Goldstone Report and Its Treatment of International
Humanitarian Law’ (2010) ASIL Annual Meeting 8.
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as general policy, omitted to explain the methodology developed to such a
scope.396
Future commissions should thus view the experiences of Burundi and East
Timor as models for the high level of attention devoted to the assessment of
sources and evidence. The methodology chosen for corroborating findings is
a crucial element in ensuring the credibility and fairness of the whole fact-
finding exercise. For this reason it is important not only that commissions
develop a sound methodology but also that such methodology is publicly
displayed. This would allow commissions of inquiry to shield themselves from
attacks and criticisms, particularly in cases where their findings are touching
upon sensitive matters or they have been reached without having all possible
evidence at disposal.
In relation to the challenges posed by particular investigations (such those
concerning armed conflicts), it is crucial for commissions of inquiry to be
entrusted with adequate resources. This pertains to both financial and logistic
support and the possibility to resort to technical expertise. It is instructive to
recall the precedent of the UN Fact-Finding Team in Jenin, which was denied
cooperation by Israel precisely on the ground that military expertise was not
adequately represented in its composition.397 In this regard, disposing of a
multidisciplinary team comprising different kinds of expertise (including those
in the legal, medical, military, ballistic and forensic fields coupled with the
knowledge of the context under investigation) not only appears paramount
in order to collect and properly assess information coming from multiple
sources but will also entrench the credibility of the investigation in the eyes
of the multiplicity of actors involved.398 In this regard, Boutruche has noted
how
‘A diversity of sources ensures that allegations are reviewed from different angles
and provide the opportunity for the fact-finder to confront alternate accounts of
events’.399
396 In this regard a notable exception is represented by the section dealing with attacks by
the Israeli forces to the Al-Quds hospital, in which it was highlighted how ‘the Mission
met staff from the hospital on six separate occasions, three of them on site visits. […] Three
long interviews were carried out with one doctor individually, another was carried out
with two doctors together and there were two group meetings with four and five doctors,
respectively’. Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (n
211) para. 595.
397 (n 322).
398 On this particular aspect see Grace (n 195) 43.




2.4.5 Legal analysis and contribution to the development of international
law
2.4.5.1 Introduction
The contribution to the development of international law may, at a first glance,
be perceived as not being among the primary functions of international fact-
finding missions and commissions of inquiry. In fact, if one looks at their
traditional conceptualization, the idea behind the setting up of international
inquiries is inherently linked with the need of stating the facts. However, one
cannot ignore the role assumed by these instruments in the practice. Commis-
sions of inquiry nowadays increasingly resort to the application of international
law and their findings contain not only an overview of the facts investigated
but also their analysis according to the relevant international legal frameworks.
In this regard, the work and practice of commissions of inquiry naturally
prompt the dilemma in determining whether they can be considered as mere
fact-finding tools or rather should be viewed as law-applying authorities.
According to Boutruche such dilemma appears intrinsic to the idea of commis-
sions of inquiry/fact-finding missions as an instrument.
‘The question about the separation of fact-finding and the legal evaluation may
be as difficult to grasp as it is intrinsic to fact-finding. In this respect it constitutes
a diffused challenge throughout the fact-finding process: How can fact-finding be
completely separate from the legal assessment of the ascertained facts?’.400
In this regard, Van den Herik has argued how the law-applying function may
have always been among the intrinsic features of fact-finding bodies:
‘the main difference between traditional and contemporary commissions of inquiry
does […] not correspond to the fact/law distinction in the sense that traditional
commissions were pure fact-finders and contemporary commissions are law-
appliers. The fact/law distinction is simply not that easy to make’.401
Indeed, international law may be well regarded as a necessary feature in the
commissions’ work as ‘selection criterion’ in order to identify which facts are
relevant and properly qualify them.402 Still, according to van den Herik, a
400 Boutruche (n 4) 6.
401 Van den Herik (n 14) 536.
402 In this regard, Boutruche refers to the opinions of Salmon and Vité by underlying how
‘the expression ‘ascertaining’ facts is misleading as it suggests that the operation is about
ascertaining an objective phenomenon that would then be ‘confronted’ to the legal norm.
On the contrary, [Salmon] stresses the influence of law on facts in several respects; for
example, he suggests that the relevance of a fact is linked to the choice of the applicable
law. Ultimately, the facts covered through the inquiry are framed by the elements of the
very rule allegedly violated. Otherwise, a legal conclusion cannot be reached’. Boutruche
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‘question arises whether the invocation of international law also serves ulterior
purposes and whether contemporary commissions of inquiry should in fact be
regarded as de facto law-applying authorities rather than fact-finding exercise’.403
What can be stated unambiguously is that fact-finding and law-application
cannot be seen as isolated or compartmentalised features in the work of
commissions of inquiry but rather should be viewed as co-constitutive
elements. Law often defines the parameters through which a fact-finding body
operates and the discernment between relevant and non-relevant facts is made
precisely on the basis of the relevant legal frameworks. From this standpoint,
it becomes extremely difficult to argue that commissions of inquiry cannot
be considered as law-applying bodies.
While it should be noted how commissions and fact-finding missions have
always showed an inclination towards engaging in legal analysis,404 in
modern times international law has become a prominent feature in both their
mandates and reporting. Not only commissions have been requested to collect
information with the aim to find out whether violations of IHL and IHRL were
committed, but ‘[i]n more recent years, the mandates of human rights commis-
sions include more pronounced instructions to make legal characteriza-
tions’.405 Hence, considerable progresses have been made since the Commis-
sion of Experts on the former Yugoslavia’s stance according to which, ‘the
Commission’s mandate is to provide the Secretary-General with its conclusions
on the evidence of such violations and not to provide an analysis of the legal
issues’.406
With commissions of inquiry undisputedly entrusted to make legal deter-
minations including through highlighting responsibilities, a number of relevant
questions automatically arise. How have commissions interpreted and applied
international law in their practice particularly compared to the use made by
judicial bodies? Which kind of contribution commissions have provided to
the development and consolidation of international law? And, finally, which
kind of value do these legal findings possess?
The following sub-paragraphs will attempt to shed light on some of these
questions.
(n 4) 7; Jean Salmon, ‘Le fait dans l’application du droit international’ (1982) 175 The Collected
Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 261; Sylvain Vite ì, ‘L’expertise au service
du droit: comment la norme façonne le processus d’enquête dans la mise en œuvre des droits de
l’homme et du droit des conflits armés’ in Debons and others (eds), Katyn et la Suisse (Georg
Geneva 2009) 251.
403 Van den Herik (n 14) 529.
404 Ibid 519.
405 Ibid 531.




2.4.5.2 Use and interpretation of international law in the practice of commissions
of inquiry
The practice shows how commissions have been generally fairly flexible and
progressive in their understanding and interpretation of the law. According
to certain authors, commissions have in fact been profiting from the caveat
that they could not be equated to a court of law entrusted with making definit-
ive findings.407
As mentioned, the main bodies of law that have been used by those com-
missions of inquiry that form the subject matter of this dissertation are inter-
national humanitarian law, international human rights law and international
criminal law.
Leaving aside for the moment the application of ICL, the main contributions
provided by commissions of inquiry/fact-finding missions have dwelled on
the applicability of international legal frameworks and the interaction between
IHRL and IHL, the applicability of IHRL to non-state actors and issues related
to IHL compliance in situation of modern and asymmetric armed conflicts.
2.4.5.2.1 The interaction between international humanitarian law and human rights
law
With regard to the interaction between IHL and IHRL, the practice of commis-
sions of inquiry offers significant developments, although they have mainly
echoed the general idea of complementarity that has been enshrined in the
International Court of Justice’s jurisprudence and supported by scholars.408
In particular, the HRC Commission of Inquiry on Syria was confronted with
the issue concerning to what extent IHRL continues to apply in situations of
armed conflict. It argued how
‘[t]he onset of IHL applicability does not replace existing obligations under IHRL;
both regimes remain in force and are generally considered as complementary and
mutually reinforcing’.409
In other terms, the Commission claimed how the applicability of one frame-
work does not exclude the other, on the contrary they should be ‘applied
consistently’ whenever possible. If not, ‘the principle of lex specialis applies’.410
407 In particular, in the opinion of Van den Herik, commissions of inquiry ‘occasionally [display]
a rather flexible and progressive attitude in their selection and understanding of the law,
which is informed by their function and purposes’. van den Herik (n 14) 535.
408 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall (n 196) para. 106; Marco Sassoli,
‘Le droit international humanitaire : Une lex specialis par rapport aux droits humains?’ in Andreas
Auer, Alexandre Flückiger, Michel Hottelier (eds), Les droits de l’homme et la constitution:
Etudes en l’honneur du Professeur Giorgio Malinverni (Schulthess Geneva 2007) 375.
409 3rd Report of the independent commission of inquiry on Syria (n 200) para. 5.
410 Ibid. For a critique, see Marauhn (n 197) 440.
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The manner in which the Commission has combined the application of
IHL and IHRL has raised the concern of certain authors. Marauhn for example
argued how the Commission’s interplay of IHL and IHRL in order to describe
incidents of unlawful killings has been ‘to say the least, imprecise’.411 He
also stressed how certain violations, as in the case of arbitrary arrests and de-
tentions, have not been examined from the point of view of IHL. Such a select-
ive approach, apparently undertaken without specific grounds, has exposed
the Commission to the accusation of ‘blurring the lines’ between the two bodies
of law with negative implications in terms of their compliance.412
Similarly, the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur determined, with regard
to the applicability of both IHL and IHRL to the situation in Darfur, how
‘[t]he two are complementary. […] The difference lies in that whilst human rights
law protects the individual at all times, international humanitarian law is the lex
specialis which applies only in situations of armed conflict’.413
The Commission went on by underlining how international human rights law
and humanitarian law are ‘mutually reinforcing and overlapping in situations
of armed conflict’.414 The Darfur Commission’s report then analysed the main
violations perpetrated both from the point of view of IHL and IHRL. Unfor-
tunately, less space was devoted to an understanding of how to combine the
applicability of the two bodies of law particularly in those cases in which the
two appear conflicting. In this regard, a more in-depth contribution has been
provided by the 2011 Commission of Inquiry on Libya particularly in relation
to the limitations imposed by IHRL on the use of lethal force in certain situ-
ations of armed conflict.415 However, such findings have been strongly
criticised by scholars given their lacking solid basis under positive law.416
In general, the practice of commissions of inquiry has represented a first
opportunity to test the interplay of IHL and IHRL in modern armed conflicts.
Indeed, commissions have acknowledged the concurrent applicability of the
two legal frameworks as well as emphasized how specific violations can be
characterized through different legal lens. At the same time – given the un-
certainty existing on how concretely the two bodies of law interact – commis-
sions have, with some notable exceptions, not gone beyond the borders set
by authoritative bodies such as the International Court of Justice and the
Human Rights Committee, namely that IHL and IHRL both concurrently apply
in situations of armed conflicts, IHL being lex specialis. No further clarity has
been provided in relation to possible concrete ways through which the two
411 Marauhn (n 197) 441.
412 Ibid 442-444.
413 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (n 211) para. 143.
414 Ibid para. 144.
415 Full Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya (n 349) para. 131.




systems interplay or on how a certain rule can affect the applicability of the
other in case of a specific conflict. In this regard, one can argue that the
approach by commissions of inquiry has been more explanatory than progress-
ive.
2.4.5.2.2 Obligations of non-state armed groups
The discourse is different when it comes to assess commissions of inquiry’s
contribution in addressing the obligations of non-state armed groups, parti-
cularly in relation to human rights law. In this field a consolidated position
had yet to be developed in terms of both opinion juris and state practice, given
the impossibility for non-state actors of ratifying human rights treaties and
all the consequences stemming in terms of enforcement.
In this context, it is important to highlight how the recent practice of
commissions of inquiry has registered significant developments. In 2011, the
UNSG Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka somehow implied the
existence of IHRL obligations for non-state actors exercising control over a
territory despite refusing to apply the human rights paradigm to the conduct
of non-state groups outside their areas of control. In particular, the Sri Lanka
investigation argued how
‘regarding the human rights obligations of non- state actors [it had] not addressed
human rights violations beyond those that it has characterized as violations of
international humanitarian law. The Panel has not considered LTTE abuses outside
the conflict zone under international human rights law because of the uncertainty
surrounding whether non-state actors have human rights obligations beyond the
territories they control’.417
This position has been revisited by subsequent investigations. In its second
report, the Commission of Inquiry on Syria noted in fact how
‘at a minimum, human rights obligations constituting peremptory international
law (jus cogens) bind states, individuals and non-State collective entities, including
armed groups’.418
On this basis, the report noted how Freedom Syrian Army (FSA) affiliated
groups had perpetrated a number of human rights abuses.419 This passage
is interesting in the sense that it determines that non-state actors are bound
to respect these obligations without specifying whether such responsibility
should be linked to the exercise of governmental-like function or control over
417 Report of the Secretary General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka (n 327)
para. 243.
418 2nd Report of the independent commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/
19/69 (22 February 2012) para 106.
419 Ibid paras. 113-120.
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a territory, in this way contradicting the position expressed by the Sri Lanka
Panel.
Such approach has not been immune from criticism. Certain authors have
emphasized how
‘[t]his is a somewhat contentious legal finding since human rights obligations are
traditionally only thought to apply to States or non-State entities that carry out
the functions of states or have effective control over some territory. […] the point
remains that it is doubtful whether the Commission of Inquiry is the best placed
body to legally determine whether any breaches of ius cogens had occurred,
whether such action was attributable to the group and what consequences would
result in terms of responsibility’.420
In this regard, the Commission has been perceived to engage in the ‘progress-
ive development’ of the existing law. At the same time, it has also been accused
to enforce the law on entities it was not intended to and ‘to be doing so in
a way that lacks rigor and legal justification’.421
However, such reasoning appears as an isolated case particularly looking
at the extensive contribution subsequently provided by the Syria Commission
on issues related to the responsibility of non-state actors. In fact, the Commis-
sion’s work has been predominantly focused at clarifying the extent and scope
of the obligations of certain non-state groups – such as the so-called Islamic
State (IS or ISIS) and Al-Nusra Front – that were capable to acquire a certain
degree of control over portions of the Syrian territory and had developed a
refined and organizational structure pretty similar to state-like entities.
For example, in its seventh report, the Commission argued how
‘the rise in torture and the inhumane treatment of the civilian population in areas
controlled by ISIS and affiliated groups provide reasonable grounds to believe that
such groups promote the widespread and systematic attack on the civilian popula-
tion.’422
These findings are relevant not in so much as highlighting how non-state
armed groups may be involved in the commission of crimes against humanity
but in emphasizing how, for those non-state actors that exercise governmental-
like function over a territory, there are legal consequences in the case human
rights are violated. This concept was further developed in the Commission’s
420 James Devaney, ‘Killing Two Birds with One Stone: Can Increased use of Article 34(2) of
the ICJ Statute Improve the Legitimacy of UN Commissions of Inquiry & the Court’s Fact-
finding Procedure?’ (2013) Sant’Anna Legal Studies STALS Research Paper n. 2/2013, 13.
421 Ibid. See also Tilman Rodenhauser, ‘Progressive Development of International Human Rights
Law: The Reports of the Independent Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’,
EJIL Talk! (13 April 2013).





‘Rule of Terror’ report dedicated to ISIS administration of the Syrian territory.
In particular, it was noted that
‘[i]n areas where ISIS has established effective control, ISIS has systematically denied
basic human rights and freedoms and in the context of its attack against the civilian
population, has perpetrated crimes against humanity’.423
Other commissions have consistently endorsed the approach undertaken by
the Syria investigation in relation to the obligation of non-state armed groups.
For example, the 2013 UNSC-mandated Commission of Inquiry on CAR under-
lined how it decided to adopt ‘the widely accepted understanding that non-
state groups that exercise de facto control over territory must respect human
rights in their activities’.424 The Commission further corroborated its approach
by pointing out how
‘[d]ebates that took place in the late part of the twentieth century as to whether
such non-state actors are nevertheless bound by the standards of international
human rights law, have today been replaced by a general understanding that non-
state groups that exercise de facto control over territory must respect human rights
in their activities’.425
Similarly, the 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry on the Gaza Conflict, with
regard to the executions of 21 alleged ‘collaborators’ for which the Al-Qassam
Brigades in Gaza had claimed responsibility, found that such actions
‘appear[ed] to have been carried out with the knowledge of the local authorities
in Gaza, in violation of their human rights obligation to protect the right to life
and security of those in their custody’.426
The 2015 OHCHR investigation on Libya followed a similar pattern in adopting
‘the approach that non-State actors who exercise government-like functions
and control over a territory are obliged to respect human rights norms when
their conduct affects the human rights of the individuals under their
control’.427
In conclusion, the approach by commissions of inquiry on the human rights
obligations of non-state armed groups has been rather progressive. Although
certain findings have raised criticism for their lacking solid basis in positive
law, in general their contribution in this direction can be viewed as a gradual
423 Report of the independent commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic – Rule of
Terror: Living under ISIS in Syria (14 November 2014) para. 74.
424 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on the Central African Republic (n 294)
para. 41.
425 Ibid para. 107.
426 Report of the independent commission of inquiry on Gaza (n 344) para. 68.
427 Report of the Investigation by the OHCHR on Libya (detailed findings) (n 304) para. 29.
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and substantive step in the process of progressive crystallization of customary
international law norms, particularly in light of the increasing interconnection
between IHL and IHRL in situations of modern and asymmetric armed conflicts.
2.4.5.2.3 Use and interpretation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello
The great majority of commissions of inquiry that forms the basis of this
comparative thematic study have been mandated to investigate situations of
armed conflicts. When dealing with the application of international law to
regulate these contexts, a first important distinction should be made between
jus ad bellum (or ‘the law regulating the use of force’) and jus in bello (the law
regulating armed conflicts or international humanitarian law).
Jus ad bellum
While the discussion around IHL and IHRL paradigms has been predominant
in the analysis of commissions of inquiry, it is important also to pay some
attention to their involvement in jus ad bellum-related issues. In this field, one
of the most remarkable contributions has been the analysis contained in the
report of the International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia
(so-called ‘Tagliavini Report’). The Mission was established by the Council
of the European Union on 2 December 2008 to
‘[i]nvestigate the origins and the course of the conflict in Georgia, including with
regard to international law […] humanitarian law and human rights, and the
accusations made in that context’.428
In its report – published in September 2009 and divided in three volumes –
the Mission determined how the Georgian offensive in Tskhinvali following
tensions in South-Ossetia and Abkhazia did not satisfy the requirements of
necessity and proportionality to defend Georgian villages. Also, the use of
force directed by the Georgian army against Russian peacekeepers was not
justified under international law. On another hand, the Russian response,
although initially justified by the need to protect its peacekeepers, was deemed
to exceed the limit of self-defense and resulted in a number of IHL and IHRL
violations.
Quite surprisingly, the Tagliavini Mission found that the intensity of the
Georgian offensive in Tskhinvali could qualify as a breach of the prohibition
on the use of force enshrined in Article(2)4 of the UN Charter. In responding
to the objection that Article 2(4) traditionally refers to inter-states violence,
the report noted how South Ossetia could be subjected to Article 2(4) as it
acquired the status of de facto state. The report thus made a distinction between
the territories under jurisdiction of South Ossetia and those under Georgia,
without at the same time questioning Georgia’s territorial integrity, an apparent




contradiction that has been duly noted by certain authors.429 The Mission
then scrutinized Georgia’s arguments on self-defence. In this regard, it em-
phasized how the restrictive interpretation that the armed attack triggering
the right to self-defence could be generated only by a State or by militia
through the substantial involvement of a State has been challenged by more
recent developments. The report thus took a progressive approach in the debate
concerning whether non-state armed groups could perpetrate armed attacks
prompting the exercise by states of their right to self-defence. On this point,
the Tagliavini Mission relied extensively on the de-facto jurisdiction of South
Ossetia but also on the UN Security Council practice particular in relation to
the 9/11 attacks.
Scholars have criticized such progressive interpretation of the law on the
use of force. Lott for example notes how state practice and the opinion of many
commentators still require a certain link between the armed activities and a
state in order for the armed attack to trigger the right to self-defence.430 In
particular, for the author, although Georgia had to face what can be described
as ‘unlawful use of force’, there are no legal requirements to classify that as
‘armed attack’ justifying self-defence under article 51 of the UN Charter. Such
more cautious interpretation seems also in line with the position expressed
by the ICJ.431
The Tagliavini Mission also addressed Georgia’s claim that its offensive
was conducted in pre-emptive self-defence. Its report, besides reaching the
conclusion that there was no valuable evidence to suggest that Russia was
on the verge of attack at the time of the offensive in Tskhinvali, noted how
the notion of ‘pre-emptive self-defence’ bore uncertain status under inter-
national law, in this way implicitly questioning its applicability. Thus, the
contribution by the Tagliavini report to the debate concerning jus ad bellum,
although it may have been subjected to criticism, appears at least mindful of
the need to balance and check more recent developments with the existing
state practice and opinion juris acquired on these matters. In this light, while
the Mission has been open to take into consideration certain progress associated
with modern warfare (such as the applicability of the notion of armed attack
to non-state actors), it has treated other theories (such as pre-emptive self-
defence) with great caution particularly in light of the political sensitiveness
of the issues involved.
Extremely interesting appears also the report’s reasoning on the legality
of the Russian response. While dismissing the other three motives adduced
429 Alexander Lott, ‘The Tagliavini Report Revisited: Jus ad Bellum and the Legality of the
Russian Intervention in Georgia’ (2012) 28(74) Utrecht Journal of International and European
Law 4.
430 Ibid 9.
431 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall (n 196) para. 139; Armed Activities
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by the Russian Federation to justify its reaction, the report focused in particular
on the need to respond to an attack directed against Russian peacekeepers.432
In this regard, the Tagliavini Mission determined that an attack on Russian
peacekeepers amounted to an armed attack against Russia triggering the right
to self-defence unless it was proven that such corps were firing against
Georgian troops during the offence in Tskhinvali.433 Hence, the report – while
noting how the Russian response was disproportionate to the threat suffered
and amounted to serious violations of both IHL and IHRL – actually justified
the legality of the Russian Federation’s reaction per se based on the right to
self-defence.434 Such conclusion appears surprising given the lack of sub-
stantial opinio juris and state practice on the matter. In particular, Lott
suggested to apply the command and control test to determine whether
Russian peacekeepers were to consider states’ instrumentalities and found out
how they were falling under the control of an international force rather than
that of the Russian Federation.435
Also the legality of the 2006 Israel offensive into Lebanon was scrutinized
by the HRC mandated Commission of Inquiry based on jus ad bellum para-
meters. The Commission noted the illegality of Hezbollah action under inter-
national law resulting in the killing of eight Israeli soldiers on 12 July 2006.
At the same time, the report determined how Israel’s reaction, although
initially justified under the right to self-defence, ‘very quickly escalated from
a riposte to a border incident into a general attack against the entire Lebanese
territory’.436 According to the Commission, these actions had ‘the character-
istics of an armed aggression, as defined by General Assembly resolution 3314
(XXIX)’.437 Regardless of whether such a finding has been based or not on
solid factual grounds, it is important insofar as it seems to imply that the use
of force, even when initially justified under self-defence, can nonetheless result
in an act of aggression if by its character, gravity and scale manifestly flagrant-
ly violates the relevant prohibition enshrined in the UN Charter.
Jus in Bello
Turning to the application of jus in bello or IHL, the main contributions of
commissions of inquiry have revolved around the determination about the
existence of an armed conflict and the challenges posed by modern warfare
432 The other motives adduced by the Russian Federation to justify its armed intervention in
Georgia were the invitation provided by South Ossethia, the urgency to engage in a
humanitarian intervention to prevent the commission of mass atrocities and the need to
protect its own citizens abroad.
433 Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia
(September 2009) paras. 21, 268.
434 Ibid paras. 265-269.
435 Lott (n 429) 17-18.





particularly in relation to asymmetric conflicts in urban and densely populated
settings.
In terms of the conditions triggering the applicability of the law of armed
conflict, commissions have often taken a cautious approach – especially where
situations on the ground appeared particularly blurred and volatile – while
leaving any final determination to the authority of judicial bodies.
In terms of distinction between international armed conflicts and conflicts
of internal nature, the Commission of Experts on the Former Yugoslavia
admitted how
‘[d]etermining when these conflicts are internal and when they are international
is a difficult task because the legally relevant facts are not yet generally agreed
upon. This task is one which must be performed by the International Tribunal’.438
However, for the sake of simplification, the Commission put forward the
opinion
‘that the character and complexity of the armed conflicts concerned, combined with
the web of agreements on humanitarian law that the parties have concluded among
themselves, justifies the Commission’s approach in applying the law applicable
in international armed conflicts to the entirety of the armed conflicts in the territory
of the former Yugoslavia’.439
Similarly, the OHCHR Mapping Exercise on the DRC held that it was ‘difficult
to classify all of the various armed conflicts that affected the DRC all over its
territory between 1993 and 2003’.440
A challenging exercise has also been the characterization of the hostilities
between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006. In this regard, the Commission of
Inquiry on Lebanon determined that
‘[t]he fact that the Lebanese Armed Forces did not take an active part in them
neither denies the character of the conflict as a legally cognizable international
armed conflict, nor does it negate that Israel, Lebanon and Hezbollah were parties
to it’.441
438 Report of the Commission of Experts on Former Yugoslavia (n 177) para. 43.
439 Ibid para. 44.
440 Report of the Mapping Exercise on DRC (n 300) para. 474.
441 In particular, the Commission substantiated this approach on three different grounds. First,
the participation of the Hezbollah group in Lebanese institutions and public life as well
as its capability of exercising de facto state authority and control over southern Lebanon.
Second, the links existing between Hezbollah and the Government of Lebanon, especially
in relation to the concept of ‘resistance’ to the Israeli occupation that has been part of the
Lebanese Government’s longstanding aspirations and narrative. Third, the fact that the
whole territory of Lebanon was subject to the hostilities. On this basis, the Commission
determined that both Lebanon and Israel were parties to the conflict and bound by the
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Another complex assessment has been represented by those situations that
escalated from mere disturbances and tensions into armed conflicts and vice
versa. In this regard, commissions of inquiry have indeed felt the necessity
of operating such distinction given the different legal frameworks available
(IHRL in situation of peacetime while a combination of IHL and IHRL in situ-
ations of armed conflict). However their practice also shows certain hesitancy
in making conclusive findings on such matters, leaving again the issue to the
final determination of authoritative judicial bodies.
For example, with regard to the situation in Libya in 2011, the HRC
mandated Commission of Inquiry claimed how
‘the precise date for determining when change from peace to non-international
armed conflict occurred is somewhat difficult in the current circumstances. The
Commission notes that other organisations that have been examining this question
such as the Prosecutor of the ICC and the […] ICRC have not put forward a particular
date’.442
However, the Commission engaged in its own assessment based on a number
of criteria mainly echoing the jurisprudence developed by the ICTY on the
matter.443 In particular, according to its report:
‘in determining whether a non-international armed conflict exists, the Commission
has thus had to consider the intensity of the conflict, the extent of relevant control
of territory and the nature of the armed group in opposition to the Government.
Examining the nature of the armed group involves considering such factors as
whether there is a hierarchical command structure, the extent to which it is able
to carry out organized operations (e.g. organises into zones of responsibility, means
of communication); discipline systems, the nature of logistical arrangements and
how the group presents itself (e.g. whether it is capable of involvement in nego-
tiations)’.444
Hence, based on a variety of information concerning structural developments
among opposition forces as well as their territorial gains, the Commission
reached the view that
Geneva Conventions of 1949, and customary international humanitarian law. Report of
the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon (n 280) para. 55.
442 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry into Libya (n 202) para. 62.
443 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadiæ, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal,
Case No. IT-94-1 (2 October 1995) para. 70; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T
(Judgment, 30 November 2005) paras. 94-129, 135–67; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case
No. IT-04-84-T (Judgment, 3 April 2008) paras. 40–49.




‘by or around 24 February, a non-international armed conflict had developed
sufficient to trigger the application of AP II and Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions’.445
More recently, a much more comprehensive analysis has been developed by
the UNSC Commission of Inquiry on CAR. The CAR Commission distinguished
between three different phases characterizing the situation in CAR between
January 2013 and December 2014. According to the Commission, ‘these three
phases […] do not necessarily reflect the nature or intensity of the conflict that
took place in the country during the relevant periods of time’, a determination
that is necessary in order to reach a conclusion as to whether a non-inter-
national armed conflict existed in CAR triggering the applicability of IHL.446
While in its preliminary report, the Commission expressed the view that
a non-international armed conflict existed in CAR since the beginning of its
mandate (1 January 2013), given the complexities of the situation it found more
grounds in its final report to revisit such an assessment, and to suggest a more
nuanced and less definitive approach in line with the determinations made
by the ICRC and the ICC Prosecutor.447 More in particular, after an extremely
detailed analysis of the criteria to assess the existence of an armed conflict
as applied to the volatile situation on the ground, the Commission’s report
concluded that ‘the level of hostilities during the period from 24 March 2013
until early December [2013] did not reach the level required to conclude that
an armed conflict existed’.448
While leaving final determinations to future analysis based on more
detailed accounts, the Commission thus considered that
‘it is a more accurate reflection of the facts on the ground and of the careful and
nuanced application of the relevant law to conclude that there was a non-inter-
national armed conflict taking place on the territory of the CAR up until March 2013,
and again from 4 December 2013 until the present time. For the remaining periods
covered by this report the Commission therefore analyses the various alleged abuses
only in terms of violations of international human rights law and crimes against
humanity under the Rome Statute’.449
445 Ibid para. 65.
446 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on the Central African Republic (n 294)
para. 83.
447 Ibid paras. 88, 89-93.
448 Ibid paras. 86-95, 96.
449 Ibid paras. 97, 99-101. It should be noted in particular how two competing interests have
been balanced by the Commission in its conclusions on the qualification of the conflict;
the first calls for caution in suggesting too many changes in the qualification of the conflict
while the second urges precision in the determination of the conflict in order to avoid the
risk that further war crimes accusations could be ruled out by an inaccurate qualification
of the contextual elements. According to the Commission, when balancing the two con-
siderations ‘it is best to err on the side of caution and to avoid blunt classifications that
may provide a greater degree of legal certainty and facilitate the continuing and uninter-
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With regard to the challenges facing the applicability of IHL in modern asym-
metrical armed conflicts, the first key area relates to the applicability of the
principle of distinction and its ramification in terms of direct participation
in the hostilities and definition of military objectives. This has represented
a particularly compelling issue especially for those inquiries mandated to
investigate armed conflicts in Lebanon, Gaza and Sri Lanka.
In this regard, a first important challenge has been posed by those tactics
aimed at targeting the enemy’s so-called ‘supporting infrastructure’, a defini-
tion that may blur, alter and significantly broaden the notion of military
objective. This may bear significant implications for non-state armed groups
such as Hezbollah and Hamas that, although labelled as ‘terrorist’ by Israel
and most western countries, have developed a structure that comprises
political, law enforcement and military wings as well as a network of indirect
affiliates.
In this debate, a first important contribution comes from the Commission
of Inquiry on Lebanon. The Commission has in fact stressed how
‘[t]he idea of treating Lebanese citizens as members, friends, family or sympathizers
of Hezbollah, and therefore as potential enemies and/or combatants susceptible
to lawful attack, goes well beyond any legal interpretation of the principle of
“civilians having lost their protected status” and of their “direct participation in
the hostilities”’.450
The Commission went even further by determining that ‘[t]reating as ‘terrorists’
all members or affiliates of an official political party leads to an unacceptable
interpretation of the law’ and that ‘the presence of Hezbollah offices, political
headquarters and supporters would not justify the targeting of civilians and
civilian property as military objectives’.451
A similar approach has been adopted by the 2009 UN Fact-Finding Mission
on the Gaza Conflict. The Mission scrutinised Israel’s policy of attacking
‘everything related to Hamas terrorist group’s supporting infrastructure’,
noting how it led to the systematic targeting of governmental and police
facilities. On this basis, it determined how Hamas should be considered an
organisation with its civil and military branches, a differentiation that is
relevant for the application of the principle of distinction under IHL. In this
regard, the Mission expressed the view that the Israeli policy failed to explain
rupted application of international humanitarian law but that do not accurately reflect the
nature of the events on the ground’.
450 Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon (n 280) para. 81. For an appraisal on the
interpretation and application by the Commission of relevant norms of international
humanitarian law see, James G Stewart, ‘The UN Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon: A
Legal Appraisal’ (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1039.




how the buildings targeted effectively contributed to military action.452 This
led it conclude that the test proposed by Israeli military officers to target all
Hamas’ infrastructure ‘is not the test applied by international humanitarian
law and accepted State practice to distinguish between civilian and military
objects’.453 While refusing the categorisation of such objects as of ‘dual-use’
nature, it thus determined that ‘the attacks on these buildings constituted
deliberate attacks on civilian objects in violation of the rule of customary
international humanitarian law’, amounting also to the grave breach of extens-
ive destruction of property under the Fourth Geneva Convention.454 The
Mission went even further by expressing the view that Israel’s justifications
for the strikes were dangerous arguments that should be vigorously rejected
as incompatible with the cardinal principle of distinction.
On this point, a different approach was later undertaken by the 2011
Commission of Inquiry on Libya. In particular, the Libya Commission’s
analysis significantly diverged from its Lebanon and Gaza predecessors in
so far as it qualified the thuwars in their entirety as members of an organised
armed group, thus making them targetable any time (regardless of the type
of conduct undertaken) by applying the ‘continuous combat function’ cri-
terion.455
However, more recently, the Commission of Inquiry mandated to invest-
igate the 2014 Gaza Conflict endorsed the approach adopted by the previous
Lebanon and Gaza experiences in underlying how
‘the mere fact of being a member of the political wing of Hamas or any other
organization in Gaza, or working for the authorities […] is not sufficient in and
of itself to render a person a legitimate military target’.456
Such remarks has called directly into question the interpretation of what
constitute a lawful military target under IHL. In this regard, the Commission
expressed the view that
452 Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Gaza (n 211) para. 383.
453 Ibid para. 384.
454 Ibid para. 387. This reasoning partly differs from the approach undertaken by the Commis-
sion of Inquiry on Lebanon in relation to the targeting of ‘dual-use’ objects. The latter in
fact appreciated that ‘some infrastructure may have had ‘dual use’ but this argument cannot
be put forward for each individual object directly hit during this conflict. Even if some
claims were true, the collateral harm to the Lebanese population caused by these attacks
would have to be weighed against their military advantage, to make sure that the rule on
proportionality was being observed’. Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon
(n 280) para. 147.
455 On this point see Heller (n 206) 24.
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‘massive scale of destruction and the number of homes and civilian buildings
attacked raise concerns that Israel’s interpretation of what constitutes a “military
objective” is broader than the definition provided by international humanitarian
law’.457
It is thus undeniable the contribution provided by commissions of inquiry,
through their different positions, to a pivotal debate within the dynamics of
modern warfare, which concerns the application of the ‘group membership
doctrine’ to assessments related to the direct participation in the hostilities.458
An articulated interpretation of the principle of distinction as applied in
densely populated contexts can also be found in the report of the UNSG Panel
on Accountability in Sri Lanka. The report noted how the Sri Lanka Govern-
ment had
‘provided vastly low estimates of civilians trapped in the conflict zone. Together
these indicate that it associated many or most people inside the conflict zone with
the LTTE and thereby failed to take account of this bedrock principle’.459
In this regard, the Panel determined how
‘[i]n regard to the presence of the LTTE in the proximity of civilians in the [No Fire
Zones], international tribunals, including the ICTY, have clarified that the ban on
attacks against civilians protects a population that is ‘predominantly civilian’
457 Ibid para. 223.
458 In this regard the findings of the Mission seem to contradict the notion of ‘direct participa-
tion’ as envisaged in a Guidance published by the ICRC in 2009. In particular, the Guidance
has widened the definition of direct participation as traditionally envisaged by the Geneva
Conventions, by determining that the status of civilian should be preserved only for those
people who engage in hostile acts, which are spontaneous, sporadic and unorganized. When
the participation of an individual goes beyond that level of engagement, that individual
cannot be considered a civilian anymore but becomes automatically a member of an
organized armed group. In this case the protection accorded by IHL is waived for as long
as the individual remains part of the group, as the rest period between acts is considered
nothing other than preparation for the next hostile act. In this context, the so-called ‘revolv-
ing door’ of protection thus operates no longer based on the notion of active participation
but on mere membership. Whether such development has consolidated in the creation of
a customary law norm is a matter of debate among scholars. Nils Melzer, Interpretative
Guidance on the Notion of ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ under International Humanitarian
Law (ICRC Geneva 2006) 72.






‘the presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within
the definition of civilians [i.e. combatants] does not deprive the population of its
civilian character’.460
This has led the Panel to argue that the same act of indiscriminately shelling
that results in civilian casualties may configure the criminal offence of
‘murder’.461
This reasoning should be linked with the outstanding contribution provided
OPT inquiries in relation to the use of precautions in urban warfare. For
example, the 2009 Gaza Mission, following the example of the 2006 HRC
Commission of Inquiry in Lebanon,462 was keen in underlying how the
system of warning implemented by Israel during the campaign (including the
sending of ‘leaflets’ and the ‘roof-knocking’ practice) did not meet the ‘effective
warning’ standard as enshrined in Article 57 of Additional Protocol I.463 The
Mission paid particular attention to the specific context existing in Gaza,
including the unavailability of humanitarian corridors and the assumption
that ‘no safe place’ could be identified for civilians to move to.464 Further-
more, in assessing the policy implemented by the IDF, according to which those
who did not act according to warnings were automatically to lose their pro-
tection, it also determined that
‘the fact that a warning was issued does not, however, relieve a commander or
his subordinates from taking all other feasible measures to distinguish between
civilians and combatants’.465
This analysis has been further developed by the UN Commission of Inquiry
on the 2014 Gaza Conflict in relation to specific policies implemented by the
IDF during its ground invasion. In particular, the 2014 Gaza Commission
focused on the IDF policy of declaring entire neighbourhoods or villages as
460 Ibid para. 196.
461 Ibid paras. 193, 197. In this regard, the report noted how ‘international jurisprudence accepts
that ‘where a civilian population is subject to an attack such as an artillery attack, which
results in civilian deaths, such deaths may appropriately be characterized as murder, when
the perpetrators had knowledge of the probability that the attack would cause death’. It
also drew attention on the fact that the war crime of making civilians the object of an attack
does not only apply to deliberate attacks against civilians but also to attacks undertaken
‘wilfully’, which – based on international jurisprudence – may encompass attacks that are
reckless regarding the impact on civilians, namely indiscriminate shelling.
462 Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon (n 280) paras. 149-161.
463 Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Gaza (n 211) paras. 537-40.
464 Ibid para. 473.
465 Ibid para. 520.
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‘sterile combat zones’.466 The Commission’s report noted in fact that while
the IDF had delivered initial warnings directing civilians to abandon those
areas, parts of the civilian population could not move for a variety of reasons.
In this regard, declaring specific areas ‘sterile combat zones’ entailed that when
the Israeli forces subsequently commenced military operations, their manner
of deployment suggested a presumption that civilians were no longer present
in these areas.467
The Commission argued that Israeli forces may have treated entire densely
populated areas as one single military object instead of distinguishing between
civilians and combatants in each of the incidents occurring in affected
areas.468 In this regard, the Commission highlighted how
‘the issuing of warnings does not signify that the subsequent attack will be lawful.
The stated effort to create a “sterile combat zone” and to consider everyone in an
area that has been the object of a warning as engaging in “terrorist activity”, could
be construed as an attempt to use warnings to justify attacks against individual
civilians’.469
In this regard the reasoning of the Commission follows the line traced by
previous investigations in Lebanon and Darfur.470 Therefore, the Commission
466 For an in depth analysis of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza
Conflict see Diakonia IHLRC, ‘From Fact-Finding to Ending Impunity’ (2015).
467 Report of the detailed findings of the independent commission of inquiry (n 344) paras.
400-401. See also Breaking the Silence, ‘This is how we fought in Gaza’ (2014) 18 http://
www.breakingthesilence.org.il/testimonies/database/?tzuk=1 accessed on 8 December
2016.
468 Report of the detailed findings of the independent commission of inquiry (n 344) para.
337.
469 Ibid para. 404.
470 In assessing whether the IDF had taken feasible precautions to spare Lebanese civilians
from attacks the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon stated that ‘[a] warning to evacuate
does not relieve the military of their ongoing obligation to ‘take all feasible precautions’
to protect civilians who remain behind, and this includes their property. By remaining in
place, the people and their property do not suddenly become military objectives which
can be attacked. The law requires the cancelling of an attack when it becomes apparent
that the target is civilian or that the civilian loss would be disproportionate to the expected
military gain’. Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon (n 280) para. 158. In relation
to attacks conducted by the Sudanese Government in Darfur villages, the Commission of
Inquiry on Darfur underlined that ‘[e]ven assuming that in all the villages they attacked
there were rebels present or at least some rebels were hiding there, or that there were
persons supporting rebels […] the attackers did not take the necessary precautions to enable
civilians to leave the villages or to otherwise be shielded from attack. The impact of the
attacks shows that the military force used was manifestly disproportionate to any threat





suggested that these operations could qualify as direct attacks against civilians
or civilian objects and thereby amount to war crimes.471
These tactics have led international inquiries on the OPT to engage in
broader reflections on the overall objectives of certain methods of warfare.
In this regard, the findings of the 2014 Gaza Commission echoed the assess-
ments of previous investigations on the employment by Israel of military tactics
that disproportionately affected large segments of the civilian population with
the alleged punitive intents. For example, the 2009 UN Fact-Finding Mission
on the Gaza Conflict dedicated, in one of the most controversial sections of
its report, an analysis to the attacks on foundations of civil life in Gaza and
the application of the so-called ‘Dahiya Doctrine’.472 The team led by Justice
Goldstone endorsed the view previously expressed by the Commission of
Inquiry on Lebanon that this military doctrine, firstly applied in certain areas
of Beirut and Southern Lebanon, violated basic tenets of IHL and IHRL.473 In
particular, the Mission argued how such policy could amount to the grave
breach of extensive destruction of property and to the violation of the prohi-
bition of using the starvation of civilians as a mean of warfare enshrined in
Article 54 of Additional Protocol I.474 It further noted how
‘the cumulative effect of the blockade policies […] and of the military operations
[…] strongly suggest that there was an intent to subject the Gaza population to
conditions such that they would be induced into withdrawing their support from
Hamas’.475
471 Report of the detailed findings of the independent commission of inquiry (n 344) para.
340.
472 The so called ‘Dahiya Doctrine’ is a military strategy designed by the IDF general Gadi
Eizenkot that foresees, through the employment of disproportionate force, the destruction
of the civilian infrastructure of so called ‘hostile regimes’, in order to punish such regimes,
impose long reconstruction processes and deter future reactions. The doctrine was named
after a densely populated southern suburb in Beirut was heavily shelled by the Israeli
Defense Forces during the 2006 Lebanon War. ‘Israel finally realises that Arabs should be
accountable for their leaders’ acts –Interview with IDF Northern Command Chief Gadi
Eizenkot’ Yedioth Ahronoth (10 June 2008); Richard Falk, Humanitarian Interventions and
Legitimacy Wars: Seeking Peace and Justice in the 21st Century (Routledge 2014) 38.
473 Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Gaza (n 211) paras. 1200-1211; Report of the
Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon (n 280) paras. 110, 331. In particular, the Lebanon
Commission stated how it ‘formed a clear view that, cumulatively, the deliberate and lethal
attacks on civilians and civilian objects, including protected religious property, protected
cultural and historical property, and items essential to the survival of the civilian population;
the collateral damage caused to protected cultural and historical properties; the attacks
against protected personnel […] the indiscriminate and disproportionate nature of these
attacks; the wilful targeting of fleeing civilians; and the gratuitous and wanton destruction
of civilian property and civilian infrastructure offering no clear and unambiguous military
advantage, amount to collective punishment’.
474 Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Gaza (n 211) para. 928.
475 Ibid para. 1324.
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In other words, according to the Goldstone-led team,
‘Israel, rather than fighting the Palestinian armed groups operating in Gaza in a
targeted way, has chosen to punish the whole Gaza Strip and the population in
it with economic, political and military sanctions’,
in this way breaching the prohibition of collective punishment enshrined in
Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.476
Such reasoning has been subjected to strong criticism particularly in relation
the overall conclusions reached. Indeed, engaging in a debate whether the
overall Israeli military campaigns have aimed at strategic and political object-
ives may lie outside the scope of pure IHL fact-finding, which purportedly
should limit its assessments on the compliance of military attacks with IHL
principles such as distinction, proportionality and precautions. At the same
time, one may also argue that commissions of inquiry felt the need to assess
the effects of an emerging trend of military doctrines that apparently blurs
the lines between the notion of ‘concrete and direct military advantage’ and
broader political and strategic scopes. The fact that such analysis led to overall
(and one may argue disputable) findings unveils the challenges that such an
emerging trend poses to the traditional framework of the laws of war.
Similar challenges were faced by the 2014 Gaza Commission in relation
to its assessment of the controversial ‘Hannibal Doctrine’, a military tactic
allegedly applied by the IDF in Rafah on 1st August 2014, which involves the
use of all necessary force in order to prevent or put an end to the capture by
an armed group of an IDF soldier. The Commission expressed the view that
‘[p]reventing the capture or freeing a soldier from captivity may be conceived as
a concrete and direct military advantage, albeit of a limited nature, since the loss
of one soldier in a large army such as the IDF does not reduce its military capability.
When doing so in a manner that is highly likely to result in the soldier’s death,
it further reduces the concrete and direct military advantage. On the other hand,
some have argued that in such a case the proportionality test must take into account
the strategic consideration of denying the armed groups the leverage they could
obtain over Israel in negotiations for the release of the captured soldier’.477
The Commission considered this to be an ‘erroneous interpretation of inter-
national humanitarian law’. In particular, it specified how
‘the proposed interpretation of the anticipated military advantage, which would
allow for abstract political and long-term strategic considerations in carrying out
476 Ibid para. 1325.





the proportionality analysis, would have the consequence of emptying the
proportionality principle of any protective element’.478
Therefore, the report found that the Rafah attack could have been expected
to cause incidental loss of civilian life and damage to civilian objects ‘which
would be grossly excessive in relation to the anticipated concrete and direct
military advantage, and may therefore amount to a war crime’.479 Such
reasoning provides an important contribution in reaffirming the fundamental
objectives and spirit behind the formulation of certain principles as
proportionality, particularly in spite of modern challenges coming from urban
warfare and asymmetric conflicts. In this regard, the Commission stressed how
the ‘military culture resulting from such policy priorities may have been a
contributing factor for the unleashing of massive firepower on Rafah, in total
disregard for its impact on the civilian population’, in this way expressing
its concerns for those emerging doctrines based on a misinterpretation and
frustration of the rationale behind IHL rules.480
Other hotly debated issues have been the tactics employed by non-state
armed groups of placing military objectives into civilians areas and the alleged
use of human shields. On this point, the assessments by international investiga-
tions have varied depending on each specific context. For example, the analysis
of the Panel on Accountability in Sri Lanka focused on the IHL related pro-
hibition of placing military objectives near densely populated civilian areas
where feasible. The Panel determined how
‘[c]redible allegations point to a violation of this provision insofar as they indicate
patterns of conduct whereby that the LTTE deliberately located or used mortar
pieces, other light artillery, military vehicles, mortar pits, bunkers, and trenches
in proximity to civilian areas. These locations included hospitals and concentrations
of IDPs, including in each of the NFZs’.481
More nuanced has been the assessment by the inquiries on Lebanon and Gaza
on the alleged use of human shields by Hezbollah and Palestinian armed
groups. In particular, according to the Lebanon Commission,
‘[t]here is some evidence that Hezbollah used towns and villages as “shields” for
their firings. At the same time, evidence points to such use when most of the
civilian population had departed the area. The Commission found no evidence
regarding the use of “human shields” by Hezbollah. However, there was evidence
478 Ibid para. 370.
479 Ibid.
480 Ibid para. 371.
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of Hezbollah using UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon posts as deliberate shields
for the firing of their rockets’.482
Even more conservative appears the approach taken by the 2009 Fact-Finding
Mission on Gaza. While not disputing the fact that both Palestinian armed
groups and Israeli forces were fighting within an area populated by civilians
and acknowledging that such method of warfare constituted a failure to take
all feasible precautions to spare civilians,483 the Mission determined how
such elements were not alone sufficient for a finding that a party was using
the civilian population as a human shield. For the Mission in fact,
‘as the words of article 57 (1) [of Additional Protocol I] show […] an intention to
use the civilian population in order to shield an area from military attack is re-
quired’
and from the facts available such a specific intent could not be detected.484
Finally, it is important to assess the review made by commissions of inquiry
of the Palestinian armed groups’ policy of launching rockets from Gaza into
Southern Israel. In particular, the 2009 Gaza Mission took a firm stance by
unequivocally labelling the indiscriminate launching of rockets and mortars
as indiscriminate and intentional attacks against the civilian population,
entailing individual criminal responsibility as war crimes.485 In this regard,
the Mission carefully assessed Hamas’ arguments that these actions were to
be considered as a form of resistance against the Israeli occupation and denial
of Palestinian people’s self-determination. While noting that the right to
(armed) resistance against colonial regimes violating self-determination has
been affirmed by the UN General Assembly,486 the Mission nonetheless argued
that the exercise of such right cannot result itself in a violation of the laws
of war. In particular, according to the report,
‘the peremptory norms of customary international law, both of human rights law
and humanitarian law, apply to all actions that may be undertaken in response
to, or to oppose, human rights violations’.487
Looking at these examples, it can be argued that commissions of inquiry have
approached the challenges posed by urban and asymmetric armed conflicts
482 Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon (n 280) para. 330.
483 Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Gaza (n 211) para. 494.
484 Ibid para. 492.
485 Ibid paras. 1717-1724.
486 ‘Importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination and
of the speedy granting of independence from colonial countries and peoples for the effective
guarantee and observance of human rights’, A/RES/3246/XXIX (29 November 1974) para. 3.




by reaffirming the need to firmly comply with IHL basic tenets and pillars as
enshrined in existing treaties and conventions and further developed by
authoritative jurisprudence. While specific findings have from time to time
sparked controversy, this may be linked with the increasing demand to amend
the traditional legal framework in order to adequately regulate those trends
emerging from modern warfare. Indeed, this is not a task for commissions
of inquiry, whose reflections however could act as engine for advancing the
debate at decision-makers level. For now, it is worth mentioning this passage
from the 2010 Sri Lanka Panel’s report in relation to the tactics employed in
the conflict between the Sri Lanka Government and the LTTE:
‘[n]either the publicly expressed aims of each side of this armed conflict […] nor
the asymmetrical nature of the tactics employed by the two sides affects the applic-
ability of international humanitarian law to the parties. The State has a right under
international law to ensure its national security and to defend itself against armed
attacks, including those of insurgents who may engage in acts of terrorism. Those
ends do not, however, justify all means to achieve them; all action for those legit-
imate purposes must comply with the requirements of international law. As the
International Court of Justice has found, the rules of Common Article 3 “constitute
a minimum yardstick [and] reflect […] ‘elementary considerations of human-
ity’”’.488
2.4.5.3 Legal creativity in the practice of commissions of inquiry
Beside from the contributions in the above discussions, the practice of commis-
sions of inquiry has also offered remarkable examples of development of
brand-new international law concepts and paradigms. In particular, two
examples of creativity by international inquiries in framing new paradigms
of international law are presented below. They pertain to the work and find-
ings of the Commission of Experts on former Yugoslavia and the Commission
of Inquiry on Syria.
2.4.5.3.1 Ethnic cleansing and rape: the contribution of the Commission of Experts
on former Yugoslavia
One cannot deny the outstanding contribution given by the Commission of
Experts on the former Yugoslavia in framing and developing new concepts
of international law.
Primarily, the Yugoslavia Commission of Experts should be paid tribute
for the first conceptualization of the offence of ‘ethnic cleansing’ under inter-
national law, defined as
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‘a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent
and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious
group from certain geographic areas’.489
The Commission referred to a number of measures carried out in strategic
areas linking Serbia proper with Serb-inhabited areas in Bosnia and Croatia.
According to the Commission, ‘this strategic factor is significantly relevant
to understanding why the policy has been carried out in certain areas and
not in others’.490 The report further argued how
‘[t]hose practices constitute crimes against humanity and can be assimilated to
specific war crimes. Furthermore, such acts could also fall within the meaning of
the Genocide Convention’.491
The definition and conceptualization of ethnic cleansing by the Commission
served the basis for important judgments delivered on the matter by the ICTY
as well as inspired the analysis of other international investigations such as
the one investigating events in CAR.492
In relation to the role of rape and other forms of sexual violence as methods
of warfare, the Yugoslavia Commission was again pioneer in noting how rape
should not only be considered in violation of the law of armed conflict but
also as ‘a crime of violence of sexual nature against the person’.493 In this
regard, it highlighted how rape could be considered as a grave breach of the
Geneva Convention (under the label of ‘inhumane treatment and willfully
causing suffering’) and also as fulfilling the material element for genocide and
crimes against humanity.494
The Commission further undertook an unprecedented analysis of the use
of rape as a tool in armed conflict through a series of studies which unveiled
the existence of several patterns, especially linked to the practice of ethnic
cleansing and abuses in detention camps.495 It also developed a database
of reports concerning rape and sexual assaults, which was heavily relied upon
by the ICTY investigative organs.496 In particular, the Commission noted how
there had been a decrease of the trend when the issue was raised in the media.
In its view, this entailed that the practice had been governed by commanders
and high-level officials and ‘that there was an overriding policy advocating
489 Report of the Commission of Experts on Former Yugoslavia (n 177) para. 130.
490 Ibid para. 133.
491 Ibid para. 130.
492 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on the Central African Republic (n 294)
para. 451.
493 Report of the Commission of Experts on Former Yugoslavia (n 177) para. 102.
494 Ibid paras. 104-106.
495 Ibid para. 252-253.




the use of rape as a method of ‘ethnic cleansing’, rather than a policy of
omission, tolerating the widespread commission of rape’.497
2.4.5.3.2 Legal definition of ‘massacres’ and the debate around ‘terrorism’: the
contribution of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria
Another significant brand-new concept developed by the practice of inquiry
commissions pertains to the legal definition of ‘massacres’ as framed by the
Commission of Inquiry on Syria. In particular, one year after its establishment,
the Human Rights Council decided to amend the inquiry’s mandate – original-
ly focused on violations of IHRL and crimes against humanity – to include the
investigation of all ‘massacres’.498 The first task for the Commission was thus
to define what actually the term ‘massacres’ could mean. In this regard,
‘massacre’ was interpreted as encompassing
‘an intentional mass killing of civilians not directly participating in hostilities, or
hors de combat fighters, by organized armed forces or groups in a single incident,
in violation of international human rights or humanitarian law’.499
This definition was viewed by certain doctrine as a further step in the process
of blurring the lines between IHL and IHRL. According to Marauhn,
‘the Commission no longer seems to carefully distinguish between human rights
law and the law of armed conflict. Rather, it seems to apply these bodies of law
alongside each other’.500
The Commission highlighted how specific investigative resources were devoted
to perform such a task. On the basis of the evidence collected, it determined
how a number of massacres were committed by both Government forces and
affiliated militia and by anti-government armed groups.501
The Commission linked the perpetration of massacres with both war crimes
and crime against humanity.502 On this point, the Commission’s seventh
report highlighted how the term ‘massacres’ may encompass
497 Ibid para. 237.
498 Human Rights Council, A/HRC/21/L.32 (2012) para. 19.
499 4th Report of the independent commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/
22/59 (5 February 2013), para. 42.
500 Marauhn n (197) 443.
501 4th Report of the independent commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (n 499)
paras. 44-57.
502 Ibid paras. 48, 52, 57. For example, with regard to the massacre taking place in Harak in
August 2012, where houses were burned and bodies were found with injuries caused by
shrapnel, close-range gunfire and severe knife wounds, the Commission argued how there
were ‘reasonable grounds to believe that Government forces and Government-affiliated
militia committed the war crime of murder’.
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‘multiple instances of the war crime of murder, the war crime of sentencing or
execution without due process and the war crime of attacking civilians […] When
murder is committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against
a civilian population […] the commission of massacres may amount to the crime
against humanity of murder’.503
This reasoning seems to support the idea that massacres, although inde-
pendently qualified, may assume relevance in terms of criminal accountability
only if they can be linked with the commission of existing war crimes and
crimes against humanity. In other terms, the conceptualization of massacres
does not automatically imply the creation of a new type of criminal offence.504
It is beyond question that massacres, by their same definition, are linked
with violations of both IHL and IHRL. This means that massacres may occur
both in armed conflict and peacetime situations.505 It is thus important to
analyse how the new notion interacts with both legal frameworks.
For example, the Commission has clarified the meaning of ‘attacks against
civilians’ under IHL as offences linked to the perpetration of massacres.
‘While the majority of civilian casualties resulted from indiscriminate or dis-
proportionate attacks, primarily aerial bombardments, these killings do not fall
within the definition of a massacre. Where there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the shelling, bombardments or bombings intentionally targeted civilians, such
attacks fall within the definition and are detailed below’.506
Such stance is confirmed in the Commission’s eight report, where it stated
that
‘[w]here there are reasonable grounds to believe that the shelling, bombardments
or bombings intentionally targeted civilians, such attacks fall within the definition
of a massacre’.507
503 7th Report of the independent commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (n 350)
Annex IV para. 2.
504 This does not mean that the perpetration of massacres cannot represent strong evidence
for the commission of international crimes. Perhaps, precisely for this reason the Commis-
sion duly ensured that ‘[in] the [massacres] described, the intentional mass killing and
identity of the perpetrator were confirmed to the commission’s evidentiary standards’. 5th
Report of the independent commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/24/
46 (16 August 2013) Annex II para, 1.
505 Ibid para. 11. In particular, in defining ‘massacre’ a Government-forces’ raid against a small
activists’ cell in the village of Al-Bayda, the Commission stated that ‘that the type of military
operation and the alleged massacre that ensued were not in the context of an armed
confrontation’.
506 7th Report of the independent commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (n 351)
para. 3.
507 8th Report of the independent commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/




This clarification is extremely important insofar as it underlines how only
deliberate attacks, and not attacks that are just ‘indiscriminate’, can fall among
the offences triggering the commission of a massacre.
Furthermore, in many of its reports the Commission has distinguished
between massacres and ‘other unlawful killings’. There seems to be no explicit
explanation on the rationale behind such distinction. Some clarity can be made
by looking at the conceptualization of massacres defined as ‘intentional mass
killings of civilians’. It implicitly follows that any other form of arbitrary
deprivation of life under IHRL or murder under IHL that it is either not massive
or not intentional cannot fall within the definition of a massacre.
A final important remark concerns the orchestrated (or policy-related)
character of massacres. As it has been emphasized by the Syria Commission,
massacres can amount to both war crimes and crimes against humanity and
have in turn been allegedly committed by both government forces and anti-
government groups in the Syrian conflict. For example, in its eight report the
Commission acknowledged how, in relation to the conduct of pro-government
forces,
‘the massacres and unlawful killings formed part of those attacks and constitute
crimes against humanity. Government forces also committed the war crime of
murder and has arbitrarily deprived people of life’.508
Thus, there seems to be no direct and automatic link between massacres and
crimes against humanity requiring a widespread and systematic pattern or
state-like organizational policy. While often being associated with orchestrated
policies, massacres can also be perpetrated in the form of isolated acts if the
massive number of civilian casualties and intentional character of the attack
are proven. At the same time, offences that form part of a widespread and
systematic attack (and thus be qualified as crimes against humanity) may not
be labelled as ‘massacres’ if they do not fulfil these two requirements. This
may mark an important difference with the legal paradigm of ethnic cleansing,
which requires by its nature the existence of an organized policy and can be
intrinsically linked with the commission of crimes against humanity.
Looking at the same context but from the perspective of a different area
of law, the conflict in Syria and the atrocities perpetrated by certain armed
groups have unfortunately provided fertile grounds for developing further
the notion of terrorism under international law. In this regard, the Syria
Commission of Inquiry has refrained from taking any progressive approach.
While it has often labelled certain groups as ‘terrorists’, the Commission has
done so without referring to any specific legal framework, except for UN
508 Ibid para. 58.
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Security Council’s resolutions.509 In relation to the employment of certain
conducts, their label as ‘terrorist acts’ has been made exclusively in relation
to the prohibition against attacks spreading terror among the civilian popula-
tion under IHL. In particular, the Commission’s fifth report highlighted how
‘[t]he commission investigated a number of incidents that may be labelled as
“terrorist attacks” or “terrorism”. Once the threshold of non-international armed
conflict has been met, and the suspected perpetrators are parties to the conflict,
the commission renders its assessment of an attack’s legality under the rubric of
international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Any attack
the sole purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population is
prohibited’.510
Such passage leaves some doubts insofar as – despite quoting both IHL and
human rights law – it limits its analysis to a vague reference to the prohibition
of attacks spreading terror among civilians as set forth in Article 51(2) of
Additional Protocol I and Article 13(2) of Additional Protocol II. While the
vague and cautious approach undertaken by the Commission may be well
justified by the longstanding controversies around a universally agreed defi-
nition of terrorism, still certain improvements from the current stalemate could
be expected particularly in light of the recent contribution provided by the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon on the matter. Indeed, one may argue that specific
recommendations for relevant actors within the international community to
enforce more resolute actions fighting terrorist groups (as contained in some
of the Commission’s reports) and the subsequent follow-up measures adopted
(such as those envisaged in UNSC Resolution 2178) needed a specific back-
ground capable of qualifying those groups as ‘terrorists’ based on more solid
and impartial parameters in terms of actual conducts and violations per-
petrated.511 This would have firstly helped identifying and isolating those
anti-government groups engaged in terrorist acts and spreading intimidation
among civilians from those who limited themselves to military challenging
pro-government forces. Secondly, it would have contributed to properly tackle
the issue concerning the spurge in foreign-fighters.
509 In particular, the Commission noted how the self-proclaimed ‘Islamic State’ and Jabhat
Al-Nusra were designated as ‘terrorist groups’ by UN Security Council Resolution 2170
(2014). It also acknowledged in its eight report that ‘in 2014, terrorist groups used suicide
and car bombs in Homs and Hama governorates’. 8th Report of the independent commission
of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (n 507) para. 126; Report of the independent
commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic – Rule of Terror (n 423) para. 1.
510 5th Report of the independent commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (n 504)
para. 11.





2.4.5.4 Contribution to the development of international law in the practice: conclud-
ing remarks
In conclusion, the use of international law by commissions of inquiry analysed
previously suggests an ambivalent approach. On the one hand, certain commis-
sions have been at the forefront in the progressive development and even in
the creation of new paradigms of international law. The relevant contributions
in the areas of ‘ethnic cleansing’, rape and sexual violence as methods of
warfare, ‘massacres’ and the human rights obligations of non-state actors go
into this direction. In this regard, it can be argued that inquiries have in certain
occasions even inspired and paved the way for the work of legal and judicial
bodies in refining new legal concepts.
Conversely, in other significant fields of international law the approach
of commissions of inquiry has been more restrained and anchored to the
traditional legal framework and existing jurisprudence. This is particularly
the case for those determinations made in the area of conduct of hostilities
and generally the laws of war, where commissions’ analysis have mainly
echoed positive law in spite of the challenges posed by modern warfare to
the overall architecture of IHL norms.
In general, as Darcy notes, the influence of commissions of inquiry on the
development of international law has declined compared to landmark ex-
periences of the past such as the 1919 and 1943 world wars commissions.512
This is mainly due to the fact that the law itself is now better established than
it was at the beginning of the 20th Century. However, some of the above-
mentioned examples clearly show that there is still space for commissions to
act as catalyst factor in the international law-making process. At the same time,
the practice of modern inquiry commissions
‘do[es] reflect an appreciation that, in particular in the most politically sensitive
dossiers, there is a set need to interpret and apply the law quite meticulously and
to develop legal reasoning at some length’.513
In fact, as it has been duly pointed out ‘rigorous legal reasoning may help
to forestall, or at least de-legitimize, unilateral dismissal on legal grounds’.514
2.4.5.5 The value of legal findings of commissions of inquiry
With regard to the value of the legal findings made by commissions of inquiry,
any assessment inevitably becomes more questionable and possibly subjected
to review. In general what can be unambiguously stated is that commissions
512 Darcy (n 44) 19.
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of inquiry cannot act as binding sources of international law as the law-making
power remains primarily a prerogative of states in the international legal
system.
Furthermore, as it has been duly pointed out by van den Herik,
‘even though [commissions] extensively use the law and apply it to established
facts, the commissions do not act as de facto law applying authorities in the sense
of creating binding legal obligations. […] International law is rather used as the
predominant language of communication and construction of facts in a quest to
make the facts more objective and to create political effects’.515
At the same time, other authors have emphasized how commissions of inquiry
might be considered as a sort of an hybrid being their approach quasi-judicial,
‘in that they comprise a detached assessment of facts through the lens of
applicable international legal standards’ and their reports ‘may ‘inadvertently
wind up serving jurisprudential purposes’ if they have addressed disputed
or uncertain international law questions’.516
Based on these premises, it has been noted how
‘the development of international law is not solely the domain of States in practice,
and commissions of inquiry can be counted amongst the various other entities,
such as international courts, which have contributed to this multi-faceted pro-
cess’.517
But how authoritative commissions’ findings can be? At the current stage, it
is probably premature to provide a definitive response to this question, and
the answer may vary depending on each particular situation. However –
looking in particular at the way the findings of these international invest-
igations have been quoted and referred to in the work of international
tribunals, bodies, academics and practitioners – an argument can be advanced
that at least some of these international inquiries can be included in the range
of authoritative international bodies whose determinations should be taken
into account in the progressive interpretation and consolidation of international
law, particularly when it comes to assess the customary nature of certain
provisions. In this regard, Darcy argues how ‘the reports of commissions of
inquiry can be compared to the recognised subsidiary sources of international
law [such as] judicial decisions and scholarly writings’ as set out in Article
38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice ‘and as such, can
515 Van den Herik (n 14) 536.
516 Darcy (n 44) 3; Teo Boutruche, ‘Selecting and Applying Legal Lenses in Monitoring,
Reporting and Fact-Finding Missions’ (2013) HPCR Working Paper, 21.




carry significant persuasive value and prove influential in the development
of international law’.518
2.4.6 Contribution in the areas of international criminal law and account-
ability
2.4.6.1 Introduction
As already mentioned in Chapter 1, the use of international criminal law and
the emphasis on individual criminal accountability represent recent and hotly
debated trends in the evolution of international commissions of inquiry.519
It should be noted preliminary that the issue of accountability is by far
broader than individual criminal responsibility stricto sensu.520 This has been
duly reflected in the practice of commissions of inquiry.521 In particular,
accountability has been defined as encompassing, inter alia, domestic institu-
tions reforms, redress and reparations for victims, disciplinary and administrat-
ive measures and the creation of national human rights authorities.522 Beside
accountability, many of these investigations have also attempted to inspire
and support the international community’s efforts to provide peaceful and
long-term solutions to conflict situations.523
As an example, according to the Panel of Experts on accountability in Sri
Lanka
‘accountability goes beyond the investigation and prosecution of serious crimes
that have been committed; rather it is a broad process that addresses the political,
legal and moral responsibility of individuals and institutions for past violations
of human rights and dignity. Consistent with the international standards mentioned
518 Darcy (n 44) 3, 21.
519 In terms of academic contributions see Jens Meierhenrich, International Commissions: the
Role of Commissions of Inquiry in the Investigation of International Crimes (Oxford: Oxford
University Press) (Forthcoming); Richard J Goldstone, ‘Quality Control in International
Fact-Finding Outside Criminal Justice for Core International Crimes’ in Morten Bergsmo
(ed), Quality Control in Fact-Finding (Florence, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher 2013);
Marina Aksenova and Morten Bergsmo, ‘Non-Criminal Justice Fact-Work in the Age of
Accountability’, in Morten Bergsmo (ed), Quality Control in Fact-Finding (Florence, Torkel
Opsahl Academic EPublisher 2013); van den Herik and Harwood (n 154); Jacobs and
Harwood (n 363); Stahn and Jacobs (n 316); Dapo Akande and Hannah Tomkin, ‘Inter-
national Commissions of Inquiry: A New Form of Adjudication?’ EJIL:Talk! (6 April 2012).
520 OHCHR, Guidance and Practice (n 3) 12.
521 Ibid 12.
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above, accountability necessarily includes the achievement of truth, justice and
reparations for victims’.524
At the same time, the Commission of Inquiry on Libya emphasized how
‘the concept of accountability incorporates various methods including criminal
prosecutions, disciplinary measures, administrative procedures and victim com-
pensation measures. Accountability should therefore not be interpreted in a narrow,
restrictive way to refer only to criminal prosecution’.525
In this context a number of inquiries, although tasked with identifying indi-
viduals criminally responsible, have duly noted the institutional fragility
behind certain eruptions of violence that led to the perpetration of grave
human rights violations. As an example, the 2006 Commission of Inquiry on
Timor-Leste has devoted significant attention to its findings on institutional
responsibility. According to the Commission the eruption of violence in April
and May 2006, rather than a series of isolated acts, was considered as a re-
flection of the ‘deep-rooted problems inherent in fragile state institutions and
a weak rule of law’.526 This led the Commission to recommend a series of
comprehensive institutional and judicial reforms, something that can explain
how the idea of accountability – as a tool to reinstall a culture of respect for
the rule of law – has gone far beyond prosecuting individuals for criminal
offences.527
However, bearing in mind these important caveats, this section will mainly
focus on the contribution given by commissions of inquiry in the field of
international criminal law and individual criminal accountability.528
As already emphasized in previous sections, a commission of inquiry is
not an international criminal tribunal; it does not have an adjudicative role
and cannot produce legally binding decisions. However, the fact that inquiries
are not entrusted with powers of adjudication does not mean that they are
not authorised to use international criminal law or that they cannot play any
role whatsoever in the process of ensuring accountability for international
crimes. What has been the use of international criminal law by these commis-
sions and which role if any can be envisaged for them in ensuring criminal
524 Report of the Secretary General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka (n 327)
Executive summary.
525 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya (n 202) para. 763.
526 Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste
(n 274) para. 74. See also Kim (n 176) 246.
527 Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste
(n 274) paras. 228-245.
528 This dissertation will not deal with the role of fact-finding bodies in the work and practice
of international judicial mechanisms other than criminal, such as the proceedings in front




accountability are among the main issues that will be analysed and debated
in this section.
2.4.6.2 The recent proliferation of international-criminal-law-based commissions of
inquiry: contributing factors and causes
As mentioned – with the notable exceptions of the 1919 Commission of Re-
sponsibilities and the 1943 UNWCC – the inclusion of international criminal
law in the work of commissions of inquiry is a relatively recent trend. In
particular, it can be associated with the beginning of the 1990s and the ex-
periences of the international investigations in Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
As it has been acknowledged by certain scholars,
‘the relevance of these two commissions of inquiry should be […] emphasized –
they represent a turning point as they paved the way for prosecution oriented
investigations led by UN fact-finding missions’.529
Starting from these leading experiences, experts have noted how not only
accountability-based commissions have proliferated but their number has also
constantly increased over the years representing the great majority of the
commissions established nowadays.530
International criminal law and accountability have been mainstreamed at
different levels in the work of commissions of inquiry, through inclusion in
the their mandates, thanks to their growing relevance in the legal analysis and
findings and by reference to the activation of accountability mechanisms in
the recommendations.531
However, one of the main justifications for the proliferation of international
criminal law in the work of international investigations has been its
interconnection with the main bodies of IHL and IHRL, particularly in relation
to their enforcement. This has been duly pointed out by inquiries themselves.
The Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, for example, noted how
529 Frulli (n 178) 1328.
530 In particular van den Herik and Harwood have developed a graph that ‘depicts the number
of UN commissions established each year since 1990, as compared with the number of
mandates that refer to the goal of ensuring accountability. The graph shows that there is
a trend towards establishing commissions with an accountability function’. van den Herik
and Harwood (n 154) 11.
531 In particular, Harwood has argued how international criminal law has proliferated in
modern commissions of inquiry through its inclusion in their mandates, its interlinks with
IHL and IHRL as standard legal frameworks and by means of teleological grounds as many
investigations have been conducted ‘with a view to ensuring accountability for violations’.
Catherine Harwood, ‘The Competence of UN Human Rights Council Commission of Inquiry
to Make Findings of International Crimes’ (2013) Grotius Centre Working Paper, 12.
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‘[t]he importance of determining individual criminal responsibility for international
crimes […] is a critical aspect of the enforceability of rights and of protection against
their violation. International human rights law and humanitarian law provide the
necessary linkages for this process of determination’.532
Similarly, the 2009 Gaza Mission determined how
‘[i]nternational criminal law has become a necessary instrument for the enforcement
of IHL and IHRL. […] The Mission regards the rules and definitions of international
criminal law as crucial to the fulfilment of its mandate to look at all violations of
IHL and IHRL by all parties to the conflict’.533
In this way – whether by reason of such interrelation or based on teleological
grounds and on the need to promote accountability – commissions of inquiry
have started referring more consistently to ICL paradigms even in cases where
they did not receive an explicit mandate to do so.
While the increased use of international criminal law by commissions of
inquiry has become a well-consolidated trend, one should speculate on the
origins of such phenomenon. Indeed, one reason may well be the revival of
international criminal law linked to the proliferation of international criminal
tribunals during the 1990s. It should be noted how this represents a pheno-
menon to which international inquiries themselves may have significantly
contributed given the role played by the Commissions of Experts on the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda for the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR, the
firsts of an important series of international criminal justice mechanisms
culminated with the entry into force of the International Criminal Court in
2002.
A second – more recent –explanation may be of an opposite nature to the
first one. Commissions have in fact been increasingly entrusted with an ICL
focus in order to fill the vacuum left by accountability mechanisms. It is in
fact undisputed that, despite the rise in numbers of international criminal
courts and tribunals, there are still many contexts marked by gross IHL and
IHRL violations that do not fall under the radar of criminal justice. This is for
different reasons ranging from the absence of political will to lack of juris-
diction. This vacuum has created situations of protracted impunity that have
rapidly become matters of concern (and even outrage) among public opinion,
which has often urged international bodies to entrust ad hoc investigations
in the absence of the necessary political consensus to adopt more robust
measures of accountability.
In other terms, while initially one of the primary reasons for accountability-
focused commissions of inquiry has been the renewed interest for international
532 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (n 211) para. 407.




criminal justice mechanisms, more recently commissions have been entrusted
with ICL mandates precisely with the aim to fill the gaps left by the
accountability and law-enforcement system. However, this ultimate reason
may lead to more unexplored terrains insofar as it may entail that international
criminal law can live and develop outside the courtroom. In this regard,
Akande and Tomkin have argued how in
‘the absence of any court that has compulsory and universal jurisdiction with
respect to the determination of violations of human rights, IHL and other rules of
international law, international commissions of inquiry may be one of the best ways
of obtaining authoritative pronouncements on these legal issues’.534
But can commissions of inquiry’s pronouncements represent an end in them-
selves? What will be the added value of such an exercise if not followed up
by more robust actions of criminal accountability or law enforcement? It is
precisely on this basis that Frulli has warned against ‘the risk of getting tangled
up in fact-finding activities, becoming an end in themselves and not a means
to achieve accountability’.535
A third reason why international criminal law has been recently main-
streamed in the work and practice of international inquiries is probably due
to the value that ICL findings may play in rising alert over the deterioration
of certain crises and provoking responses by the international community.
The ‘politicized’ use of ICL will be analysed more in depth below. For now,
it is sufficient to highlight how an ‘alerting’ use of ICL may lay on a distortion
of the legal value to be attached to ICL findings compared to IHL and IHRL
violations. While in fact ICL possesses a specific function that distinguishes
it from frameworks such as IHL or IHRL, this does not mean that the latter
should be considered less significant or that their violations should attire less
concern than those offences labelled as international crimes. In this regard,
one can argue that the proliferation of ICL-based commissions may rely upon
a misconception of ICL, as paradigm capable of attracting the attention of media
and public opinion and in this way influencing international stakeholders’
responses much more than ‘less evocative’ frameworks such as IHL or IHRL.
This is only partially true. Looking also from a strictly legal perspective,
international crimes may play an added value in soliciting the obligation for
the international community to respond. Frameworks such as the R2P or the
Peace and Security Council within the African Union have in fact included
international crimes as the main trigger factors for the activation of
534 Akande and Tomkin (n 519); Stahn and Jacobs (n 316) 3.
535 Frulli (n 178) 1336.
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institutionalised responses.536 This may thus explain why commissions of
inquiry have been increasingly entrusted with making ICL findings, particularly
if one looks at the modern function of inquiries as tools empowering inter-
national stakeholders with the appropriate facts and analysis to develop
adequate responses to crisis situations.
2.4.6.3 Competence in applying international criminal law
It is now time to go back to the initial idea of commissions of inquiry applying
international criminal law to assess whether these bodies have indeed the
competence and legitimacy to perform such a task. This is not a secondary
issue given that – as has been pointed out by certain scholars –
‘perceptions of legitimacy can strongly influence the extent to which concerned
states, affected individuals and other actors are willing to engage with commissions,
and thus such perceptions can play a decisive role in the effectiveness of an invest-
igation’.537
As highlighted above, commissions of inquiry have started to increasingly
refer to ICL paradigms due to instructions contained in their mandates, by
reason of interrelation with the main bodies of IHL and IHRL and as tool in
their pursue of accountability.
Particularly in relation to the inclusion of ICL in commissions’ mandates,
the question arises whether the mandating bodies possess such a competence.
Indeed, with regard to those commissions established by the UNSC, there is
little doubt that the UNSC may entrust inquiries with ICL mandates given that
its authority to set up international criminal tribunals (and thus dealing with
criminal justice more in general) has been well established. More controversial
appears the case of the HRC, which has been responsible for the establishment
of the great majority of accountability-based commissions. The question con-
cerning the HRC going beyond the IHRL reign has been the focus of intense
academic debate.538 The issue has been examined previously in relation to
its capability in applying IHL paradigms and the conclusion reached, looking
also at the competence bestowed upon it expressly or implicitly by the UN
General Assembly, appears to be that the Council, considered within the
broader UN picture, does not act ultra vires in resorting to legal paradigms,
such as IHL or ICL, that go beyond its strict IHRL mandate. This conclusion is
536 In particular, under Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the Africa Union (AU), the AU
is empowered to intervene in the territory of one of its member states in case grave situ-
ations -namely genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes – arise. See, Constitutive
Act of the African Union (Lome, Togo, 11 July, 2000).
537 Van den Herik and Harwood (n 154) 12.




reinforced in the case of ICL, particularly given its intrinsic linkage with IHL
and IHRL as potential enforcement paradigm.
This however does not answer all the questions as Harwood notes how
‘IHL and ICL may be dealt with by the UN generally, so its external jurisdiction is
intact […]. However, internal irregularities should be avoided, as the perception
that the HRC has exceeded its mandate may damage its credibility and legitimacy,
which could impair relationships with states and in turn reduce compliance with
HRC resolutions and commissions’ recommendations’.539
In this regard, it should be noted some isolated instances of states’ objections
over the exercise of such a power by the HRC.540 However, given the broad
mandate of the UN to rule upon issues related to criminal justice and
accountability, the HRC cannot be considered acting ultra vires in entrusting
ICL-based commissions of inquiry. In particular, the strong interrelation existing
between ICL and the main frameworks of IHL and IHRL coupled with the
development of an increasing practice with only isolated state objections may
represent two significant factors in justifying what has now become a well-
established trend. In this regard, it should be reminded how the HRC and other
UN organs have, as a general practice, endorsed the conclusions of inquiries
that have reached ICL findings, in some cases even explicitly referring them-
selves to the need to hold accountable those individually responsible.541
2.4.6.4 Resorting to international criminal law: a productive or counterproductive
step?
Once determined the prima facie competence of commissions of inquiry to use
ICL, it is time to assess the utility for them to do so. In fact, such a trend may
entail both opportunities and challenges that it is important to carefully analyse
before reaching conclusive findings.
539 Harwood (n 531) 8.
540 In this regard Harwood noted how India and Pakistan had abstained from voting on a
resolution on the human rights situation in Syria on grounds that text was ‘unduly focused
on accountability’ and that the HRC ‘should not?confuse its mandate with the humanitarian
one’. Also, in relation to the endorsement of the report of the 2009 UN Fact-Finding Mission
on the Gaza Conflict, Russia while voting in favour of the resolution highlighted how ‘a
number of provisions in the document went beyond the scope of the Mission, in particular
recommendations to the [ICC] and the Security Council, as well as calls on States to
prosecute war crimes on the basis of universal jurisdiction’. However, Harwood seems
arguing how these views seem to represent a distinct minority. See, Human Rights Council,
Draft Resolution, A/HRC/23/L.29 (2013); Human Rights Council, A/HRC/RES/23/26
(2013); OHCHR, ‘Press Release: Human Rights Council Endorses Recommendations in
Report of Fact-Finding Mission led by Justice Goldstone and Calls for their Implementation’
(16 October 2009); Harwood (n 531) 8.
541 Harwood (n 531) 16, 17, 18.
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The possibility for commissions of inquiry to resort to ICL may generate
a number of positive implications. Firstly, as pointed out by certain experts,
managing ICL paradigms can help commissions of inquiry increasing the
quality of their fact-finding by basing it on more rigorous standards.542 It
may affect for example the methodology used for assessing evidence and the
standard of proof employed, which require solid basis and specific guarantees
when it comes to assess individual criminal responsibility.
In addition, reference to ICL can help commissions in shedding light on
the existence of specific patterns and policies behind certain violations. Inter-
national crimes are different from ordinary crimes on the grounds that they
require the fulfilment of contextual elements, such as the existence of a wide-
spread and systematic attack against the civilian population for the per-
petration of crimes against humanity. Qualifying ‘ordinary’ violations in a
specific context may thus help commissions of inquiry in ‘contextualising’
certain offences and thus providing a more comprehensive portrait of the
situation under investigation. Such an exercise can entrust inquiries to interpret
events into a different light, particularly when it comes to assess institutional
and individual responsibilities for specific conducts. It will also strengthen
the findings of these commissions looking in two directions: reaching the truth
about certain events and stimulating specific reactions by the international
community, including the trigger of accountability mechanisms.
However, the increasing resort to ICL by commissions of inquiry also raises
a number of concerns. Some fear that the migration of ICL outside the
courtroom may undermine its legitimacy, particularly where findings are
subjected to less rigorous standards in terms of procedures and evidence.543
A number of academics have warned against the politicization of ICL in relation
to the ‘alarming’ and ‘provoking’ functions of modern commissions of
inquiry.544 Put in other terms, ICL findings used as vehicle to trigger political
action by the international community may delegitimise this body of law,
which has been always intrinsically anchored to independent and impartial
criminal proceedings respectful of high quality standards and guarantees both
in terms of rules of procedure and evidence and due process. Thus, its use
outside the courtroom risks turning ICL into a new hybrid category. This may
lead not only to undermine the findings of commissions of inquiry but can
also weaken states’ support to international criminal justice mechanisms if
there is indeed a perception that ICL is used for other purposes than impartially
enforcing the law in court.
Although such concerns should not be underestimated, the idea of ICL
surviving outside the courtroom should not be a priori rejected. ICL pronounce-
ments made by different bodies can bear different values. This variety should
542 Jacobs and Harwood (n 363) 3.
543 Jacobs and Harwood (n 363).




not be seen as necessary endangering the legitimacy of ICL. To remain in the
realm of courtrooms, it is interesting to recall the reasoning contained in the
Separate Opinion of Judge Gaia in the ICJ Genocide Case II. In particular, Gaia
raised some doubts on the Court’s approach to equate the legal framework
when considering issues related to the responsibility of States for acts of
genocide and individual criminal responsibility, particularly in relation to
issues concerning standard of proof and dolus specialis.545 According to Gaia,
‘establishing that an individual or organ committed certain acts with genocidal
intent is not a precondition for finding that a State committed genocide’.546
On this point, it should be noted how the UN Commission of Inquiry on
Darfur excluded that the Government of Sudan had pursued a genocidal policy
in Darfur, this without ruling out the possibility that single individuals within
its political and military ranks acted with such an intent. On the contrary, it
may happen that a determination by commissions of inquiry that international
crimes may have been perpetrated in a specific context does not result in the
conviction of an individual in court, in case the requirements for individual
criminal culpability are not fulfilled.547 In these examples it may be explained
the subtle but significant difference between commissions of inquiry and
international tribunals when it comes to assess their role in ICL. In this regard,
according to the Commission on Darfur, a commission of inquiry
‘does not [...] make final judgement as to criminal guilt; rather, it makes an assess-
ment of possible suspects that will pave the way for future investigations, and
possible indictments, by a prosecutor, and convictions by a court of law’.548
Hence, determining that a situation has been characterized by violations that
may amount to international crimes (with the purpose to call for further
investigations) or even ruling that certain crimes have been committed for
the purpose of state’s responsibility is by far a different task from investigating
and prosecuting an individual for a specific offence in the context of criminal
proceedings. This, however, does not mean that the first action entails an
undue use of the legal framework or that it cannot be instrumental to crim-
inally investigating and prosecuting an individual.
In addition, even within international criminal justice mechanisms the
procedure that leads to individual criminal convictions undertakes different
545 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Croatia v. Serbia II) ICJ Rep. 2015, Judge Gaia Separate Opinion.
546 Ibid 2.
547 In this regard it should be noted that, although it is not a commission of inquiry, the ICTY
Appeal Chamber in Krstic determined that ‘[t]he fact that the Trial Chamber did not attribute
genocidal intent to a particular official within the Main Staff […] does not undermine the
conclusion that Bosnian Serb forces carried out genocide against the Bosnian Muslims’.
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A (Appeal, 19 April 2004) para. 35.
548 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (n 211) para. 15.
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stages. If one thinks at the ICC framework, a Prosecutor’s request to open an
investigation based on reasonable allegations that international crimes have
been committed has by far a different meaning than a trial chamber ruling
that a specific individual has perpetrated international crimes beyond reason-
able doubt. Can we really speak about an undue use of ICL in the first case?
The answer would reasonably be no. While indeed one can argue that a
determination made by a criminal prosecutor differs from that of a commission
of inquiry, at least in the preliminary stages it does not vary significantly in
terms of standard of proof employed and sources of evidence used. As it will
be assessed more in depth below, the fact that in more than one occasion the
ICC machinery has significantly relied upon commissions of inquiry’s findings
during the preliminary examination phase is indicative of how an ICL that is
managed outside the courtroom can be seen more as an opportunity than as
a risk. This if course bearing firmly in mind the need to recognize different
values to ICL findings if emanated from different authorities.
However, the fact that ICL findings by commissions of inquiry may
potentially benefit international criminal investigations should actually prompt
commissions to manage ICL in a proper manner by employing adequate
standards to corroborate such findings. While in fact experts have somehow
accepted a more flexible use of ICL if applied in the context of the so called
‘preventive’ sphere (such as in the framework of the work of international
inquiries and R2P mechanisms),549 an excessive laxity not only risks to under-
mine ICL as body of law but also would deter accountability mechanisms from
resorting more consistently to the findings of international inquiries in their
own investigations.
2.4.6.5 The use of international criminal law in the practice of commissions of inquiry
With these caveats in mind, it is now important to turn to the use that commis-
sions have made of ICL in their practice. As it has been emphasized by Van
den Herik and Harwood, ‘[t]he turn to international criminal law by commis-
sions of inquiry has been selective’.550 While in fact abundant reference can
be found in relation to the contextual elements and legal definitions of the
crimes, far less analysis has been devoted to issues related to criminal pro-
cedure and modes of liability.
Indeed, a selective approach to ICL should not be necessarily viewed with
negative connotations. Given the role of commissions in paving the way for
549 Van den Herik and Harwood (n 154) 18-19; See also Gareth Evans, ‘Crimes Against Human-
ity and the Responsibility to Protect’ in Leila N Sadat (ed), Forging a Convention for Crimes
Against Humanity (2011) 1; Larissa J van den Herik, ‘The Schism between the Legal and
Social Concept of Genocide in Light of the Responsibility to Protect’ in Ralph Henham and
Paul Behrens (eds), The Criminal Law of Genocide; International, Comparative and Contextual
Aspects (2007) 75.




future accountability mechanisms, an emphasis on the legal definition of the
crimes and their contextual elements may appear in line with the preliminary
nature of the findings of these inquiries on the commission of international
crimes. Issues related to modes of liability may acquire more relevance when
commissions are requested to narrow their scope of investigation and identify
those allegedly responsible. On this point, it is necessary to look at those cases
in order to examine how commissions have reacted to such instructions.
2.4.6.5.1 Contribution in the identification of different elements of international crimes
There are three main elements that should be assessed in order to enforce
international criminal law, namely the contextual element; the material element
or legal definition of the crime; and individual criminal responsibility. The
practice of commissions of inquiry shows an important focus on the first two
elements while only few and selective reference to the third one.551
In this context, one can argue that the most relevant contribution by com-
missions of inquiry in this field has been so far the identification of the linkage
existing between specific incidents and underlying patterns and policies of
IHRL and IHL violations. This can help framing the contextual elements of
crimes where needed. For example, it has been underlined how
‘a commission’s investigation into a conflict situation may assist criminal invest-
igators to identify the different parties involved and the various stages of conflict,
such as when internal disturbances escalate into a non-international armed conflict,
or when a conflict is internationalised’.552
This has been the case with the findings of the commissions of inquiry on Côte
D’Ivoire (2011), Libya (2011) and Central African Republic (2013).
In addition, the commissions’ analysis can also point towards the existence
of a widespread and systematic attack directed against the civilian population
as requirement for crimes against humanity. This has been the case for many
human rights inquiries including the most recent experiences in Guinea, North
Korea and Eritrea.
The findings of commissions of inquiry can even start directing criminal
investigators towards specific levels of responsibility, particularly in those cases
where violations perpetrated on the ground seem the result of policies
designed, organized and orchestrated at highest military and political level.
A relevant example in this sense is the analysis of the Commission of Experts
on former Yugoslavia on the siege of Sarajevo through the use of snipers and
rape as a method of warfare. The Commission highlighted how such practices
could not have been implemented on the ground without being envisaged
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or at least condoned and accepted at high-ranking military level.553 Similarly,
the 2014 Commission of Inquiry on Gaza emphasized, in relation to a number
of Israeli military attacks, how they ‘may have constituted military tactics
reflective of a broader policy, approved at least tacitly by decision-makers at
the highest levels of the Government of Israel’.554
This, according to the Commission’s report, raised questions
‘regarding the role of senior officials who set military policy in several areas
examined by the commission […] In many cases, individual soldiers may have
been following agreed military policy, but it may be that the policy itself violates
the laws of war’.555
With regard to highlighting modes of individual criminal liability, the contri-
bution of international inquiries has been more selective and less consistent.
In particular, certain commissions, such as in the case of Syria and Libya,
did not articulate on modes of liability even though they were tasked with
identifying those responsible.556 On the contrary, inquiries such as those
established in relation to Guinea, Darfur and East Timor engaged in depth
on different forms of responsibility of alleged perpetrators. In particular, the
Commission of Inquiry on Guinea represents one of the rare examples of
investigations that publicly revealed the names of alleged suspects. It acknow-
ledged how ‘[t]he final determination of individual criminal responsibility
lies exclusively with a court of law’.557 However, it noted how it was ‘obliged
by its mandate to establish responsibility and to identify, where it can, the
perpetrators of the crimes committed’.558 Thus, the Commission dedicated
an entire section of its report to assess the different forms of individual
criminal responsibility of the listed individuals with the aim that such informa-
tion ‘could guide any possible future criminal investigation of the presumed
perpetrators’.559
While not publicly revealing the names of alleged responsible, the Commis-
sion of Inquiry on Darfur adopted a similar approach. It determined how it
had prima facie identified
‘10 high-ranking central Government officials, 17 Government officials operating
at the local level in Darfur, 14 members of the Janjaweed, as well as 7 members
of the different rebel groups and 3 officers of a foreign army (who participated
553 Report of the Commission of Experts on Former Yugoslavia (n 177) paras. 183-209.
554 Report of the independent commission of inquiry (n 344) para. 44.
555 Ibid para. 77.
556 In particular, see the criticism raised by Heller on the failure by the 2011 Libya Commission
of defining command responsibility and articulating its main features. Heller (n 206) 36.
557 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Guinea (n 211) para. 212.
558 Ibid.




in their individual capacity in the conflict), who may be suspected of bearing
individual criminal responsibility for the crimes committed in Darfur’.560
It scrutinized these cases according to different forms of criminal liability
including perpetration/co-perpetration, joint criminal enterprise, aiding and
abetting, planning, command responsibility and failing to prevent or repress
the commission of a crime. The Commission in fact believed that
‘[t]o render any discussion on perpetrators intelligible, two legal tools are necessary:
the categories of crimes for which they may be suspected to be responsible, and
the enumeration of the various modes of participation in international crimes under
which the various persons may be suspected of bearing responsibility’.561
In conclusion, although the approach of commissions of inquiry to ICL has
been selective and certain elements (contextual and material) have been
privileged over others (modes of individual criminal responsibility) in their
analysis, this should not be necessarily seen as undermining the application
of international criminal law. In this regard, notwithstanding the fact that
certain authors have raised concerns for the process of severing ICL from the
individual perpetrator,562 a more diluted reference to individual criminal
liability might be tolerated given the preliminary nature of the commissions’
findings.563
That being said, the risks behind watering down the standards of ICL and
‘merging’ it with IHRL and IHL frameworks remain serious and should not be
underestimated.564 Indeed, one should not forget that the purpose of ICL
remains to investigate and prosecute individuals for international crimes while
granting them all the guarantees that a criminal process entails. Thus, inquiries’
findings should always take such objectives into account when resorting to
ICL paradigms. That said, one advice to commissions of inquiry would be to
include some level of analysis on individual criminal responsibility every time
findings related to the commission of international crimes are made. Alternat-
ively, inquiries could present the reliability of their criminal law findings as
conditioned to the need of fulfilling specific requirements or to further invest-
igations by competent judicial bodies.565 In this regard, it is interesting to
560 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (n 211) para. 531.
561 Ibid para. 530.
562 Harwood (n 531) 21.
563 This perception may be reinforced looking at the type of assessment that international
criminal prosecutors undertake in the preliminary examination phases, where the analysis
is focused on whether there are reasonable basis that international crimes have been
committed rather than on building individual cases.
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note the formula chosen by the Commission of Inquiry on Guinea which
specified how
‘[a]lthough the question as to whether or not crimes were committed can be finally
and conclusively resolved only by a court with the requisite jurisdictional compet-
ence, […] there is a set of characteristics which demonstrate that the acts perpetrated
on 28 September 2009 were sufficiently serious to justify their qualification as crimes
against humanity’.566
2.4.6.5.2 Use and interpretation of international criminal law in practice
Moving to assess how international criminal law has been applied and inter-
preted by commissions of inquiry, these investigations have generally relied
upon existing legal standards and jurisprudence. In particular, according to
certain authors
‘it can be observed that in their general legal qualifications, commissions refer to
prevailing legal standards and interpretations. They cite international case law quite
abundantly, even if in doing so they generally display a preference for the more
flexible case law of the ICTY. The more demanding standards of the Rome Statute
have sometimes been neglected’.567
However, few examples of progressive development of ICL and creative
analysis should be highlighted.
Contextual elements in crimes against humanity
Experts have underlined a certain relaxation in the approach traditionally
adopted by commissions of inquiry in determining the policy requirement
as contextual element for crimes against humanity.568 They pointed out the
difference, in the level of reasoning, between the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in
the Kenya case and the analysis developed by commissions, particularly in
the Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, Libya and DRC contexts.569 Central to the debate
566 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Guinea (n 211) para. 180.
567 Van den Herik and Harwood (n 154) 18.
568 Ibid 17.
569 In this regard, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in the Kenya case has engaged in an extensive
and elaborated reasoning on the matter that led it, albeit with the dissenting opinion of
Judge Kaul, to endorse an extremely inclusive approach, in so far as it has not required
a precise level of organization or control over the territory. ICC, Situation in the Republic
of Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Pre-Trial Chamber II) Case No.
ICC-01/01-19 (31 March 2010). This approach has raised certain criticism by legal scholars.
See, Claus Kress, ‘On the Outer Limits of Crimes against Humanity: The Concept of
Organization within the Policy Requirement. Some Reflections on the March 2010 ICC Kenya
Decision’ (2010) 23 LJIL 855. On the contrary, Van den Herik and Harwood have noted
how the Fact-Finding Mission on Zimbabwe and the Mapping Exercise on the DRC omitted




is the notion of ‘organizational policy’ and, in particular, the issue of structure
and control over the territory that an organization should possess in order
to be capable of committing crimes against humanity.
In this debate, commissions of inquiry more recently established have
provided more significant contributions.
For example the Commission of Inquiry on Eritrea referred to the ICC and
ICTY jurisprudence to assess the ‘attack against a civilian population’ and
‘organisational policy’ requirements. In particular, in considering the
‘organisational policy’ always an implicit element in the codification of crimes
against humanity, the Commission implicitly affirmed its customary char-
acter.570
The Commission of Inquiry on Syria has also significantly engaged in such
an analysis, particularly with regard to the role played by certain non-state
groups such as ISIS. The Commission has been clear in distinguish between
the violations committed by Government forces, which were perpetrated in
accordance with a State policy and may therefore result in the commission
of crimes against humanity and those abuses perpetrated by anti-government
groups that, in the absence of such a policy requirement, could amount ‘only’
to war crimes.571
However, the Commission acknowledged the particular position of those
groups, such as ISIS and Al-Nusra, that have acquired a certain degree of control
and developed administration-related functions over vast portions of the Syrian
territory. In this regard, the Commission outlined the two different kinds of
violations perpetrated by a group such as ISIS. Firstly,
‘[a]s an armed group bound by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and
customary international law, ISIS has violated its obligations toward civilians and
persons hors de combat, amounting to war crimes’.572
Secondly, the Commission noted, ‘[i]n areas where ISIS has established effective
control, ISIS has systematically denied basic human rights and freedoms and
the Panel of Experts on Sri Lanka discussed its fulfillment only in a footnote. The same
criticism has been highlighted by Heller with regard to the 2011 Commission of Inquiry
on Libya. Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to assess the Scope and Impact
of Operation Murambatsvina (18 July 2005) paras. 64-66; Report of the Mapping Exercise
on the DRC (n 300) para. 488-491; Report of the Secretary General’s Panel of Experts on
Accountability in Sri Lanka (n 327) fn 127. See also van den Herik and Harwood (n 154)
17; Heller (n 206) 34.
570 2nd Report of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on Eritrea (n 315) paras.
181-182.
571 9th Report of the independent commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/
30/48 (13 August 2015) paras. 168-170.
572 Report of the independent commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic – Rule of
Terror (n 423) para. 74.
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in the context of its attack against the civilian population, has perpetrated
crimes against humanity’.573 In particular, the Commission argued how:
‘ISIS functions under responsible command and has a hierarchical structure including
a policy level. The group has demonstrated its capacity to impose a policy on its
members and ensure the coordinated implementation of decisions made by its
leadership. With the capacity and means to attack the civilian population on a large
scale, ISIS has carried out mass victimization against civilians, including segments
of the population on the basis of gender, religion and ethnicity. According to the
evidence collected, there are reasonable grounds to believe that ISIS has carried out
attacks in accordance with an organisational policy’.574
In the view of the Commission, this has permitted the group to carry out
widespread and systematic attacks as part of a coordinated campaign of
instilling terror among the civilian population under its control.
This reasoning has been reaffirmed in subsequent investigations, where
the Commission determined how
‘ISIS has directed acts of violence and terror against the civilian population under
its control in Raqqah, Dayr Az-Zawr, Hasakah, Aleppo, Hama and Homs
governorates. ISIS, a structured group, directs and organizes these acts of violence
against civilians, evincing an organizational policy. ISIS has committed murder,
torture, rape, sexual slavery, sexual violence, forcible displacement and other
inhumane acts as part of a widespread attack on the civilian population, amounting
to crimes against humanity’.575
With such an analysis the Syria Commission has, on the one hand, demon-
strated the possibility for fact-finding bodies to go far deeper in their reasoning
on the organizational policy than the experiences of Zimbabwe, the DRC, Sri
Lanka and Libya have shown. On the other hand, the inquiry’s assessment
has resulted in a relevant contribution to the debate concerning the interpreta-
tion of the organizational policy requirement for crimes against humanity.
Contrary to the inclusive approach put forward by the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber,
it has in fact anchored the fulfilment of such a requirement on a number of
indicators including, ‘effective control over a territory’, ‘responsible command
and a hierarchical structure’, and ‘capacity to impose a policy on its members
and ensure the coordinated implementation of decisions made by its leader-
ship’. This contribution may thus have the potential to influence future deter-
minations on the matter, particularly if the ICC Trial and Appeal Chambers
573 Ibid.
574 Ibid paras. 76-77.





will not feel totally persuaded by the approach adopted by the Pre-Trial
Chamber.
Genocide
Another area where commissions of inquiry have enriched the existing legal
debate is related to the determination of the crime of genocide. In this regard,
international inquiries have often been mandated to investigate situations that
were considered by the international community to be on the verge of geno-
cide. Commissions have reacted to this challenge in different ways depending
on the specific context.
A first analysis can be found in the experiences of the commissions of
experts on former Yugoslavia and Rwanda that led to the establishment of
the ad hoc tribunals. In particular, in relation to the identification of the pro-
tected group, while the ‘negative approach’ put forward by the Yugoslavia
Commission was not endorsed by the ICTY Appeal Chamber,576 the Commis-
sion of Experts on Rwanda developed an important precedent in discussing
the issue of political motives, given the exclusion of political groups from the
list of protected groups under the Genocide Convention. In this regard the
Rwanda Commission argued how,
‘the presence of political motive does not negate the intent to commit genocide
if such intent is established in the first instance. In connection the Commission
argued that, to recognize that there exists discrimination on racial or ethnic grounds,
it is not necessary to presume or posit the existence of race or ethnicity itself as
a scientifically objective fact’.577
In a certain way such preliminary analysis paved the way for the more robust
contribution given on the matter by the ad hoc tribunals, which in turn influ-
enced the work of subsequent commissions of inquiry.
In particular, the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur was expressly mandated
to determine whether the crime of genocide had been committed.
In its findings, the Darfur inquiry recognized that a number of conducts
incarnating the material element of the crime had been perpetrated in the
context of the Sudanese Government counterinsurgency campaign in Darfur.
The Commission further noted the subjective approach developed by the ICTR
in relation to the identification of the protected groups as well as the
‘permanent and stable’ requirements. In particular, the report highlighted that
‘what matters from a legal point of view is the fact that the interpretative expansion
of one of the elements of the notion of genocide (the concept of protected group)
576 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-A (Appeal, 22 March 2006) para. 27. See also
Darcy (n 44) 19.
577 Report of the Commission of Experts on Rwanda (n 375) para. 159.
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by the two International Criminal Tribunals is in line with the object and scope
of the rules on genocide’
noting also how such interpretation does not depart from the legal text of the
Genocide Convention and it has been implicitly accepted by States.578 How-
ever, with regard to the ‘permanent and stable’ requirements, the view
endorsed by the Commission was only put forward by the ICTR Pre-Trial
Chamber in Akayesu without being upheld in appeal.579 This renders even
more controversial the Commission’s claim that such ‘interpretation and
expansion has become part and parcel of international customary law’.580
In any case, by applying this analysis to the context of Darfur, the report
noted how
‘in recent years the perception of differences has heightened and has extended to
distinctions that were earlier not the predominant basis for identity. The rift
between tribes, and the political polarization around the rebel opposition to the
central authorities, has extended itself to issues of identity. Those tribes in Darfur
who support rebels have increasingly come to be identified as “African” and those
supporting the government as the “Arabs”’.581
For the Commission the argument regarding the self-perception of being
different was demonstrated in both attackers and victims by the derogatory
language used by the attackers in the attacks and by victims referring to
‘Janjaweed’. On this basis, the Commission argued how ‘it may be considered
that the tribes who were victims of attacks and killings subjectively make up
a protected group’ within the definition of the crime of genocide.582
However, it determined how such actions could not be considered as
committed pursuant to a genocidal policy. The Commission argued in fact
that, despite the seriousness of the offences documented, the extremely high
threshold set up in order to determine the mental element pervading the crime
of genocide – namely, the intention to physically destroy in whole or in part
a specific protected group – was not met.583 In particular, in the words of
the Commission:
‘Generally speaking the policy of attacking, killing and forcibly displacing members
of some tribes does not evince a specific intent to annihilate, in whole or in part,
a group distinguished on racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds. Rather, it
would seem that those who planned and organized attacks on villages pursued
578 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (n 211) para. 501.
579 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T (Judgment, 2 September 1998); ICTR,
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-A (Appeal, 1 June 2001).
580 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (n 211) para. 501.
581 Ibid para. 510.
582 Ibid para. 512.




the intent to drive the victims from their homes, primarily for purposes of counter-
insurgency warfare’.584
Thus, the Commission dismissed the claim according to which the Government
of Sudan had pursued a policy of genocide in Darfur. This, however, did not
automatically rule out from its point of view the possibility ‘that in some
instances individuals, including Government officials, may commit acts with
genocidal intent’.585 Whether this was the case in Darfur, the report added,
is a determination that only a competent court can make on a case-by-case
basis.
Indeed, one of the merits of the Commission led by Professor Cassese has
been to highlight, from a legal point of view, the difference between the
existence of a State-led genocidal policy and the commission of genocide as
a crime perpetrated by an individual, regardless of his or her links with the
State apparatus. The inquiry seems to propend for the existence of the latter
rather than the former in relation to the situation in Sudan, a view that has
not been shared by the ICC Prosecutor at the time, Luis Moreno Ocampo.586
By requesting an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir charg-
ing him with three counts of genocide, the Prosecutor seemed in fact implicitly
to believe in the existence of a genocidal policy implemented at a State level,
as it would be difficult to consider the conduct of the President of Sudan as
separate from that of its Government.587
584 The same reasoning has been applied with regard to the effect of the policies of displace-
ment in dire and desert areas and to the conditions of life experimented in IDP camps.
In this regard, the Commission found that the treatment and conditions of IDP camps, while
envisaging a conduct that may be in breach of the Sudanese Government’s obligations under
international human rights law, could not be indicative of any intent to annihilate a group
and thus amount to the crime of genocide. As the Commission stated, ‘this is all the more
true because the living conditions in those camps, although open to strong criticism on
many grounds, do not seem to be calculated to bring about the extinction of the ethnic
group to which the IDPs belong. Suffice it is to note that the Government of Sudan generally
allows humanitarian organizations to help the population in camps by providing food,
clean water, medicines and logistical assistance’. Report of the International Commission
of Inquiry on Darfur (n 211) paras. 507-522, 515.
585 Ibid paras. 518-20.
586 On this issue see Andrew T Cayley, ‘The Prosecutor’s Strategy in Seeking the Arrest of
Sudanese President Al Bashir on Charges of Genocide’ (2008) 6 Journal of International
Criminal Justice 834.
587 The Prosecutor’s decision to charge Al Bashir with genocide was initially dismissed by
the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber, before its ruling was reversed on appeal. As a result, the ICC
Pre-Trial Chamber finally ordered the arrest warrant for offences including three counts
of genocide, and determined that ‘the conditions of life inflicted on the Fur, Masalit and
Zaghawa groups [in Darfur] were calculated to bring about the physical destruction of
a part of those ethnic groups’ and that ‘forcible transfer by resettlement by member of other
tribes, [was] committed in furtherance of the genocidal policy’. ICC, Prosecutor v Bashir,
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The question around the existence of a genocidal policy was also central
to the analysis of the UNSC-mandated Commission of Inquiry on CAR. The
situation in CAR in 2013 had been already labelled by different UN sources as
being ‘on the verge of genocide’.588 The Commission analysed the policy
of ethnic cleansing pursued by the anti-balaka forces against Muslim popula-
tion in Bangui and other areas of the country. Referring to the jurisprudence
of the ad hoc tribunals, it noted how ethnic cleansing had been acknowledged
as a crime. However, although it could be associated with a genocidal policy,
the CAR inquiry underlined how ethnic cleansing should not be viewed
necessarily as synonymous with genocide.589 In particular, it referred to case
law of the ICJ and ICTY to demonstrate how there have been instances where
ethnic cleansing had not been conducted with genocidal intent. On the con-
trary, based on the absence of the necessary dolus specialis required by the crime
of genocide, the Commission argued for a stronger link existing between the
ethnic cleansing perpetrated in the context of CAR and crimes against humanity,
particularly in the form of persecution and forcible transfer.590
Finally, it is important to emphasize the contribution provided by the Syria
Commission of Inquiry on the genocidal policy enforced by ISIS against the
Yazidi minority. According to the Commission such policy has been imple-
mented through three different stages: the separation of women and children
from men and the mass killing of young and adult Yazidi men; the infliction
on Yazidi women of conditions amounting to slavery and sexual slavery; and
the separation of children from women and their related indoctrination through
a policy of obliteration of Yazidi values.591 The Syria investigation highlighted
how all five material conducts enshrined in the Genocide Convention have
been carried out by ISIS militants and elite against Yazidis.592 With regard
to the mental element, the Commission relied upon the numerous statements,
magazines and leaflets published in which the terrorist group outlined the
policy to be enforced against the targeted minority.593
Persecution and other findings
Looking more in general at the practice of commissions of inquiry, there have
been many instances where their analysis has not been confined to restating
existing jurisprudence but has provided innovative inputs to the process of
interpreting and applying concepts of international criminal law. While there
have been occasions where their reasoning may have gone beyond the existing
and consolidated standards of interpretation, this may also explain an implicit
588 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on the Central African Republic (n 294)
para. 443.
589 Ibid para. 452.
590 Ibid para. 453.
591 ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis (n 57) para. 31.
592 Ibid paras. 106-149.




desire to creatively interpret the law when facing concrete and practical
challenges coming from the investigated realities on the ground. From this
perceptive one should look at the contribution provided by the inquiries on
Darfur and North Korea on so called ‘famine crimes’ and grave violations of
the right to food.594 Even the debate on slavery (including instances of sexual
slavery) as an international crime has enormously benefited from the contribu-
tions of the investigations in Eritrea and Syria.595 It should also be recalled
the significant role by investigations such as those in the former Yugoslavia,
Rwanda and Guinea for the development of the concept of rape as both a war
crime and a crime against humanity.596 Finally, with regard to the commis-
sion of war crimes in modern and asymmetric warfare, the impact of the
analysis developed by commissions such as those established in the former
Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Sri Lanka and OPT should be carefully assessed, parti-
cularly in relation to the notion of deliberate and indiscriminate attacks against
civilians and the responsibility through the chain of command in case of
violations reflective of high-level policies.
In such a context, it is also relevant to highlight the contribution of inter-
national inquiries in the conceptualization and application of the crime against
humanity of persecution. Commissions have referred to it in many situations
where discriminatory policies marked by grave human rights violations could
not be labelled as genocide given the absence of the necessary mental element.
Examples encompass the analysis by inquiries in the context of former Yugo-
slavia, Darfur and CAR.
The Commission of Experts on the former Yugoslavia, for example, has
referred to persecution not only as one of the constitutive acts of crimes against
humanity but also as an intrinsic feature of the widespread and systematic
attack that is necessary for the contextualization of the offence. In the words
of the Commission,
‘[i]solated acts constituting offences, such as extra-judicial executions or other
common crimes punishable under municipal law, do not qualify as crimes against
humanity by themselves. The acts must be part of a policy of persecution or
discrimination […] It is the systematic process of victimization against the protected
group which is essential’.597
594 On this issue see, Alessandro Tonutti, ‘Famine Crises and International Crimes’, (2014)
International Law and Disasters Working Paper 02 http://disasterlaw.sssup.it/wp-content/
uploads/2014/01/IDL-Working-Paper-22014.pdf accessed on 8 December 2016.
595 ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis (n 57) paras. 113-128; 2nd Report of the detailed findings
of the commission of inquiry on Eritrea (n 315) paras. 191-234.
596 Report of the Commission of Experts on Former Yugoslavia (n 177) paras. 232-253; Report
of the Commission of Experts on Rwanda (n 375) paras. 126-146; Report of the International
Commission of Inquiry on Guinea (n 211) para. 96.
597 Report of the Commission of Experts on Former Yugoslavia (n 177) para. 84.
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Subsequent categorizations of crimes against humanity, included the one
enshrined in the ICC Statute, have however ruled out such articulated inter-
pretation. While in fact requiring that crimes against humanity should be
perpetrated in the context of a widespread or systematic attack, they have not
referred to the discriminatory character and the persecutorial intent of such
attack as a necessary requirement.
More recently, the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur referred in many
instances to the paradigm of persecution in order to qualify, through the lens
of ICL, a number of offences perpetrated on discriminatory grounds.598 The
Commission, while finding how there was insufficient evidence to sustain that
the Sudanese Government had pursued a genocidal policy, underlined none-
theless how such conclusion could not be interpreted as underestimating the
gravity of the offences perpetrated during the counterinsurgency campaign
in Darfur. In particular, through a reasoning that have subsequently inspired
the inquiry on CAR, the Darfur Commission pointed out how ‘some reports
conclude that elements of persecution and “ethnic cleansing” are present in
the pattern of destruction and displacement’.599 On this basis, it deduced
how a pattern of systematic and widespread attacks and violations committed
by the Government on persecutory grounds (by targeting certain specific
groups) could be inferred. ‘In this respect’, the report noted ‘in addition to
murder as a crime against humanity, the Government may be held responsible
for persecution’.600
More open to debate appear the analysis developed by international
investigations on the OPT in their assessment of Israeli policies of collective
punishment. For example, the 2009 UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza
Conflict, while analysing the effects of the Israeli blockade in Gaza, emphasized
the combined effect of a series of acts that had deprived the population of the
Gaza Strip of their means of subsistence, employment, housing and water,
while also denying their freedom of movement and right to leave and enter
their own country.601 By recalling the ICTY case law, it further noted that
‘the [crime against humanity] of persecution encompasses a variety of acts, in-
cluding, inter alia, those of physical, economic or judicial nature, that violate an
individual’s right to the equal enjoyment of his basic rights’.602
598 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (n 211) paras. 295, 320-321,
360, 379, 393.
599 Ibid para. 194. See also Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on the Central
African Republic (n 294) paras. 451-453.
600 Ibid para. 519.
601 Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (n 211) para. 1328.




On this basis, it concluded that
‘from the facts available […] some of the actions of the Government of Israel might
justify a competent court finding that crimes against humanity have been com-
mitted’.603
Such stance was reiterated in the section dedicated to Israeli systematic viola-
tions against the Palestinian population in the West Bank, in particular in
relation to those measures resulting in the application of a discriminatory legal
framework and in widespread arrests and detentions.604
A different approach was adopted by the Commission of Inquiry on Eritrea
in assessing a number of collective punishment policies during peacetime,
particularly the practice of punishing relatives of people considered as ‘crim-
inals’. The Commission defined these acts as crimes against humanity under
the label of ‘other inhuman acts’ rather than ‘persecution’, by emphasizing
how
‘with respect to forms of reprisal resulting in detention, enforced disappearance,
physical injury or death, […] they are of a character similar to other crimes set out
in the Rome Statute, but that those crimes do not adequately capture the nature
of the acts of reprisal described’.605
2.4.6.5.3 Identification of responsibilities
Turning to the issue concerning the identification of those responsible for the
crimes, only a limited number of commissions have been openly instructed
to carry out such a task. A look to the practice reveals how commissions have
interpreted such a mandate in different ways.
In general, these inquiries have exercised a high level of caution in identify-
ing and displaying information about those responsible for grave violations.
This can be linked to the absence of due process and adversarial procedure
guarantees that is inherent to the work and procedure of fact-finding bodies.
For example, the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur justified its decision not
to publicly reveal the names of alleged perpetrators on three main grounds.
First, the need to safeguard elementary principles of due process; second, the
fact that the Commission was not vested with any prosecutorial or investigative
power; third, the need to protect witnesses.606 In sum, the Commission was
of the opinion that
603 Ibid.
604 Ibid para. 1534.
605 2nd Report of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on Eritrea (n 315) paras.
273-280.
606 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (n 211) paras. 526-529.
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‘the information it has gathered would be misused if names were to be published,
as this could lead to premature judgements about criminal guilt that would not
only be unfair to the suspect, but would also jeopardize the entire process under-
taken to fight impunity’.607
So far, thirteen commissions have been expressly mandated to name indi-
viduals responsible. These include commissions established in the context of
Libya, Darfur, Timor-Leste, DRC, Guinea, Kyrgyzstan, Gaza, Bahrain, Cote
d’Ivoire, Syria, North Korea, CAR, and Burundi.
Commissions have reacted to these instructions in different ways. In certain
occasions, such as in the case of the inquiries in Libya and in the 2014 Gaza
Conflict, they have declined to name individuals. While in the Libya case the
Commission cited time constraints and the difficult conditions under which
it operated as justification, no reason has been provided by the Commission
of Inquiry on Gaza.608
Other investigations – such as for example in the cases of Darfur, North
Korea, Syria and Cote d’Ivoire – have identified individuals but refused to
publish their names. They have preferred to transmit sealed lists of perpetrators
to their mandating organs within the United Nations.
Only two commissions – the Commission of Inquiry on Guinea and the
2006 Commission of Inquiry on Timor-Leste – decided to publicly reveal the
names of alleged perpetrators in their reports, which in the case of Guinea
included the Head of State and high-level governmental officials. It should
be noted how in the context of the Timor-Leste investigation, the Timor-Leste
Government had specifically requested the Commission to reach such find-
ings.609
While inquiries have rarely named individuals, their findings have more
often pointed towards the responsibility of specific actors, groups or organs.
Commissions have in this way refrained from reaching findings on specific
persons in the absence of adequate due process guarantees but, at the same
time, have grouped together useful information on the responsibility of specific
groups and institutional actors that may help in narrowing down the scope
of investigation and consequently facilitate future criminal prosecutions.
For example, in contexts such as Kyrgyzstan, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Darfur,
Timor-Leste, North Korea and Eritrea, international investigations have identi-
fied and expressly named paramilitary groups or state organs as allegedly
responsible for the violations perpetrated. While in the case of Guinea and
Darfur the inquiries have combined findings on individual responsibility with
those on groups, the Commission of Inquiry on Kyrgyzstan did not identify
any individual but expressly referred to the responsibility of members of the
607 Ibid para. 528.
608 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry into Libya (n 202) para. 236.




army, police and non-state groups for the commission of criminal acts, while
also analysing the institutional and political responsibility of certain govern-
mental actors.610 Similarly, the 2006 Commission of Inquiry on Timor-Leste
interpreted its mandate ‘to clarify responsibility’ in a way that encompassed
both criminal and political/institutional responsibility at organs level.611
On the same line, the Commission of Inquiry on North Korea noted, with
regard to a number of policies, how these had been decided at Supreme Leader
level and could not be implemented without the Supreme Leader’s ap-
proval.612 Furthermore, the report determined that among the main perpe-
trators were officials of the State Security Department, the Ministry of People’s
Security, the Korean People’s Army, the Office of the Public Prosecutor, the
judiciary and the Workers’ Party of Korea, who are acting under the effective
control of the central organs of the Workers’ Party of Korea, the National
Defence Commission and the Supreme Leader of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea.613 Particularly telling are also the findings included in
the reports of the Commission of Inquiry on Eritrea. Its first report expressly
listed among perpetrators the Eritrean Defence Forces (in particular the Eritrean
Army); the National Security Office; the Eritrean Police Forces; the Ministry
of Information; the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of Defence; the People’s
Front for Democracy and Justice; the Office of the President; and the Presi-
dent.614 The second report contained an entire section on institutional
responsibility, highlighting in particular the role played by the informal inner
circle around the Eritrean Presidency, including the specific position of the
army and the blurred relationship between the Government and the People’s
Front for Democracy and Justice.615
Hence, the possibility for commissions of inquiry to focus on groups/organs
and on the responsibility at political/institutional (rather than individual) level
may add new value to the work of these bodies, particularly given that an
actor can still be held accountable for its political and institutional failures
even in those situations where proving criminal liability becomes arduous.
Such assessment may bear significant implications, particularly taking into
account that the objectives of modern fact-finding exercises encompass not
only holding individuals accountable but also stimulating international tailored
responses in spite of political and institutional failures at domestic level. In
610 Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the Events in Southern
Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 (January 2011) paras. 367-400. See also Grace (n 195) 37.
611 Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste
(n 274) paras. 4, 11.
612 Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the situation of human rights in North Korea (n
273) para. 67.
613 Ibid para. 24.
614 Report of the commission of inquiry on Eritrea (n 273) para. 23.
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this regard, it is unfortunate that so far the analysis on institutional and
political responsibilities has received only marginal attention in the practice
of international inquiries and has been significantly underestimated in the work
of experts and practitioners.616
2.4.6.6 Use of international criminal law by commissions of inquiry: main objectives
2.4.6.6.1 Objective One: provoking action
In conclusion, it is possible to identify two main purposes behind the use of
international criminal law by inquiry mechanisms. The first one relates to the
activation of the international response through the exercise of denouncing,
condemning and provoking functions.617 As it has been described above,
this use of ICL is indeed more ‘political’ as it refers to the commissions’ ability,
through their findings and recommendations, to solicit stakeholders’ responses
and direct them to tackle impunity for international crimes. In particular,
according to van den Herik:
‘the use of international criminal law serves accountability purposes, but perhaps
even more importantly, it evidences the quest to evoke external action. The doctrine
of R2P has articulated a moral and political responsibility for the international
community and more specifically the Security Council to act when international
crimes are being committed and characterizing acts as international crimes also
assists in bringing a situation within the attention of the International Criminal
Court’.618
This ‘provoking’ function has thus been highlighted as a distinctive feature
of the latest generation of commissions of inquiry, particularly those created
within the UN Human Rights Council’s framework. To say it again with the
words of van den Herik, ‘human rights inquiries are used as advocacy tools
with the main agenda being to induce compliance or alternatively to provoke
external action that will halt on-going human rights violation’.619 Indeed,
such evolution from their original and purely fact-finding role may trigger
the question of whether it is still possible to label them as ‘commissions of
inquiry’. This issue merits further reflection and will be dealt more in depth
in the final Chapter.
2.4.6.6.2 Objective Two: contributing to the work of international justice mechanisms
The second purpose behind the use of international criminal law by inter-
national inquiries is more technical and relates to the value ascribed to their
findings. On this point, a number of questions should be posed. In particular,
616 Grace (n 195) 37.






what is the role to be attributed to commissions of inquiry’s findings in the
course of criminal proceedings? Can such findings be used for the purpose
of criminal investigations and how? Is there room for a better coordination
between commissions of inquiry and international tribunals?
In this regard, the practice of commissions of inquiry has provided mixed
responses. It is undeniable that commissions of inquiry have on many occasions
facilitated the work of international criminal tribunals. Looking at their
practice, commissions have created databases to store evidence and incidents
that have been (like in the case of former Yugoslavia) – or may be like in the
case of North Korea – significantly relied upon by criminal prosecutors. As
the landmark case of Darfur has shown, commissions have also been able to
set up lists of prima facie perpetrators that can help criminal prosecutors
narrowing the focus in the selection of specific criminal cases where the
evidence available appear more robust.
Furthermore, inquiries’ assessments may be extremely valuable in identify-
ing contextual elements of the crimes. In this regard, the analysis developed
by the Yugoslavia Commission of Experts on the existence of an international
or non international armed conflict or the reasoning of the inquiries in Guinea
and Syria on the fulfilment of the so called ‘state policy requirement’ for crimes
against humanity in relation to a circumscribed incident or the conduct of non-
state actors stand as remarkable examples.
Finally, commissions can support the work of judicial bodies by providing
preliminary assessments of whether certain crimes have been committed (like
in relation to the issue of whether the crime of genocide had been committed
in the contexts of Darfur or Central African Republic) or by offering their
interpretation on questions of law. They may also help the progressive develop-
ment of international criminal law, in particular by linking certain patterns,
as it has been the case for the studies of the Yugoslavia Commission on ethnic
cleansing and rape, with the commission of international crimes.
The contribution of commission of inquiry to the work of international
criminal tribunals is thus beyond question. However, how far this contribution
can be stepped up? This issue has not yet been addressed at institutional level
and the practice of recent international investigations seems to go in different
directions.
In particular, certain commissions have adopted a more conservative
approach. For example, the Commission of Inquiry on Libya in its interim
report underlined how it opted ‘for a cautious approach by consistently re-
ferring to the information obtained as being distinguishable from evidence
capable of being used in criminal proceedings’, in this way suggesting the
impracticability to resort to its findings in the course of criminal trials.620
Such approach appears diametrically opposed to the role as envisaged by
previous commissions such as those established in relation to the conflicts in
620 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry into Libya (n 202) Executive summary.
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former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. For example, the Commission of Experts on
Rwanda noted how
‘in accordance with the Security Council mandate, [it] plans to gather evidence
and report to the Secretary-General. The primary objective of this plan of action
is to produce specific evidence likely to be used for prosecution and to identify
individuals responsible for having perpetrated grave violations of international
humanitarian law as well as possible acts of genocide’.621
Other human rights inquiries have tried to go beyond the specific question
of evidence and more generally conceptualise their role in relation to the whole
criminal accountability process. In particular, the Commission of Inquiry on
CAR viewed its work ‘as a vital step towards encouraging and facilitating
criminal investigations and prosecutions to be undertaken’, explaining how
its tasks
‘is to marshal a reliable body of information, that is consistent with and supported
by as many sources as possible, in order to provide the foundations for a full-
fledged criminal investigation to be undertaken in the future by the appropriate
national and/or international authorities’.622
Furthermore, the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur stated how it ‘would make
an assessment of possible suspects that would pave the way for future invest-
igations, and possible indictments, by a prosecutor’.623 More comprehensively,
the Commission of Inquiry on North Korea, while restating its difference from
a court of law and the impossibility to make final determinations on criminal
responsibility, advocated for its competence to
‘determine whether its findings constitute reasonable grounds establishing that
crimes against humanity have been committed so as to merit a criminal investiga-
tion by a competent national or international organ of justice’.624
This may lead to the assertion that commissions of inquiry, although non
adjudicatory in their nature, may act as quasi-judicial filters or pre-judicial
bodies.625 However, such labels can be misleading in adding unnecessary
confusion to a debate that mainly relays on the developing practice in the
absence of a solid institutional background. There is no reference to categories
such as ‘pre-judicial body’ in the law and practice of international organisa-
621 Report of the Commission of Experts on Rwanda (n 375) Appendix V, para. 1.
622 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on the Central African Republic (n 294)
paras. 16, 24.
623 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (n 211) para. 15.
624 Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the situation of human rights in North Korea (n
273) para. 74.




tions. While it is fair (and even necessary) to assess whether modern inquiry
commissions have gone beyond their fact-finding role, this should not necessar-
ily be done through the creation of brand-new categories in the absence of
a consolidated institutional regime.
On the contrary, an approach that, by looking at the practice, simply
assesses the contribution and role possibly played by commissions of inquiry
in advancing criminal accountability should be preferred, at least for the time
being. Hence, once accepted the contribution of commissions of inquiry to
the work of criminal justice mechanisms, it remains to analyse more specifically
which value and weight their findings may bear in the course of criminal
proceedings.
2.4.6.7 Contribution of commissions of inquiry to the work of international tribunals:
an assessment of the practice
As already explained in the section dedicated to the standard of proof, inter-
national criminal proceedings are composed by a variety of different stages,
from preliminary examination to the trial and appeal procedures. In this regard
Stahn and Jacobs have analysed the different value and contribution that
inquiries’ findings can play in the various phases of such process.626 It
emerges, as a general trend, that fact-finding bodies can exercise a more
influential role in the preliminary examination and investigation stages (which
are the preliminary phases of involvement of international criminal justice
mechanisms) than during pre-trial and trial proceedings. This indeed should
be considered as a general remark that does not capture always the full picture.
Moreover, it has been highlighted how their findings mostly benefit the
Prosecutor, while their incidence on the work of judges and especially of the
defence appears more marginal.627
2.4.6.7.1 Preliminary examination phase
In the phase of preliminary examinations, where the standard of proof required
is lower and the reliance on third party information bears considerable weight,
the contribution of international commissions can prove extremely useful,
especially in providing fresh evidence and direct testimonies in contexts where
626 Stahn and Jacobs (n 316).
627 Ibid 12-13. In particular, the possibility for the findings of international inquiries to contri-
bute to the work of defense teams in criminal trials has been so far largely underestimated,
including by commissioners themselves. In this regard, with regard to the experience of
the 2011 Commission of Inquiry on Libya, Heller pointed out the Commission’s lack of
compliance with a request from the ICC’s Office of Public Counsel for the Defense in the
Saif Qadhafi case to provide exculpatory evidence in its possession. According to the author
such failure appears ‘inconsistent with the Commission’s claim to have functioned inde-
pendently of the [Office of the Prosecutor]’. Heller (n 206) 8.
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international prosecutors are not immediately granted access to the affected
territory.
Furthermore, the investigation of the Prosecutor at preliminary examination
stage does not focus on the identification of a specific individual case, some-
thing that reduces the concerns for the defensive rights of the individual(s)
involved.628 In fact, the Prosecutor is expected to acquire information that
can help it assessing whether there are reasonable basis for finding that inter-
national crimes have been committed. As it has been emphasized, ‘the idea
is to evaluate more generally if a situation deserves closer attention. Human
rights fact finding reports are useful in this context’.629
Unsurprisingly, if one takes a close look at the practice of the ICTY and
the ICC, human rights documentation and, in particular, fact-finding missions’
reports have played a significant contribution in this phase. With particular
reference to the ICC, a first remarkable example relates to the role played by
the findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur on the preliminary
examination subsequently conducted by the Office of the Prosecutor, which,
unlike the Cassese-led team, was not granted access to the territory of Sudan.
Following the same line, the investigations conducted by the HRC-mandated
Fact-Finding Mission and the UNSG Panel of Inquiry on the Gaza Flotilla
incident have been highly influential for the work subsequently conducted
by the ICC Prosecutor on the issue. The incident was submitted to the attention
of the Prosecutor on 14 May 2013 by a referral from the Union of the Comoros,
State Party to the Rome Statute and registered State of the Mavi Marmara
vessel involved in the incident.630
628 Stahn and Jacobs (n 316) 14.
629 Ibid.
630 ‘Referral under Articles 14 and 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute arising from the 31 May 2010,
Gaza Freedom Flotilla situation’ (14 May 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/
Referral-from-Comoros.pdf accessed on 8 December 2016. Based on the Comoros Referral
the ICC Prosecutor issued, on 6 November 2014, a statement on the conclusion of its
preliminary examination, in which it determined that the legal requirements under the
Rome Statute to open an investigation had not been met. In particular, Prosecutor Bensouda,
although concluding how there was a reasonable basis to believe that war crimes within
the jurisdiction of the ICC had been committed on board of the Mavi Marmara, noted that
‘the potential case(s) likely arising from an investigation into this incident would not be
of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the ICC’, given that gravity is an explicit
criteria set by the Rome Statute for the opening of an investigation. After an Application
for Review of the Prosecutor’s decision was filed on behalf of the Republic of Comoros
on 29 January 2015, on 16 July 2015 the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber requested the Prosecutor
to reconsider its decision due to a number of material errors in her determination of the
gravity requirement. See ‘Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court,
Fatou Bensouda, on concluding the preliminary examination of the situation referred by
the Union of Comoros: ‘Rome Statute legal requirements have not been met’’ (6 November
2014), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%
20the%20prosecutor/reports%20and%20statements/statement/Pages/otp-statement-06-11-
2014.aspx accessed on 8 December 2016; ICC, ‘Situation on registered Vessels of Comoros,




In this regard, it is extremely relevant to note how both the Comoros
referral and the Prosecutor’s subsequent decision relied significantly upon the
findings of the UNSG Panel of Inquiry and of the HRC Fact-Finding Mission.631
With specific regard to the work of the HRC fact-Finding Mission, its findings
were used extensively in the Comoros referral as the principal source in order
to provide an account of the events prior, during and after the seizure of the
Mavi Maramara by the IDF.632 In relation to those findings concerning in-
dividual criminal responsibility, the HRC Mission’s determinations on the
characterization of certain acts as war crimes were also duly taken into con-
sideration, although the referral included a broader list of criminal offences
including both war crimes and crimes against humanity.633
Also in relation to the ‘Article 53(1) Report’ submitted by the ICC Prosecutor
in response to the referral, the Mission’s report provided a precious contribu-
tion to those sections dedicated to the factual determinations and legal analysis.
In particular, such findings have been used by the Prosecutor in its assessment
concerning the legality of the Gaza blockade, although it did not reach a
preliminary conclusion on the matter.634 More importantly, the Fact-finding
Mission’s analysis played a prominent role in the Prosecutor’s assessment on
whether specific war crimes had been perpetrated during and after the seizure
of the flotilla by the Israeli forces.635 In this regard, it should be noted that,
notwithstanding its final decision not to proceed with an investigation given
the absence of the gravity requirement, the Prosecutor did partially endorse
the position expressed by the Fact-Finding Mission on the fact that certain
war crimes had probably been committed.636
pursuant to Article 53(3)(a) of the Prosecutor’s Decision of 6 November 2014 not to initiate
an investigation in the Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the
Ellenic Republic of Greece and the Kingdom of Cambodia’, Case No. ICC 01/13 (29 January
2015); Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s
decision not to initiate an investigation (Pre-Trial Chamber I) Case No. ICC 01/13 (16 July
2015).
631 Referral on Gaza Freedom Flotilla situation (n 630) paras. 5, 25, 29, 30; ICC Prosecutor,
‘Situation of Comoros – Article 53(1) Report’ (n 630) paras. 7, 31, 38, 39-42, 44, 67, 75, 108,
123.
632 In particular, the Referral upheld the Mission’s findings on the use of live ammunition
and lethal force by Israeli soldiers. It also endorsed the Mission’s view that the treatment
of those passengers detained after the seizure amounted to torture and inhuman treatment
according to international human rights standards. Furthermore, the Mission’s findings
were used to support the argument that the actions carried out by the IDF were undertaken
as part of a deliberate plan and policy to resort to violence in order to dissuade the flotilla
to reach Gaza, in this way justifying the ‘gravity’ requirement. Referral on Gaza Freedom
Flotilla situation (n 630) paras. 25, 38-40, 42-45, 48.
633 Ibid paras. 58-59, 60-65.
634 ICC Prosecutor, ‘Situation of Comoros – Article 53(1) Report’ (n 630) paras. 30, 31.
635 Ibid paras. 42, 66, 75, 108, 121.
636 Ibid paras. 61, 72.
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Another important example of the influence played by fact-finding bodies
on the ICC preliminary examinations relates to Georgia. The situation, with
regard to alleged crimes committed during the conflict with the Russian
Federation over South Ossetia between 1 July and 10 October 2008, has been
under the radar of the ICC since 14 August 2008 when a preliminary exam-
ination was opened. On 16 October 2015 the Prosecutor requested Pre-Trial
Chamber I to open a full investigation. The request was granted on 27 January
2016.
The Prosecutor’s request under Article 15 of the Statute has heavily relied
upon the findings produced by the EU-mandated International Fact-Finding
Mission (IIFFMCG or ‘Tagliavini Mission’).
In particular, the analysis conducted by the Tagliavini Mission has played
an important role in supporting the Prosecutor’s assertion that the Russian
Federation was exercising overall effecting control over South Ossetia’s military
and civil authorities at the time of the conflict. In this regard, the Prosecutor
noted how ‘the IIFFMCG concluded that Russia supported South Ossetian forces
in numerous ways, including by training, arming and equipping them’ and,
on such basis, determined that
‘the information available provides a reasonable basis to believe that at all times
and locations relevant to this Application the Russian armed forces exercised overall
control over South Ossetian forces’.637
The evidence collected by the Tagliavini Mission has also significantly influ-
enced the Prosecutor’s analysis on the alleged responsibility of Russian
peacekeepers for the crimes committed by South Ossetia forces. In particular,
the request makes reference to the fact that:
‘the IIFFMCG conducted interviews that also provided different accounts “ranging
from active intervention to stop violations, to passive observation, and even involve-
ment”. The IIFFMCG stated that while it appeared difficult to conclude that Russian
forces systematically participated in or tolerated the conduct of South Ossetian
forces, there seemed to be “credible and converging reports” indicating that in a
number of instances Russian forces did not act to prevent or stop South Ossetian
forces from committing crimes’.638
It is also important to highlight the IIFFMCG’s contribution to the Prosecutor’s
assessment on the use of certain weapons, such as Grad MLRS, resulting in
indiscriminate attacks against civilians and on the fulfilment of contextual
elements for the commission of crimes against humanity.639 In particular,
637 ICC, ‘Request for authorization of an investigation pursuant to article 15’ Case No. ICC-01/
15 (17 November 2015) paras. 99-100, 103.
638 Ibid para. 139.




the Prosecutor’s request heavily referred to the findings of the Tagliavini
Mission in order to determine the multiple character of the commission of
the crimes and the existence of a state-organised policy behind the perpetration
of certain offences, such as forcible transfer and persecution, committed on
ethnic grounds and labelled as crimes against humanity in the Prosecutor’s
application.640
Following the same line, in the case of Cote d’Ivoire, the analysis contained
in the ICC Prosecutor’s Article 15 request for an investigation and the Pre-Trial
Chamber’s subsequent authorisation have significantly driven inspiration from
the findings of the HRC-mandated commission of inquiry.641 In this regard,
the fact that the Prosecutor’s request and the report of the HRC-mandated
inquiry have been published almost simultaneously may suggest that a certain
degree of coordination between the two bodies might have been put in place,
given the numerous references to the findings of the Commission in the
Prosecutor’s request.
Conversely, other inquiries’ experiences had marginal impact on the
preliminary work of the ICC Prosecutor. In this regard, the Libya situation is
often evoked as an example of lack of coordination between the work of fact-
finding bodies and international criminal justice mechanisms, in light of the
fact that the ICC preliminary examination was concluded before the submission
by the UN Commission of Inquiry of its interim report.642 Similarly, the Report
of the UN Commission of Inquiry on CAR was published two months after the
opening of an investigation by the Office of the Prosecutor and could not
significantly contribute to the Prosecutor’s analysis. Quite the contrary, in many
instances it has been the Prosecutor’s assessment that has influenced the final
findings of the UNSC-mandated inquiry, particularly in relation to the question
around the existence of an armed conflict and the commission of genocide.643
2.4.6.7.2 Investigation phase
Moving to the investigation stage, certain authors have emphasized the need
to distinguish between investigations over a situation and over a specific
individual case.644 In the first case, the role of fact-finding missions’ reports
remains extremely relevant and reference to their findings may abound, as
this phase can be hardly distinguished from the preliminary examination. In
640 Ibid paras. 265-266.
641 ICC, ‘Request for authorization of an investigation pursuant to article 15’ Case No. ICC-02/
11 (23 June 2011) paras. 28, 63, 70, 71, 82; ICC, ‘Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome
Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Cote
d’Ivoire’ (Pre-Trial Chamber III) Case No. ICC-02/11 (2 Ocotber 2011) paras. 37, 92, 97,
123, 124, 142.
642 Frulli (n 178) 1333.
643 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on the Central African Republic (n 294)
paras. 89-93, 461.
644 Stahn and Jacobs (n 316) 14.
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the second case, an indiscriminate reference to commissions of inquiry’ findings
may become more problematic given the increased role played by the defence
in light of the narrowing of the investigation to a specific individual.
Referring again to the situation in Darfur, the report of the UN Commission
of Inquiry played an important role as source of information also in the course
of the ICC investigation following the closing of the preliminary examination.
In particular, both the ICC Prosecutor and Pre-Trial Chamber extensively
referred to the Commission’s factual and legal analysis in their requests for
and decisions issuing warrants of arrest, this despite reaching opposite findings
on certain issues, particularly in relation to the question on whether genocide
had been perpetrated.645
In this regard, it should be noted that, while investigations over specific
cases may entail more restrain in referring to the evidence collected by fact-
finding bodies, two elements should be taken into account. The first one is
that commissions of inquiry have been increasingly empowered with the task
of identifying individuals responsible for international crimes. It means that
they are required to collect evidence that can serve such purpose, at least at
a prima facie level. The second one is that the standard of proof that has been
consistently applied by commissions (the ‘reasonable grounds’ formula)
resembles the one required for the Prosecutor to request an arrest warrant
to the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber. These two elements may suggest that findings
from human rights inquiries might still play a substantive role also in the
formal investigation stage. However, only future practice will help clearing
the grounds, depending on the way inquiries will carry out such a task and
bearing in mind that the Prosecutor and Pre-Trial Chamber maintain full
discretion on the way commissions’ findings on individual suspects may be
used and interpreted.
2.4.6.7.3 Confirmation of charges and trial stages
Shifting to more advanced stages of the criminal procedure, the standard of
proof as well as the adversarial nature of the procedure and the powers
granted to the defence inevitably increase. These are factors that render the
reliance on the work of commissions of inquiry necessarily more difficult. For
example, looking at the confirmation of the charges phase, the Prosecutor case
against Mbarushimana failed the Pre-Trial Chamber test precisely because of
the abuse of UN and civil society reports in the evidence presented.646 In this
645 ICC, Prosecutor v Harun and Ali Khusayb, ‘Prosecutor Application under Article 58(7)’ Case
No. ICC-02/05 (27 February 2007); ICC, Prosecutor v Bashir, ‘Prosecutor Application under
Article 58(7)’ Case No. ICC-02/05-157-AnxA (14 July 2008) paras. 52, 68, 79, 88; ICC,
Prosecutor v Bashir, (Pre-Trial Chamber I) Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09 (4 March 2009) paras.
63, 64, 68, 76, 83, 85, 88, 97, 136, 215.
646 ICC, Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges) Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10- 465-Red (16 December 2011) paras. 113–239; See also




regard, the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Gbagbo case made it clear how such
reports cannot be the ‘fruits of a full and proper investigation by the
Prosecutor’ according to Article 54 of the ICC Statute.647
Indeed, such principle applies even more to the trial stage, where the
standard of proof required is the responsibility of the defendant beyond
reasonable doubt. However, this does not mean that commissions of inquiry’s
findings cannot be referred at all during trial, particularly if they dwell on
legal issues rather than on factual evidence. As an example, the ICTY Trial
Chambers in the Jelisic and Tolimir decisions expressly endorsed the view
adopted by the Commission of Experts about the fact that genocide could be
perpetrated by the mere combination of measures of forcible transfer of a
targeted group and elimination of its total leadership (including political and
administrative leaders, religious leaders, academics and intellectuals, business
leaders and others) regardless of the actual numbers killed.648
2.4.6.7.4 Conclusions
In sum, while the influence played by commissions of inquiry on the work
if international tribunals is undeniable, a question emerges concerning whether
such forms of interaction should be further institutionalised or, at least,
rationalised and conceptualised. While we will devote more attention to this
issue in the final Chapter, it is now important to underline how, in the absence
of a formal and institutionalised framework of coordination, the experience
of interaction between fact-finding bodies and criminal justice mechanisms
has so far provided mixed responses. While in contexts such as former Yugo-
slavia, Darfur, Georgia and Cote d’Ivoire the interaction has indeed been
fruitful with the criminal justice machinery mostly benefiting from the work
of fact-finding bodies, the case of Rwanda appears more contentious while
the Libya process can even be considered as an example indicative of what
are the risks behind the lack of coordination between the two spheres.649
This issue has also stimulated a fruitful debate among scholars. For
example, Frulli has advanced the need to ensure a more clear-cut separation
of tasks among criminal prosecutors and commissions of inquiry investigators
through an organised system of cooperation among them.650 Other authors
have instead warned against an unrestrained enthusiasm on the impact of fact-
finding bodies on the work of criminal tribunals. In particular they have
emphasized how it would be
647 ICC, Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision adjourning the hearing on the
confirmation of charges pursuant to article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute) Case No. ICC-02/
11-01/11-432 (3 June 2013) para. 35. See also Stahn and Jacobs (n 316) 19.
648 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T (Judgment, 14 December 1999) para. 82; ICTY,
Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T (Judgment, 12 December 2012) paras. 777, 781.
649 Stahn and Jacobs (n 316) 9-10.
650 Frulli (n 178) 1333.
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‘misleading to frame the link between investigative fact-finding and international
criminal justice in terms of a continuum, in which one element builds naturally
on the other. There are differences and structural tensions that challenge the idea
of a fluid ‘division of labor’.651





3 Commissions of Inquiry at the Current
Stage
Impact and Way Ahead
3.1 IMPACT OF COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY ON THE RESPONSE BY THE INTER-
NATIONAL COMMUNITY
3.1.1 Introduction
Since their first conceptualization in the Hague Conventions, one of the main
purposes of international commissions of inquiry has been to provide states
and competent bodies within the international community with the relevant
facts and analysis in order to develop appropriate responses to certain situ-
ations.
Hence, the type of response provided by the international community may
represent a useful indicator to evaluate the performances of international
inquiries. At the same time, as we will see in the course of this paragraph,
such indicator should not be overestimated.
If we look at the unfolding of the most recent human rights emergencies
around the world (many of whom have been the object of ad hoc international
investigations), the picture appears generally as extremely bleak. In many
recent crises – such as Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Libya, South Sudan and the OPT –
we have assisted not only to a constant deterioration of the situation on the
ground but also the response offered by the international community has
weakened and become more fragmented and selective, particularly in terms
of enforcement and compliance with relevant international law norms. In this
regard, a number of concerning trends should be highlighted. These include
the selectivity of the UN Security Council and Human Rights Council when
it comes to uphold international law standards, the political stalemate among
High Contracting Parties around a possible revision of common article 1 to
the Geneva Conventions that would enhance third states obligations vis-à-vis
violations of the laws of war and the decision to pull out from the ICC
expressed by an increasing number of African states.652 Should these trends
652 On the double-standards applied by the Human Rights Council see, as an example, its
inconsistent approach vis-à-vis the Yemen crises particularly in relation to a Dutch proposal
of dispatching an international inquiry (n 207). On the selectivity of the UN Security Council
in applying and enforcing international law see, as an example, its systematic recourse
to the veto power to block any attempt to refer the situation in Syria to the ICC. UNSC,




be taken into account in the assessment on the impact of commissions of
inquiry?
The answer to such question deserves further reflection. Firstly, it would
be unfair to ascribe responsibility solely to international inquiries for the
weaknesses of the international community’s response to current atrocities.
The lack of enforcement or selective enforcement of international law has much
deeper roots than the positive or negative performance of a fact-finding body.
In particular, as it will be analysed in the course of this Chapter, commissions
of inquiry have succeeded the most in those cases where they have been
granted adequate political and technical support from key decisions makers
at regional and international level.
Secondly, similarly to the assessment undertaken in Chapter 2 with regard
to parties’ cooperation, it would be naïve to reach ‘black and white’ conclusions
when it comes to measure the impact of commissions of inquiry on the
response to human rights emergencies. In order to properly measure the role
played by these commissions, it is thus paramount to assess the different
nuances and variables emerging from the practice.
3.1.2 Perspectives from which to assess impact
However, before looking at the practice, it may be useful to identify two
perspectives (or angles) from which to measure the impact of the work con-
ducted by international inquiries.
The first perspective (perspective one) relates to their ‘provoking’ and
‘alerting’ role. From this angle, commissions of inquiry can be evaluated based
on the way they have influenced the response of domestic institution and the
international community by triggering and soliciting specific reactions. In this
manner commissions of inquiry are assessed in their more ‘political’ and
‘activist’ dimension. As it has been emphasized in the course of this disserta-
tion, this dimension has not always been inherent to the work of international
inquiries and only recently it has represented a distinctive feature in their
activities.
Council from Adopting Draft Resolution’, SC/11407 (22 May 2014). See also the numerous
failures by the Security Council to condemn illegal Israeli settlements. ‘U.S. Veto Thwarts
UN Resolution Condemning Settlements’ Haaretz (18 February 2011) http://www.haaretz.
com/israel-news/u-s-veto-thwarts-un-resolution-condemning-settlements-1.344333 accessed
on 8 December 2016. On the decisions to pull out from the ICC by African states it is
important to highlight the steps taken by Burundi, South Africa and Gambia. ‘Burundi
to leave the ICC six months after probe announced’ BBC News (7 October 2016) http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-africa-37585159 accessed on 8 December 2016; ‘South Africa to Quit
International Criminal Court’ Al Jazeera (21 October 2016) http://www.aljazeera.com/news/
2016/10/south-africa-formally-applies-quit-icc-media-161021044116029.html accessed on
8 December 2016; ‘The Gambia joins African queue to leave ICC’ BBC News (26 October
2016) http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37771592 accessed on 8 December 2016.
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The second perspective (perspective two) pertains to the inquiries’ role
as law-applying authorities. This angle enables us to assess how far their
factual findings and legal analysis have been used and reproduced in sub-
sequent determinations by legal bodies and judicial actors subsequently
involved in the response by the international community.
Thus, with the important caveat that no strict scientific parameter can be
deployed to describe a phenomenon such as the impact of inquiries in their
practice, the following analysis will look comprehensively at both these
perspectives in order to shed more clarity on the matter.
3.1.3 Impact of commissions of inquiry: an assessment of the practice
3.1.3.1 Two landmark experiences: the Commission of Experts on Former Yugoslavia
and the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur
Looking at the most recent practice, two international commissions of inquiry
stand out as milestones in the history of international human rights fact-
finding. The first one is the Commission of Experts on the Former Yugoslavia,
the second one the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur.
The Yugoslavia Commission can be considered a success story looking
at both the perspectives outlined above. It has propelled a significant reaction
by the international community through the establishment of the ICTY, it has
actively supported future criminal prosecutions through the collection of
evidence and the creation of a comprehensive database and it has even con-
tributed to the progressive development of international law through its work
and studies on a number of specific patterns. What appears more surprising
is that all such positive outcomes emerged from an experience that can be
considered as pioneering in inaugurating the era of modern human rights
inquiries and, as such, was not directly benefiting from any previous lessons
learnt.
It has been argued that the key for the success of the Yugoslavia Commis-
sion has been the support and cooperation that it has received from world
powers. This is only partially true. Since its inception, the Commission suffered
from a considerable lack of funding by the United Nations, which prompted
the resignation of his Chair, Professor Kalshoven.653 In order to overcome
such deficit, a Trust Fund was set up in March 1993 in order to receive
voluntary donations. Based on such mechanism, thirteen governments decided
to contribute for a total of $1,320,631. Also, private donations significantly
contributed to finance specific tools, such as the creation of a database at
653 Michael P. Scharf, ‘Cherif Bassiouni and the 780 Commission: The Gateway to the Era of
Accountability’ (2006) Case School of Law – Occasional Paper, 8; Cherif Bassiouni, The




DePaul’s University International Human Rights Law Institute, whose total
cost exceeded one million dollars.654
Hence, the lack of funding from the UN was compensated by the strong
support provided by governments, in particular the United States. Such
support was not only expressed in financial terms but also through political
and technical means. In terms of political backing, the Commission benefited
from the political climate existing in the aftermath of the Cold War, with a
United States’ led Security Council that entrusted it with a strong mandate.655
With regard to technical support and cooperation, the governments of Austria,
Sweden and Germany provided government lawyers and police investigators
while a number of different countries prepared written submissions including
interviews with victims and witnesses.656 The Commission benefited also
from the cooperation of a wide range of countries, including the newly born
Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina and Slovenia that were directly involved in the
conflict.
When it comes to assessing the impact of the Yugoslavia Commission, a
first indicator of its success has been the actions undertaken by the inter-
national community in response (perspective one). After the publication of
the Commission’s interim report that recommended the setting up of an ad
hoc international tribunal to try the most serious offences, the UNSC, acting
pursuant to Resolution 808 (1993), took a first significant step in establishing
the ICTY. According to Scharf, the Commission preliminary findings played
a crucial role in highlighting how the particular circumstances and gravity
of the crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia required the formation of
an ad hoc international criminal tribunal rather than a truth and reconciliation
commission or the activation of domestic mechanisms.657 In this regard, Prof.
Bassiouni noted how the Council referred to the conclusions of the Commis-
sion’s interim report that the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal would be
‘consistent with the direction of its work’.658 However, this author also
acknowledged how it was not possible to assess whether the Commission’s
work and recommendations played a decisive role or whether the Council
merely referred to it in order to support a decision that was already in the
mind of some of its permanent members.659 In any case, the ICTY was
established and its Statute reflected the same legal frameworks that had been
identified in the Commission’s interim report, including the prohibition against
654 Bassiouni, The United Nations Commission of Experts (n 84) 796.
655 Ibid 790. In particular, Prof. Bassiouni noted how the Commission ‘received its mandate
from what appeared to be a unified Security Council. Thus, its legal and moral authority
was unprecedented’.
656 Bassiouni, The United Nations Commission of Experts (n 84) 799.
657 Scharf (n 653) 12-13.
658 Bassiouni, The United Nations Commission of Experts (n 84) 791; UNSC Res. 808 (1993).
659 Ibid 790, 791.
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the crime of genocide, crime against humanity and grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions and other war crimes.
In terms of further responses by the international community, certain
scholars have highlighted how the creation of the Tribunal and the findings
of the Commission on the links between Belgrade and the crimes perpetrated
by the Srpska Republic in Bosnia Herzegovina
‘led inextricably to the issuance of indictments, which in turn contributed to the
downfall of Slobodan Milosevic, ultimately resulting in his arrest and transfer to
The Hague for trial’.660
The role played by international criminal justice in the former Yugoslavia
conflict and its contribution to the causes of peace and reconciliation in the
Balkans is the object of a complex and on-going debate among scholars. Hence,
it would be hasty to reach clear-cut conclusions in this sense. Indeed, it can
be alleged that the work and findings of the Yugoslavia Commission have
clearly paved the way for the adoption of more concrete steps by the inter-
national community that – through the establishment of the ICTY and all the
consequences that this led to – have significantly affected the course of the
conflict.
Looking from the second perspective, the Yugoslavia Commission has also
heavily contributed through its investigations and findings to the work of the
ICTY. While the Commission was not initially required to collect evidence that
could serve the purpose of criminal proceedings, after the establishment of
the ad hoc tribunal the Bassiouni-led team implied that this was the case. In
particular, the UNSC required the Commission to continue its work ‘on an
urgent basis’ pending the appointment of a Prosecutor.661
Thus, resolutions 808 and 827 established a certain form of connection
between the two organs despite no institutional link was ever envisaged.662
In addition, delays in the appointment of the Prosecutor resulted in the Com-
mission terminating its work before the Prosecutor actually took office. How-
ever, after the completion of its work the Commission transmitted all its
evidence and material, including the database, to the Office of the Prosecutor
ensuring in this way a prompt and swift transition. In this regard, Bassiouni
has emphasized how
‘the fact that the Tribunal’s Office of the Prosecutor was able to produce over two-
dozen indictments within a few months of the submission of our report indicates
how useful the material turned out to be’.663
660 Scharf (n 653) 13.
661 UNSC Res. 827 (1993).
662 Bassiouni, The United Nations Commission of Experts (n 84) 792.




In particular, the database included 64,000 pages of documentation of all kind
and, although many of the sources could not be used as evidence in criminal
trials, it underwent a process of refinement that tremendously facilitated the
ICTY Prosecutor in its screening process.664 Moreover, the 35 field missions,
on-site investigations and studies on specific focus areas undertaken by the
team led by Prof. Bassiouni significantly affected the direction given to the
ICTY investigations.
Certain authors have pointed out how the ICTY jurisprudence partly
endorsed and partly departed from the legal findings reached by the Commis-
sion.665 It has also been argued that the Commission proved sometimes to
be more conservative than the ad hoc tribunal in analysing a number of specific
trends.666 However, it is undeniable that the experience of the Yugoslavia
Commission resulted in a significant contribution to the development of
international law, particularly in relation to policies associated with the com-
mission of international crimes. The innovative work and analysis conducted
by the Commission on practices such as ‘ethnic cleansing’ and ‘rape’ have
already been assessed in the previous Chapter. At the present stage it is just
important to stress how such findings have not only benefited the juris-
prudence of the ICTY but have also influenced the course of other international
justice mechanisms and subsequent human rights fact-finding experiences.
The final report of the Commission was welcomed by UNSG Boutros Ghali
who emphasized how
‘the material and information collected and recorded in the database, now trans-
ferred to the Tribunal, will not only assist in the prosecution of persons responsible
for serious violations of international humanitarian law, but will constitute a
permanent documentary record of the crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia,
and thus remain the memorial for the hundreds of thousands of its innocent
victims’.667
664 Bassiouni, The United Nations Commission of Experts (n 84) 796.
665 Darcy (n 44) 18.
666 Ibid 19-20. In particular, the author refers to the arguments – included in the Commission’s
report and subsequently refuted by the ICTY – on the necessary nexus between crimes
against humanity and armed conflicts and on the applicability of the war crimes paradigm
solely to international armed conflicts.
667 Cherif Bassiouni, ‘The Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former
Yugoslavia’ (1996) Occasional Paper No. 2 – International Human Rights Law Institute,
DePaul University College of Law, 60-61.
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As it has been pointed out by Frulli,
‘[t]he Darfur Commission marks another watershed for prosecution oriented fact-
finding and it could represent a model for drafting guidelines and regulations to
be adopted for analogous cases in the future’.668
In particular, contrary to the Yugoslavia Commission, the team led by Prof.
Cassese operated in a more settled environment in terms of the possibility
to resort to lessons learnt from previous experiences of fact-finding and to
activate pre-existing accountability mechanisms.
The Commission was established by the UNSG pursuant to UNSC Resolution
1564 (2004) with the mandate to
‘investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human
rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide
have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to
ensuring that those responsible are held accountable’.669
According to certain authors, the ‘unique’ character of the mandate played
an important part in the Commission’s success allowing it to tailor its analysis
to reach specific conclusions and recommendations.670 In addition, the mission
led by Prof. Cassese received a satisfactory degree of cooperation from the
Government of Sudan and was granted access to the whole Sudanese territory,
including Darfur. It held consultations in Geneva and visited Sudan two times,
meeting with governmental representatives, and a number of other local and
international stakeholders. Hence, notwithstanding the time constraints
imposed by its mandate, the Commission was able to present at the end of
its three-month investigations a comprehensive and elaborated report to the
Secretary General.
The UNSC-mandated inquiry represented the culmination of a scaling-up
investigative and monitoring efforts by the international community in relation
to the situation in Darfur. It was established way after the international
community’s preliminary involvement in the conflict, which erupted in 2003.
In particular, the Security Council’s decision to set up the Commission was
based on the failure by the Sudanese Government to comply with its commit-
ments to disarm the Janjaweed and to bring those leaders responsible for grave
violations to justice. It is also important to highlight how just before the
Security Council was to discuss the findings contained in the Commission’s
report, it passed Resolution 1591 setting up a committee mandated to list
668 Frulli (n 178) 1330.
669 UNSC Res. 1564 (2004) para. 12.
670 Philip Alston, ‘The Darfur Commission as a Model for Future Responses to Crisis Situations’




specific individuals responsible for human rights violations and threats to the
peace to be subjected to travel bans and the freezing of assets.671
In addition, the creation of the team led by Professor Cassese was preceded
by a number of previous fact-finding experiences. In particular, in the space
of 2004 the Commission on Human Rights appointed an independent expert
to Darfur in order to examine the situation and an investigative team was set
up by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and concluded its work
with a recommendation to establish an independent international commission
of inquiry.672
Similarly to its predecessor in former Yugoslavia, there are many reasons
why the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur can be considered a success story.
The first reason is indeed its impact on the response by the international
community (perspective one). One of the most important follow-up measures
to the recommendations of the Darfur Commission was the decision by the
UNSC through resolution 1593(2005) to refer the situation in Sudan to the ICC,
using for the first time the power granted by Article 13(b) of the ICC Statute.
As it has been underlined by certain experts,
‘[i]n the Darfur case, the work of the Commission had a strong impact on the
referral of the situation to the ICC. The UN Security Council was convinced by the
evidence presented in the report that there was indeed room for the ICC prosecutor
to commence its investigation in Darfur’.673
Whether or not this corresponds to the truth, the UN Security Council in
passing resolution 1593 expressly took note of the Commission’s report.674
It also emphasized two important conclusions reached by the Commission,
particularly in terms of advancing domestic accountability efforts and provid-
ing redress for victims through states’ contributions to the ICC Trust Fund for
Victims.675
While certain passages of Resolution 1593 have raised several criticisms
in terms of compliance with international law standards,676 the historic
671 UNSC Res. 1591 (2005).
672 Alston (n 670) 602.
673 Frulli (n 178) 1331.
674 UNSC Res. 1593 (2005).
675 Ibid.
676 For some commentaries to the resolution which highlight a number of its critical aspects
see Annalisa Ciampi and Luigi Condorelli, ‘Comments on the Security Council Referral
of the Situation in Darfur to the ICC’ (2005) Journal of International Criminal Justice 597; Robert
Cryer, ‘Sudan, Resolution 1593 and International Criminal Justice’ (2006) Leiden Journal of
International Law 195; Corrina Heyder, ‘The UN Security Council Referral of the Crimes
in Darfur to the International Criminal Court in Light to the US Opposition to the Court:
Implications for the International Criminal Court’s Functions and Status’ (2006) Berkeley
Journal of International Law 658; Florian Aumond, ‘La situation au Darfur déférée à la CPI’ (2008)
Revue générale de droit international public 111.
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significance of the first UNSC referral to the ICC and the role played by the
Commission of Inquiry in such a decision cannot be underestimated. In this
regard, certain commentators have highlighted how:
‘[t]he UN Security Council is an inherently political body and reliance on the work
of credible, competent and independent commissions of inquiry as a basis for its
decisions regarding which situations are to be further investigated and even referred
to the ICC prosecutor may help the Council to fulfil the role conferred to it by the
ICC Statute. Reliance on impartial and professional reports may enhance the credibil-
ity of the Security Council as a guarantor in the struggle against impunity for the
most serious international crimes’.677
Hence, the experience of the Darfur Commission may have represented the
gateway for another important role to be assigned to modern fact-finding
bodies in reconciling the inherent political nature of the Security Council with
its responsibility in the activation of criminal justice mechanisms.
The findings of the Commission also proved an invaluable source of
information for the preliminary phases of the ICC involvement in the situation
(perspective two). The Commission identified 51 alleged individuals who could
be suspected of bearing criminal responsibility for the crimes committed in
Darfur.678 It transmitted the sealed list of alleged perpetrators to the UNSG
with the recommendation to hand it over to a competent prosecutor. It also
provided a remarkable analysis of the potential modes of criminal responsibil-
ity on which to charge those allegedly involved in the violations.679
As a result, the evidence gathered in Darfur by the Cassese-led Mission
proved extremely relevant for the ICC Prosecutor investigative team, particular-
ly in light of the fact that, unlike the Commission, the latter was not allowed
into the territory and received no cooperation from the Sudanese Government.
As it has been stressed above, the factual and legal analysis undertaken by
the Commission significantly inspired the work undertaken by the ICC Pro-
secutor during the preliminary investigation and investigation stages.680 This
notwithstanding the fact that the two bodies reached opposite findings with
regard to certain particular issues, particularly on whether the crime of
genocide had been perpetrated as a government-led policy in Darfur.
Finally, the Commission, through its legal analysis, has provided an im-
portant contribution to the development of international law in specific areas.
In particular, its reasoning on the crime of genocide has drawn the attention
677 Frulli (n 178) 1331.
678 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (n 211) para. 532.





of many reviewers.681 While in relation to the notion of ‘protected group’
its endorsement of the so-called ‘subjective approach’ can be considered as
merely reaffirming previous jurisprudence, its reasoning on the dolus specialis
may have added fresh inputs to an on-going debate. Furthermore, its analysis
on the link existing between the exploitation of natural conditions and the
commission of international crimes, although partially overturned by the ICC
Prosecutor, may have inspired future inquiries such as the one investigating
human rights violations in North Korea.682
Along the same line one should assess the contribution of the Commission
of Inquiry on East Timor on the decision by the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to set up the so called ‘Special Panels
for Serious Crimes’ to investigate the most serious violations perpetrated after
the 1999 referendum for independence. Unlike the experiences in former
Yugoslavia and Darfur, the inquiry established by the UN Commission on
Human Rights in September 1999 did not engage in a comprehensive legal
analysis of the violations occurred on the ground. Moreover, the evidence
collected could hardly be used in following criminal investigations. However,
in its final remarks, the Commission recommended the establishment of an
international prosecutor body and an international human rights tribunal
consisting of judges appointed by the UN and possibly including Indonesian
and East-Timorese nationals to sit in Indonesia with jurisdiction over serious
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.683 In June
2000 UNTAET, by explicitly recalling such recommendation, officially established
Panels with Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences within the District
Court in Dili. The Panels were entrusted with jurisdiction over genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, torture and sexual offences and were composed
by two international and one East-Timorese judge.684
Although the experience of the Special Panels will not be remembered as
a success,685 this cannot overshadow the role played by the Commission of
681 See, as an example, William A Schabas, ‘Darfur and the ‘Odious Scourge’: The Commission
of Inquiry’s Findings on Genocide’ (2005) 18(4) Leiden Journal of International Law 871-885;
Claus Kress, ‘The Darfur Report and Genocidal Intent’ (2005) 3 Journal of International
Criminal Justice 562-578.
682 Tonutti (n 594).
683 Report of the international Commission of Inquiry on East Timor (n 330) paras. 152-153.
684 UNTAET, Regulation No. 2000/15, UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (6 June 2000) Sections 1, 22.
685 In particular, the Special Panels faced a number of significant obstacles, including inadequate
financial and logistical support from international actors and lack of ownership from East
Timor. Furthermore, the non-cooperation of Indonesia significantly hampered the possibility
of trying high-ranking perpetrators with the consequence that only a handful of low-level
officials faced justice. In addition, criticism was raised on the quality of the proceedings
compared with international standards of due process. International Bar Association, ‘Special
Panels for Serious Crimes (East Timor)’ http://www.ibanet.org/Committees/WCC_East
Timor.aspx accessed on 8 December 2016. See also David Cohen, ‘Indifference and Account-
ability: The United Nations and the Politics of International Justice in East Timor’ (2006)
East West Centre Special Rep. 9.
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Inquiry’s report in the decision by the UN to set up such accountability mechan-
ism.
3.1.3.2 The ‘controversial’ legacy of commissions of inquiry in the OPT
The experiences of former Yugoslavia and Darfur have somehow certified how
consensus among key players within the international community and coopera-
tion by affected states may significantly increase the chance of success of fact-
finding exercises, particularly in terms of follow-up actions. On the contrary,
inquiries that do not receive this level of support are exposed to accusations
of ‘politicization’ with the concrete risk that their findings and recommenda-
tions may be undermined endangering the whole follow-up process. This is
has been especially the case of those inquiries established in relation to contexts
such as the OPT and Syria.
With specific regard to the OPT, probably the most interesting example is
represented by the experience of the 2009 UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza
Conflict. The Mission was established by the Human Rights Council amid the
opposition of the block of western countries.686 The one-sided character of
its original mandate and the choice of some of the commissioners attracted
severe criticism and the Mission was denied any form of cooperation and
access to the territory by Israel. Its final report contained a detailed set of
conclusions and recommendations addressing different actors including Israel,
the Palestinian authorities, the UN Human Rights Council, the UN Security
Council, the UN General Assembly, the ICC Prosecutor and the international
community as a whole.
In general, the Mission called for a more robust and effective intervention
in the conflict by the international community through a number of different
channels.
It referred to the 2005 World Summit Outcome document and the R2P
framework to reiterate the obligation of the international community to inter-
vene in case of perpetration of war crimes and crimes against humanity. In
this regard, the report noted how
‘after decades of sustained conflict, the level of threat to which both Palestinians
and Israelis are subjected has […] increased. […] The State of Israel is […] failing
to protect its own citizens by refusing to acknowledge the futility of resorting to
violent means and military power’.687
686 The HRC resolution establishing the Mission was passed with the negative vote of Canada
and the abstention of all EU member states. Human Rights Council, A/HRC/RES/S-9/1
(2009).




In this context, according to the Mission:
‘the international community has been largely silent and has to-date failed to act
to ensure the protection of the civilian population in the Gaza Strip and generally
the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Immediate action […] needs to be accompanied
by a firmer and principled stance by the international community on violations
of international humanitarian and human rights law and long delayed action to
end them. […] When the international community does not live up to its own legal
standards, the threat to the international rule of law is obvious and potentially far-
reaching in its consequences’.688
With regard to specific recommendations, the team led by Justice Goldstone
requested the Security Council to establish an independent committee of
experts charged to monitor the investigative efforts undertaken. In the absence
of progress at domestic level, the Mission, based on the precedent of Darfur,
urged the Council to refer the situation in Gaza to the ICC.689
Aware of the deadlock within the Council on issues concerning Israel and
the OPT, the report addressed also specific recommendations to the UN General
Assembly. In particular, in case of inaction of the Council on the matter, the
Assembly was invited to consider whether additional action within its powers
could be required in the interests of peace and justice, including under the
‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution.690 According to certain scholars, such a refer-
ence to the ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution ‘was one of the highest profile
references to the resolution, and the problem which it had sought to address
in many years’.691
Notwithstanding the fact that specific sections of the report immediately
attracted a certain amount of criticism both from a factual and legal perspect-
ive,692 the international community did react to the conclusions and recom-
mendations included therein. In this regard, certain authors expressed the view
that the report had ‘significant impact’ on the accountability efforts in the OPT,
while fairly contributing to illuminating the facts of what happened in
Gaza.693 In addition, according to one opinion,
688 Ibid para. 1713.
689 Ibid para. 1766.
690 Ibid para. 1768.
691 Kearney (n 323) 5.
692 For a critical view of the Gaza Mission’s report see Laurie R Blank, ‘Finding Facts But
Missing the Law: The Goldstone Report, Gaza and Lawfare’ (2011) 43 Cas. W. Res. J. Int’L.
L.; Bell (n 395).
693 Yihdego (n 372) 49; Wilkinson, Standards of Proof in International Humanitarian and
Human Rights Fact-Finding (n 149) 33.
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‘despite the controversies over the fairness of some methods used and some of
the impediments recorded, the Gaza Report was generally comprehensive and
attempted to be inclusive of all parties to the conflict and others’.694
The report was, in fact, endorsed by both the Human Rights Council and the
General Assembly, but not by the Security Council. In particular, the blessing
of the General Assembly was considered by certain scholars a success.695
While the track undertaken by the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) with
the declaration ex article 12(3) of the Rome Statute accepting the jurisdiction
of the ICC did not end successfully due to the controversial status of Palestine
as a State,696 a first important follow-up to the Mission’s recommendations
concerned the establishment by the UN Human Rights Council of a Committee
of Independent Experts (chaired by Ms. Mary McGowan Davis) tasked with
monitoring and assessing legal actions undertaken by Israeli and Palestinian
authorities to investigate alleged violations. Such move triggered somehow
a reaction by the affected parties. In particular, it was noted that Israel con-
ducted 400 command investigations in relation to Operation Cast Lead, and
52 criminal investigations of which three have led to prosecutions, in this way
‘suggesting that many of the concerns the Mission rose did indeed deserve
judicial scrutiny’.697 At the same time, the PNA established an ad hoc commis-
sion to investigate alleged violations of international law perpetrated during
the conflict. The so-called ‘Davis Committee’ released two reports in which,
although acknowledging Israel’s significant efforts and allocation of resources
for furthering the investigation process, it highlighted how there was no
indication that Israel had opened investigations into the actions of those who
designed, planned, ordered and oversaw Operation Cast Lead, while the Gaza
694 Yihdego (n 372) 19.
695 Yihdego (n 372) 53. In particular, according to the author, ‘the empowerment (and readiness)
of the UNGA to endorse or oversee a fact-finding mission with the purpose of probing
serious breaches of civilian immunity during armed conflict, particularly when the hands
of the UNSC are tied as a result of political division among its members, is of great im-
portance’.
696 After the Palestinian Minister of Justice, on 22 January 2009, lodged a declaration under
Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute accepting the jurisdiction of the ICC in Palestine starting
from 2002, the ICC Prosecutor decided to open a preliminary examination into the situation.
Such examination ended in April 2012 with the publication of an ‘update’ by the Office
of the Prosecutor (OTP) in which it was argued that the OTP could not proceed to open
an investigation due to controversies around the definition of Palestine as a ‘State’ under
international law. According to the OTP, such controversies fell outside the competence
of the ICC Prosecutor and should have been resolved by competent bodies within the United
Nations. ICC, ‘Situation in Palestine’ (4 April 2012) http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
C6162BBF-FEB9-4FAF-AFA9-836106D2694A/284387/SituationinPalestine030412ENG.pdf
accessed on 8 December 2016.
697 Wilkinson, Standards of Proof in International Humanitarian and Human Rights Fact-




de facto authorities had also not conducted relevant legal actions into the
launching of rockets and mortar attacks against Israel.698
On a separate development, on 1 April 2011, in an editorial written for
the Washington Post entitled ‘Reconsidering the Goldstone Report on Israel
and War Crimes’, the Mission’s Chair Richard Goldstone reconsidered the
work and findings of the UN Fact-finding Mission in light of Israel’s subsequent
disclosure of certain evidence, concluding that ‘If I had known then what I
know now, the Goldstone Report would have been a different document’.699
In particular, he adopted the following view:
‘although the Israeli evidence that has emerged since publication of our report
doesn’t negate the tragic loss of civilian life, I regret that our fact-finding mission
did not have such evidence explaining the circumstances in which we said civilians
in Gaza were targeted, because it probably would have influenced our findings
about intentionality and war crimes’.700
Such statement, despite being extrapolated from the context of an editorial
that otherwise commended the efforts and the results achieved by the Fact-
finding Mission, was used by certain actors to undermine the credibility and
fairness of the whole inquiry.701 This development induced the other mem-
bers of the Mission to release a statement in which they made clear that:
‘there is no justification for any demand or expectation for reconsideration of the
report as nothing of substance has appeared that would in any way change the
context, findings or conclusions of that report with respect to any of the parties
to the Gaza conflict. […] The report of the fact-finding mission contains the con-
clusions made after diligent, independent and objective consideration of the in-
698 ‘Report of the Committee of independent experts in international humanitarian and human
rights law established pursuant to Council resolution 13/9’, A/HRC/16/24 (18 March 2011)
para. 79.
699 Richard Goldstone, ‘Reconsidering the Goldstone Report on Israel and war crimes’ The
Washington Post (1 April 2011) http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/reconsidering-
the-goldstone-report-on-israel-and-war-crimes/2011/04/01/AFg111JC_story.html accessed
on 8 December 2016.
700 Ibid.
701 In particular, according to Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu it was time, after Goldstone
retraction, ‘to throw [the report] into the dustbin of history’. Consistently, the US Senate
unanimously passed a resolution calling on the UN ‘to reflect the author’s repudiation of
the Goldstone report’s central findings, rescind the report and reconsider further Council
actions with respect to its findings’. ‘PM: Throw Goldstone Report into dustbin of history’
The Jerusalem Post (2 April 2011) http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/PM-Throw-
Goldstone-Report-into-dustbin-of-history accessed on 8 December 2016; ‘US Senate Urges
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formation related to the events within our mandate, and careful assessment of its
reliability and credibility. We firmly stand by these conclusions’.702
In this regard, certain scholars have emphasized how
‘such an unfortunate but intriguing “rift” among Mission members raises not only
the issue of ensuring the impartiality and objectivity of a fact-finding mission before,
during and after publishing their report, but also the need for a clear UN procedure
by which subsequent concerns of members and those who are directly impacted
by a fact-finding report can be accommodated’.703
Regardless of the whether the report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission contained
substantial flaws, the whole experience has triggered an extremely polarized
debate, in which political and strategic interests have often overlooked technical
and legal assessments. This has indeed negatively affected the Fact-Finding
Mission’s legacy and follow-up process. However, despite the fact that neither
the General Assembly nor the Security Council undertook significant actions
in relation to the recommendations contained, the creation of the Davis Com-
mittee and the consequent reaction provoked at domestic level can be con-
sidered as important, albeit insufficient, steps. Thus, although no substantive
progress was made in terms of political action and accountability, a number
of meaningful albeit insufficient improvements can be highlighted, particularly
in light of the creation of the Davis Committee and the steps undertaken at
domestic level.
It can be argued that subsequent OPT investigations have drawn important
lessons learnt from the 2009 Fact-Finding Mission experience. In particular,
the HRC resolution establishing a commission of inquiry to investigate alleged
violations committed during the 2014 round of hostilities in Gaza contained
a much more even-handed and impartial language than its 2009 predecessor.
The Commission was in fact mandated to
‘investigate all violations of international humanitarian law and international human
rights law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, par-
ticularly in the occupied Gaza Strip, in the context of the military operations
conducted since 13 June 2014’
without referring solely to Israel.704
702 Hina Jilani – Christine Chinkin – Desmond Travers, ‘Goldstone Report: Statement issued
by members of UN mission on Gaza war’ The Guardian (11 April 2011) http://www.the
guardian.com/commentisfree/2011/apr/14/goldstone-report-statement-un-gazaaccessed
on 8 December 2016.
703 Yihdego (n 372) 48.




Furthermore, unlike the 2009 Mission, the investigate team abstained from
engaging in far reaching assessments and conclusions on the Israeli military
campaign’s overall scopes and objectives in the absence of information coming
from the Israeli side. This however did not prevent the Commission to reach
conclusions on the violations of IHL perpetrated by both sides of the conflict.
In this regard, the Commission’s report not only found that both sides had
been responsible for indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks against
civilians (some of them amounting to war crimes) but also it signalled how
many of the violations were the consequences of policies designed and imple-
mented at senior military and political level for which appropriate
accountability should be sought.
While it is soon to assess the effects produced by the 2014 Commission
of Inquiry particularly given the ICC’s recent involvement in the situation, it
is important to highlight how its final report has been endorsed by the HRC
with a resolution adopted with 41 votes in favour, including those of all EU
member states sitting on the Council.705 The unanimous support of EU mem-
ber states for the resolution represented an unprecedented move and can alone
be considered as an important improvement from the 2009 experience. Such
stance was accompanied by the inclusion, for the first time in the EU Council
Conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process, of language referring to compli-
ance with international law and accountability as cornerstones for peace and
security in the region.706
While such steps may be considered as positive developments particularly
if compared to the fragmented follow-up process to the 2009 Fact-Finding
Mission’s report, when it comes to assess the status of enforcement of inter-
national law in the OPT the picture remains bleak. Several international invest-
igations have been established since 2000 and yet to date the parties to the
conflict and international community have largely failed in their responsibility
to uphold and comply with their international law obligations.707 During
this period, the human rights situation has significantly deteriorated and the
humanitarian crises provoked by continuous rounds of conflicts and the
prolonged military occupation has deepened. In addition, negative trends such
as Israeli settlements expansion, displacement of civilians, de-facto annexation
policies and political splits among the Palestinian side have further diminished
meaningful prospects for peace.
Commissions of inquiry have not been immune from such a context and
have underlined the crucial role of accountability and international law compli-
705 Human Rights Council, A/HRC/29/L.35 (2015).
706 The European Council, ‘Council Conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process’, Press
Release 610/15 (20 July 2015) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/
2015/07/20-fac-mepp-conclusions/ accessed on 8 December 2016.
707 Alessandro Tonutti, ‘International Commissions of Inquiry and Palestine: Overview and
Impact – Study Analysis’ (2016) Al-Haq Center for Applied International Law.
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ance for addressing the root causes of the conflict and create a platform for
sustainable peace negotiations. In this regard, the 2014 Gaza Commission has
duly pointed out how the great majority of the recommendations formulated
by previous investigations still remain on paper. It is from this perspective
that one should consider its request to the Human Rights Council to conduct
a comprehensive review of the status of the implementation of the numerous
recommendations of past investigations and explore mechanisms to ensure
their compliance.708 The discussion around possible mechanisms to ensure
implementation of international inquiries’ reports is indeed as compelling as
fascinating and should not only be limited to the context of Israel and the OPT.
However, the question concerning which concrete avenues to explore in order
to set up such mechanism remains unanswered. In this regard the 2016 OHCHR
report on the status of implementation of recommendations contained in the
2009 and 2014 Gaza commissions’ reports should be considered as a first step,
which should form the basis for more concrete (and creative) actions at political
level.709
3.1.3.3 Supporting domestic and international justice mechanisms: the work of the
commissions of inquiry on Guinea, Georgia and Cote d’Ivoire
Other commissions have produced less impact than the Yugoslavia and Darfur
experiences in terms of stimulating positive steps by relevant stakeholders
within the international community. However, they have been able with their
findings to influence further responses at domestic and international level,
particularly in terms of criminal investigations. It has been already emphasized
in Chapter 2 the significant contribution provided by investigations such as
those concerning Georgia and Cote d’Ivoire on the subsequent ICC involvement
in those matters.
With regard to the situation in Guinea, it should be noted how, in accord-
ance with the recommendations of the UN Commission of Inquiry, on 8 Febru-
ary 2010 the Conakry Appeals Court General Prosecutor appointed three
Guinean investigative judges (hereinafter ‘panel of judges’) to conduct a
national investigation into the events of 28 September 2009. In this regard,
the ICC Prosecutor has noted how
‘over the reporting period, the panel of judges issued additional indictments against
high-level political and military officials […] including former Ministers at the time
of the events and the former Head of State, Moussa Dadis Camara, who was
interviewed and indicted in Burkina Faso. The indictment and arrest of a former
708 Report of the detailed findings of the independent commission of inquiry on Gaza (n 344)
para. 90.
709 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the implementation





member of the military for alleged acts of torture committed against demonstrators
detained in the weeks following the 28 September 2009 events is another important
step in the investigation of alleged crimes committed in military facilities’.710
In addition, the ICC opened a preliminary examination, which is still on going
pending a final assessment on admissibility in relation to the efforts undertaken
at domestic level. In particular, it should be noted how the ICC Prosecutor in
its preliminary examination report has referred to the conclusions reached
by the UNSG-mandated inquiry in relation to the events in the Conakry stadium
and the allegations of crimes against humanity.711
3.1.3.4 Raising alert and directing attention: the experience of commissions of inquiry
on North Korea and Eritrea
On a separate development, the commissions investigating violations in North
Korea and Eritrea merit further reflection. Those inquiries have been mandated
to look into long lasting regimes of systematic and institutionalised human
rights denial. Interestingly enough, these contexts have also been for long time
off the radar of the international community.
With regard to North Korea, the Commission of Inquiry created in March
2013 by the HRC handed in its final report on February 2014. It determined
how the North Korea regime was involved in widespread and systematic
violations including large scale enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions,
torture, summary executions and violations of freedom of expression, freedom
of movement and the right to food. The report also found out how many of
such violations were the result of a policy designed and implemented at the
highest level of the State chain of command and could be qualified as crimes
against humanity attracting individual accountability, including at Supreme
Leader level. In its conclusions, the inquiry expressed outrage and strong
condemnation for the perpetuation of a well-consolidated system of human
rights denial of such a magnitude. In particular, the report highlighted how
‘the gravity, scale and nature of these violations reveal a State that does not have
any parallel in the contemporary world […] a State that does not content itself with
ensuring the authoritarian rule of a small group of people, but seeks to dominate
every aspect of its citizens’ lives and terrorizes them from within’.712
710 ICC Prosecutor, ‘Report on Preliminary Examination Activities’ (13 December 2011) para.
114; ICC Prosecutor ‘Report on Preliminary Examination Activities’ (12 November 2015)
paras. 176, 177.
711 ICC Prosecutor, ‘2011 Report on Preliminary Examination Activities’ (n 710) paras. 107-113.
712 Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the situation of human rights in North Korea
(n 273) para. 80.
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In light of the grave and criminal nature of the violations, the report referred
to the R2P framework and underlined how
‘the international community must accept its responsibility to protect the people
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from crimes against humanity,
because the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has manifest-
ly failed to do so’.713
The report thus called the UN and the international community to take firm
action to ensure accountability given the unwillingness of the North Korean
regime to react, in particular by either requesting the UN Security Council to
impose targeted sanctions against those responsible for crimes against human-
ity or by referring the situation to the ICC.714
The North Korea’s inquiry experience should mainly be assessed from the
point of view of the type of response provoked (perspective one). In particular,
the work and findings of the Commission of Inquiry had indeed the merit
of placing the issue concerning the respect for human rights in North Korea
at the centre of the attention. So far, the international debate around North
Korea has been mainly focused on the threat for international peace and
security derived from the development of its arsenal of nuclear weapons. Thus,
for the first time international bodies were solicited to discuss the situation
in North Korea from the point of view of ‘internal’ human rights concerns.
The Commission’s report was endorsed by the Human Rights Council and
submitted by the General Assembly to the attention of the Security Council.
Furthermore, in March 2015 the Human Rights Council, acting through resolu-
tion A/HRC/28/L.18, formally requested the Security Council to refer the
situation to the ICC and to consider
‘the scope for effective targeted sanctions against those who appear to be most
responsible for acts that, according to the commission, may constitute crimes against
humanity’.715
It also noted
‘the decision of the Security Council to add the situation in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea to the list of issues of which the Council is seized [and] the
holding of an open Council meeting on 22 December 2014 during which the situ-
ation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was dis-
cussed’.716
713 Ibid para. 86.
714 Ibid para. 94.
715 Human Rights Council, A/HRC/28/L.18 (2015) para. 6.




Pending any decision of the Security Council on the matter, one year later,
the Human Rights Council, through a resolution which was passed without
a vote, decided to set up a group of experts tasked with finding practical ways
to hold rights violators in North Korea to account. Such new mechanism was
requested to
‘(a) explore appropriate approaches to seek accountability for human rights viola-
tions in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in particular where such
violations amount to crimes against humanity, as found by the commission of
inquiry; (b) to recommend practical mechanisms of accountability to secure truth
and justice for the victims of possible crimes against humanity in North Korea,
including the ICC’.717
It should also be highlighted that the OHCHR took steps, in line with the
Commission’s recommendation, towards establishing a field-based structure
in the Republic of Korea with the aim of strengthening its monitoring and
documentation efforts.718
While meaningful measures have yet to be taken by the international
community to reverse the trend of impunity and lack of accountability in North
Korea, the work of the Commission of Inquiry has had so far the merit to place
the human rights aspect of the crisis among the key priorities in discussions
held at international institutional level. In this light, it should highlighted the
recent decision by the US Government to place North Korean Supreme Leader
Kim Jong-un in a sanctions blacklist given his direct responsibility in a series
of severe human rights violations.719
A similar pattern can be detected in relation to the situation in Eritrea. The
Commission of Inquiry mandated in June 2014 by the HRC to assess the human
rights situation in the country, submitted its final report on June 2015. Based
on its findings that the Eritrean State was imposing a regime of severe human
rights violations and limitations, the Human Rights Council decided to extend
its mandate for a year and requested it to
‘investigate systematic, widespread and gross violations of human rights in Eritrea
with a view to ensuring full accountability, including where these violations may
amount to crimes against humanity’.720
Hence, in June 2016, the Commission handed over its second report in which
it determined how there were reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against
717 Human Rights Council, A/HRC/31/L.25 (2016) para. 11.
718 A/HRC/28/L.18 (n 715).
719 ‘Kim Jong-un placed on sanctions blacklist for the first time by the US’ The Guardian (6 July
2016) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/06/north-korea-kim-jong-sanctions-
blacklist accessed on 8 December 2016.
720 Human Rights Council, A/HRC/29/L.23 (2015) para. 10.
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humanity – including enslavement, imprisonment, enforced disappearance,
torture, other inhumane acts, persecution, rape and murder – had been com-
mitted in Eritrea since 1991.721
The report also recommended that the Security Council refer the situation
in Eritrea to the Prosecutor of the ICC for consideration, and that States Mem-
bers of the United Nations exercise their obligation to prosecute or extradite
any individual suspected of international crimes present on their territory.722
While it is too soon to assess the impact of the work of the Eritrea inquiry
in its broader sense, it should be underlined how the Human Rights Council
endorsed the Commission’s second report with resolution 32/24, reiterating
a number of its key recommendations particularly in terms of account-
ability.723
3.1.3.5 When the impact has been more marginal: the case of the Commission of
Inquiry on Libya
With regard to other commissions, the impact, looking at both perspectives,
has been less significant. In this regard, an interesting example is represented
by the 2011 Commission of Inquiry on Libya. The HRC resolution setting up
the investigation was adopted just one day before the decision by the UN
Security Council to refer the situation in Libya to the ICC.724 While the UNSC
expressly welcomed the decision by the HRC to dispatch the inquiry, it is
difficult to imagine how the work of the Commission effectively contributed
to subsequent actions undertaken by the international community, including
the ICC investigation. In this regard, it should be noted how the first arrest
warrants by the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in the Libya case were issued in con-
comitance with the submission of the Commission’s interim report. While the
time and character of the response may differ in each particular case, it is
important to emphasize how the R2P framework has generally placed commis-
sions of inquiries and fact-finding missions as tools to be employed at the
outset of the international community’s involvement, capable through their
findings and recommendations of inspiring further actions and progressive
responses by relevant international stakeholders. In this regard, with regard
to the Libya example certain authors have pointed out how
‘[i]t is […] questionable whether a concomitant commission of inquiry established
by the Human Rights Council working simultaneously as ICC investigators, may
721 2nd Report of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on Eritrea (n 315) paras.
59-95.
722 Ibid paras. 107-111.
723 Human Rights Council, ‘Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea welcomes
strong resolution on human rights in Eritrea’ (4 July 2016) http://www.ohchr.org/EN/News
Events/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20228&LangID=E accessed on 8 December 2016.




be appropriate unless it is clearly established which body or organ undertakes
which actions’.725
Thus, the fact that in the Libyan case the establishment of a commission of
inquiry was concomitant with other more robust steps adopted by the inter-
national community may well explain its marginal incidence on the broader
response.726
3.1.4 Conclusions and lessons learnt
In sum, when it comes to assess the impact of commissions of inquiry it is
difficult to reach ‘black and white’ conclusions. Impact should in fact be
measured from different perspectives, including capability of influencing
reforms and political reconciliation at national level, incidence of the inquiries’
recommendations on subsequent decisions adopted at international level and
degree of endorsement of their findings in following decisions, resolutions
and investigations. Indeed, the abovementioned examples reflect various
degrees of impact according to these different angles. Thus, an important
caveat is that when it comes to commissions of inquiry each case is often
influenced by unique dynamics, something that makes it extremely difficult
to engage in overall assessments and lessons learnt.
However, certain general trends can be highlighted. In particular, the
practice has shown how a strong and coherent support by the international
community during the entire commissions’ ‘life cycle’ can play an invaluable
role in positively affecting both their work and follow-up. This support should
encompass from one side the need to protect the investigations’ independence
and impartiality, shield them from possible accusations and entrust them with
adequate tools and resources. From the other it should ensure a smooth process
of translating commissions’ conclusions and recommendations into meaningful
debates at institutional level, which can open the gate for the adoption of
concrete responses. Equally, the development of an open and constructive
relation between the commissions and those states involved into the concerned
situations represents also a determinant factor in increasing the chances of
the inquiries’ success. Finally, appropriately placing commissions of inquiry
725 Frulli (n 178) 1333.
726 In this regard, it should be noted that the Libya case represents one of the rare examples
where the R2P paradigm has been expressly recalled by the UN Security Council in the
exercise of its functions to maintain and restore international peace and security. In par-
ticular, on 17 March 2011, the UNSC passed resolution 1973 in which it reiterated the
responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the civilian population in order to justify
the imposition of a no-fly-zone and the resort by Member States to ‘all necessary measures’
to protect civilians from the threat of attacks. See, UNSC Res. 1973 (2011).
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at the right moment of the international community’s response may be critical
in increasing their incidence in shaping further actions.
From this perspective, the previous analysis has revealed how examples
such the commissions appointed on former Yugoslavia and Darfur may be
considered as important ‘best practices’ from which to draw inspiration for
future experiences, both in terms of actions provoked (perspective one) and
contribution of their factual and legal analysis to subsequent determinations
(perspective two). Commissions such as those in Georgia and Cote d’Ivoire
have seen their findings reflected in subsequent criminal investigations
(perspective two), while the Commission of Inquiry on Guinea has stimulated
specific actions at domestic level (perspective one). Other inquiries, although
not leading to concrete responses, had the merit of placing long-lasting situ-
ations of human rights denial under the radar of international institutions
(perspective one). Finally, there have been cases – such as in the OPT, Syria
and Libya – where the work of international inquires has led to more divisions
than consensus and resulted only in palliative measures by the international
community. However, these examples had also the merit to trigger much-
needed substantial and operational debates and should stand as vivid lessons
learnt of the enormous challenges facing the international community’s
response to serious international law violations in the current set of circum-
stances.
3.2 THE MODERN ROLE OF COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY: AN APPRAISAL
3.2.1 Introduction
After having undertaken a comparative thematic analysis and appraised the
impact of a number of significant examples, it is now time to address the
question of what modern commissions of inquiry have become as a tool.
A first important remark concerns the fact that, while the regime of inter-
national inquiries has undergone a significant evolution since its first
conceptualization in the Hague Conventions, commissions have still preserved
their original function related to ascertaining facts and unveiling the truth with
regard to specific situations. Thus, the fact-finding component currently
remains pivotal in their work as well as in the expectations of mandating
bodies. In other words, what relevant actors of the international community
primarily expect from commissions of inquiry now as in the past is firstly to
clarify the facts and allegations in order to entrust them to make the most
suitable decisions in relation to a specific matter.
However, inquiries have evolved in a way that has progressively entrusted
them with a set of complex and multifaceted features that as no comparison
with their role as traditionally conceived and envisaged in their first codifica-




directions coming from mandating organs and the commissions’ own creativity
played a relevant role.
3.2.2 Evolution in the role of commissions of inquiry: main features
The first aspect of such an evolution is their escaping from states’ control.
Under The Hague Conventions commissions of inquiry had been designed
as a tool in the hands of states that could be activated in the preventive
diplomacy sphere with the aim of decreasing animosities and reaching a
peaceful settlement of their disputes. On the contrary, modern human rights
inquiries have been increasingly established without the consent and coopera-
tion of the affected countries. This has often implied that states have denounced
their findings and allegations as baseless. Such an important change should
be appreciated in the sense that the work of modern commissions of inquiry
does not serve uniquely affected states’ interests but calls into question the
role of the whole international community.
This new function is directly related to the second aspect of the commis-
sions’ evolution. Nowadays, commissions of inquiry do not limit themselves
to ascertain facts. They have become much more proactive in linking facts with
legal analysis in order to highlight violations of the relevant legal frameworks.
They have also started pointing out and identifying states’ failures and re-
sponsibilities at political, institutional and individual level in relation to the
events investigated. Finally, they have started addressing specific actors within
the international community in order to suggest concrete courses of actions
and follow-up measures to react to their findings. In other terms, international
inquiries have not only evolved into a tool that the international community
can rely upon for confronting certain situations where states have breached
their international obligations, but they have themselves become active
promoters in stimulating such a response by suggesting different directions.
In this regard, it can even be argued that modern commissions of inquiry
‘function as correction mechanisms’ to the inability of certain international
organs to respond effectively.727 As noted by van den Herik,
‘they would represent public opinion and have the de facto aim to express con-
demnation, to present a compelling conflict narrative so as to counter the Security
Council inaction or to elicit alternative involvement by the International Criminal
Court’.728
Such analysis renders even more compelling those questions related to which
legal value inquiries’ findings may possess. This is especially the case in those
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contexts where the enforcement of international law encounters serious
challenges derived from the inaction of political bodies and/or the impossibil-
ity of entrusting judicial bodies with jurisdiction.
3.2.3 The role of commissions of inquiry in modern international law: an
appraisal
It is thus possible to picture modern commissions of inquiry as a creature with
two heads. From one side they have preserved their nature as an independent
experts technical body not only in stating the facts but also in correctly inter-
preting and applying the law and contributing with their findings to the future
activities of law-enforcement bodies. However, this technical function does
no longer uniquely serve states’ interests but has often been put at disposal
of the international community to properly react to states’ failures. More in
particular, Frulli has emphasized how:
‘Commissions of inquiry […] could have great potential and they may be rapidly
deployed in situations where serious crimes are allegedly being committed and,
if adequately equipped, be capable of gathering information or helping preserve
evidence that could be valuable, at a later stage, to build a criminal case and that
could otherwise get lost before a proper criminal investigation is put in place’.729
Hence, from this perspective, international inquiries can be seen as playing
a significant role in the process aimed at consolidating the respect for inter-
national law and strengthening its compliance.
From the other side – and this is where modern commissions have signi-
ficantly departed from their traditional conceptualisations – human rights
inquiries play also a less technical and more ‘activist’ role in denouncing,
condemning, rising attention and provoking further action by the international
community vis-à-vis situations of concerns.730 In this regard, their use of
international law serves ulterior purposes than just technical assessments.
On this basis, it can be argued that
‘[modern] commissions of inquiry have [developed] an unmistakably public nature.
Their prime task seems to be raising awareness and mobilizing public opinion […]
and preparing a case for action’.
Therefore, they can be used ‘as advocacy tools with the main agenda being
to induce compliance or alternatively to provoke external action that will halt
on-going human rights violation’.731
729 Frulli (n 178) 1330.
730 Van den Herik (n 14) 536.




It is arguable whether this role may fit with the idea of commissions as
early-warning tools as firstly envisaged in Article 34 of the UN Charter and
further developed in the Agenda for Peace of former UN Secretary General
Boutros-Ghali and in the R2P framework.732 In reality, most of the modern
commissions of inquiry function as more denouncing rather than just early-
warning mechanisms given that the human rights emergencies that they
investigate are often protracted in time and that the nature of the responses
they inspire are reactive rather than pre-emptive. In this regard, van den Herik
has noted how
‘[the] inquiry is to a certain extent predisposed. The mere fact that a commission
is created by the Human Rights Council signals a perception that there are credible
allegations that human rights have been violated’.733
In sum, by combining the first (more technical) and the second (more political)
aspects together, it is possible to consider modern commissions of inquiry as
absolving the function of preliminary step in the international community’s
response to situations marked by grave IHL and IHRL violations aimed at
ensuring justice and accountability, restoring rule of law and, in so, achieving
and promoting peace.
3.2.4 The modern role of commissions of inquiry: which legitimacy?
However, it should be noted that such an evolution has been the result of a
process carried out in the absence of any regulation or conceptualisation
endorsed at institutional level. In other words, no general treaty or resolution
of the kind of The Hague Conventions or the 1991 UNGA Declaration on Fact-
Finding have been adopted to discipline the role assumed by human rights
inquiries in recent years.
Thus, the recent evolution should be connected primarily with the activity
of mandating bodies and with the practice of commissions of inquiry them-
selves. This has by time generated a number of criticisms, firstly in relation
to the lack of power in appointing these kind of inquiries and secondly with
regard to the failure in ensuring consistency among different experiences.734
732 ‘An Agenda for Peace; Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, Report of
the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the
Security Council on 31 January 1992’, UN Doc. A/47/277–S/24111 (17 June 1992).
733 Van den Herik (n 14) 536.
734 For example, in 2012 Frulli, while rewarding the experiences in former Yugoslavia and
Darfur, has acknowledged how unfortunately those commissions had not triggered the
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While the issue concerning the power of different international bodies in
establishing commissions of inquiry has been deeply analysed in Chapter 1
and II, with regard to the lack of guidelines and standardisation, a number
of important recent developments should be highlighted. In particular, the
OHCHR has set up a ‘Methodology Education and Training Unit’ (MET) and
a ‘Rapid Response Unit’ with the purpose of assessing lessons learnt, develop-
ing guidelines and setting up a framework capable of adequately and promptly
assisting in future responses involving human rights inquires.735 As it has
been already underlined in Chapter 1, this process has led to the publication
by the OHCHR of the 2015 ‘Guidance and Practice of commissions of inquiry
and fact-finding missions on international human rights and humanitarian
law’, which provides policy, methodological, legal and operational guidance
on the work of commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions.736
Indeed, even such recent developments have not received any formal
approval at State level nor does it appear probable that they will translate into
a treaty or a declaration approved by political organs within the United
Nations. Hence, the recent evolution undergone by commissions of inquiry
has, for the time being, not been formally endorsed and acknowledgment at
institutional level. However, it has led to a consolidated and well-settled
practice that has so far encountered no formal opposition and the acquiescence
of the great majority of states and international organisations. From this
perspective, it should thus be accepted and assessed.
Looking again at the nature of the evolution undertaken by modern human
rights inquiries, one may even wonder whether it is still possible to define
them under the label of ‘commissions of inquiry’. Regardless of what can be
the possible answer, it is undeniable how commissions of inquiry have reached
a new dimension. While this evolution still lacks solid basis in terms of insti-
tutional backing, such a new prototype appears more mindful of the modern
setting in which commissions are operating, particularly looking at the primary
importance of respecting human rights at international level (and at the array
of mechanisms available to respond to human rights emergencies) and at the
need to stimulate responses in a context marked by an increasing lack of
accountability and disrespect for the rule of law.
735 Grace and Bruderlein (n 1). In relation to the work of the MET, certain concerns have been
raised by practitioners with regard to the quality of the trainings delivered. Wilkinson,
Finding the facts (n 296) 25.





In conclusion, modern commissions of inquiry can be considered both a fact-
finding tool and a first step in the international community’s response to
ensure accountability for grave violations of international law.
Indeed, the fact that such evolution has so far lacked legal and
institutionalised basis goes against a rigid and crystallised categorization of
commissions of inquiry in one direction. At the same time, the practice has
shown how their potential looking at the broader framework of the inter-
national community’s response cannot and should not be underestimated.
On this basis, one additional question emerges: is it time to institutionalise
such a role? The conservative reaction by a number of states to certain commis-
sions of inquiry’s experiences coupled with the intense debate generated among
legal scholars on the risks and opportunities inherent to such an evolution
are indicative of the fact that consensus has not yet been reached over a shared
definition and conceptualisation of a new paradigm of commissions of inquiry.
However, experiences on the ground have more consistently driven us towards
the creation of such specific model. The practice developed so far with all its
inconsistencies should thus be considered as the starting point for all future
discussions.
Hence, rather than focusing on the absence of an institutionalised frame-
work, the first step should be to address the inconsistencies of the current
practice, including the lack of harmonization and coherency between different
experiences. In other terms, the need to shed more clarity over a number of
aspects and address inconsistencies resulting from the current practice should
be seen as priorities in the process aimed at the legitimization and consolida-
tion of the role of modern commissions of inquiry. This may help the framing
of a coherent model of commissions that would be more consistently and
increasingly referred in future responses. Therefore, the process of consolida-
tion of inquiries in their modern conceptualisation necessarily requires a
thorough assessment of the present gaps and inconsistencies. This is why the
next sub-chapter will provide an analysis of some of the main challenges and
gaps facing modern commissions of inquiry and suggest possible avenues to
properly address them.
3.3 MODERN COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY: BETWEEN CHALLENGES, LESSONS
LEARNT AND WAY FORWARD
Through the analysis undertaken in the present study it is now possible to
highlight a number of substantial challenges and lessons learnt from the
experience of modern commissions of inquiry.
These challenges relate to the role of commissions both as technical bodies
and as early warning triggers of further responses by the international com-
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munity. The challenges identified in the present sub-chapter pertain to the
following macro areas:
1 Lack of institutionalisation and controversies around the definition and
boundaries of commissions of inquiry;
2 The cohabitation of political and technical interests that risk to produce
short circuits within the commissions’ own life cycle;
3 Challenges related to the current interaction of commissions of inquiry
with the work of international tribunals.
3.3.1 Challenge 1: lack of institutionalisation, guidelines, harmonisation and
controversies around commissions of inquiry’s nature and discipline
Such issue has been extensively debated in the course of this dissertation. The
model of modern commissions of inquiry, if any, has mainly been shaped
through practice and in the absence of an institutionalised framework designed
by relevant political decision-makers. Furthermore, until recently no meaning-
ful steps have been taken to consistently draw lessons through the adoption
of guidelines that can help standardising the work of commissions and, in
so, enhancing their coherency.
It is important to emphasize as a preliminary remark that commissions
of inquiry are mandated to investigate situations that are often unique in their
character and difficult to group together under a common denominator. Such
assumption is reflected in the idea that considers commissions as ad hoc tools
to respond to ad hoc situations of crises. This however does not necessarily
render the need of harmonization futile. Harmonization between different
practices does not mean that commissions should work uniformly or under
a one-model-fits-all framework. On the contrary, the fundamental rule under
which each commission operates is its mandate, which should be framed
according to the peculiarities of the situation under investigation. However,
it is undeniable (and the practice analysed in this dissertation has provided
numerous examples) that fact-finding bodies are often confronted with similar
dilemmas, such as in the way to assess the credibility of evidence, the standard
of proof to apply and the manner in which to proceed in case national author-
ities are not cooperative or access to affected location is not granted. In this
regard, the fact that commissions have started increasingly to apply the model
set by previous experiences in areas such as standard of proof or in relation
to the findings concerning the perpetration of international crimes is indicative
of the need for guidelines and lessons learnt. Developing lessons learnt with
the aim of tending towards an harmonized practice in a number of key
thematic areas does not necessarily mean that commissions should operate
in a manner that detaches them from the unique dynamics of the situation
under investigation. It does mean that when a particular issue arises, commis-




established standards if they consider them as pertinently applicable to their
case. On the contrary, the absence of guidelines and lessons learnt may risk
in the long run to undermine the commissions’ legitimacy and negatively
impact the record of compliance with their findings.
In this regard more clarity is needed in defining roles and responsibilities
throughout the whole ‘life cycle’ of commissions of inquiry.
Such life cycle can be dissected into three main phases, namely: a) the
commission’s establishment phase; b) the commission’s work and reporting
phase; and c) the commission’s follow up phase.
With regard to the commissions’ establishment phase, a first sign of frag-
mentation concerns their proper identification. Today in fact international
investigations on human rights/IHL violations can take many forms. They can
be performed through the establishment of a commission of inquiry, a fact-
finding mission, a UN field mission’s report or, as it has been more increasingly
the case in recent times, through an OHCHR investigation. Although there have
been some attempts to assess and clarify the meaning of such different labels,
there seems to be a lack of transparency over the meaning and purposes of
each of these forms of international inquiries.737
Furthermore, several bodies have been involved in the setting up of fact-
finding mechanisms in the IHRL/IHL sphere. The UN Security Council, the
General Assembly, the Secretary General, the Commission on Human Rights
and, more recently, the Human Rights Council have been all active promoters
in such a process. This is without mentioning the role exercised by regional
bodies. While not disputing the fact that each of these bodies possesses the
competence to establish international investigations, the consequences of such
pluralistic approach in the absence of a coherent underpinning framework
should be assessed. According to Grace and Bruderlein:
‘[o]n the one hand, the multiplicity of [commissions of inquiry] mandating bodies
– including international, regional, and national entities – is beneficial, providing
political actors with various venues for reaching consensus around initiating
[commissions of inquiry] mechanisms. On the other hand, institutional barriers
have fragmented the [commissions of inquiry] community, hindering the develop-
ment of adequate guidelines, training opportunities, and rosters of qualified and
available [commissions of inquiry] leaders and investigators’.738
Hence, in relation to the commissions of inquiry’s establishing phase more
clarity is required. In particular, while it may be neither feasible nor useful
to ‘centralise’ and concentrate the power of setting up inquiries to one specific
737 In this regard, it should be noted how the OHCHR website groups commissions of inquiry,
fact-finding missions and OHCHR investigations under the same domain. See, in particular,
OHCHR website at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/COIs.aspx accessed
on 8 December 2016.
738 Grace and Bruderlein (n 1) 2.
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body, a more structured division of roles among different organs may enhance
the consistency and fairness of the whole fact-finding exercise. In particular,
certain bodies may retain the power to appoint commissions to investigate
into matters that pertain to the specific ambits of their operations and in so
far better coordinate responses. In this regard, the concurrent appointment
by the UN Secretary General and the UN HRC of two independent inquiries
on the Gaza flotilla incident should draw important lessons for the future.
Although the two inquiries were set up with significantly different mandates,
the fact that they reached opposite conclusions on certain important matters
(such as the legality of the Israeli blockade) may expose the risks hidden
behind such lack of coordination.739
For example, certain authors have implicitly argued that HRC-appointed
inquiries may better focus uniquely on investigating international human rights
law violations rather than looking at situations of armed conflict and breach
of the peace that may better fall under the more authoritative mandate of the
UNSC.740 While – as it has been already underlined in previous chapters –
limiting the competence of the HRC in such a manner may not represent the
most appropriate solution, it is undeniable that a more clear understanding
of the roles played by different bodies involved in the establishment of inde-
pendent inquiries may contribute to the commissions’ own legitimacy, in this
way increasing their effectiveness and chances of success.
In relation to the central phase concerning the commissions’ work and
reporting, a more robust and comprehensive set of guidelines and lessons
learnt is pivotal in order to mitigate the numerous challenges currently faced
by these investigations.741 Such guidance is needed both for investigators
at a more procedural and methodological level and for commissioners at higher
reporting level. In this regard it should be noted how the implementation phase
represents the stage in the life cycle where commissions may play a protagonist
role as their dependency from the decisions of political organs is less acute.
Thus, the need to enhance and safeguard their impartiality and independence
and strengthen the credibility and fairness of the fact-finding process should
be seen as priorities. Only in this manner can the commissions’ own legitimacy
and consequent final success be secured. According to certain authors, by
ensuring that the commissions’ impartiality, independence and credibility are
guaranteed it would be possible
‘to insulate [their] implementation phase – in which investigators undertake tech-
nical data gathering and analysis – from the initial mandate-drafting phase – in
739 Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry (n 339) paras. 69-82; Report of the
international fact-finding mission to investigate violations of international law resulting
from the Israeli attacks on the flotilla (n 272) paras. 51-54.
740 Frulli (n 178) 1334.




which political actors agree to create a […] mission and decide on the mission’s
broad contours’.742
Safeguarding these principles means also ensuring a clear-cut separation of
roles, responsibilities and clarifying the hierarchical relationships existing
between the different components within the inquiry mechanism.743 In parti-
cular, the relationship between the external commissioners and the Secretariat
(including the team of investigators) put at disposal by the OHCHR should be
the object of a careful assessment of past performances in order draw lessons
learnt and stimulate the provision of guidelines for the future. Furthermore,
the use and selection of the different (technical, financial, human, logistic)
resources available (especially given the recurrent time and resources con-
straints that commissions are facing) should always follow a careful needs-
assessment discussion among relevant stakeholders involved.
As already noted above, significant steps have been recently adopted by
the OHCHR in this direction. Furthermore organisations such as the Institute
for International Criminal Investigations and Justice Rapid Response have been
increasingly supporting the development of best practices related to the invest-
igations phase, by providing training courses and setting up roster of experts
to be deployed on occasion to support the work of commissions of inquiry.744
However, many remaining gaps need to be filled in order to adequately
tackle the fragmentation and lack of harmonisation in the commissions’ central
phase. In this regard, a determination coming from an authoritative body
would be highly beneficial. In particular, based on the precedent of the 1970
UNSG Model Rules, a set of guidelines regulating the main procedural features
742 Ibid 3.
743 Wilkinson (n 296) 23-24.
744 Justice Rapid Response (JRR) is an association that works as professional service provider
to entities that have the jurisdiction or mandate to investigate, fact-find or carry out inquiries
wherever mass atrocities may have occurred. In particular, the idea behind the set up of
Justice Rapid Response is that of providing adequate resources to entrust international
bodies to conduct prompt investigations immediately after a situation of conflict or human
rights violations took place. JRR developed a module to train in a ‘standardised manner’
investigators and experts to be included in a roster where states, international organisations,
international tribunals and commissions of inquiry can refer to. JRR has so far contributed
to a number of international commissions of inquiry included, inter alia, those on Guinea,
Cote d’Ivoire, Libya, Syria and North Korea. For more information, visit the Justice Rapid
Response website at http://www.justicerapidresponse.org/ accessed on 8 December 2016.
The Institute for International Criminal Investigations ‘is an independent, not-for-profit,
non-governmental international organization constituted for the purpose of providing
criminal justice and human rights professionals with training in the techniques and know-
ledge necessary to impartially investigate and adjudicate egregious human rights violations,
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, and for the purpose of quickly deploy-
ing multi-disciplinary teams to investigate such violations or crimes’. For more information,
visit the Institute’s website at http://www.iici.info/ accessed on 8 December 2016.
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inherent to the modern model of commissions of inquiry may shed clarity
and in so help harmonising future practices.
Finally, with regard to the third ‘follow up’ phase, it is now time to explore
the possibility of setting up compliance mechanisms within the framework
of each mandating organs. Whether this would translate into concrete obliga-
tions and commitments for states to comply with the recommendations of
commissions of inquiry will probably depend by the coercive powers exercised
by each body, but the design of pre-determined mechanisms to monitor
compliance records and ensure a time-bound implementation will definitely
strengthen the effectiveness, and as a result increase the chances of replication,
of these fact-finding exercises. In this regard, it is worth mentioning again the
recommendation by the 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry on the Gaza Conflict
to the Human Rights Council to consider conducting a comprehensive review
of the implementation of the recommendations contained in previous commis-
sions of inquiry and fact-finding missions’ reports and explore mechanisms
to ensure their implementation.745 The mapping exercise subsequently under-
taken by the OHCHR should be considered as an important starting point but
more significant action and a greater degree of political commitment are
required in order to seriously advance a process that can lead to the design
and implementation of a compliance mechanism.746
3.3.2 Challenge 2: interplay of political and technical dimensions in the
commissions of inquiry’s life cycle: the risk to produce short circuits
The definition of the life cycle of commissions of inquiry in three phases allows
us to appreciate the interplay between political and technical actors and their
related dimensions.
In particular, phase one related to the inquiries’ establishment is heavily
influenced by the work and determinations of political actors. The main actor
in this phase is indeed the mandating body. The political dimension is mainly
reflected in the way the mandate of commissions can be shaped and in the
capability of attiring the necessary consensus among states. It can also affect
the choice of the commissioners and the time, financial and technical resources
devoted to perform the fact-finding task.
It has been already emphasized how unilateral mandates or mandates that
already imply specific conclusions over the facts alleged may expose commis-
sions to accusations of politicisation, exacerbate divisions among states and
thus turn counterproductive. The identification of individuals to serve as
commissioners represents also an extremely delicate passage as the choice of
personalities that may be perceived as not impartial or not qualified enough
745 Report of the independent commission of inquiry (n 344) para. 90.




in relation to the specific context can undermine the legitimacy of the whole
fact-finding exercise. Furthermore, the appointment of people holding UN
positions directly liked to the country under investigation (such as UN country
or thematic rapporteurs) is also a trend that merits further reflection, including
an assessment study balancing its positive and negative implications. Also,
inadequate financial and human resources as well as technological and
logistical support can negatively affect the work of the commissions along
with the imposition of strict time constraint.
With regard to phase two, the work and reporting stage is apparently the
moment where the more technical and impartial assessment of commissions
as independent bodies can prevail. However, even during this phase commis-
sions of inquiry are not immune from political considerations. Firstly, lack
of cooperation and access to the territory from affected states and non-state
actors may seriously jeopardise the collection of information and evidence
and expose the inquiries’ findings to criticism, as they might not wholly reflect
the situation existing on the ground. Sometimes, the impossibility for commis-
sions to reach certain areas also depends from the security situation on the
ground, as it has been the case for the investigations in Libya and Central
African Republic. In light of that, a strong and unequivocal support of the
international community becomes paramount either in pressuring the con-
cerned countries or in empowering the commissions to gather evidence through
alternative avenues. At the same time inquiries shall as much as possible
develop an open and constructive dialogue with the main actors concerned
and exercise a high level of caution in reaching specific findings in the absence
of relevant information coming from the main parties involved. Secondly, for
the sake of the credibility and fairness of the whole fact-finding exercise,
commissioners should be adequately equipped to conduct their investigation
in a thorough and comprehensive manner. It thus becomes extremely important
to place an adequate level and quality of resources at disposal of the commis-
sions as well as to ensure a fair and transparent definition of roles and respons-
ibilities in the relationship between commissioners (who act as experts that
are independent and external to the UN machinery) and the OHCHR secretariat
(which, although put at disposal of the commissioners still responds to the
OHCHR hierarchical structure).
Finally, with the endorsement of the commissions’ reports political actors
return to play a critical role in ensuring adequate follow-up to the findings
and conclusions reached by the inquiries. Thus, phase three can be linked back
to phase one as being characterised by a strong political dimension.
The study analysis conducted in this dissertation has revealed how dis-
connection and lack of coordination between the actors involved in the three
phases may seriously jeopardise the commissions’ work, legitimacy and
chances of success. Indeed, politicization of commissions and their work on
one hand and lack of political will in entrusting them with adequate resources
and ensuring serious follow-up mechanisms on the other may create short
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circuits that can irreversibly undermine the whole commissions’ life cycle. It
thus seem from a certain perspective that great responsibility should be placed
on political actors and mandating organs in preserving the commissions’
legitimacy and success by protecting their independence and impartiality and
ensuring meaningful support and compliance.
At the same time, much can be done by commissions of inquiry themselves.
Numerous examples have shown how commissions have demonstrated the
tendency to correct and amend certain distortions related to their establishment
phase and to partially overcome the obstacles represented by the lack of
cooperation and access from affected states. A remarkable example is repres-
ented by the 2009 UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, which has
pushed for an amendment of its unilateral mandate and has made sure in its
analysis to adequately portray the Israeli views of the events despite the lack
of cooperation from the Israeli authorities. The fact that the Human Rights
Council in establishing a second Gaza investigation in 2014 has taken stock
of past experiences by resorting to a more neutral terminology in the mandate
shows the potential of independent inquiries in affecting the political spheres
within their own life cycle.
Furthermore, commissions can ensure, through an open and transparent
dialogue, the cooperation and trust of the affected states. Even in those cases
where formal channels of cooperation would prove unavailable, working
through informal and indirect forms of dialogue may still result precious both
in terms of evidence gathering and legitimacy of the whole exercise. An
interesting example is represented by the Commission of Inquiry on the
situation of human rights in Eritrea. Despite receiving no formal cooperation
and access from the Government of Eritrea, the Commission met with the
Permanent and Deputy Permanent Representatives of the Permanent Mission
of Eritrea to the United Nations, while its Secretariat at the opportunity to
hold an exchange of views with the Presidential Adviser and Head of Political
Affairs of the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice.747 The Commission
duly noted the pro-government’s criticism and submissions filed against its
first report and thoroughly screened and rebutted such arguments in its second
report, in this way carrying out an indirect exchange of views with the Eritrean
authorities on issues of merit, which has undoubtedly enhanced the credibility
and authoritativeness of its findings.748
Finally, in relation to their ‘denouncing’ and ‘evoking action’ roles, commis-
sions should be always mindful of the great value attached to their conclusions
and recommendations. Particularly looking at the low level of compliance
emerging from the practice, this requires future commissions to be both prag-
matic and creative in ensuring that their work can produce meaningful follow-
747 2nd Report, detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in Eritrea (n 315)
para. 4.




up at both domestic and international level. Indeed, the manner in which to
frame and identify recommendations should depend on each singular case.
For example, high-sounding and ground-breaking recommendations can well
serve the inquiries’ provoking and denouncing functions in certain situations
but undermine any prospect to ensure a meaningful follow-up in other more
delicate contexts, while more modest but tailored suggestions may lead to
substantial improvements particularly at the level of national reforms and
domestic accountability.
In conclusion, while it is true that commissions still fundamentally rely
upon the good will of political actors in phases one and three, through their
work and the methodology adopted in phase two they can still significantly
affect the records of both their establishment and follow-up stages.
3.3.3 Challenge 3: the interaction of commissions of inquiry with inter-
national tribunals
It is unanimously accepted that commissions of inquiry are not adjudicatory
bodies. They do not apply the same standard of proof, they do not possess
the same instruments, they do not employ the same procedural structure and
apply the guarantees of judicial bodies.
At the same time, it has been emphasized how commissions of inquiry
have for various reasons increasingly resorted to international criminal law
paradigms, including by making findings on the criminal responsibility of
individuals.
It has also been analysed how findings (both factual and legal) and evid-
ence collected by commissions of inquiry have been often significantly relied
upon by international criminal tribunals, particularly by prosecutors in the
preliminary phases of their investigations. At the same time some experts have
raised concerns on the partial and selective approach to international criminal
law by commissions of inquiry and the possibility to resort to their findings
has been considered more difficult in more advanced stages of the proceed-
ings.749 In this regard, according to Darcy
‘while the reports of contemporary commissions are frequently described as author-
itative, international courts have been quite conservative when it comes to relying
upon their findings’.750
749 In particular, it has been pointed out how ‘no immediate precedential value should be
attached to detailed legal findings of commissions of inquiry. [...] legal findings and inter-
pretations from commissions of inquiry can only be transposed to the context of a criminal
trial with a certain care and diligence’. van den Herik and Harwood (n 154) 2-3, 16.
750 Darcy (n 44) 3.
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The author notes how
‘Judge Ušacka of the International Criminal Court commented that the legal con-
clusions of such commissions “may be relevant only by analogy”, in the same way
that the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals “is not directly applicable before this
Court without ‘detailed analysis’”’.751
Taking into account these caveats, a number of conclusions and suggestions
for improving future performances can be made.
Firstly, it should be noted that, while the commissions’ more substantial
involvement in the applicability of international criminal law is now a fact,
such a debate has not yet attired institutional attention. In particular, any
discussion so far regarding the value of commissions’ findings in the area of
ICL and their potential coordination with international criminal tribunal has
remained confined to practitioners and scholars’ contributions. Hence, after
the encouraging experience of the UNWCC in the 1940s, no further attempt has
been made to institutionally improve coordination between the work of inquiry
and adjudicative bodies involved in potential criminal investigations. In this
regard it should be warned that in the absence of any guidance regulating
such coordination, a futile competition in securing accountability risks to
prevail over a fruitful cooperation and separation of roles.
It is a fact that commissions of inquiry (at least in their modern concept-
ualization) and international tribunals are bodies that belong to different and
separate institutional frameworks so any discussion about institutionalising
their coordination would not conform to reality. However, this does not mean
that there have not been examples of direct and indirect coordination between
the two actors and that this coordination cannot be improved.
Although we have seen that international investigations can be more
beneficial to criminal justice mechanisms if they operate at the outset of the
international community response and before international tribunals take the
lead, there have been many cases in which commissions and tribunals where
concurrently involved and even coordinated their activities. These exchanges
should be, where possible, encouraged.
In particular, leaving aside the prominent example of the Yugoslavia
Commission and the ICTY highlighted above, more recently the investigations
on Libya and CAR have, in the course of their activities, held consultations
and exchanged information with the Prosecutor of the ICC.752 These inter-
751 Ibid. See also ICC, Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for
a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, (Pre-Trial Chamber I) (Separate
and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Ušacka) Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09 (4
March 2009) para. 6.
752 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry into Libya (n 202) para. 18; Report of





actions, albeit on ad hoc basis, are nonetheless important where commissions
of inquiry and the ICC are simultaneously involved in a given context. This
is even more important in those situations, like in the case of former Yugo-
slavia and Sudan, where commissions of inquiry are deployed immediately
after certain events took place and granted access to fresh evidence, which
may not be available at a later stage when criminal justice mechanisms take
the lead. In this regard, awareness by each actor of its role in the broader
response and coordination with other key stakeholders involved in the process
represent pivotal ingredients for the effectiveness and success of the overall
performance of the international community.
It is a fact that modern inquiries have been increasingly resorting to inter-
national criminal law. Not only they have been applying international criminal
law paradigms but they have also been explicitly tasked to highlight respons-
ibilities and identify individuals responsible. These new powers, whether or
not they have been wisely conferred,753 come with new responsibilities. In
particular, commissions of inquiry should show greater transparency in consist-
ently and meticulously outlining their standards of proof and explaining the
methodology they have applied in order to collect and assess sources and
evidence. This includes also those procedures eventually developed to test
the reliability of different sources, to protect confidentially and ensure the
safety of witnesses and victims.
In this regard, the fact that commissions have (or not) availed themselves
of the expertise of specific human resources and of the use of certain techniques
should be clearly spelled out in the methodology section of their reports. For
example, commissions of inquiry have increasingly resorted to the experts
included in the roster of the JRR association. Indeed, the trainings that are
provided by JRR are focused on criminal investigations over contexts where
international crimes are committed. Hence, those experts that are trained by
JRR and seconded to commissions of inquiry are formed on the basis of the
standards applied in criminal proceedings. If it has been the case, this aspect
should be duly emphasized in the final report of commissions of inquiry as
a criminal prosecutor or a court of law may more easily rely upon evidence
collected by a criminal investigator rather than by a ‘mere’ human rights
expert.
Furthermore, although it has been argued in this dissertation that even
a selective application of international criminal law by commissions of inquiry
may benefit the course of criminal proceedings, an effort should be required
for commissions of inquiry in order to adequately investigate all aspects related
to the perpetration of international crimes. It means not only to address the
753 On the feasibility of empowering commissions with the task of identifying individuals
responsible for international crimes see Carsten Stahn and Catherine Harwood, ‘What’s
the Point of ‘Naming Names’ in International Inquiry? Counseling Caution in the Turn
Towards Individual Responsibility’ EJIL Talk! (11 November 2016).
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facts and circumstances related to the criminal offence and the contextual
element but also to properly link the commission of the crime with the respons-
ibility of a given individual. In this regard, commissions of inquiry should
more consistently analyse and assess modes of responsibility particularly when
tasked in their mandate to identify individuals allegedly responsible.
Commission should then exercise an high degree of caution in managing
incriminating evidence and in engaging in the naming and shaming of indi-
viduals in the absence of an adversarial procedure that takes into adequate
account the rights and guarantees of the defendants. In this regard, an
approach that respects the confidentiality of such information should generally
be preferred to ‘public naming and shaming’.
Finally, as an alternative to the delicate and challenging process of naming
individuals, commissions may explore the usefulness of investigating other
forms of responsibilities. As it has been already emphasized in Chapter 2, these
responsibilities (including those of organs, institutions and groups) may be
more feasible for inquiries to highlight while still empowering relevant actors
within the international community to take the appropriate actions. In addition
such evidence – together with indications concerning contextual elements of
the crimes or the identification of patterns of violations or specific incidents
that may attire attention for their criminal implications – can still provide an
enormous contribution in tailoring and narrowing the focus of the activities
subsequently carried out by criminal tribunals.
In sum, more transparency in the methodology and procedures employed
and a greater level of consistency in the application of international criminal
law paradigms can give findings of commissions of inquiry more appeal in
front of international tribunals and induce criminal prosecutors and judges
to resort more safely to their reports as authoritative secondary sources.
Especially in those contexts where they lack access to the territory and possibil-
ity to gather first-hand fresh evidence, the actors involved in criminal proceed-
ings may in fact be more inclined to resort to findings and evidence that have
been collected with the mind of a criminal investigator that conform to specific
standards, procedures and guarantees.
However, it should be recalled that the identification of responsibilities
for the commission of international crimes represent just one of the tasks
assigned to modern commissions of inquiry and the need to develop ‘crim-
inally-oriented’ procedures and practices should be compromised with the
other functions and duties that these investigations have to absolve. In other
terms, reducing modern human rights inquiries to preliminary-investigations
supporting bodies would firstly not fit with the nature of such bodies and
secondly unduly limit their scope and frustrate their potential as a tool within
the broader international community response. Hence, while further
coordination and procedural efforts are required in order to improve the
records of interaction between commissions of inquiry and international









This research has analysed the role played by independent international
inquiries with an emphasis on those mechanisms mandated to investigate so-
called ‘atrocities’, namely situations of gross and systematic violations of
international humanitarian and human rights law.
Through a historical overview it was shown how such role has significantly
evolved and how the underlying causes of the exponential proliferation of
human rights mandated international commissions of inquiry witnessed in
recent years have progressively led to a model whose features differ significant-
ly from the inquiry paradigm as conceptualised at the beginning of the 20th
Century.
While the fact-finding aspect has substantially remained unaltered, this
study has demonstrated how commissions have been increasingly empowered
with law-applying functions. On the one hand, such a trend has opened the
discussion – debated in the course of the comparative thematic analysis –
concerning the use made by commissions of inquiry of the relevant legal
frameworks and their contribution to the development and consolidation of
international law. On the other hand, it has raised important questions on the
value of the legal findings of inquiry bodies particularly if compared with
the function exercised by adjudicative organs such as courts and tribunals.
The use of international criminal law by commissions of inquiry and their
contribution (both factual and legal) to efforts aimed at ensuring criminal
accountability represent also matters that have extensively been investigated
in the course of this research.
However, such issues undoubtedly present wider ramifications and in-
evitably call into question what are the main goals and purposes of modern
fact-finding exercises. This dissertation has in fact demonstrated how modern
human rights inquiries can no longer be conceived, as they were traditionally,
as mere preventive diplomacy tools in the hands of states to appropriately
settle their international disputes. These mechanisms seem also to differ from
the model envisaged in the R2P framework, where fact-finding was considered
as an early-warning tool in the hands of the international community to
prevent further escalations of crises. Practice has shown how such investiga-
tions have become at times more involved in condemning rather than prevent-
ing, in provoking action (and often outrage) in front of situations of protracted
human rights violations rather than in de-escalating tensions. In particular




mechanism to the failures of the international community to react rather than
as a trigger of further action. This may indeed raise some questions concerning
which kind of accountability and enforcement inquiries can bring as an end
in themselves in light of the failure of enforcement bodies, such as the UN
Security Council or the International Criminal Court, to act.
Hence, this study has recognised two main functions of modern inquiry
commissions as preliminary step in the international community’s response
to atrocities. The first, more ‘activist’ and ‘political’, is to provoke further
measures and actions by relevant local and international stakeholders or to
denounce a particular crises in light of the failure of the international commun-
ity to react. The second, more technical, is to influence with their findings and
analysis further determinations by local and international institutional actors,
particularly in the legal and judicial spheres.
It has also been emphasized that this evolution in the role of international
inquiries has taken place without any formal institutional backing. This has
stimulated a fascinating debate among scholars on the challenges and oppor-
tunities of such a transformation. This study has not taken a particular position
on whether this new model of inquiry commissions is itself legitimate or
whether certain institutional rubber-stamp would be necessary. It has noted
how this evolution has led to a well-established practice that, as such, needs
to be accepted and improved.
Indeed, what this dissertation has attempted to do – through the comparat-
ive thematic analysis and by assessing the impact of a number of landmark
inquiry experiences – is to identify a number of key gaps and challenges
(mainly related to the lack of harmonization and the interplay of different
political interests in the course of the commissions’ life-cycle) that the current
practice is facing. This with the goal of contributing to those debates (and
hopefully stimulate new ones) aimed at rectifying certain trends and positively
influencing future models of response. This analysis has in fact underlined
how commissions of inquiry in their modern conceptualisation have shown
the potential to incarnate a paramount, albeit preliminary, step in the inter-
national community’s response to ensure accountability in case atrocities have
been perpetrated. Such a potential (with all its ramifications) needs to be
carefully studied and debated and any attempt in this direction requires the
contribution of an array of different actors, including academics, practitioners
and institutional and political decision-makers. This author sincerely hopes
that the present dissertation will represent a fresh and positive input to




The thesis engages with a topic that still remains under-researched: the role
of international commissions of inquiry and their evolution throughout recent
history. While – given the recent proliferation of these mechanisms particularly
in relation to the investigation of serious violations of international human-
itarian and human rights norms – a number of ramifications stemming from
such trend have become the object of selective academic work, there exist only
few comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon. In this regard, the present
work engages not only in an historic overview of the evolution undertaken
by inquiry mechanisms but also examines thoroughly the main significant
consequences emerging from the current practice, including the interpretation
of the commissions’ mandates, their use and contribution to the development
of international law, their impact on the proceedings before international
criminal courts and tribunals and the shift in their role as part of the response
by the international community. In this regard, the thesis, by reaching findings
that go beyond the state-of-the-art, makes a novel contribution to academic
research.
In terms of the research question, the thesis aims to respond to the follow-
ing query:
which is the role currently acquired by modern commissions of inquiry, particular-
ly looking at the international community’s response to gross human rights
violations?
The present research has being based primarily on the review of the documents
that constitute the work, practice and follow-up to commissions of inquiry
and similar human rights investigations. It has also benefited from the consulta-
tion of articles, books, conferences and policy papers written by experts and
practitioners on the matter. While refraining to resort to the instrument of
formal interviews, the author has also conducted a round of informal
exchanges of views and consultations with former commissioners, practitioners
and experts in the field. Furthermore, the research has benefited from the
fieldwork carried out by the author in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, which represents one of the most relevant contexts to appreciate
the work and functioning of modern international commissions of inquiry.
This author has spent the last four years researching and working as legal




He has closely followed the work and developments of two international
inquiries: the 2012 UN Fact-Finding Mission on Israeli settlements and the 2014
UN Commission of Inquiry on the Gaza Conflict.
The dissertation is divided into three main chapters. The first one provides
an overview of the history of commissions of inquiry from their inclusion in
the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes to their current proliferation in relation to the investigation of serious
human rights and international humanitarian law violations. The Second
Chapter engages in an in-depth comparative thematic analysis of the main
recent experiences of international commissions of inquiry based on a number
of thematic areas including: mandate received; standard of proof implemented;
impact of cooperation/non cooperation by the parties; use and combination
of sources and evidence; use and contribution to the development of inter-
national law; contribution in ensuring accountability and the use of inter-
national criminal law. Finally, Chapter 3 provides an assessment of the impact
of inquiry mechanisms and, by highlighting a number of gaps and challenges,
it draws a number of lessons learnt that can help rectifying future trends.
In terms of findings, this research has emphasized, in relation to the evolu-
tion undertaken by commissions of inquiry, how these tools, while preserving
their original fact-finding task, have been increasingly empowered with law-
applying functions. On the one hand, such a trend has opened the discussion
concerning the use made by commissions of inquiry of the relevant legal
frameworks and their contribution to the development and consolidation of
international law. On the other hand, it has raised important questions on the
value of the legal findings of inquiry bodies particularly if compared with
the function exercised by adjudicative organs such as courts and tribunals.
This dissertation has also pointed out how the role of inquiries has signi-
ficantly shifted from their original function as preventive diplomacy tools in
the hands of states to appropriately settle their international disputes. These
mechanisms, as currently operationalized, seem also to differ from the model
envisaged in the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ framework, where fact-finding was
considered as an early-warning tool in the hands of the international commun-
ity to prevent further escalations of crises. On the contrary, the recent practice
has shown how such investigations have become at times more involved in
condemning rather than preventing, in provoking action (and often outrage)
in front of situations of protracted human rights violations rather than in de-
escalating tensions. In particular circumstances, one can even argue that
inquiries have operated as correction mechanism to the failures of the inter-
national community to react rather than as a trigger of further action. This
may indeed raise some questions concerning which kind of accountability and
enforcement inquiries can bring as an end in themselves in light of the failure
of enforcement bodies, such as the UN Security Council or the International




Hence, this study has recognised two main functions of modern inquiry
commissions as preliminary step in the international community’s response
to atrocities. One, more technical, is to influence with their findings and
analysis further determinations by local and international institutional actors,
particularly in the legal and judicial spheres. The other, more ‘activist’ and
‘political’, is to provoke further measures and actions by relevant local and
international stakeholders or to denounce a particular crises in light of the
failure of the international community to react.
The thesis has also emphasized that this evolution in the role of inter-
national inquiries has taken place without any formal institutional backing.
This has stimulated a fascinating debate among scholars on the challenges
and opportunities of such a transformation. On this point, the dissertation does
not take a particular position on whether this new model of inquiry commis-
sions is itself legitimate or whether certain institutional rubber-stamp would
be necessary. It has noted how this evolution has led to a well-established
practice that, as such, needs to be accepted and improved. What this disserta-
tion has attempted to do is to identify a number of key gaps and challenges
(mainly related to the lack of harmonization and the interplay of different
political interests in the course of the commissions’ life-cycle) that the current
practice is facing. This with the goal of contributing to those debates (and
hopefully stimulate new ones) aimed at rectifying certain trends and positively
influencing future models of response. This analysis has in fact underlined
how commissions of inquiry in their modern conceptualisation have shown
the potential to incarnate a paramount, albeit preliminary, step in the inter-
national community’s response to ensure accountability in case atrocities have
been perpetrated. Such a potential (with all its ramifications) needs to be
carefully studied and debated and any attempt in this direction requires the
contribution of an array of different actors, including academics, practitioners







DE ROL VAN MODERNE INTERNATIONALE ONDERZOEKSCOMMISSIES:
Een eerste stap naar het waarborgen van verantwoording voor schendingen van
internationaal recht?
Het proefschrift behandelt een onderwerp dat nog steeds weinig onderzocht
wordt: de rol van internationale onderzoekscommissies en hun ontwikkeling
in de loop van de recente geschiedenis. In het licht van de recente toename
van deze mechanismen, met name als gevolg van onderzoek naar ernstige
schendingen van internationale humanitaire normen en mensenrechten, is in
beperkte mate academisch onderzoek verricht naar een aantal gevolgen die
voortvloeien uit deze ontwikkeling; grondige analyses van dit fenomeen komen
echter maar sporadisch voor. In dit verband verschaft dit proefschrift niet
alleen een historisch overzicht van de ontwikkeling van onderzoeksmechanis-
men, maar onderzoekt ook diepgaand de belangrijkste gevolgen die voort-
vloeien uit de huidige praktijk, waaronder de interpretatie van de mandaten
van de commissies, hun gebruik van en bijdrage aan de ontwikkeling van
internationaal recht, de invloed van de commissies op de procedures voor
internationale strafhoven en tribunalen en de verandering van hun rol als
onderdeel van de reactie van de internationale gemeenschap. In dit opzicht
verstrekt dit proefschrift een nieuwe bijdrage aan het academische onderzoek,
doordat er conclusies worden getrokken die verder strekken dan de huidige
stand van de wetenschap.
Dit proefschrift heeft tot doel de volgende onderzoeksvraag te beantwoor-
den:
wat is de rol die hedendaagse onderzoekscommissies inmiddels verworven hebben,
in het bijzonder ten aanzien van de reactie van de internationale gemeenschap
op grove schendingen van mensenrechten?
Dit onderzoek is hoofdzakelijk gebaseerd op de beoordeling van documenten
met betrekking tot het werk, de praktijk en de follow-up van onderzoekscom-
missies en soortgelijke onderzoeken met betrekking tot mensenrechten. Tevens
zijn artikelen, boeken en conferentie- en beleidsdocumenten geraadpleegd die
door deskundigen en beoefenaars over dit onderwerp zijn geschreven. Hoewel
geen officiële interviews gehouden zijn, heeft de auteur wel een aantal infor-
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mele gedachtewisselingen en beraadslagingen gehad met voormalige commis-
sieleden, professionals en deskundigen in dit vakgebied. Daarnaast is door
de auteur veldwerk uitgevoerd in Israël en het bezette Palestijnse gebied: één
van de meest relevante contexten voor evaluatie van het werk en het functio-
neren van moderne internationale onderzoekscommissies. De auteur heeft de
afgelopen vier jaar onderzoek verricht en gewerkt als juridisch adviseur voor
lokale en internationale niet-gouvernementele organisaties die gevestigd zijn
in het bezette Palestijnse gebied. Hij heeft nauwlettend het werk en de ont-
wikkelingen van twee internationale onderzoeken gevolgd, namelijk de VN-
onderzoeksmissie van 2012 inzake Israëlische nederzettingen en de VN-onder-
zoekscommissie van 2014 inzake het conflict in de Gazastrook.
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit drie hoofdstukken. Het eerste hoofdstuk geeft
een overzicht van de geschiedenis van de onderzoekscommissies vanaf hun
opname in het Verdrag voor de vreedzame beslechting van internationale
geschillen van 1899 en van 1907 tot de huidige toename van de onderzoeks-
commissies als gevolg van onderzoek naar ernstige schendingen van mensen-
rechten en internationaal humanitair recht. Het tweede hoofdstuk bestaat uit
een diepgaande, vergelijkende analyse van de belangrijkste recente ervaringen
van internationale onderzoekscommissies aan de hand van een aantal thema’s,
waaronder: ontvangen mandaat, toegepaste bewijslast, effect van samenwer-
king/niet-samenwerking door partijen, toepassing en combinatie van bronnen
en bewijsmateriaal, toepassing van en bijdrage aan de ontwikkeling van
internationaal recht, bijdrage aan het waarborgen van verantwoording en
toepassing van internationaal strafrecht. Tot slot wordt in hoofdstuk III een
analyse gegeven van de impact van de onderzoeksmechanismen en wordt
door middel van het aanstippen van enkele leemtes en uitdagingen een aantal
lessen getrokken die kunnen bijdragen aan het rechtzetten van toekomstige
ontwikkelingen.
Voor wat betreft de conclusies heeft dit onderzoek met betrekking tot de
ontwikkeling die ontwikkelingscommissies hebben doorgemaakt, benadrukt
hoe deze instrumenten, met behoud van hun oorspronkelijke taak van waar-
heidsvinding, steeds meer functies met betrekking tot rechtshandhaving hebben
gekregen. Enerzijds heeft deze ontwikkeling de discussie in gang gezet over
de toepassing door onderzoekscommissies van de relevante juridische kaders
en hun bijdrage aan de ontwikkeling en consolidatie van het internationaal
recht. Anderzijds zijn hierdoor belangrijke vragen opgeworpen over de waarde
van de juridische bevindingen van onderzoeksorganen, in het bijzonder in
vergelijking met de functie die wordt uitgeoefend door berechtingsorganen
zoals rechtbanken en tribunalen.
In dit proefschrift wordt ook duidelijk gemaakt hoe de rol van onderzoeken
aanzienlijk verschoven is ten opzichte van de oorspronkelijke functie van
preventief diplomatiek instrument waarmee staten hun internationale geschillen
op passende wijze beslechten. In hun huidige toepassing lijken deze mechanis-
men ook te verschillen van het model zoals voorzien in het ‘Responsibility
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to Protect’-kader, waarin onderzoek beschouwd werd als vroegtijdig waarschu-
wingsinstrument van de internationale gemeenschap ter voorkoming van
verdere escalaties van crises. De recente praktijk laat echter zien dat dergelijke
onderzoeken soms meer de tendens hebben om te veroordelen in plaats van
te voorkomen, of actie (en vaak verontwaardiging) uit te lokken ten aanzien
van langdurige schendingen van mensenrechten in plaats van spanningen te
de-escaleren. Onder bepaalde omstandigheden zou men zelfs kunnen conclu-
deren dat onderzoeken meer hebben gefunctioneerd als correctiemiddel voor
het falen van de internationale gemeenschap dan als stimulans tot verdere
actie. Dit kan zelfs een aantal vragen oproepen over het soort verantwoording
en handhaving dat onderzoekscommissies kunnen verschaffen als doel op zich,
gezien het achterwege blijven van optreden door handhavingsinstanties zoals
de VN-Veiligheidsraad of het Internationaal Strafhof.
Daarom zijn er in dit onderzoek twee hoofdtaken van onderzoekscommis-
sies vastgesteld als voorbereidende stap voor het reageren door de internatio-
nale gemeenschap op gruweldaden. De eerste, meer technische taak betreft
het beïnvloeden, door middel van toepassing van de bevindingen en analyses
van onderzoekscommissies, van nadere besluiten door lokale en internationale
institutionele actoren, in het bijzonder op juridisch en gerechtelijk terrein. De
tweede taak is meer activistisch en politiek van aard en betreft het uitlokken
van nadere maatregelen en acties van relevante lokale en internationale belang-
hebbenden en het veroordelen van een specifieke crisis in het licht van het
uitblijven van een reactie van de internationale gemeenschap.
Het proefschrift benadrukt tevens dat deze ontwikkeling van de rol van
internationale onderzoeken zich heeft voltrokken zonder enige formele institu-
tionele steun. Dit heeft een fascinerend debat onder geleerden op gang gebracht
over de uitdagingen en kansen van een dergelijke transformatie. Op dit punt
neemt het proefschrift geen specifiek standpunt in ten aanzien van de vraag
of het nieuwe model voor onderzoekscommissies op zichzelf legitiem is of
dat er een bepaalde mate van institutionele goedkeuring benodigd is. Er wordt
op gewezen hoe deze ontwikkeling heeft geleid tot een gevestigde praktijk,
die als zodanig moet worden aanvaard en verbeterd. In dit proefschrift is
geprobeerd een aantal belangrijke leemtes en uitdagingen vast te stellen
(hoofdzakelijk gerelateerd aan het gebrek aan harmonisatie en de wissel-
werking tussen verschillende politieke belangen tijdens de levenscyclus van
de commissies) waarmee de huidige praktijk zich geconfronteerd ziet. Het
doel hiervan is om bij te dragen aan de discussies (en hopelijk nieuwe te
stimuleren) die gericht zijn op het corrigeren van bepaalde ontwikkelingen
en het positief stimuleren van toekomstige reactiemodellen. Deze analyse heeft
onderstreept hoe onderzoekscommissies in hun hedendaagse uitvoering het
potentieel aangetoond hebben tot het gestalte geven aan een ??belangrijke,
zij het eerste stap in de reactie van de internationale gemeenschap ter waarbor-
ging van verantwoording in het geval van gruweldaden. Een dergelijk poten-
tieel (met alle bijkomende gevolgen) dient zorgvuldig te worden bestudeerd
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en besproken; voor elke poging in deze richting is bovendien de bijdrage
benodigd van een reeks verschillende actoren, waaronder academici, pro-
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